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The historiography of Buddhism 佛教史學) in modern China develops under the 
influence of modernity and amidst dramatic transformations in the Chinese 
intellectual world. It combines the philological tradition of Evidential Learning with 
foreign intellectual trends in history, philosophy, and linguistics, and develops 
syncretistic methodologies of data collection, textual criticism, chronological 
arrangement, and historiographical interpretation. As one pivotal part of the so 
called “Buddhist revival,” this research branch demonstrates the formation of 
modern Buddhist knowledge and introduced religious concerns into Chinese 
academia. It plays a cardinal role in the re-invention of Chinese Buddhist tradition, as 
well as the establishment of ‘Chinese Buddhism’.  
Most leading scholars of the modern period contributed to this field, including 
historians such as Liang Qichao, Hu Shi, Chen Yinke, Tang Yongtong, Chen Yuan; and 
scholarly monks and Lay Buddhists such as Taixu, Yinshun, Lü Cheng, and so on. Due 
to their different motivations and viewpoints, the writing of Buddhist history quickly 
grew in diversity and complexity, triggering debates, controversies, and discussions. 
Practices and phenomena related to this new research area not only reflect the 
general interdisciplinary character of the historiography of Buddhism as a border 
field but also show how it was constrained by specific contextual factors and two 
ontological concerns: what is ‘Chinese Buddhism’ and what is ‘China’. Investigating 
how these two concerns were addressed by modern Chinese intellectuals will deepen 
our knowledge of the history of historiography in modern China and contribute to a 
more thorough understanding of how the field of religion has changed as well as how 
modern Chinese intellectuals in their studies of religion and history have tried to re-
understand themselves, China and the world. 
Recently, the changes of Buddhism in China since the 1890s has been 
investigated by current scholarship. However, because of the current dominant 
discourse of secular modernity in historiography, as well as the prevailed research 
paradigm of “religion-state” in religious studies, issues like the modernization of 
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Buddhist knowledge and the tension between faith and truth in the writings of the 
history of Buddhism remain unresearched. To examine the influence of 
historiography on modern Buddhist studies and the fundamental mechanism of the 
formation of Buddhism as new knowledge regime, my study focuses on the modern 
discourses of this religious tradition, with particular emphasis on the 
historiographical transition of Buddhist studies from the 1900s to the 1960s. By 
comparing different scholars with different backgrounds in faith and varying 
conceptual approaches, I investigate the general background of the historiography in 
modern China as well as several specific topics, including the construction of the 
general history of Chinese Buddhism, the authenticity of Buddhist textual tradition, 
the narrative of Buddhist sinicization, etc.  
Using the methodology of academic history and discourse analysis, my study 
shed light on the genealogy of modern Chinese historiography of Buddhism. The 
emerging academic interest in writing the history of Buddhism engaged with the 
changing scholarly and religious situation in modern China. Historians and Buddhist 
organized, criticized, and interpretated the past of Buddhism through hermeneutic 
readings of Buddhist texts and through critically utilizing new theories. Their 
attempts of historizing Buddhism further led to the formation of a ‘secularized’ 
understanding of Buddhism. In this process, ‘Chinese Buddhism’ was constructed 
terminologically and discursively. The historiography of Buddhism reflects the 
relocation of Buddhism in the modernized constellation of Chinese traditions and the 
attempts of reshaping Buddhism as an alternative to Confucianism to be a national 
cultural identity. This textual-historiographical path (文史路徑), which has 
developed different research perspectives, became the dominant paradigm of 
modern Chinese religious scholarship. It influenced the defining of Buddhism as a 
‘religion’ (discursively in parallel to science, and superstition) and participated in the 
multifaceted process of modernization. 
 






Die historiografischen Arbeiten über den Buddhismus im modernen China (佛教史
學) entstanden unter dem Einfluss der Moderne und den damit zusammenhängenden 
dramatischen Transformationsprozessen in der intellektuellen Landschaft in China. 
In der Historiografie des Buddhismus kamen Einflüsse von der philologisch geprägten 
textkritischen Tradition mit westlichen akademischen Strömungen aus der 
Geschichtswissenschaft, der Philosophie und der Linguistik zusammen und es wurden 
damit sowohl neue synkretistische Methoden der Datenerhebung und Textkritik als 
auch der chronologischen Zusammenstellung und historischen Deutung gewonnen.    
 Als ein zentraler Teil des sogenannten „Wiederauflebens des Buddhismus,” 
zeigt diese Forschungsrichtung auf, wie das Wissen um den Buddhismus in der 
Moderne aufgebaut ist und führt auch religiöse Ansätze in den akademischen Diskurs 
in China ein. Die Historiografie des Buddhismus spielt eine tragende Rolle in der 
Neuerfindung der chinesischen buddhistischen Tradition und der Bildung eines 
„chinesischen Buddhismus.” Die meisten der führenden Intellektuellen in der 
modernen Epoche haben ihren Beitrag in diesem Forschungsfeld geleistet, darunter 
Historiker wie Liang Qichao, Hu Shih, Chen Yangtong und Chen Yuan, wie auch 
gelehrte Mönche und Laienbuddhisten wie Taixu, Yinshun, Lü Cheng und andere. 
Aufgrund der unterschiedlichen Motivationen und Standpunkte der Gelehrten, 
wuchs die Geschichtsschreibung über den Buddhismus in Komplexität und Diversität 
rasch an und entfachte Debatten und Kontroversen. Die unterschiedlichen Debatten, 
die in diesem neuen Forschungsfeld der Geschichtsschreibung über den Buddhismus 
geführt werden, deuten nicht nur auf dessen allgemeine interdisziplinäre 
Ausrichtung hin, sondern zeigen auch auf, wie dieses Forschungsfeld durch den 
spezifischen Kontext und zwei (definitorische) Fragen bestimmt und damit auch 
begrenzt wurden, nämlich: was bedeutet “Chinesischer Buddhismus” und was heißt 
„China“ in diesem Kontext. In meiner Arbeit untersuche ich, wie diese zwei Fragen 
von den modernen chinesischen Intellektuellen (unterschiedliche) beantwortet 
wurden, was uns neue Erkenntnisse über die Geschichte der Historiografie in China 
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und ein tieferes Verständnis für den Wandel des Diskurses der Religion ermöglicht. Es 
gibt uns ebenfalls Aufschluss darüber, wie die chinesischen Intellektuellen der 
Moderne in ihren religionswissenschaftlichen und historischen Arbeiten sich selbst, 
China und die Welt neu verstanden haben.   
 Aufgrund der Dominanz, welche der Diskurs der Säkularisierten Moderne in 
dem Bereich der Geschichtsschreibung eingenommen hatte, und durch die 
bedeutende Stellung des Forschungsparadigmas „religion- state,” wurde die 
Historiografie des Buddhismus im modernen China sowohl in der 
Geschichtswissenschaft als auch in der Religionswissenschaft weitgehend 
vernachlässigt. Themen wie die Modernisierung des buddhistischen Wissens und die 
Spannung zwischen Glauben und Wahrheit in den Schriften der buddhistischen 
Geschichte sind in der Forschung noch nicht angemessen angegangen worden. Um 
den Einfluss der Geschichtsschreibung auf die moderne Gelehrsamkeit des 
Buddhismus und die Mechanismen hinter der Bildung des Buddhismus als ein neues 
Wissenssystem besser zu verstehen, wird in der vorliegenden Arbeit der Blickpunkt 
auf den Diskurs über die religiöse Tradition gelegt, und zwar unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung des historiografischen Übergangs der Gelehrsamkeit über den 
Buddhismus in dem Zeitraum von 1900 bis in die 1960er Jahren. Durch einen 
Vergleich von Gelehrten unterschiedlichem Hintergrund in ihren 
Glaubensrichtungen und ihrem konzeptionellen Vorgehen, werde ich den 
allgemeinen Kontext der Geschichtsschreibung des modernen China zu ergründen 
suchen und auch auf mehrere stärker spezifische Themen wie die der Konstruktion 
einer allgemeinen Geschichte des chinesischen Buddhismus, der Authentizität der 
buddhistischen Texttradition und der Erzählung einer Sinisierung des Buddhismus 
näher eingehen und beleuchten.     
Anhand der Methodologie der Diskursanalyse und der akademischen 
Geschichtsschreibung werden in dieser Arbeit die Genealogie der modernen 
chinesischen Geschichtsschreibung über den Buddhismus aufgezeigt. Das 
herausbildende akademische Interesse, die Geschichte des Buddhismus zu schreiben, 
bezieht sich auf die sich wandelnden Situation der Gelehrsamkeit und Religiosität im 
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modernen China. Historiker und buddhistische Gelehrte organisierten, kritisierten 
und interpretierten die Vergangenheit des Buddhismus durch hermeneutische Lesart 
der buddhistischen Schriften und durch die kritische Nutzung neuer Theorien. Ihre 
Versuche, den Buddhismus zu historisieren, erzeugt ein säkularisiertes Verständnis 
des Buddhismus. In diesem Prozess wurde der “Chinesische 
Buddhismus“ terminologisch und historiografisch konstruiert. Die 
Geschichtsschreibung des Buddhismus vorführt, wie der Buddhismus in die moderne 
Vorstellung von chinesischer Tradition integriert oder als eine Alternative zum 
Konfuzianismus als eine nationale-kulturelle Identität Chinas, gezeichnet wurde. 
Dieser textuell-historiographische Weg (文史路徑), der verschiedene 
Forschungsperspektiven entwickelt hat, wurde zum dominanten Paradigma der 
modernen chinesischen Religionswissenschaft. Dieser Weg beeinflusste die Definition 
des Buddhismus in Abgrenzung zur Wissenschaft und Aberglauben als eine 
„Religion“ und nahm an den facettenreichen Prozess der Modernisierung teil.   
 







This dissertation is the result of the confluence of various yinyuan 因緣. In the 
process of conceiving and executing it, I have benefited from the support and 
inspiration of numerous individuals. My gratitude goes first to my advisor, Prof. Axel 
Schneider, for his stalwart support, critical eye, and generous enthusiasm. His 
intellectual influence helped shape the essential questions behind this research. I am 
also grateful to my second supervisor, Prof. John Kieschnick, for his astute comments 
and his wise guidance.  
 I have also gained important information, insights, and opportunities from 
scholars in Taiwan and mainland China. In particular, Prof. Li Yu-chen at the National 
Chen-chi University gave me the benefit of her long experience as a historian and as a 
female scholar. I also owe a debt of thank to Prof. Teng Wei-jen at the Dharma Drum 
Institute of Liberal Arts, for his generosity, resourcefulness, and his impeccable 
ability of host.  
Many scholars have read, discussed, and steered this dissertation. They 
include Julia Schneider, Katja Triplett, Wang Fan-sen, Chen Huaiyu, Chen Jinhua, 
Pung Mingfei, Ge Zhaoguang, Chi Chih-Chang, Tsai Jung-Ting, Lin Pei-ying, Huang Yi-
hsun, Xue Yu and the participants of the meetings and seminars I attended.  
Grants from the Committee on Scholarly Communication with China funded 
the research of this dissertation, fellowships from the Sheng-yen Foundation and the 
GSGG enabled my several stays in China and Taiwan.  
My thanks also to my friends and peers, for the nice conversations we had and 
our numerous coffee-gatherings. I would like particularly to thank Felix Ernst and 
Pan Xuan, who help me with the German translation; and Chiu Tzu-lun, for sharing 
with me her experience, joy, and effort.   
Lastly, my heartfelt gratitude flows to my family, for their patience, support, 





YBSHJ         Yinbing shi heji 飲冰室合集 [Collected works of the Ice Drinking Studio]  
SBP               Foxue yanjiu shiba pian 佛學研究十八篇  
JMCB           Jinmingguan conggao chubian 金明館叢稿初編 [First volume of the Jinmingguan 
Drafts].  
JMEB          Jinmingguan conggao chubian 金明館叢稿二編 [Second volume of the Jinmingguan 
Drafts]  
HLTJ           Hanliu tangji 寒柳堂集 [Collected works from the Cold Willow Hall]  
Hanwei       Hanwei liangjin nanbeichao fojiao shi  漢魏兩晉南北朝佛教史 [History of Buddhism 
in Han, Wei, Jin and Southern and Northern Dynasties] 
Suitang         Sui Tang fojiao shigao 隋唐佛教史稿 [Draft of Sui and Tang Buddhist History] 
TYQJ           Tang Yongtong Quanji 湯用彤全集 [Complete Works of Tang Yongtong] 
HSWJ           Hu Shih Wenji 胡適文集 [Collected Works of Hu Shih] 
LFLX             Lü Cheng Foxue lunzhu xuanji 呂澂佛學論著選集 [A Selective Collection of the 
Published Works of Lü Cheng on Buddhism] 
TXQS           Taixu Dashi quanshu 太虛大師全書 [Complete Works of Master Taixu]  
CYQJ             Chen Yuan quanji 陳垣全集 [Complete Works of Chen Yuan] 
MFQ          Mingguo fojiao qikan wenxian jicheng 民國佛教期刊文獻集成 [Collection of 
Republican-Era Buddhist Periodical Literature] 
MFQB        Mingguo fojiao qikan wenxian jicheng bubian 民國佛教期刊文獻集成補編 [Supplement 
to the Collection of Republican-Era Buddhist Periodical Literature] 






Chinese terms and names are transliterated according to the hanyu pinyin system, 
except in cases where alternate renderings are more commonly used (e.g. Hu Shih, 
Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek), or when official names of existing organizations and 
places employ another romanization (Taipei, Peking.)  
Traditional Chinese characters will be used in all cases, even when the original 
source was written in simplified characters. 
Single quotation marks enclose terms used under consideration, to bring 
attention to the fact that they may not have the meaning commonly ascribed to them 
or they require emphasis in the context. Double quotation marks are used for direct 
quotations from sources. Original texts of translated sentences are provided where 







—— 詩經 Shijing, “Zhengfeng·Fengyu鄭風·風雨”  
江山重複爭供眼，風雨縱橫亂入樓。	
	—— Lu You 陸游, “Nanding Lou yu jiyu南定樓遇急雨”1 
 
 
A few steps from Xuanwu Lake 玄武湖, in the heart of Nanjing, one comes upon the 
old Jiming Temple 雞鳴寺, small and elegant, shrouded by the cherry blossoms every 
spring. At the northeastern corner of the temple stands a charming building of three 
storeys, the Huomeng Lou 豁蒙樓. In 1904, Zhang Zhidong 張之洞 (1837-1909), the 
Viceroy of Liangjiang 兩江, donated to the temple to transform the old chanting hall 
into a building for sightseeing and literati assembly. He named it after a marvelous 
phrase from Du Fu’s poem—“when sorrow comes, the perplexity in one’s mind is 
dispelled” [youlai huo mengbi 憂來豁蒙蔽]—in memory of his student, Yang Rui 楊銳 
(1855-1898), one of the six young men who had been executed by the Qing court after 
the failure of the Hundred Days Reform.  
 With Zhang Zhidong’s portrait hanging in the main chamber and Liang 
Qichao’s 梁啟超 (1873-1929) handwriting on the gateposts, this corner, although 
hidden deep in the temple, lost its religiosity and ritual function while it was 
secularized and culturized as a historical landmark. Literati2 like Huang Kan 黃侃 
 
1 This phrase from the poem “Nandingkou yu jiyu” [Encountered with torrential rain in Nanding Lou] 
written by the famous Song poet Lu You, was what Liang transcribed on the gateposts of Huomeng lou, 
as mentioned below.  
2 In this dissertation, ‘literati,’ ‘gentry,’ and ‘elite’ are utilized differently. By ‘gentry’ [xiangshen 鄉紳] I 
mean a class that owned its property, was educated, and had a direct link with local, especially rural, 
culture. By ‘literati,’ I mean a group of elites who were well-educated and had a reputation for 
literature and scholarship but were not employed in the central bureaucracy. ‘Elite’ is more general; it 
has different sub-categories, for example, political elites, intellectual elites, and religious elites. See 
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(1886-1935) and Chen Sanli 陳三立 (1853 -1937)3; historians, from Liu Yizheng 柳詒徵 
(1880-1956) and Hu Shih 胡適 (1891-1962) to Guo Moruo 郭沫若 (1892-1978);  
religious elites, from Taixu 太虛 (1890-1947) and Lü Cheng 呂澂 (1896-1989) to Zhao 
Puchu 趙樸初 (1907-2000); and politicians, such as Cao Jingyuan 曹經沅 (1891-1946) 
and Wang Jingwei 汪精衛 (1883-1944), all visited this place, viewing the majestic 
scenery of Xuanwu Lake and the relic of the Taicheng 台城 and writing poems to 
express their nostalgia and emotions. Nowadays, serving as a tea house, this 
renovated building is typically crowded with pilgrims and tourists and is slightly 
contaminated with something of a commercial touch. The turbulence it witnessed in 
history has been forgotten; the implication of its name, ‘enlightenment,’ is also 
seldom mentioned. However, this building still silently recalls the vicissitude of 
Chinese society and the transformation of the Chinese religious landscape.  
 One hundred years ago, when Liang Qichao visited this holy place in 1922, 
China was still in the midst of a storm, as he lamented through Lu You’s poem. This 
was Liang’s first visit to Nanjing, while at that time he had more or less escaped from 
the political vortex. After witnessing the dramatic transformations in modern China, 
Buddhism appealed to him once again. He understood that China was still in turmoil 
and that there was no relief for people’s suffering. The ideal pictured by the Western 
theories that had once given him hope was basically also an illusion. Under such 
circumstances, he felt that the claimed universal tenets, whether imported from the 
West or based on China’s past experience, could not solve the problems China was 
encountering. What was more important, now he understood, was the particularity of 
China and the free will of each Chinese person. To him, the awakening of the 
individual could eventually become a collective enlightenment and later save the 
country. 
 
Ping-Ti Ho, The Ladder of Success in Imperial China: Aspects of Social Mobility, 1368–1911 (New York, London: 
Columbia University Press, 1962), 37-41. 
3 Chen Sanli was Chen Yinke’s 陳寅恪 father. He was the leading figure of the Late Qing literati. After 
the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, he is said to have committed suicide by starvation in protest of the 
Japanese invasion.   
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This thinking about faith differed from Liang’s earlier instrumental 
understanding of religion, but was closely related to his reading of Buddhism in his 
youth. After his failure in the Metropolitan Examination in Peking in 1895, he 
experienced a series of setbacks in both his personal career and political project. 
Perhaps it was due to the agony of the aborted revolution that Liang came into deep 
contact with Buddhism. When he was in Shanghai, he spent days with his friends, 
such as Tan Sitong 譚嗣同, Song Shu 宋恕, Wu Yanzhou 吳雁舟, and so on, reciting 
sūtras, discussing the relationship between Buddhism and science, and meditating.4 
In one letter he sent to his friend Xia Suiqing 夏穗卿, he wrote, “even in an age that 
had been abandoned by the Buddha, peace and tranquility will finally arrive if people 
keep the Buddhist precepts strictly.”5 As he indicated here, Buddhism might be able 
to play its role in a time of turmoil and transition if it could bring people together 
through the power of faith. He expressed this view more clearly in an essay he 
dedicated to his mentor, Kang Youwei 康有為. In this essay, Liang reflected on his 
past failures and his own shortcomings in scholarship: “I think my knowledge is still 
limited,” he wrote, “[therefore] I am recently studying history and reading ‘Inner 
Classics 內典’ (Buddhist texts). I seem to be making progress and realize that our faith 
吾教, the teaching of ‘Great Harmony’ [datong 大同], is only something that the 
Buddha disdained to talk about.” Liang then further persuaded Kang to assist the 
salvation of the world [jiushi 救世] by becoming a “missionary [chuanjiao 傳教],” as 
the Buddha did. He said: “Our mission is rather preaching our faith than managing 
state affairs, is rather saving the world and all sentient beings than saving one 
country.”6 Due to such a religious enthusiasm for saving the world, Liang Qichao’s 
reflections on the fate of China often returned to faith, a spiritual force that seemed 
to him both rooted in the past and echoing the present. He had noticed that the 
religious landscape and intellectual climate of China were altering dramatically; the 
 
4  Sun Baoxuan 孫寶瑄 , Riyi zhai riji 日益齋日記, excerpted from Ding Wenjiang 丁文江, Liang Qichao 
nianpu changbian 梁啟超年譜長編 (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2009). 
5  Liang Qichao , “Yu Suifo shangzuo shu 與碎佛上座書,” ibid.  
6 Zhongguo shixuehui 中國史學會, Zhongguo jindaishi ziliao congkan ·Wuxu bianfa 中國近代史資料叢刊·
戊戌變法, vol.2 (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2000), 544. 
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existing faith of the Chinese was challenged both by modern values and principles 
from the world outside and by the innate tension within tradition itself. For the sake 
of explaining and legitimatizing all the changes he observed, he ranged widely, often 
in a comparative manner, over ancient and modern Chinese and Western thought. In 
the Chinese field, although his first concern was Confucianism, he made a broad and 
generally sympathetic study of other traditions, in particular Buddhism.7 In the book 
On the Major Trends of the Changes in Chinese Scholarship and Thought [Lun Zhongguo 
xueshu sixiang bianqian zhi dashi 論中國學術思想變遷之大勢, below: Dashi], published 
in 1902, Liang for the first time incorporated Buddhism into the national history of 
China, locating this external tradition within the constellation of Chinese culture 
through historiography.8 By doing so, he framed his reading of Buddhism into his 
revolution in scholarship and thus pioneered the study of the historiography of 
Buddhism.  
After Liang Qichao, more and more professional and Buddhist historians 
began to describe and interpret Buddhism from a historiographical angle. Their paths 
and perspectives triggered a profound shift in the modernization of the knowledge of 
Buddhism—the ‘historiographical turn’ of Buddhology in modern China. This 
research trend closely related to religious commitments, historical reflections, 
modern impacts, and political concerns. Beginning at the turn of the century, the 
impact of modernity9 profoundly changed people’s understanding of history and 
religion: history was in search of new meanings and paradigms; religion, at the same 
time, was controlling or modifying its representations and resources to fit into the 
modern category of ‘religion.’ Witnessing and involved in such transformations, a 
new generation of historians and religious scholars began to re-establish the 
 
7 Liang Qichao, “Kang Nanhai xiansheng zhuan 康南海先生傳,” YBSHJ, Wenji, vol.3, 67-70. 
8 For details, see later chapters. In this dissertation, I considered this work by Liang as the first study of 
the history of Buddhism from a modern historiographical perspective.  
9 The term ‘modernity,’ as I use it in this dissertation, differs slightly from ‘modernization.’ 
Modernization focuses on material and social changes, such as urbanisation, industrialization, 
technological innovations, modern medicine, mass media, the decline of social hierarchy, and the 
increasing commodification of goods and human labour. Modernity refers to discourses and concepts, 
for example, science, evolution, progress, and so on. 
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legitimacy of religion through the discourse and methodology of historiography, 
describing religion as tradition and reflecting on its origin and composition, and 
further contemplating the premise of modernity as well as the interplay between 
civilizations through the example of religion. In this process, religion became part of 
national history, and history constructed new knowledge of religion.  
The historiography of Buddhism, under this mechanism, not only 
intellectualized Buddhism through academic discourses, demarcating it from 
superstition, but also defined Buddhism in China’s past based on the experience of 
Sinicization. These two dimensions echo the core issues of the transformation of 
Buddhism in modern China—namely, first, Buddhism, as a ‘world religion,’  
underwent a process of modernization, not only on the doctrinal and institutional 
levels but also on a discursive level, in order to resist the onslaught of science and to 
reconcile itself with the material world; secondly, it was also legitimized by history—
through the narratives of Sinicization—as a ‘Chinese’ tradition that could help to 
support the newly established national identity of China. The historiography of 
Buddhism, therefore, eventually formed a ‘historized Buddhism’ that functioned both 
as the standard of the ‘truth’ of Buddhism and as the discursive basis of ‘Chinese 
Buddhism.’   
How did the historiography of Buddhism emerge in the early twentieth 
century? How did it change the knowledge about Buddhism and further lead to the 
formation of ‘Chinese Buddhism’? These questions configure the broad framework of 
my research, insinuating themselves into my discussion of various individual cases. 
All these cases, which I wish to elaborate through comparative description, entwine 
to form a complicated, multifaceted field in which individuals with varying identities 
and habitus participate in debates and conversations on issues relevant to the past, 
present, and future of Buddhism and China. 
  
Buddhist Revival  
 6 
 
In the Late Qing dynasty, dramatic changes were in their embryonic stage. An intense 
pessimism prevailed throughout the whole Chinese nation, including among 
intellectuals and Buddhist elites. “The Buddhist chanting in the Mountain Fish had 
stopped, and the lion petal of the Buddha was covered by dust,” as the eminent Monk 
Jichan 寄禪 (also known as Bazhi Toutuo 八指頭陀, 1852-1912) described rhetorically 
in his poem on the desperate situation he observed.10 Jichan, however, was not the 
only one who had great anxiety about the future of Chinese Buddhism and was 
worried about the arriving age of ‘declining Dharma.’ Although there was a brief 
Buddhist revival among the literati during the late Ming period, generally the 
scenario at the dawn of the modern age was alarming: Buddhism had gradually 
“fallen into quietude, neither showing knowledge of doctrine nor striving to 
accumulate it.”11  Indeed, some members of the Qing royal family were devout 
Buddhists;12 the Qing emperors, in contrast, continually issued edicts to “make severe 
 
10 The original sentence is “魚山輟梵, 獅座蒙塵,” in Bazhi toutuo shiwenji 八指頭陀詩文集 (Changsha: 
Yuelu shushe, 1984), 471.   
11  In Japan, the academic discourse on the decadence of early modern Buddhist clergy is usually 
referred to as kinsei bukkyō darakuron 近世仏教堕落論 and variants thereof. Tsuji asserted the “so-
called Theory of Buddhist Decadence in the Edo Period [kinsei bukkyō darakuron]” (1979, 224–25). 
Expressions such as the “historical view of decadent Edo Buddhism” [Kinsei bukkyō daraku shikan 近世
仏教墮落史観], “the pejorative historical view of Edo Buddhism” [Kinsei bukkyō keishi no shikan 近世仏
教軽視の史観], or “historical view of Buddhist decline” [Bukkyō suitai no shikan 仏教衰退の史観] are 
also used by some authors. For more on this issue, see Orion Klautau, “近世仏教堕落論の近代的形
成	:	記憶と忘却の明治仏教をめぐる一考察,” Journal of Religious Studies 81, no. 3 (2007): 581-601; 
Orion Klautau, “Against the Ghosts of Recent Past: Meiji Scholarship and the Discourse on Edo-Period 
Buddhist Decadence,” Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 35, no. 2 (2008): 263-303.  
12 Officially, the Manchu Qing dynasty valued the Buddhism of Mongolia and Tibet instead of Han 
Chinese Buddhism. For the relationship between the Qing Court and Tibetan Buddhism, see Zhang 
Yuxin 張羽新, Qing zhengfu yu Lama jiao 清政府與喇嘛教 (Lhasa: Xizang renmin chubanshe, 1988); 
Miaozhou 妙舟, Meng Zang Fojiao shi 蒙藏佛教史(Yangzhou: Jiangsu guangling guji keyinshe, 1997). 
Also, Yumiko Ishihama 石濱裕美子, Shinchō to Chibetto Bukkyō: bosatsuō to natta Kenryūtei 清朝とチベッ
ト仏教:菩薩王となった乾隆帝 (Tokyo: Waseda University Press, 2013); Johan Elverskog, Our Great 
Qing: The Mongols, Buddhism, And the State in Late Imperial China (Hololulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 
2006), chapter 4. 
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regulation, so that [Buddhism] will not spread widely.”13 In many regions, Buddhism 
continued to be practiced and retained its role in rituals and in people’s daily lives, 
but the number of monasteries and the clergy population had dramatically shrunk;14 
studies of Buddhist doctrines, although ongoing, remained a minor trend in 
scholarship. The space for Buddhism was extremely compressed, while suffering 
caused by foreign invasion and internal socio-political turmoil became more and 
more overwhelming.  
In this deepening gloom, however, a glimmer of hope of Buddhist ‘revival’ 
sparkled. As the example of Huomeng Lou shows, Buddhist apologists began to build up 
new links with secular realms, seeking further participation in socio-political 
transformation and academic activities. Significantly, Liang connected Buddhism 
with the modern Chinese intelligentsia, who tried to promote the ‘New Learning’ 
[xinxue新學] (Here Liang used ‘the study of Buddhism’ [foxue 佛學], instead of 
‘Buddhism as religion’ [fojiao 佛教]). Buddhism, again, as Liang suggested here, 
engaged in the intellectual turn of the Chinese, constructing itself in accordance with 
the call of the age and re-interpreting itself with new discourses, just as it had coped 
two millennia before. 
Liang’s opinion directed later scholars to the prevailing, if not dominant, 
pattern of narrative, namely, a structure of ‘decline-revival;’ meanwhile, since Liang 
traced this revival back to Gong Zizhen 龔自珍 (1792-1841) and Wei Yuan 魏源 (1794-
1857), it has been widely accepted that Gong and Wei were the key figures who led to 
widespread attention to Buddhism, for they encouraged people to use Buddhism 
against the shackles of Confucianism.15 However, as some scholars rightly have 
 
13 “嚴其禁約,勿使滋蔓,” in Qing Kangxi Huidian [清康熙會典], vol. 71: Buddhist and Daoist Monks; cf. 
Zenryū Tsukamoto 塚本善隆, Chūgoku kinseibukkyōshi no shomondai 中国近世仏教史の諸問題, 
Tsukamoto Zenryū chosakushū 塚本善隆著作集, vol.5 (Tokyo: Daitō shuppansha, 1975). 
14 The Qing Court had placed restrictions on temple construction. See Yu Benyuan 于本源, Qing 
wangchao de zongjiao zhengce 清王朝的宗教政策 (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe,1999). 
For the activity of building temples, see Wolfram Eberhard, “Temple-Building Activities In Medieval 
And Modern China: An Experimental Study,” Monumenta Serica 23 (1964): 264-318. 
15 For example, Guo Peng put Gong and Wei at the beginning of his second volume, indicating their role 
as forerunners. See Guo Peng 郭朋, Zhongguo jindai foxue sixiang shigao 中國近代佛學思想史稿 
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pointed out, it was due to their rebelliousness as heretics rather than their 
contributions to Buddhist scholarship that Gong and Wei were admired.16 More 
scholars from the field of religious studies, following Holmes Welch, have tended to 
consider Yang Wenhui 楊文會 (1837-1911) as the ‘father of modern Chinese 
Buddhism,’17 not merely because of his endeavor to spread Dharma through 
distributing the Buddhist canon and promoting new-style education for laity and 
clergy, but, more generally, because of his concept of an ‘institutionalized’ religion 
that granted Yang several remarkable attributes of ‘modern-ness.’18  
In both cases, the thesis of ‘revival’ seems to have been accepted without 
doubt. This revival has been perceived as a natural outcome of ‘decline’ and ‘crisis.’ 
According to this narrative, the intellectual elite in the early twentieth century China 
was pushed to respond to challenges from both inside and outside, reflecting on the 
built-in tension between the past and present of China and searching for a way out of 
the crisis by selectively transforming and reinterpreting Chinese cultural and 
religious heritages.19 Against this background, they turned to something unorthodox 
but familiar—Buddhism.   
 
(Chengdu: Bashu shushe, 1989). Deng Zimei also considered Gong and Wei as “opening a new historical 
process of using Buddhism to fight against Confucianism”; see Deng Zimei 鄧子美, Chuantong fojiao yu 
Zhongguo jindai hua 傳統佛教與中國近代化 (Shanghai: Shanghai Huazhong shifan daxue chubanshe, 
1994). Ma Tianxiang, as well, labelled Gong and Wei as “vanguards”; see Ma Tianxiang 麻天祥, Wanqing 
foxue yu jindai shehui sichao 晚清佛學與近代社會思潮 (Taipei: wenjin chubanshe, 1992).  
16 Some scholars have noticed that Gong and Wei “were marginal figures whose historical importance 
has been determined largely by a consensus of twentieth-century scholars.” See Benjamin Elman, A 
Classicism, Politics, and Kingship: the Chang-chou School of New Text Confucianism in Late Imperial China 
(Berkeley: University of Califonia Press, 1990), xxii; Ge Zhaoguang 葛兆光, “Guanyu jindai fojiao yanjiu 
de shuping關於近代佛教研究述評,” Si yu Yan思與言, 37, 2 (1999). 
17 Holmes Welch, The Buddhist Revival in China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), 2.  
18 For studies on Yang Wenhui, see Welch, The Buddhist Revival in China.; Gabriele Goldfuss, Vers un 
bouddhisme du XXe siècle: Yang Wenhui (1837-1911), réformateur laïque et imprimeur, (Paris: Collège de 
France, Institut des Hautes Études Chinoises, 2001); also, Chen, Jidong 陳繼東, Shinmatsu bukkyō no 
kenkyū清末仏教の研究--楊文会を中心として (Tokyo: sankibō busshorin, 2003). 
19 Justin Ritzinger labelled it as the “‘push’ model of modernity.” See Justin R. Ritzinger, “Anarchy in 
the Pure Land: Tradition, modernity, and the reinvention of the cult of Maitreya in Republican China” 
(Ph.D Harvard University, 2010), 4-9.  
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Once Buddhism was put on the table, however, it needed to regain its 
legitimacy by satisfying several principles set by modernity and relocating itself in 
the modernized constellation of ‘national essence’ [guocui 國粹]. First of all, it had to 
be shaped, categorized, and defined, to at least a certain degree, as a ‘modern 
religion.’ Then, it must meet the expectations of the modern Chinese. At times, 
Buddhism was expected to fill the vacuum of belief left by Confucianism and bring 
‘wakening’ to the new citizens of China. At other times, it became a personal domain, 
or a shelter, in which the intellectuals, who were tired of the surrounding dissensions 
and sufferings, could escape the volatile situation into the peaceful world of 
Buddhism and gain some rest. These entangled and somewhat conflicting aspects of 
Buddhism present the current interpreter with a puzzle, namely, how can we 
understand the multiple facets of Buddhism and the roles it played in modern China? 
It acted as a foundation of faith, a force of revolution, a new domain of science, a 
medicine for mental illness, or a distinction, in Pierre Bourdieu’s sense.20 Its multi-
facet character,  as well as the contradiction in the modernization of it, made 
Buddhism one of the axes of the ‘transitional’ intelligentsia.21 If the intellectual elite 
that emerged after the Sino-Japanese war could be divided into ‘conservatives’ and 
‘reformists,’ their moving trajectories often intersected in Buddhism.22 Eventually, 
 
20 Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1984). 
21 Chang, Hao, “Zhongguo jindai sixiangshi de zhuanxing shidai 中國近代思想史的轉型時代,” in 
Ershiyi Shiji 二十一世紀 [The Twenty-First Century] (1999): 29–39.  
22 However, intellectual conservatives/reformists and religious conservatives/reformists did not 
always coincide. In this dissertation, ‘conservatives’ mean a group of intellectuals who supported 
‘Chinese values’ (not matter whether these values are particular or universal) instead of aiming at the 
preservation of the socio-political status quo. In this sense, my use of conservativism is closer to 
Mannheim’s ‘style of thought’ than Burke’s theory. See Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in 
France and on the Proceedings in Certain Societies in London Relative to that Event: In a Letter Intended to Have 
Been Sent to a Gentleman in Paris (London, 1790). Reprinted in Frank M. Turner, ed., Reflections on the 
Revolution in France (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 2003) and Karl Mannheim, 
“Conservative Thought,” in From Karl Mannheim, ed. Kurt H. Wolff, (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1971), 132-222. For an overall discussion of studies on conservatism, see Panajotis Kondylis, 
Konservativismus: geschichtlicher Gehalt und Untergang (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1986). For different 
approaches to defining conservatism, see Klaus Epstein, The Genesis of German Conservatism (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966), 3-25; Jerry Z. Muller, “Introduction: What is Conservative Social 
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Buddhism, more or less became not only a common topic for discussion but also a 
shared ground for conversations, similar to what Paul Cohen has called the 
“consensual Chinese agenda.”23 Because of Buddhism’s connecting role, some current 
scholars have placed Buddhism at the core of their understanding of modern Chinese 
history.24  
Centered on the term ‘revival,’ the current scholarship on Chinese religion has 
devoted great endeavor to exploring the reasons behind this revival and its 
manifestations in various locales and times. Numerous studies in the past decades 
have focused on religious changes in modern China,25 emphasizing the tension 
between religion and secular force, such as unstable social environments, policies, 
and regulations, the attitudes of government, and the whole project of ‘making the 
state.’26 Following the pattern of sociological history and focusing on the 
 
and Political Thought?,” in idem(ed.), Conservatism: An Anthology of Social and Political Thought from David 
Hume to the Present (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 3-31. For conservatism in China, 
see Charlotte Furth, “Culture and Politics in Modern Chinese Conservatism,” in idem (ed.), The Limits of 
Change: Essays on Conservative Alternatives in Republican China (Cambridge, MA, London: Harvard 
University Press, 1976),22-53; and Benjamin I. Schwartz, “Notes on Conservatism in General and in 
China in Particular,” in Charlotte Furth (ed.), The Limits of Change (q.v.), 3-21. There are also different 
tendencies within conservatism. Axel Schneider has made a distinction between a “classicist 
conservatism” that identifies timeless, universal norms and a “historicist conservatism” that leaves 
the question of universal standards unanswered and that stresses the particularity of traditions. See 
Axel Schneider, “The One and the Many: A Classicist Reading… and Its Role in the Modern World—An 
Attempt on Modern Chinese Conservatism,” Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences 2, no. 5 (2010). 
23 Paul A Cohen, Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1984), 132-133. 
24 See for example, Paul R. Katz, Religion in China and Its Modern Fate (Waltham: Brandeis University 
Press, 2014). 
25 Representative recent works include Vincent Goossaert and David A Palmer, The Religious Question in 
Modern China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011); Yoshiko Ashiwa and David L. Wank, Making 
Religion, Making the State: The Politics of Religion in Modern China, The Politics of Religion in Modern China 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009); Mayfair Mei-hui Yang, Chinese Religiosities, Afflictions of 
Modernity and State Formation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008); Adam Yuet Chau, Religion 
in Contemporary China: Revitalization and Innovation (London: Routledge, 2011). 
26 See Yoshiko Ashiwa, “Making Religion, Making the State: The Politics of Religion in Modern China,” 
in Making Religion, Making the State: The Politics of Religion in Modern China, ed. Yoshiko Ashiwa and David 
L. Wank (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009). 43-73.  
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‘institutional’ development of Buddhism as a ‘modern religion’27 (evidenced by the 
modernization of saṃgha education, the growth of Buddhist publications, the 
transformation of Buddhist culture in urban and rural space, the restoration of 
Buddhist monasteries, and so on),28 a narrative of ‘revival,’ or in Vincent Goossaert’s 
words, “the renewal paradigm,” has been formulated and been used to describe a 
concrete, state-induced process of “revival-cum-institutionalization.”29 Consequently, 
‘revival’ has then been solidly linked to the discourse of ‘reform’ or ‘revolution.’30  
Taixu and his slogan of “three revolutions of Buddhism” reinforced this link.31 
The Buddhist revival has been depicted as a process of ‘humanization,’ 
‘secularization,’ and ‘politicization.’ However, this impression begs some crucial 
questions. If a ‘revival’ of Buddhism did occur in modern history, the issue is not only 
why the revival emerged and what it looked like, but rather its very nature: was it an 
unwilling response to impacts from the outside, especially that of modernity, or a 
spontaneous reaction to save Buddhism from decline? Was it a progressive step 
towards a better future or a loss of Buddhism’s essence and a betrayal of its tradition? 
Was it part of the project of globalization, or in contrast, a segment of 
 
27 Normally, Buddhism is considered a highly institutionalized religion. For the division of 
‘institutionalized’ and ‘diffused’ religion, see C.K. Yang, Religion in Chinese Society: A Study of 
Contemporary Social Functions of Religion and Some of Their Historical Factors (Berkeley, Los Angles: 
University of California Press, 1961), chapter 12. 
28 For a discussion of some fundamental Buddhist institutional innovations since the end of the 
nineteenth century, see Ji Zhe, ‘Buddhist Institutional Innovations’, in V. Goossaert, J. Kiely & J. 
Lagerwey ed., Modern Chinese Religion II: 1850-2015 (Leiden, Brill, 2006), 731-766.  
29 Vincent Goossaert, “State and Religion in Modern China: Religious Policies and Scholarly Paradigms,” 
paper presented at Rethinking Modern Chinese History: An International Conference to Celebrate the 50th 
Anniversary of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, Taipei, June 29–July 1. Goossaert considers 
Buddhism as one of the most outstanding cases of this paradigm. 
30 The discourse of revolution [geming 革命] is very dominant in studies of modern China. It was 
considered a ‘symbolic capital’; see Chen Jianhua, ‘Geming’ de xiandaixing: Zhongguo geming huayu 
kaolun ‘革命’的現代性: 中國革命話語考論 (Shanghai: shanghai guji chubanshe, 2000); also, David 
Ernest Apter and Tony Saich, Revolutionary Discourse in Mao’s Republic (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1994); Xiaobo Liu, “That Holy Word, ‘Revolution’,” in Popular Protest And Political 
Culture In Modern China, ed. Jeffrey N Wasserstrom,  (New York: Routledge, 2018), 309-324. 
31 For studies on Taixu as a Buddhist reformist, see Don A. Pittman, Toward a Modern Chinese Buddhism: 
Taixu's Reforms (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2001).  
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nationalization? Was it an actualized occurrence in history, or did it remain a utopian 
plan imagined or designed by certain figures?  
As some scholars have noticed, Taixu was actually a ‘too-perfect ideal’ or a 
“classical” religious figure, in Joachim Wach’s sense.32 His legacy and his Buddhism 
for the human world [renjian fojiao 人間佛教] represent a type of spirituality that 
exemplifies the trend of ‘modern religion’ identified by Joseph Kitawaga, John 
Randall, and others: an ethicized, protestant Buddhism with a this-worldly 
soteriology.33 However, the stunning case of Taixu, as well as other ‘classical’ figures, 
more or less has overshadowed the complexity of the ‘religious issue’ in modern 
China because it has established a simplified logic of causality—because Buddhism 
needed to overcome its decline, it had to be reformed; because Buddhism was 
reformed (although the reform was incomplete), it experienced a revival. This logical 
sequence, although still dominant, contains several pitfalls. 
 Influenced by the concept of ‘declining Dharma’ [mofa 末法], a sense of crisis 
has always haunted the minds of Chinese Buddhists.34 Fundamentally, this concept 
essentially has its root in Buddhist teaching. It is not only a prophecy, but rather a 
 
32 Joachim Wach, Types of Religious Experience. Christian and Non-Christian (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1972), 48-57. 
33 Joseph M. Kitagawa, “Primitive, Classical and Modern Religions: A Perspective on Understanding the 
History of Religions,” in The History of Religions : Essays on the Problem of Understanding, ed. Joseph M. 
Kitagawa (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967). 39-65; and John Herman Randall Jr, The Making of 
the Modern Mind: A Survey of the Intellectual Background of the Present Age (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1926).  
34 The concept of mofa, which was interpreted by Erik Zürcher as a Messianism, describes the demise of 
Buddhist teachings in an era when the Buddha has long since entered nirvana and all semblances of 
the monastic community have disappeared. While references to the decline of Buddhism were present 
in Indian literature, the systematization of this concept was most likely articulated in medieval China. 
People of the Northern Dynasties (386-581) and Tang periods (618-907) had already been anxious about 
mofa and prepared for its coming. See Jan Nattier, Once upon a Future Time: Studies in a Buddhist Prophecy 
of Decline, vol. 1 (Fremont: Jain Publishing Company, 1991). Also Yūki Reimon, “Shina Bukkyō ni okeru 
mappō shisō no kōki’ 支那佛教に於ける末法思想の興起 [The Rise of the Mofa Concept in Chinese 
Buddhism,” Tōhō gakuhō 東方學報 [Journal of Oriental Studies] 6, no. 1 (1936). Foreboding of the 
destruction of Buddhist teachings can be found in Nakāya or Āgama scriptures; see Jamie Hubbard, 
“Salvation in the Final Period of the Dharma.” Ph.D. Dissertation (University of Wisconsin, 1986), 15-24; 
David W. Chappell, “Early Forebodings of the Death of Buddhism,” Numen 27 (1980): 124-127. 
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tripartite scheme of periodization. After the two sequent ages of the ‘correct Dharma’ 
[zhengfa 正法] and the ‘semblance Dharma’ [xiangfa 像法], the final age of mofa will 
inevitably come. The decline and disappearance of the dharma have been viewed in 
Buddhist sources as automatic, simply resulting from the transitory nature of all 
conditional things. Therefore, in Chinese terms, the response to mofa has always 
focused on how to practice Buddhism in this prolonged, decadent final age, instead of 
how to stop the arrival of mofa. Historically, within monastic communities, the 
concept of mofa or ‘decline’ was utilized to reinforce monastic regulations and to 
stress self-examination among the saṃgha in order to react to external criticism and 
prevent further corruption from the inside. In the modern Chinese context, the 
intensifying attention to mofa  or intensive vigilance towards the ‘decline,’ called a 
“we-try-harder response” by Jan Nattier,35 undoubtedly was caused by various 
factors, for example, the impulse to strengthen the internal management of the 
saṃgha against corruption, impacts from Christian missionaries, military invasions, 
criticism from Japanese Buddhism, and so on.36 However, these efforts meant it was 
impossible to legitimatize the ‘reform’ of Buddhism itself. In some cases, as Welch has 
indicated, the idea of ‘decline’ was a ‘narrative’ constructed on purpose by Buddhist 
reformers like Taixu. It was neither an established fact nor a real crisis that needed to 
be overcome by a certain kind of reform or revolution.37 
Besides, the ‘revival’ model has overlooked the built-in strata within the 
modern transformation of Chinese Buddhism. Apart from the inner contradictions 
between Buddhists and non-Buddhists, which made the whole picture more 
 
35 Nattier, Once upon a Future Time: Studies in a Buddhist Prophecy of Decline, 137. 
36 For the narrative of mofa in modern times, see Erik Schicketanz, Daraku to fukkō no kindai Chūkoku 
Bukkyō: Nihon Bukkyō to no kaikō to so no rekishizō no kōchiku 堕落と復興の近代中国仏教:日本仏教との
邂逅とその歴史像の構築 (Kyoto: Hozōkan, 2016). Also, Erik Schicketanz, “Narratives of Buddhist 
Decline and the Concept of the Sect (Zong) in Modern Chinese Buddhist Thought,” Studies in Chinese 
Religions 3, no. 3 (2017), 281-300. 
37 Welch’s attitude towards ‘revival’ made him special among all scholars who put ‘revival’ at the 
centre of their narrative. See Welch, The Buddhist Revival in China, 222-223. 
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complicated,38 the modern Chinese Buddhist community, in general, was a layered, 
multidimensional, and hybrid edifice. Taking rituals and festivals into account, Paul 
A. Katz has pointed to “triangular networks of power,” featuring three groups 
involved in management and regulation: officials, elites, and religious specialists.39 
Prasenjit Duara, based on his study of religion in rural China, has also indicated a 
divided space of religious practice, separate from formal institutionalized religions, in 
which the masses of common believers lived. This localized, popularized facet of 
religion constituted the bottom structure of religious communities.40 Scholars 
beginning with Timothy Brook have noticed a ‘connecting stratum.’41 Their analysis 
has found that, in the urban space, the gentry and the elite played their roles as 
‘middlemen’ between the populace and the governors, resisting the national 
apparatus of the government through supporting local monasteries and participating 
 
38 For example, although Taixu insisted on the purity of Buddhism and its distinction from 
superstition, he did not fully forbid ‘superstitious activities’ in his monastic communities and tacitly 
consented to such practices. See Kangbao, “Yige zhuming shanghai shangren yu cishanjia de zongjiao 
shenghuo --Wang Yiting 一個著名上海商人與慈善家的宗教生活—王一亭” in Cong chengshi kan 
Zhongguo de xiandaixing 從城市看中國的現代性, ed. Wu Renshu巫仁恕, Lin, Meili林美莉, and Paul 
Katz 康豹 (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica), 275–296; studies of Buddhism and 
superstitious activities, for example, fuji, see Wang Jianchuan 王見川, “Jindai Zhongguo fuji cishan: yi 
Yinguang wenchao wei kaocha xiansuo近代中國扶乩慈善與「迷信」—以印光文鈔為考查線索,” in 
Disijie guoji hanxue huiyi lunwenji: Xinyang, shijian, yu wenhua tiaoshi 第四屆國際漢學會議論文集: 信仰, 
實踐, 與文化調適 (Taipei: Academia Sinica, June 2013), 525-562; Fan Chunwu范純武, “Jindai 
Zhongguo fojiao yu fuji近現代中國佛教與扶乩,” in Yuanguang foxue xuebao 圓光佛學學報, 3 (1999), 
261-291. 
39 Katz, Religion in China and Its Modern Fate, 6-7.  
40 Prasenjit Duara, “Knowledge and Power in the Discourse of Modernity: The Campaigns Against 
Popular Religion in Early Twentieth-Century China,” in The Journal of Asian Studies 50, no. 1 (1991), 67-
83; also, Prasenjit Duara, Culture, Power, and the State: Rural North China, 1900-1942 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1991). Further studies on ‘popular religion’, Adam Yuet Chau, Miraculous Response: 
Doing Popular Religion in Contemporary China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005); Philip Clart, 
“Chinese Popular Religion,” in The Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Chinese Religions, ed. Randall Nadeau 
(Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 219–37; Adam Yuet Chau, “The Politics of Legitimation and the Revival 
of Popular Religion in Shaanbei, North-Central China,” Modern China, 31,2 (2005): 236-78. 
41 Focusing on the late Ming period, Brook’s study revealed the relationship between Buddhism and 
Ming gentry. See Timothy Brook, Praying for Power: Buddhism and the Formation of Gentry Society in Late-
Ming China (Cambrige, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University and Harvard-Yenching 
Institute, 1993).  
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in religious practices.42 These inherent hierarchies and structures were very solid and 
did not really undergo a changing process of decline and revival. 
This ‘hybridity’ of Buddhism that David McMahan (borrowing from Homi 
Bhaba) pointed out hints at the limitation of the ‘reform-revival’ narrative, 
demonstrating that the stories of religious leaders promoting reforms have only been 
the tip of the iceberg.43 This hybridity, as noted by many current scholars, also has 
made China an exception to the theory of secularism.44 The Buddhist ‘revival’ in 
modern China cannot be attributed to secularization but to a process of religious 
modernization, which had as its preconception the idea of ‘progress’ and emphasized 
the deeper engagement of religion in public affairs. However, the different scenario 
in modern China reveals that the narrative of the ‘reform’ of Buddhism was basically 
an unfulfilled dream that existing in the writings and sayings of some Buddhist 
leaders. The practice of Buddhist modernization in Republican China essentially 
failed, as many current Buddhist reformers have already realized.45 Pressures from 
the inside and outside hindered any intensive, thorough attempts. China, during the 
first decades of the twentieth century, never fully established its own form of 
‘Buddhist modernism’, as Japan did.46 The outcome of the Buddhist revival in China, 
as well, was something polyphonic, ambiguous, and paradoxical, which, as Welch has 
 
42 Many of the studies have taken Shanghai as their case. See James Brooks Jessup, “The House Holder 
Elite: Buddhist Activism in Shanghai, 1920-1956” (PhD University of California, Berkeley, 2010).; Tang 
Zhongmao 唐忠毛, Zhongguo fojiao jindai zhuanxing de shehui zhi wei: minguo Shanghai jushi fojiao zuzhi yu 
cishan yanjiu 中國佛教近代轉型的社會之維：民國上海居士佛教組織與慈善研究 (Guilin: Guangxi 
shifan daxue chubanshe, 2013). 
43 David McMahan, The Making of Buddhist Modernism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 14, 19. 
44 For a discussion of China and secularization, see Karel Dobbelaere, “Secularization: A Multi-
Dimensional Concept,” Current Sociology 29 (1981); Karel Dobbelaere, Secularization: An Analysis at Three 
Levels (New York: Peter Lang, 2002); Also, José Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1994).  
45 For example, Taixu outlined the reasons for the failure of his Buddhist reform in his essay “Wo de 
fojiao gaige shibai shi 我的佛教革命失敗史. TXQS, vol.31, 57. 
46 David McMahan has enumerated four features of Buddhist modernism; see David L. McMahan, The 
Making of Buddhist Modernism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).  
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described, sometimes even “meant not a growing vitality for Buddhism but its 
eventual demise as a living religion.”47  
Meanwhile, the paradigm of ‘reform-revival,’ as analyzed above, always 
presupposed modernity, for it imagined that, through reform, Buddhism could 
become more progressive, more scientific, and more modern. However, if we look 
beyond the level of practice to some more theoretical reflections that emerged 
during the early twentieth century, we find that whether and how Buddhism could be 
modernized was sometimes irrelevant. To some Chinese, the route of modernization 
was either a dead end or thorny. As early as the 1910s, suspicion and rejection of 
Western modernity had arisen among many Chinese intellectual elites. Different 
voices also appeared inside the Buddhist circle. The ‘conservative’ group of monks, 
such as Xuyun虛雲 (?-1959), Yinguang 印光 (1862-1940), Hongyi 弘一 (1880-1942), 
and so on, rejected the ‘secular’ presupposition of the reform of Buddhism from a 
stance of preserving monastic purity;48 also, lay Buddhists associated with the China 
Inner Learning Institute [Zhina Neixueyuan 支那內學院], such as Ouyang Jingwu 歐
陽竟無 (1871-1943), Lü Cheng, and Wang Enyang 王恩洋 (1897-1964), consciously 
dismissed the model of modernization and reflected on some of the essential 
concepts behind it, such as science and progress.49 The polarized voices speaking 
about reform scattered here and there in these people’s works declared or implied a 
tendency of Buddhism to develop into other forms that were ‘purer,’ ‘truer,’ and 
more ‘genuine.’ 
 
47 Welch, The Buddhist Revival in China, 264. 
48  For Xuyun, see Daniela Campo, “Chan Master Xuyun: The Embodiment of an Ideal, The Transmission 
of a Model,” in Making Saints in Modern China: Profiles in Religious Leadership, ed., D. Ownby, V. Goossaert & 
Z. Ji (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 99–136; for Yinguang, see Jan Kiely, “The Charismatic 
Monk and the Chanting Masses: Master Yinguang and his Pure Land Revival Movement,” in ibid, 30-77; 
for Hongyi, Raoul Birnbaum, “Master Hongyi Looks Back: A Modern Man Becomes a Monk in 
Twentieth–Century China,” in Buddhism in the Modern World: Adaptations of an Ancient Tradition, ed. 
S.Heine & C. Prebish, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 75–124. 
49 For more information on studies of those Buddhist intellectuals, see the collected essays in John 




From Holmes Welch’s groundbreaking research to most of the latest studies, 
the revival of Buddhism, whether it was only an unfulfilled blueprint or an actualized 
phenomenon in history, has normally been perceived as a practice-oriented Buddhist 
‘game.’ It has either been connected with certain groups of believers located in a 
religious hierarchy, or linked to the triangular power system posited by Paul Katz; it 
was these Buddhists who expected, participated in, disturbed, or witnessed the 
‘revival’ directly or indirectly, or at least were concerned about the ‘modern fate’ of 
Chinese Buddhism. In this process, no matter whether Buddhist apologists in modern 
China were trying to reform or to protect Buddhism, they all realized that they must 
firstly ‘know’ it: not simply know its doctrines, but rather know how this tradition 
was formed in China’s past and how it responded to the call of the time. Writing the 
history of Buddhism, then, became very crucial to Buddhist believers. This is why 
Buddhist elites often engaged in or initiated discussions about the past of Buddhism. 
Meanwhile, their voices on this topic were shadowed by their intense concerns with 
reality and their calls for reform. Therefore, the historiography of Buddhism in 
modern China has been read as a relatively marginal theoretical practice of ‘insiders.’ 
However, if we return to Liang Qichao’s paragraph cited previously, we will identify 
one missing piece of the puzzle. This project, as one part of the modern 
transformation of Buddhism at the discursive rather than the institutional level, was 
not driven solely by those within the Buddhist circle. There were still some figures 
who remained outside of the tradition or who alienated themselves from any kind of 
religious practices. Chen Yinke 陳寅恪 (1890-1969), Tang Yongtong 湯用彤 (1893-
1964), and Hu Shih 胡適 belonged to this group. The changing of the religious 
landscape was definitely manifested in their personal and academic life; they always, 
however, kept a distance from religious life and maintained their identity as 
professional historians. This does not mean that these people were peripheral; quite 
the contrary, they were those who had the most comprehensive and perceptive 
understanding of Buddhism as well as of the West—‘the modern world.’ To them, the 
logic behind the ‘revival’ of Buddhism—Buddhism needed to change to become 
modern—was sometimes in opposition to the tenet of their historiography; what 
they were concerned about was not the historical development of Buddhism itself but 
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how to define the Buddhism in Chinese history as ‘Chinese Buddhism’ and how to 
identify, maintain, and evaluate its ‘Chinese-ness.’ One aim of my study, then, is to 
bring those ‘outsiders’—the ‘side current’ [fuliu 伏流] in Liang Qichao’s words—into 
our vision. They have disappeared in most of the recent literature on modern 
Buddhist scholarship; however, their voices echoed the broader account of the 
invention of ‘Chinese Buddhism’ under the modern category of ‘religion’ and the re-
construction of the religious and historical truth of Chinese Buddhism, in the 
multifaceted modernization of the domains of both academy and belief.  
 
Religious Truth and Historical Truth 
Buddhism, as a religion, has its allegedly eternal, ahistorical ‘truth’50: the Dharma, 
although the Dharma had been ceaselessly redefined, reinterpreted, and recreated 
throughout history. In China, people have been preoccupied with record keeping and 
history making throughout the past two millennia.51 Under the influence of this local 
culture, records about Buddhism were written down mostly by clergy but also by 
History Officers [shiguan史官] and literati. Chinese Buddhists, although often 
belonging to varying denominations, established their own historical narrative 
tradition, which contained varied forms of writing, including sectarian stories, 
doctrinal bibliographies, gazetteers, biographies of monks, and so on.52 Writing the 
 
50 In this Introduction, I make a distinction between religious truth and historical truth and will discuss 
the difference between these two truths. In the later part of this dissertation, however, if there is no 
special clarification, I use ‘truth’ from a phenomenological perspective, which is what the historian can 
observe from historical materials or summarize from some evidential facts, namely, the historical 
truth. Certainly, the term ‘truth’ [zhenli 真理] itself, which originated in the West, had been widely 
used in a religious context. 
51 For the main facets of the historiographical tradition in China, see Endymion Wilkinson, Chinese 
History: A Manual (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Centre, 1998).  
52 This tradition of Buddhist historiography had been studied by several scholars, for example, John 
Kieschnick, The Eminent Monk. Buddhist Ideals in Medieval Chinese Hagiography (Honolulu: University of 




history of Buddhism was one means for the believers to approach and reproduce the 
‘real’ teaching of the Buddha.  
The historiography of Buddhism that emerged in twentieth century China, 
however, was not a continuation of the previous tradition of Buddhist 
historiography.53 Several profound transformations can be observed. For example, 
new studies of the history of Buddhism surpassed sectarian boundaries and often 
organized the Buddhist past by referring to more general frameworks of 
periodization. Also, writing the history of Buddhism was no longer the privilege of 
Buddhist communities; the practices of professional historians challenged the 
monastic monopoly of Buddhist knowledge. Meanwhile, this new branch of 
Buddhology as an independent and highly institutionalized discipline imported 
numerous terms, concepts, and methods to describe and explain the changes in 
Buddhism throughout history according to new theoretical paradigms. More 
importantly, there was always a concern behind all these concrete and complex 
phenomena: what is ‘Chinese Buddhism,’ or what makes Buddhism ‘Chinese’? Such 
questions were never asked by premodern Buddhist historians.  
Reflections on these questions revolved around the rethinking and 
redefinition of ‘truth’ in two dimensions: religious truth, which determines that 
Chinese Buddhism is ‘Buddhism,’ and historical truth, which identifies Chinese 
Buddhism as ‘Chinese.’ As an interdisciplinary field, the historiography of Buddhism, 
in this sense, unites these two tendencies by, firstly, historicizing religious truth and, 
secondly, narrating Buddhism as part of the national history of China. This dual logic 
reveals what I see as the two cores of this historiographical turn— ‘faith’ and ‘truth,’ 
as indicated in the title of this dissertation.  
Historiographical Buddhism indicates, in a broad sense, that teachings, ideas, 
and religious experience, and the criticism and narration about them, are actually 
 
53 I divide ‘Buddhist historiography’ and the ‘historiography of Buddhism.’ The former refers to 
historical writings produced by Buddhists, for example, scholarly monks, laymen, and so on. The 
‘historiography of Buddhism’ refers to all writings about the history of Buddhism, no matter whether 
these writings come from professional or monastic historians. 
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historized and can express their own historicity. The historiography of Buddhism in 
modern China presented and reinforced the historicity of Buddhism by setting up a 
textually oriented methodological paradigm. By critically reading Buddhist scriptures 
as historical material and questioning their authenticity and legitimacy, historians 
converted Buddhist doctrines into historical sources that could be dubious, 
disorderly, and even false. On the one hand, because of this stand of textual 
orientation, historians turned to a body of data that had been overlooked or 
deliberately ignored by former Chinese researchers and also their Western 
counterparts—the extra-canonical texts. Some of these texts were carefully 
preserved and heavily edited or commentated upon but seldom had drawn wide 
attention within academia. Others were unedited or even ‘unread’ before the rise of 
modern Buddhist historiography, such as some manuscripts discovered in the caves 
of Dunhuang. Historians dated, translated, and interpreted these materials. To them, 
all these texts, no matter whether canonical or not, were fundamentally equal. 
Without sectarian prejudice, they treated the texts as a database of information. On 
the other hand, these historians believed that texts were produced under certain 
historical circumstances by certain groups of people with special expectations and 
biases. Therefore, although Buddhism is a canon-based religion, its doctrinal 
foundation actually is not stable. To Buddhist historians, texts, despite their varying 
contents and styles, are, or at least were when they were produced, ‘normative’ 
expressions aimed at setting ideals, establishing doctrinal and sectarian orthodoxy, 
or responding to other practical concerns. 
Because Buddhist scriptures was critically read by historians without faith, the 
tension between historical facts and the Buddhist ‘essence’ arose, and further caused 
the historicization of Buddhism.54 As we will see in this dissertation, the believers in 
 
54 Discovering the essence of Buddhism remained the main task of Buddhist studies for a long time. 
This intention can be observed in the works of C.A.F. Rhys Davids, Hermann Oldenburg and later 
Theodor Stcherbatsky and so on. See Rhys Davids, Sakya, Or Buddhist Origins (London: Kegan Paul, 
Trench, Trubner and Co., Ltd., 1931); Hermann Oldenburg, Buddha, sein Leben, seine Lehre, seine Gemeinde 
(Berlin: Verlag von Wilhelm Hertz, 1881); and Theodor Stcherbatsky, The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana 
(London: Mouton & Co, 1965).   
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the Dharma and the proponents of historical fact both claimed, although in a careful 
and friendly manner, that the other side’s approach would miss the ‘real’ truth. For 
Buddhist scholars, the underlying logical structure behind their rhetoric of ‘genuine 
Buddhism’ involved positing a distinction between the ‘essence’ of a religious 
tradition and its ‘cultural manifestations.’ As Robert Sharf has remarked, these 
scholars believed that “while the cultural manifestations of religion are invariably 
shaped by social, institutional, and economic contingencies, the essence is an 
ahistorical truth logically prior to, and thus unsullied by, the cultural forms through 
which it is made known.”55 However, historians have rejected this position by 
criticizing that this attitude of fundamentalism fails to realize the historicity of truth 
itself.56 Sometimes, the terrain between these two camps has been so wide that voices 
from both sides have engaged in monologues. 
In the context of religion, truth is often equated with faith. Such truth consists 
of a set of sacred doctrines, embodying itself through the activities of sages and ritual 
performances. It is often timeless, providential, and transcendent. Remarkably, 
religious truth indicates not merely worship and devotion, but also ‘tradition,’ 
namely, something, in Gadamer’s sense, that one can never escape from.57 This 
inescapability does not mean that tradition is not questionable; on the contrary, as 
Gadamer has noted, tradition hands down certain interests, prejudices, questions, 
and problems that have the potential to incite critique and reform.58 The Buddhist 
reform conducted by Taixu, for example, was incited by the faith in Buddhist 
doctrines and monastic traditions. Similarly, for those who claimed themselves to be 
 
55 R. H. Sharf, “Whose Zen? Zen Nationalism Revisited,” in Rude Awakenings: Zen, the Kyoto School and the 
Question of Nationalism (1995): 44.  
56 Faure Bernard, Chan Insight and Oversight (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 90 
57 Tradition literally implies (in both its Latin form ‘tradition’ and its Chinese form ‘chuantong’ 傳統) 
continuity and orthodoxy. However, as some scholars have pointed out, while tradition is usually seen 
as the opposite of modernity, yet it is much loved by modernity. Traditions are continually being 
created, not in some past time immemorial, but during modernity. For studies on this issue, see Eric 
Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1983). 
58 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 289-96.  
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‘atheists’, like Hu Shih, ‘faith’ or ‘tradition’ still underlay their writings in certain 
forms. Through ‘faith,’ individuals produce symbols, stories, and memories that give 
them both identity and status. In a society that changes slowly, ‘faith’ may be solidly 
attached to powers—religious, political or ideological—and the stability maintained 
by the structure of power; however, in a time full of changes, I will suggest, faith is 
not so strong as to dominate one’s behavior but is something that can be selected, 
discussed, and questioned. It often defines itself as an intellectual resource, a way of 
life, or one alternative: should one pick from (one’s) previous faiths or should one go 
along with something more modern and form a new faith? In this sense, in the 
modern context, faith is a ‘reservoir,’ instead of an authority; that is, it is a strength 
to draw upon, a device for forming identity, and a source of a sense of safety, 
specialness, or difference. 
In the context of history, truth, which is evidence-based, is also not ideology-
free. It always turns out to be “a mobile army of metaphors,” as in Nietzsche’s phrase, 
that sometimes goes against certain stands or faith.59 That is why sometimes the 
writing of Buddhist history became a deconstructive power to the monasteries. 
Meanwhile, once it was proved that a given system could not be reduced to its 
original form or the circumstances of its emergence, the overwhelming historicity 
then encouraged this system to resist against or even interfere with historical 
changes. That is why the protagonists of Buddhism persistently emphasized the 
‘genuineness’ of the Dharma through history. This tendency echoes the view of Ernst 
Troeltsch. When discussing the “essence of Christianity,” Troeltsch pointed out that 
the ‘essence’ of religious teaching incorporates not only an abstract ideal but also a 
critical judgment “which measures the manifestations against this ideal essence.”60 
That is to say, religious essence is irreplaceable and inescapable, for it is the criterion 
 
59 Nietzsche, “On Truth and Falsity in their Ultra Moral Sense” in The Complete Works of Frederick 
Nietzsche, ed. Oscar Levy (New York: Gordon, [1873]1974).  
60 See Michael Pye, “Comparative Hermeneutics in Religion,” in The Cardinal Meaning: Essays in 
Comparative Hermeneutics, Buddhism and Christianity, ed. Michael Pye and Robert Morgan (The Hague: 
Mouton, 1973), 14. For a discussion of Ernest Troeltsch’s notion of ‘essence’, see Mark Chapman, Ernest 
Troeltsch and Liberal Theology: Religion and Cultural synthesis in Wilhelmine Germany (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001).  
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by which other truths are judged to be true. The ‘historical essence’ of Buddhism, 
although largely rejected by the recent trend of ‘de-essentialization’ in Buddhology, 
which Donald Lopez has called “a new historiography,”61 had haunted many Western 
Orientalists and Buddhologists.62 In modern China, a similar intention was also 
repeatedly presented in the works of Lü Cheng and other lay Buddhist scholars from 
the China Institute of Inner Studies. Unlike both the scholastic monks and 
professional historians, these lay scholars made unique endeavors to safeguard the 
essence of Buddhism—the foundation of their faith—through provocative 
historiographical statements. 
Different understandings of the truth led to the ambiguous role of 
historiography in Buddhology. The dilemma of historized Buddhism, as I will show in 
this dissertation, is that Buddhism can be depicted as the product of history, but only 
at the risk of opening up questions about its sacred past; meanwhile, although history 
tried to search for hard facts and to construct a ‘historically real’ Buddhism, history 
further separated Buddhism from its religious truth—the ‘genuine’ Buddhism. Also, it 
cannot be ignored that the writing of Buddhist history itself can also be historized 
and find itself captive by temporal discourses like science and progress. This point 
was particularly evident in modern China.But, if there is always a gap between 
religious truth (faith) and historical truth, how did writing the history of Buddhism 
become so active and important in early twentieth-century China, when both 
‘history’ and ‘religion’ were undergoing dramatic transformations?  
One significant inner transformation that might have inspired the inclination 
to write a national history of Buddhism was the widespread reflection on tradition 
among Chinese intellectuals after 1900. Tradition, a “white metaphor” in Derrida’s 
 
61 See Lopez’s foreword to Gregory Schopen’s Bones, Stones, and Buddhist Monks, 1997, x. Here I need to 
add that Schopen’s study provides a representative example of the trend that the ‘real’ Buddhism 
should be found in a distinctly unidealized reading based on a mélange of textual and extra-textual 
evidence, including epigraphic and archaeological materials. See his essays collected in the book.  
62 One response to this issue is the collected work edited by Roger R. Jackson and John J. Makransky, 
Buddhist Theology: Critical Reflections by Contemporary Buddhist Scholars (London: Cruzon, 2000). Also see C. 
W. Huntington Jr. “History, Traditon, and Truth,” in History of Religions, 46, no.3 (2007): 187-227. 
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sense, was selectively interpreted as the counterpart of ‘modernity.’63 The argument 
of tradition in the Chinese context was put forward by the historian Joseph Levenson. 
His argument of ‘traditionalism’—the embrace of tradition in modern China as one 
response to the imbalance between history and value caused by the arrival of the 
West—is reminiscent of the same term used by Karl Manheim and Max Weber, which 
also emphasized the psychological clinging to tradition. As Levenson described, 
Chinese intellectuals, realizing the incompatibility of Confucianism with modern 
institutions, eventually “retired Confucius honorably into the silence of the 
museum.”64 In this sense, the great tradition of Confucianism lost its voice in current 
affairs and was reduced to a symbol for national self-hood. After Levenson, his 
student Laurence Schneider complicated this paradigm by showing that Chinese 
intellectuals, such as Gu Jiegang 顧頡剛 (1893-1980), were still shaped by traditions 
and drew on classical resources as a means of redefining Chinese identity.65 Chang 
Hao, as well, contended that, influenced by deep-rooted philosophies, Chinese 
intellectuals retained a sense of traditional values and attempted to seek universal 
meanings in traditions.66 Yü Ying-shih further suggested that Chinese modernity had 
its historical root in the inherent transformation of traditions, which, he pointed out 
 
63 The Chinese encounter with modernity was a double-edged sword: from the beginning, it was at the 
same time a project of anti-modernity—Wang Hui has referred to modern Chinese thought as marked 
by an “antimodern theory of modernization”—since modernity was perceived as belonging to the 
West. See Hui Wang, China's New Order: Society, Politics, and Economy in Transition, ed. Theodore Huters 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 150. A similar point was made by Arif Dirlik and 
Zhang Xudong, who raised the question of the experience of modernity for those “who were 
compelled into modernity by Euro-American coercion.” Arif Dirlik and Xudong Zhang, “Introduction: 
Postmodernism and China,” in Postmodernism and China, ed. Arif Dirlik and Xudong Zhang (Durham, 
London: Duke University Press, 2000), 2.  
64 Joseph R. Levenson, Confucian China and its Modern Fate: A Trilogy (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1968), vol.3, 79. For a discussion Levenson’s point in relation to modernity, see Arif Dirlik, 
“Global Modernity?:Modernity in an Age of Global Capitalism,” European Journal of Social Theory 6, no. 3 
(2003), 278-279.  
65 Laurence A. Schneider, Ku Chieh-kang and China's New History: Nationalism and the Quest for Alternative 
Traditions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971). 
66 Chang Hao, Chinese Intellectuals in Crisis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987). 
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rightly, included not only Confucianism but also other intellectual heritages, 
especially Buddhism.67  
To modern historians, Buddhism is a special case, for, firstly, unlike other 
native religious traditions that may be categorized under the rubric of ‘Chinese 
religion,’ Buddhism is undisputedly a ‘great religion’ or ‘world religion’: it has 
profoundly influenced more than one large-scale civilization. As an illustrious 
tradition, Buddhism demonstrates how a vast, powerful metaphysical system can 
become dynamically ingrained in the social fabric of completely different contexts. 
Secondly, centered on several defining sectarian lineages and historical personages—
founders, masters, and reformers—Buddhism is a ‘perfect’ object for historical 
narration. As such, Buddhism offered modern Chinese scholars a comprehensive, 
representative, and comparative example to understand the mechanism through 
which an external system of thought entered China, became localized, and developed; 
they could study how this process functioned and what influences it caused. Answers 
to these questions further provoked reflections on the nature of Chinese civilization 
and the self-construction of Chinese national identity.68  
Another issue that affected concerns about the historical truth of Buddhism 
was the textualism of Buddhism. Compared to other folk beliefs, Buddhism was partly 
transformed into a written tradition based on readable records and data. Therefore, 
modern historians could locate Buddhism in a chrono-system (for example, the 
national history of China), and observe and understand it from the outside, without 
personally taking part in any ritual activities or having any religious experience. In 
this process, Buddhist scriptures were read and investigated as historical materials 
and were placed equally next to other materials. In many cases, it was curiosity about 
new materials and a propensity for antiquarianism that led historians into the field of 
 
67 Yu Ying-shih, “Wusi yundong yu Zhongguo chuantong 五四運動與中國傳統,” in Zhongguo sixiang 
chuantong jiqi xiandai bianqian 中國思想傳統及其現代變遷 (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 
2014), 82-91.   
68 For the formation of the concept of Chinese national identity [minzu xing 民族性], see Huang 
Xingtao, Chongsu zhonghua: Jindai Zhongguo ‘zhonghua minzu’ guannian yanjiu 重塑中華:近代中國“中華
民族”觀念研究 (Hong Kong: Sanlian shudian, 2017).  
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Buddhist studies.  Their first contacts with Buddhism came from the problems them 
encountered when studying other issues that were not directly related to Buddhism, 
or the new sources about Buddhism they discovered by accident. Chen Yuan and Hu 
Shih are two representative examples. Both of them had only limited connections 
with Buddhism and defined themselves as the outsiders of Buddhism but made their 
contributions to the historiography of Buddhism. 
The textual orientation in the historiography of Buddhism, of course, does not 
mean that the past of Buddhism exists only on paper or that Buddhism should not be 
‘open’ to the future. On the contrary, as I will argue in this dissertation through the 
cases of Chen Yinke, Hu Shih, and so on, the questions historians asked when they 
were writing the history of Buddhism in China pointed precisely to the future. When 
scholars began to focus on religious phenomena, ritual activities, and the changing 
relationship between religions and social-political forces in the Chinese historical 
context, connecting the historical material (Buddhist texts) with more general 
historical phenomena and principles, Buddhism then became more and more 
explained and interpreted by non-Buddhist discourses and theories, such as 
evolutionism and nationalism. In this process, the main agenda of the historical 
writing of Buddhism became the formation of ‘Chinese Buddhism.’ Replacing the 
essence of Buddhism with the particularity of Chinese Buddhism, the historiography 
of Buddhism in modern China established its own paradigm, responding to the 
dilemma of historicized Buddhism by creating Chinese Buddhism as a historical entity 
and combining the legitimation of its past with the choice for China’s future. What 
modern Chinese historians of Buddhism wanted to understand about the religion, 
then, was not the doctrinal history of Buddhism or the Dharma itself but rather 
‘China’ and the historical manifestations of Buddhism in China’s past. In this sense, 
referring to the historical texts of Buddhism in ancient times, historians invented a 
Chinese Buddhism, or a Buddhist China.  
Because the questions asked by historians went far beyond the doctrinal 
context of Buddhism, those historians were at times accused of misreading the 
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Buddha’s teachings or confusing and mixing up certain essential doctrinal terms.69 
However, they had adequate reasons to do so, for what the Buddha said was not their 
concern. As Bernard Faure argued, in Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s words, Chinese 
historians “do not have to choose from between those who think that the history of 
the individual or society holds the truth of the philosopher’s symbolical 
constructions, and …those who think on the contrary that the philosophical 
consciousness has as a matter of principle the keys to personal and social history”—
the tension is somewhat imaginary for “those who defend one of these resorts 
surreptitiously to the other.”70 As we will see, in many cases, when historians were 
accused of distorting Buddhism, they were not unable, but rather unwilling, to 
respond to this criticism from Buddhists head on. What they concerned were the 
historical manifestations of Buddhism, which was dominated or determined by 
different socio-political systems and cultural landscapes. Even the Buddhists who 
were antagonistic towards ‘superficial’ history,71 such as Taixu and Lü Cheng, could 
not deny the historicity of Buddhism and also often resorted to historical 
terminology and methodology to prove their ideas. As Arthur Waley has remarked in 
relation to Suzuki and Hu Shih’s case, those Buddhist scholars never felt that they 
were sinners when they dabbled in history; still less did they need to ask historians to 
join their ‘peccavi,’ for “if there were no Hu(s), there would be no Suzuki(s).”72   
All these aspects above have complicated the overall scenario of the modern 
transition of Chinese Buddhism. The questions faced by Chinese Buddhism, although 
concrete, pragmatic, and political, were related to two ontological concerns: what is 
‘Chinese Buddhism,’ and what is ‘China’? Clearly, the history of Chinese Buddhism or 
the history of China, as we understand them today, were one side; the history of the 
terms ‘Chinese Buddhism’ and ‘China’ themselves, which can be dated back to the late 
 
69 I provide more detail on the criticism they received in later chapters.  
70 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Signs, Trans. Richard McCleary (Evanston: Northwestern University), 128-29. 
71 In Lü Cheng’s commentary on Tang Yongtong’s history of Buddhism, he criticized Tang’s work as 
“superficial” [fan 泛]. For details, see the chapter 5 of this dissertation.  
72 Authur Waley, “History and Religion,” in Philosophy East and West, 5, (1955): 75-78. 
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nineteenth century, was another side.73 To be sure, the latter ‘Begriffsgeschichte’ is 
not separable from the former as a conceptual invention; the two are intertwined. 
Thus, the historiography of Buddhism in modern China was not only a historical 
writing of Buddhism, especially Buddhism in the Chinese context, but also a historical 
writing of the concept of ‘Chinese Buddhism.’ Behind the multifarious practices of the 
historiography of Buddhism during the modern Chinese period, the tension between 
the two truths—religious truth and historical truth—persisted and transformed into 
another question: should Buddhism or China be the focus of the modern Chinese 
historiography of Buddhism? As I will show in the following chapters, there was little 
consensus about the answer to this question. Accounts of Buddhist history swung 
between the two poles of ‘Buddhism’ and ‘China,’ sometimes overlapping, sometimes 
opposing or ignoring each other. Debates between historians and Buddhist scholars 
from the 1920s to the 1940s provided several concrete examples of the gap. Giving the 
conflicting standpoints behind their writings, their discussions were rather ‘dialogues 
of the deaf.’ However, such discussions, as I wish to explicate in this dissertation, 
appertained precisely to the validity of the premises of each interlocutor and, more 
generally, to their claims to legitimacy based either on the doctrinal supremacy of 
Buddhism as metaphysics, or on its value as a cultural factor and tradition presented 
by historiography. So, is Buddhism the business of historians?74 To what extent is 
Buddhism amenable to the historiographical approach, if indeed it is? Can Buddhism, 
which essentially rejects the concept of history, really be historicized? Or is 
Buddhism threatened by the result of historiographical inquiry, and how does 
 
73 Based on the Western experience, many scholars have pointed out that although many civilizations 
have had long histories, the stories of their respective religions are of recent pedigree. The 
establishment of ancient religions as objects of study coincided with the establishment of religion 
itself as a concept of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. See Brent Nongbri, Before Religion: A 
History of a Modern Concept (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 2013), 152; Peter Harrison, ‘Religion’ and 
the Religions in the English Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 1; and Tomoko 
Masuzawa, The Invention of World Religions: Or, How European Universalism was Preserved in the Language of 
Pluralism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).      
74 This question is related to D.T. Suzuki. In the article “Zen: A Reply to Hu Shih,” he stated that “it is 
not the business of historian to peer into [Zen in itself].” See D.T. Suzuki, “Zen: A Reply to Hu Shih,” 
Philosophy East and West (1953), 3,1: 26.  
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Buddhism respond to this threat? The complexity and intersection behind these 
questions determined the structure I employed in this dissertation: rather than 
advancing my investigation in a chronological fashion or ordering it in a biographical 
sequence, I purposely choose to cast a wide net in which the genealogy of the 
historiography of Buddhism is described as more layered than linear, more abrupt 
than cumulative, more paradoxical than tranquil. Behind the relatively sudden 
appearance of the new field of the historiography of Buddhism in modern China, I 
suppose, much of the logic and setting of this subject had already taken shape 
spontaneously underground but remained invisible until broader change suddenly 
stripped away all the topsoil and made everything apparent. It was not like a seedling 
growing into a tree, where we could log its development day by day, but rather like a 
flower bud suddenly bursting into full bloom.  
   
The Power of History  
Erik Zürich suggested that the history of Buddhism is not a “history of ideas” but a 
history of “a way of salvation, a way of life.”75 His reflection emphasized a non-
doctrinal perspective on Buddhist scholarship. After him, scholars went beyond the 
depository of Buddhist scriptures and began to understand Buddhism as a living 
tradition or a manifestation of several social phenomena that have changed 
throughout history. The practically and socially engaged aspects of Buddhism have 
received more and more attention and have been discussed under the rubric of 
religious studies, which was literally derived from the term ‘science of religion’ [G. 
Religionwissenschaft] but has concentrated on the cultural and historical phenomena 
of religion.76 Religious studies is an interdisciplinary area related to sociology and 
anthropology, as well as to history. Along with the establishment of religious studies 
as an independent discipline, Buddhism has been integrated into the constructed, 
 
75 Erik Zürcher, The Buddhist Conquest of China (Leiden: Brill, 1972). 1 
76 For the emergence of the ‘study of religion’ in the West, see Masuzawa, The Invention of World 
Religions: Or, How European Universalism was Preserved in the Language of Pluralism. In North American and 
Europe, it has become segregated into two institutional niches: religious studies and theology.  
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discursive category of ‘religion.’77 The various cultural and social factors that 
contributed to the formation of Buddhism and its later development have been 
assigned as objects of religious studies.  
In the contemporary academic system, the history of religion stands at the 
overlap between theology/philosophy and ‘pragmatic’ religious studies.78 This 
delimitation of this research area seems even more ambiguous if we look at the 
religious studies curricula in many American universities and colleges, which are 
taught by scholars representing a variety of disciplinary areas. ‘History of religion,’ in 
these institutions, has become a ‘virtual code word’ for any specialty other than 
Christianity and Judaism.79 More as a matter of convention and practical necessity 
than as a descriptor of a concrete ‘discipline,’ ‘history’ here means not ‘writing the 
history of religion’ but rather general studies of the non-Western religious traditions. 
In the studies of Chinese Buddhism, the gap between Buddhology and Sinology has 
also been conspicuous; the former has tended to look towards the textual tradition of 
Indian Buddhism, and the latter has focused on the literati culture related to 
Buddhism in China. Writing the history of Buddhism with conceptual reflections, as 
 
77 Some scholars have argued that the term ‘religion’, which emerged quite late, is an “essentially and 
increasingly contested category,” see Roland Robertson, “Modernity and Religion: Towards the 
Comparative Genealogy of Religion in Global Perspective,” Zen Buddhism Today, 6 (1988): 125-33; cf. 
Peter Beyer, “The Modern Emergence of Religions and Global Social System for Religion,” International 
Sociology, 13 (1998): 151-72. For similar attempts in the history of the concept of ‘religion’, see Ernst 
Feil, Religio, 4 vol., (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1986-2007); Jonathan Z. Smith, “Religion, 
Religions, Religious,” in Mark C. Taylor (ed.), Critical Terms for Religious Studies (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1998).  
78 Several articles have discussed the impact of historical discourse on theology in Europe. For 
example, see Kurt Rudolph and Gregory D. Alles, “We Learn What Religion Is from History: On the 
Relation between the Study of History and the Study of Religions,” Historical Reflections/Réflexions 
Historiques 20, no. 3 (1994): 357-76; John McIntyre, “The Uses of History in Theology,” Studies in World 
Christianity 7.1 (2001): 1-20; Gordon E. Michalson, Jr.,  “Faith and History,” in Alister E. McGrath ed., 
Modern Historical Thought (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993); R Kendall Soulen, “The Believer and the Historian: 
Theological Interpretation and Historical Investigation,” Interpretation 53.2 (2003): 174-186. For a 
broader study on the discipline of the ‘history of religion,’ see Russell T. McCutcheon, The Discipline of 
Religion: Structure, Meaning, Rhetoric (London: Routledge, 2003). 
79 See Masuzawa, The Invention of World Religions: Or, How European Universalism was Preserved in the 
Language of Pluralism, 8. 
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some scholars associated with the ‘French school’ have done, is one exception to this 
division of labor, or something in between these two types of scholarship.80 This 
hybrid approach of reading Buddhism historically as an intellectual system, which 
might be named the ‘intellectual history of Buddhism,’ however, has never been the 
mainstream in Buddhist scholarship.81  
Although the rubric of ‘the history of Buddhism’ today is no more than an 
expedient name, in modern Chinese academia, writing the history of Buddhism 
marked the emergence of modern scholarship on Buddhism in China and the 
formation of a new paradigm for knowledge of Buddhism. Admittedly, Buddhist 
historiography had been practiced in premodern China for centuries. However, as the 
traditional systems of faith and history both were deconstructed and re-constructed 
again during the modern era, the old connection between Buddhism and 
historiography also profoundly changed. The new field of the historiography of 
Buddhism presented a unique and significant phenomenon. The new generation of 
historians showed preferences in its approach to Buddhism that neither directly 
originated from the Chinese historiographical tradition nor from the secular ‘new 
historiography’ of the West. Nor were they exclusively incited by religious 
commitment. Rather, this new historiographical approach was derived from the dual 
tasks of defining ‘Chinese Buddhism’: on one hand, Buddhism needed to gain its 
legitimacy as a ‘modern,’ global religion that fulfilled the requirements of modernity. 
It thus utilized the concepts and methodology of scientific historiography, such as 
progressivism and linear time. On the other hand, history treated Buddhism as an 
evidential historical experience through which historians could define the vitality 
 
80 Robert H. Sharf, Coming to Terms With Chinese Buddhism: A Reading of the Treasure Store Treatise 
(Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2002), 1. 
81 This situation may be changing, as attested in a number of recent English-language volumes on 
Chinese Buddhism that include contributions from both Buddhologists and Sinologists; see Peter N. 
Gregory, ed., Sudden and Gradual: Approaches to Enlightenment in Chinese Thought, vol. 5 (Honolulu: 
University of Hawai‘i Press, 1991); Robert E. Buswell, Jr., ed., Chinese Buddhist Apocrypha (Honolulu: 
University of Hawai‘i Press, 1990); and Peter N. Gregory, and Daniel A. Getz, Jr., ed., Buddhism in the 
Sung, vol. 13 (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1999).  
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and uniqueness of their tradition and fulfil their expectation of defending the value 
and independence of their own culture. 
Undoubtedly, all the historians and scholars in modern China who wrote the 
history of Buddhism experienced a time full of turbulent and even violent changes. 
Being part of it, they observed and participated in the transformations that brought 
them both suffering and opportunities. One of the most famous theories about the 
transition China encountered in the modern period is what Joseph Levenson called a 
turn from “culturalism” to “nationalism.”82 During this transition, the ‘universalistic 
pretension’ of the Imperial Qing, namely, Chinese centrality, were entirely smashed. 
Chinese intellectuals then realized that there were other competing values that were 
not inferior variants of the Chinese ones but perhaps were something ‘advanced.’ 
Levenson described this scenario as a struggling process of ‘alienation.’ Levenson’s 
thesis, which has been often read as a narrative of modernization, indicated an 
inevitable demise of ‘Confucian China’ in the face of Western modernity. However, 
the real situation was much more complicated. This transition, albeit in cases passive 
and painful, was also constructive, inspiring both radical self-critique and 
conservative entrenchment, as well as every position in between. The Chinese were 
not simply persuaded by the values of the West, they also tried to defend their own 
values, those they once thought were ‘universal’ but now appeared to be particular. 
In this process, they began to realize the particularity of China—the particularity of 
the terms they used to acquire and advance knowledge, the norms they enforced to 
construct the social system, the languages they uttered when telling the stories of 
their ancestors. The historical experience of Buddhism revealed that there never had 
been a monistic China; therefore, encountering the challenge of re-constructing a 
national identity, the Chinese intellectual elite could widely inspect the traditions 
that shaped them and make themselves open to different options. They did not have 
to choose between ‘Confucian China’ and the West: if Confucianism was a dead end, 
 
82 See Joseph R. Levenson, Liang Ch’i-ch’ao and the Mind of Modern China (Cambridge: Harvard University 




they still had other alternatives besides the path of the West—Buddhism was one of 
them. 
New historical circumstances and options motivated historians to re-write 
history. In premodern China, historians, especially those in the official history 
system, showed less interest in non-Confucianist thoughts. The mission of traditional 
historiography, primarily, was actualizing the proper form of the Dao in the flux of 
time and rationalizing the ‘Mandate of Heaven’ [tianming 天命] through recording the 
activity of the rulers.83 Therefore, the nature of Buddhism as a belief and its 
ingredients of gods, demons, the next life, myth, and supernatural powers, 
determined that records about Buddhism could hardly be categorized as ‘history.’ 
Also, because of the intension to establish Confucian orthodoxy, many conceptual 
and theoretical resources, including Buddhism, were customarily excluded or deleted 
from the traditional system of scholarship. Outside the monasteries, the preservation 
and study of Buddhist scriptures was only stimulated by collectomania or 
antiquarianism among the literati, instead of by any historiographical interest.  
When China entered into an age that was preponderantly characterized by 
modernity and concomitant discourses such as ‘linear time’ and ‘secularization,’ the 
old intellectual paradigm of China began collapsing under unprecedented pressure, 
both internal and external. At this stage, new ideas of history and religion which 
formed in the West became dominate. One of the influential theories was the 
progressive model, the narrative of gradual but steady progress from the lowest, the 
crudest, and the most primitive to the highest, the finest, and the most complex; this 
narrative also often described an upward spiral movement that started from a short 
stage of corruption and degeneration, followed by a precarious recovery and 
maturation, and finally culminating in the fulfillment of a certain ultimate goal. This 
narrative can be observed in Hume’s Natural History of Religion (1756), Hegel’s 
Philosophy of History (1830-1831), and many other accounts of the nineteenth century. 
 
83 Yves Chevrier, “Post-scriptum : La servante-maîtresse : condition de la référence à l’histoire dans 
l’espace intellectuel chinois,” Extrême-Orient, Extrême-Occident 9, no. La référence à l‘histoire (1987). 
Also, Étienne  Balázs, “Chinesische Geschichtswerke als Wegweiser zur Praxis der Bürokratie: Die 
Monographien, Enzyklopädien und Urkundensammlungen,” Saeculum 8 ( 1957): 210-23. 
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These works either suggested a universal form of religious development or, more 
frequently, a new, transcultural, objective worldview of science’s conquest that wiped 
away the magical, religious concepts as obsolete and irrelevant. 
By the time of Ranke, the metaphysical element within Hegel’s history had 
also been largely eliminated. History became a time-honored ideographic, as opposed 
to a nomothetic study of human activities and was transformed into a scientific 
discipline.84 No longer a moral narration of edifying tales about bygone ages, history 
became essentially a work of ‘research,’ in the natural sciences’ sense of the term, 
whose cardinal objective now was to establish certain facts about the past. 
Consequently, the construction of ‘the science of history’ resulted in a prevailing, if 
not dominant, secular paradigm of ‘historiography.’   
Even now, history scholarship is still profoundly influenced by the logic of 
‘historical secularism,’ namely, the idea that historical processes are basically 
determined by secular forces. Current studies of modern Chinese history have paid 
little attention to the Buddhist presence in social, cultural, and political arenas. 
Whether their perspectives have leaned towards Western impact or Chinese 
responses, modernization or revolution, historians have focused primarily on 
political transformation, social structure, ideological shifts, or the lives of several 
representative individuals and have presumed a predominantly secular Chinese 
modernity. A politicalized and scientized view of history, which has been especially 
attributed to the tremendous impact of the May Fourth movement, has always been 
overriding in Chinese academia. This tendency has given later researchers the 
impression that modern Chinese intellectuals did not care about religion or even felt 
antipathy and hostility towards religion. Because of this impression, as well as a 
 
84 This concept of history comes from Dilthey. See Manfred Riedel “Einleitung (Introduction),” in 
Whilhelm Dilthey ed., Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften (Frankfurt/Main: 
Suhrkamp, 1997), 9-80. Previously, the conception of the past, time, and history went through several 
changes. See R. Koselleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2004). On the development of views of history and the problem of historicity in 
nineteenth and twentieth century Europe, see Jeffery A. Barash, Martin Heidegger and the Problem of 
Historical Meaning (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988). 
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consistent marginalization of religion in the agenda for historical study, the most 
informative studies in the field of historiography have been undertaken on the 
Western roots of modern Chinese thought and the consequent response from the 
Confucianist tradition; the significance of other schools of thought, such as 
Buddhism, has been largely ignored.85 
Benjamin Schwartz warned about the danger of considering the May Fourth-
New Culture Movement to be the key turning point in the history of modern China.86 
The May Fourth model87 has been repeatedly criticized for privileging the anti-
traditional tendency as the shared paradigm of most modern historians and therefore 
losing sight of the contribution of historians who did not approve of the assumptions 
of the ‘modern agenda.’88 However, the ‘May Fourth approach’ is still influencing the 
 
85 Based on reflections on the modern landscape of Chinese religion and the deep links between 
religion and society, scholars such as Vincent Goossaert, David Palmer, Adam Chau, Daniel Bays, 
Rebecca Nedostup, Ji Zhe, and others have questioned the narrative of secular modernity and have 
tried to recover the very nature of Chinese religiosity through the historical manifestations of the 
changing religious landscape. 
86 Benjamin I. Schwartz, “Introduction,” in Benjamin I. Schwartz (ed.), Reflections on the May Fourth 
Movement: A Symposium (Cambridge, MA: East Asian Research Centre, Harvard University Press, 1972), 
1-13; also “Themes in Intellectual History: May Fourth and After,” in John K. Fairbank (ed.), The 
Cambridge History of China, Republican China, 1912-1949, vol. 12 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1983), 406-51.  
87 The historiographical approach has been depicted as one part of the ‘intellectual revolution’ of the 
May Fourth Movement. For this issue, see Chow, Tse-Tsung, The May-Fourth Movement: Intellectual 
Revolution in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971); Lin, Yüsheng, The Crisis of 
Chinese Consciousness: Radical Antitraditionalism in the May Fourth Era (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 
1979); Vera Schwarcz, The Chinese Enlightenment: Intellectuals and the Legacy of the May Fourth Movement of 
1919 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986); For the impact of the May Fourth on modern 
Chinese historical methods, see Q. E. Wang, Inventing China through History: The May Fourth Approach to 
Historiography (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001). Like Tang, Xiaobing, Wang used 
Liang’s ‘New Historiography’ as the starting point for modern Chinese historical discourse. According 
to Wang, this ‘new history’ was shaped by two May Fourth notions: nation and science. 
88 Axel Schneider, “Reconciling History With The Nation? Historicity, National Particularity, And The 
Question Of Universals,” Historiography East and West 1 (2003). Also see Hung-Yok Ip, Tze-Ki Hon, and 
Chiu-Chun Lee, “The Plurality of Chinese Modernity: A Review of Recent Scholarship on the May 
Fourth Movement,” review of Fin-de-Siècle Splendor, David Der-wei Wang; Translingual Practice, 




writing of modern Chinese history. Scholars still tacitly acknowledge the anti-
religious tendencies of modern intellectuals, thus neglecting their historical 
interpretations of religion when exploring their attitudes towards tradition.  
Indeed, modern scholars and historians, both from inside and outside 
Buddhist circles, more or less noticed that, as both political and scholarly discourse, 
the ‘spirit of May Fourth’ and its derivatives always urged religion to transform itself 
conceptually by taking ‘science’ as the yardstick. Science, at that time, was the 
dominant, if not the only, criterion of truth. Then, religion was resolved into 
components to fit into the scientific framework of modern knowledge in order to 
avoid being further exiled into ‘superstition.’ In some cases, it was divided and 
reproduced as ‘social phenomena’ that could be coped with using ‘social science’; in 
other cases, it was read as ‘textual heritage,’ the object of the ‘science’ of history. This 
emphasis on science, however, did not mean that those modern historians had an 
anti-religious tendency, but rather was linked with the epistemological status of 
history at the time. By gathering data, texts, and archaeological materials 
comprehensibly within one intellectual system, history places more emphasis on 
objective evidence and demonstrates a ‘will to truth’ when it produces, manages, and 
authorizes our knowledge and memories. Objectivity in the spirit of science served as 
an important basis for this epistemological function of historiography.89  
Meanwhile, modern historiography did not cut itself off from faith. The 
ethical standpoints of historians and their political ideals also played a significant 
role in historical writings. History was seen as having the potential to regulate 
conflicts and bring a sense of order in a variety of realms—political, intellectual, and 
cultural, as Gossmann described: 
By making the past speak and restoring communication with it, it was believed, the 
historian could ward off potentially deconstructive conflicts produced by repression 
and exclusion; by revealing the continuity between remotest origins and the present, 
between the other and the self, he could ground the social and political order and 
demonstrate that the antagonism and rupture—notably the persistent social 
 
89 Edward W. Said, Orientalism, vol. 115 (New York: Vintage Books, 1978). 1-28, 201-84.  
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antagonism—that seemed to threaten its legitimacy and stability were not absolute 
or beyond all mediation.90 
This expectation reinforced the power of history. Confucian Classists, philosophers, 
and Buddhist believers increasingly relied on history to expound and justify their 
own ideas, propositions, and world views.  
Whether ‘Six Classics is historiography’ or ‘Six Classics is historical materials,’ 
these new slogans indicated that the status of historiography in the hierarchical 
system of Chinese scholarship had changed since the mid-Qing period. Traditionally, 
history was dominated by official historiography and constituted mostly of the 
imperial diaries [qijuzhu 起居注], veritable records [shilu 實錄] and dynastic 
histories [zhengshi 正史].91 The collapse of the old order of the Imperial era, however, 
triggered the demise of the central pillars of this discursive structure. Instead, state 
support for the cultivation of historical knowledge shifted to professional historians 
and specialists who mainly worked in research institutes and universities. This new 
generation of historians drew extensively from the West in their attempts to 
establish modern historical practice, but meanwhile, they also tried to bridge the gap 
between new theories and the rich indigenous tradition of China. To them, 
historiography was unique among all the modern disciplines, since it had long been a 
defined and integral part of the traditional cultural fabric and was a deep reservoir 
that could be drawn on.92 Despite the existence of divergent views about traditional 
historical writing, modern historians saw some use in the insights and methodologies 
of historiography: historiography had at least some sort of ‘hard ground’ that was 
 
90 Lionel Gossman, “History as Decipherment: Romantic Historiography and the Discovery of the 
Other,”New Literary History 18, no. 1 (1986): 29.  
91 For a detailed discussion of the development of this official historiography and the system of the 
History Officer [shiguan 史官], see Denis Twitchett, The Writing of Official History Under the T'ang 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
92 The attitude towards traditional historiography can be found, for example, in Liang Qichao’s New 
Historiography in 1902. Liang argued that traditional historiography needs to be transformed, because 
China’s survival depends on it. Other historians, on the contrary, believed that it was historiography, 
as an inherited tradition, that gave meaning to Chinese communities. See Brian Moloughney and Peter 
Zarrow, ed., Transforming History: The Making of a Modern Academic Discipline in Twentieth-Century China 
(Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 2012).  
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unquestionably written on paper, bones, and stones; it also had a power of 
explanation, which could help people understand the changes, ruptures, and 
discontinuities they faced; and, finally, history could always be re-written and 
reformulated to respond to the time. Not surprisingly, with the rising status of 
historiography during the modern period, history replaced the Classics to become 
one of the most important channels for the solution of conflicts and contradictions 
between different worldviews, belief standpoints, and value judgments.  
Indeed, the ‘whole concept of historical truth’ has been called into question 
nowadays, especially in the Western discourse, and people are talking about the ‘lies 
in history’93; however, even the most critical historian in modern China never 
doubted the epistemological status of history. The discovery of new materials and the 
debates on textual authenticity did not really undermine their confidence in 
historical objectivity and universal standards of truth, or result in their rejection of 
the variability in the process of searching for stable and determinate meanings. The 
practices of writing the history of Buddhism showed clearly that “the historicity of 
the criteria of truth” did not stop history from being utilized as a reliable and 
effective way of producing knowledge.94  
Meanwhile, history helped modern Chinese people negotiate the “trauma of 
accommodation” caused by political turmoil and war, producing a sense of coherence 
and identity essential for nation-building.95 At the century’s turn, China experienced 
a profound identity crisis, because of the collapse of the imperial powers and the 
 
93 Ellen Somakawa and Elizabeth E. Smith, “Theorizing the Writing of History or ‘I Can’t Think Why It 
Should Be So Dull,” Journal of Social History 22.1 (1988): 149-161. There is an immense literature on the 
problem of historical knowledge, on historical objectivity, on the historians’ construction of the past, 
and on the very conception of historical reality independent of contemporary discourse. See Lionel 
Gossman, “Towards a Rational Historiography,” Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 79, no. 3 
(1989): 1-68; Carol Ginzburg, “Checking the Evidence: The Judge and the Historian,” Critical Inquiry 18 
(1): 79-92; Joyce Oldham Appleby, Lynn Hunt, and Margaret J. Jacob, Telling the Truth about History (New 
York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1994). 
94 Jeffrey Andrew Barash, “Martin Heidegger in the Perspective of the Twentieth Century: Reflections 
on the Heidegger Gesamtausgabe,” The Journal of Modern History 64, no. 1 (1992): 76. 
95 See Theodore Huters, Bring the World Home: Appropriating the West in Late Qing and Early Republican 
China. (Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi University: 2005), 3. 
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traditional worldview. The old world order, the All under Heaven [tianxia 天下], 
was—as the widely accepted tenet in modern historiography held—to be replaced by 
the nation state [guojia 國家]. In trying to determine Chinese-ness—what it meant to 
be Chinese and what should be excluded—the past was always considered to be a rich 
legacy that needed to be adapted to the current conditions of the nation in order to 
create a shared consciousness of belonging.96 Therefore, many intellectuals, scholars, 
and religious believers in modern China, regardless of how practically they were 
engaged in the present and how much of a utopia they imagined the future to be, 
always returned to history. To them, writing history was not a purely academic 
activity, but a choice, or a stand related to politics—to the enterprise of establishing 
the national identity of China. The reading of Buddhism’s past thus had practical 
implications. Firstly, Buddhism, as an exogenous resource of ideas, was seen by 
modern Chinese historians as an informative example of indigenization, showing how 
to use new, non-local theories and concepts to rejuvenate and develop the national 
spirit. Secondly, the historical process of Buddhist Sinicization proved to be a 
triumph of Chinese indigenous civilization over foreign intellectual tradition, which 
could bring about a sense of national pride. Meanwhile, Buddhism was read not only 
as an active component of Chinese particularity but also as one potential power of 
social transformation, as the experience of modern Japan had shown.97  
The political implications behind the modern Chinese historiography of 
Buddhism suggested a lasting historiographical consciousness—what came after bore 
the imprint of what went on before. Modern Chinese historians and the Buddhist 
elite, facing the same situation as their predecessors had faced two millennia before, 
 
96 Tze-ki Hon, “National Essence, National Learning, and Culture: Historical Writings in Guicui Xuebao, 
Xueheng and Guoxue jikan,” in Historiography: East and West, 1.2 (2004), 240-287.   
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believed that Chinese Buddhism would provide answers about how China could 
participate in the global conversation between civilizations while maintaining its 
‘national essence.’ Although many of the historians I investigate in this dissertation 
claimed no political commitments, they all devoted themselves to this enterprise. 
They were thus not as free as they pretended when thinking of the legacies that they 
consigned to the past. Based on these general observations, in this dissertation, I 
examine a few assumptions behind the ‘historicized Buddhism’ fashioned by modern 
historiography. However, current scholarship on modern Chinese Buddhism has not 
paid sufficient attention to the delicate influence of historiographical discourse on 
people’s understanding of Buddhism. The processes by which Buddhism was narrated 
throughout history as one unit of China’s national identity and the ways in which 
historiography challenged, shaped, and produced knowledge about religion (here 
Buddhism) still remain unclear. We need, as I propose in this dissertation, to realize 
that the alleged features of Chinese Buddhism on a doctrinal or practical level bear 
some resemblance to those features on the historical level. Our understanding of 
Buddhism can be biased or sectarian, and also can be historical, because all the 
claimed ‘truth’ (both religious and historical), which has been denied belonging to 
any specific place and time, has fundamentally arisen from somewhere at a certain 
moment. Therefore, Buddhism, whether for historians, clergy, students, or ordinary 
believers, has always been a tradition handed over from their ancestors but bearing 
some elements of the present.  
 
Scope and Structure 
The historiography of Buddhism is at the disposal of ‘historians,’ which literally 
means people who study and write histories. However, in this present case, further 
categorization is required. Professional historians and amateur historians would be a 
primary division; Buddhist scholars and non-Buddhist scholars would be another. 
Both of these divisions are clear enough but oversimplified. To avoid the pitfall of 




Certainly, history can be written by anyone: academics, dilettanti, storytellers, 
religious pundits, and so on. As many scholars have analyzed, historiography in 
modern China moved from the court or the emperor’s study to universities and 
academic institutions, and from history officers to professors.98 Knowledge about 
Buddhism’s past was previously exclusively kept by the monasteries. Historical 
sources were mainly preserved in the sutra repository of temples and only a few 
educated monks had the permission and ability to access them. However, because of 
the emergence of lay Buddhism, the monastic monopoly on religious knowledge was 
overcome as early as in the Late Ming era.99 In modern China, this trend became more 
intensive. Later, modern Buddhist scholarship emerged in Europe and was soon 
introduced into China, with methodologies designed to analyze religions by means 
that differed from prior Buddhist confessional, theological norms.100 A difference 
between the theology of Buddhism and the historiography of Buddhism gradually 
opened up.  
 
98 For a discussion of the formation of modern academic disciplines in China, see Luo, Zhitian 羅志田, 
“Xixue chongji xia jindai Zhongguo xueshu de yanbian 西學衝擊下近代中國學術的演變” Shehui kexue 
yanjiu 社會科學研究 1 (2003): 107-114; Hou, Yunhao 侯雲灝, “20 shiji Zhongguo shixue de xuekehua 
jincheng 20 世紀中國史學的學科化進程”, in Shixue yuekan 史學月刊 5 (1999): 90-97.; Liu, Longxin 劉
龍心, Xueke yu zhidu: xueke tizhi yu xiandai Zhongguo shixue de jianli 學科與制度: 學科體制與現代中國史
學的建立 (Taipei: Yuanliu, 2002) and Essays in Moloughney and Zarrow, Transforming History: The 
Making of a Modern Academic Discipline in Twentieth-Century China. 
99 Goossaert and Palmer, The Religious Question in Modern China, 35-36. Liu Chengyou 劉成有 showed 
clearly the contributions made by committed lay believers to Buddhology in his Jinxiandai jushi foxue 
yanjiu 近現代居士佛學研究 (Chengdu, Bashu shushe, 2002). For the historical origins of 
Anticlericalism, see Ch’en Kenneth, “Anti-Buddhist Propaganda During the Nan-ch’ao,” Harvard Journal 
of Asiatic Studies 15.1-2 (1952): 166-192; Zürcher, The Buddhist Conquest of China., 254-285; Sylvie Hureau, 
“L'apparition de thèmes anticléricaux dans la polémique anti-bouddhique médiévale,” Extrême-Orient 
Extrême-Occident 24 (2002).17-29. 
100 An analogical example is eighteenth-century Germany, where the biblical criticism conducted by 
secular scholars horrified many churchmen. See T.A Howard, Protestant Theology and the Making of the 
Modern German University (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); W. Clark, Academic Charisma and the 
Origins of the Research University (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2006), chap.7. 
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The development of the modern historiography of Buddhism prompted the 
difference of “the insider/outsider,” as pointed out by Russell McCutcheon.101 The 
‘outsider’ is the academic scholar who studies another’s religion or studies religion as 
an ‘other,’ while the ‘insider’ studies his/her ‘own’ religion. The personages discussed 
in this dissertation consist of both ‘outsiders’ and ‘insiders.’ In the outsiders, I include 
a group of professional historians who had no Buddhist faith and limited contact with 
Buddhist communities but demonstrated different historiographical stands—Liang 
Qichao, Hu Shih, Chen Yinke, Tang Yongtong, and Chen Yuan; the ‘insiders’ refer to 
scholarly saṃgha and lay Buddhists, especially Taixu and Lü Cheng, who represent 
two conflicting attitudes within Buddhist communities. In this study, more emphasis 
will be placed on the former group, for their contribution of providing challenging, 
controversial, and groundbreaking ideas to the historical writing of Buddhism. The 
latter group will also be analyzed as a valuable comparative reference.  
There are, of course, atypical examples, such as Liang Qichao, who stood both 
outside and inside of religious belief, and there were also sub-camps within the 
believers, for example, those of clergy and laymen. However, the divergence between 
insiders and outsiders is significant. The insiders’ history usually seems drawn to 
presenting a picture that is universally and eternally true and rejecting 
acknowledgment that the truth may vary from time to time or place to place. By 
contrast, a historian is accustomed to making relative statements. Doctrinal terms, 
such as karma, interdependence, causality, and the Vinaya codes are much less 
important for historians. Instead, ‘relative’ questions, such as the relationship 
between Buddhism and other cultural, political, and social factors, are more crucial 
for the academic historiography of Buddhism.  
The issue, however, is not simply whether an outsider’s critical findings 
accorded or should have accorded with the self-representations of the religious 
insider, but how this critical, secular, and othering interpretation of Buddhism 
 
101 Russell T. McCutcheon “‘It is a Lie. There’s No Truth in It! It’s a Sin!’” Journal of the American Academy 
of Religion, 74.3 (2006): 720-750; Also see José Ignacio Cabezón, “The Discipline and its Other: The 




formed in a modern context and how this kind of interpretation should be 
understood. How can a ‘secularized’ history get into the world of Buddhism, a world 
cultivated by an ‘ahistorical’ religious worldview? Was the investigation of 
historiography valuable or provocative for the insiders? How did historical 
knowledge negotiate with religious commitments and how has this benefitted a 
modern understanding of Buddhism? And why were religious changes in China’s past, 
as discovered and recovered by historians, so crucial for modern China? As 
Schleiermacher has stated, “history [is] always religious and religion [must] be 
essentially historical”102; these questions, therefore, generalize the historiography of 
Buddhism into a broad discursive field, bridging its two wings of the historiographical 
path and doctrinal concern.  
 My dissertation explores, albeit in a piecemeal fashion, the emergence of the 
modern historiography of Buddhism in early twentieth-century China and seeks to 
recover the half-forgotten venture towards a modernized Chinese Buddhology. 
Falling roughly in the purview of the ‘modern age,’ this study covers a more 
particular timespan: from 1902, when Liang Qichao discussed Buddhism in Chinese 
intellectual history for the first time in his booklet Dashi, to 1965, when the Seminar 
of Buddhism in Nanjing founded by Lü Cheng was closed down and other Buddhist 
academies stopped their teaching and research activities in succession.103 Focusing on 
how the historiography of Buddhism emerged in modern times and how it 
discursively shaped ‘Chinese Buddhism,’ the following chapters are divided into two 
parts: the first two chapters explore the intellectual background and conceptual 
context of the historiography of Buddhism: how modernity influenced both history 
and religion discursively in the early twentieth century and further incited the 
emergence of the historiography of Buddhism. The five chapters in the second part 
 
102 Friedrich Schleiermacher, Bruchstücke der unendlichen Menschheit, Fragmente, Aphorismen und Notate 
der frühromantischen Jahre, K. Nowak ed., (Berlin: Union Verlag Berlin, 1984), 51. 
103 This, not exactly in accordance with historians’ convention of the ‘modern age,’ is defined by the 
actual development of the research agenda rather than a political based periodization. Some works 
published after 1965, for example, Lü Cheng’s two general history of Indian and Chinese Buddhism—
Zhongguo fojiao yuanliu luejiang 中國佛教源流略講 and Yindu fojiao yuanliu luejiang 印度佛教源流略講, 
would not be excluded from this study.  
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investigate, firstly, the major content and achievements in, as well as some 
theoretical and methodological features of, this research area, and secondly, some 
core issues and tendencies behind the writing of the history of Buddhism. In the 
concluding part, I will discuss and evaluate the limitations and influence of the 
historiographical path in Buddhology.  
 The first part of my discussion refers to the transforming discursive space 
within which the new historical views and religious attitudes emerged. The dramatic 
changes in the domain of historiography and in the Chinese religious landscape laid 
the groundwork for the academic legitimization of interpretations of Buddhist 
history. In the first chapters, I contextualize the emergence and development of the 
historiography of Buddhism by laying out some historical movements and conceptual 
changes.  
In Chapter 1, I discuss the changing conception of ‘history’ in the Chinese 
context—from the ahistorical cosmology of Buddhism to premodern Confucian 
historiography, and onwards to the modern historical view imported from the West. 
This reappraisal took place within a vastly expanding intellectual realm, one just like 
that of early medieval China when Buddhism entered the country. As the twentieth 
century began, the historiography of Chinese Buddhism saw a transformation caused 
by the Western framework for ordering the ‘national past’ as part of world history, 
especially through progressivism and historicism. Changes at three levels triggered 
the emergence of the historiography of Buddhism: methodologically, modern 
historiography maintained, or upgraded, history as an epistemological ground of 
knowledge; institutionally, historiography was professionalized and gained its 
independence as a modern discipline; conceptually, it provided new perspectives for 
re-shaping a continuity in traditions and establishing the national identity of China. 
These tendencies, as Partha Chatterjee has argued, were “for a regeneration of the 
national culture, adapted to the requirement of progress, but retaining at the same 
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time its distinctiveness.”104 In this way, Buddhism became an important object of 
historiography.  
Chapter 2 focuses on the equally significant transformation of ‘religion 
[zongjiao 宗教].’ Assuming the narrative of the ‘invention’ of religion is correct (and it 
probably is), I begin this chapter by tracing how the combined neologism zongjiao was 
invented as a modern notion. In the modern Chinese intellectual realm, the term 
‘religion’ was defined by the dual yardsticks of science and ‘superstition’ [mixin 迷
信]. Although Buddhism in premodern times used to be controlled or even banned as 
heterodoxy [yiduan 異端] by officialdom, beginning with the revival of Buddhism in 
the modern era, it gained its legitimacy both due to an engaged model of Buddhist 
modernization and to historiographical interpretations. As I will show in this part, a 
complex mechanism with particular socio-political conjunctions led to a failure of the 
engaged Buddhism and furthered the path of Buddhist nationalism; the 
historicization of Buddhism, however, provided the Chinese with a perspective for 
understanding the historical manifestations of Buddhism and reflecting on its future.    
In the second part of this dissertation, I move to an empirical level, taking a 
closer look at the inner variance within the modern historiography of Buddhism. In 
the third chapter, I initially examine the scholarly environment of the emergence of 
the historiography of Buddhism, including the influence from Europe and Japan. 
Then I draw a few portraits of relevant personae across the modern/traditional 
spectrum, from their education background to their academic interests, and 
document their representative contributions.  
Despite the apparent difference and temporal separation between history and 
religion, the transference of ‘truth’ and ‘faith’ and the reciprocal relationship 
between ‘China’ and ‘Buddhism’ will be discussed in Chapter 4 to Chapter 7 through 
four cases. Each case represents one facet of the overall framework consisting of 
modernity, identity, religion (faith), and history.  
 
104 Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse? (London: Zed 
Books, 1986), 2.  
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It might be surmised that something fundamentally new emerged in the 
historiographical tradition of Buddhism, and this watershed was marked by modern 
signatures on the writing of Buddhist history. This turn, which occurred in the 1900s, 
is the subject of the fourth chapter—the encounter between modernity and the 
writing of Buddhism. The concepts of linear history and evolutionism were two of the 
significant factors that became the dominant logic for historical interpretations. 
However, this progressivist paradigm105 was criticized by several modern intellectuals 
who referred to the concepts of interdependence, graduality, and causation, which 
were based on Buddhist concepts such as karma. Liang Qichao and Taixu are two 
examples who represent how modern Chinese tried to construct the history of 
Buddhism by borrowing from evolutionary theory and how they responded to the 
paradoxes and dilemmas caused by the contradictions between this modern theory 
and Buddhism.  
After examining the adoption and regeneration of the historiography of 
Buddhism on the level of historical concept, in the fifth chapter, I focus on the 
relationship between the historiography of Buddhism and people’s understanding of 
Buddhism. Using historiographical methodology to break the canonical orthodoxy of 
Buddhist texts, the modern historiography of Buddhism, as I show, returned to the 
‘truth’ of Buddhism, using historiographical methods to re-discover the facts about 
Buddhism from textual sources. Further, the textual criticism based on historical 
material went beyond the domain of methodology and demonstrated a deep conflict 
on the issue of ‘objectivity,’ touching upon the fundamental tension between 
ahistorical religious essence and historized truth. With this concern in mind, in this 
chapter I sketch the development of the renewed scholarship of textual criticism 
from the tradition of Evidential Learning in the Late Qing era to the Doubting 
Antiquity School, and further examine three examples—the modern reading of the 
Sūtra of Forty-Two Chapters [Sishier zhangjing 四十二章經], the debates surrounding the 
 
105 For other paradigms of modern Chinese historiography, see Huaiyin Li, Reinventing Modern China: 
Imagination and Authenticity in Chinese Historical Writing (Hololulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 2013).  
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Treatise on Awakening Mahāyāna Faith [Dasheng qixinlun大乘起信論], and Hu Shih’s 
interpretation of Chan Buddhism.  
In Chapters 6 and 7, I explore how political concerns, especially the issue of 
identity, intertwined with historians’ reflections on both history and religion through 
their writing of the history of Buddhism. I shed light upon the issue of the very 
nature of ‘Chinese Buddhism’ and a relevant and essential question: what is, 
fundamentally, the real relationship between Chinese Buddhism and its Indian 
origin? This question is what I see as a crucial concern behind the writing of the 
history of Buddhism in modern China. Instead of answering this question directly, I 
examine the responses that we can read from modern writing on the history of 
Buddhism and analyze these texts as ‘the history of effects,’ in Gadamer’s sense.106 In 
Chapter 6, I focus on the side of historical truth, namely, how historians re-
constructed Buddhism in China’s past through re-narrating Buddhism into Chinese 
national history. Taking Chen Yinke and Tang Yongtong’s critical interpretations of 
‘matching concepts” [geyi 格義] as an example, I investigate how these two 
historians understood the influence of Buddhism on Chinese culture and scholarship 
from the perspective of intellectual history and how they reflected on transcultural 
communication in Chinese history through the history of Buddhism.  
The plurality and estrangement embodied in the modern Chinese 
historiography of Buddhism is representatively shown in Chapter 7 in the divergent 
opinions on the issue of the Sinicization of Buddhism. In this part, I enumerate 
different opinions about the formation of ‘Chinese Buddhism,’ such as the early 
transmission of Buddhism into China, the definition and character of ‘Chinese 
Buddhism,’ the relationship between Buddhism and local culture, and the general 
influence of Buddhism on Chinese history. Based on these discussions, I suggest that 
historians and Buddhist scholars utilized historiography to discover the ‘Chinese-
ness’ of Buddhist tradition. This last chapter serves both to summarize this study and 
 
106 The term ‘the effect of history’ I use here is derived from Gadamer’s ‘effective history,’ which 
involves a relationship of past and present in which the past constitutively determines the present 
through an interplay by bringing its tradition to bear upon it. See Gadamer, Truth and Method, 300.  
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to sketch the beginning of a potential future inquiry into the question of how Chinese 
Buddhism could be understood and expressed in a time when almost all the models, 
paradigms, tracks, and claimed truth received by historians from both their ancestors 
and the West were turning out to be problematic.  
In general, scholars involved in the academic trend of the historiography of 
Buddhism were encamped separately and loosely, due to the divergence of their 
professional orientations and religious tendencies. Also, the abstract presuppositions 
behind religion and history caused these scholars to reconsider their own positions 
constantly, although these presuppositions seldom allowed them to switch between 
camps (Liang Qichao might be an exception).107 Therefore, this study does not consist 
of a batch of academic biographies or a typological study of certain figures, but rather 
is a reflective narration of academic history that consists of several interrelated, 
contradictory voices; each voice presents one facet of the interwoven phenomenon 
that includes religious faith, historical knowledge, political orientation, and 
contemporary issues.  
 
107 As Chang Hao suggested when discussing the writing of the history of Buddhism, the instability of 


















Buddhism has its history. This statement, which seems almost a truism, however, is 
very modern. Admittedly, in different Buddhist traditions, historical writings, not 
only in chronicle form but also in the form of sectarian stories, doctrinal 
bibliographies, gazetteers, biographies of monks, and so on, were created for 
centuries.108 However, due to the particularity of diverse genealogies, lineages, and 
differing spiritual authority, none of these historical writings became a universal 
pattern or was categorized under the rubric of ‘history’ in a modern sense.109 It is only 
at the beginning of the twentieth century under the influence of Qing learning and 
Western theories and methodologies, that historians began to narrate the history of 
Buddhism within the framework of modern scholarship. 
 
Historical Narratives in Buddhist Traditions   
A historical character, nevertheless, could be observed in these ancient practices, 
although ‘secular,’ dynastic historical time conflicts in some fundamental ways with 
the cosmological time of Buddhism. In most cases, traditional Chinese Buddhist 
historiography was a constructed narrative relying on local cultural forces—which 
might be shared by other religious or non-religious traditions—rather than an 
 
108 Timothy Barrett, “History,” in Critical Terms for the Study of Buddhism, ed. Donald S. Lopez Jr. (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 2005), 124.  
109 According to the research of some scholars, given the strong Chinese penchant for historical 
studies, the Chinese word “history” occurs somewhere in some Buddhist texts; the dictionary yields no 
useful equivalent in an Indian language. See Hirakawa Akira, A Buddhist Chinese-Sanskrit Dictionary 
(Tokyo: The Reiyukai, 1997), 237.  
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account based on the nature of Buddhism itself and its primary concerns with time 
and space. 
  
The Buddhist Concept of History 
In the worldview of Indian Buddhism, the condition of life and the essence of 
existence is ultimately transient, evanescent, and inconstant, and hence involves 
suffering [duhkha]. The Buddha, according to the early āgama canon, insisted that the 
beginning [ana-varāgra] of the world process [saṃsāra] is totally inconceivable 
[anamatagga].110 Nevertheless, it is possible to see periods of evolution [vivaṭṭa] and 
dissolution [saṃvaṭṭa] following one another.111 These periods are reckoned in terms 
of aeons [kalpa], each of which is said to be of such immense duration that it can only 
be illustrated by means of a simile. One simile was Buddha’s answer to the questions 
about the beginning and end of time posed by monk Mālunkyāputta: 
Suppose there was a great mountain of rocks, seven miles across and seven miles 
high, a solid mass without any cracks. At the end of every hundred years, a man 
might brush it with a fine Benares cloth. That great mountain of rock would decay 
and come to an end sooner than ever the aeon. So long is an aeon. And of aeons of 
this length not just one has passed, not just a hundred, not just a thousand, not just a 
hundred thousand.112 
This passage indicates that time is immense and out of the realm of the six senses. In 
the Abhidharma tradition, both Theravādins and Sarvāstivādins described the world 
as thrice-thousandfold world-spheres [cakra-vāda] driven by saṃsāra. It is a world 
 
110 For example, see Samyutta Nikāya, ed. Leon Feer (London: PTS, 1884-1904), i.178 ff; and 
Sāratthappakāsini, ed. F. L. woodward (London: PTS 1929-1937), ii. 156, anamattaggo aviditaggo. Later 
Mahāyāna disciples maintained that there is no beginning. See Mūlamadhyamakakārikās des Nāgârjuna, 
avec la prasannapadā commentaire de Candrakīrti, publié par Louis de la Villée Poussin (St. 
Petersburg: Academy of Sciences of USSR, 1903-1913), xi, 1. Also see David J. Kalupahana, “The 
Buddhist Conception of Time and Temporality,” Philosophy East and West 24, no. 2 (1974): 181.  
111 The Dīgho Nikāya, ed. T. W. Rhys Davids and J. E. Carpenter (London: PTS, 1890-1911), iii.84-5; Taishō, 
i.37b-c. 
112 Taishō ii. 242a-243b. Translation quoted from the foundation of Buddhism, Rupert Gethin, The 
Foundations of Buddhism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 113.  
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without spatial limitation and is divided into a hierarchy consisting of thirty-one 
realms in which devas, Mara, Brahmas, human beings, and demons are living. In the 
world-spheres of human beings, the great mountain Meru or Sumeru is in the center, 
surrounded by seven concentric mountains and seas. Beyond those mountains and 
seas are four continents, among which the southern continent, Jambudvīpa, is the 
place inhabited by ordinary human beings.  
The world in Buddhism is not a static system but rather exists in ceaseless 
expansion and contraction. Cosmological time in Buddhism is measured by kalpa. 
According to the the Sarvāstivāda texts, time in the Buddhist world is moving in 
circles, going through a temporal and repeated progress of four stages: the nascent 
[jāti, cheng 成], the static [sthiti, zhu 住], the decaying [jarā, huai 壞], and the cessant 
[nāśa, kong 空].113 Every big kalpa will end with a universal destruction caused by the 
natural forces of fire, water, and wind that sweep across the lower realms of dhyāna.114 
Only the devas and gods in superior world-spheres can escape from the destruction 
and finally enter into the process of nirvana. At the end of aeons, there is no ‘Savior’ 
or ’Messiah’ who leads all the suffering beings to salvation, as promised by the Judeo-
Christian tradition, but a fire from hell that burns up everything; afterwards all 
beings are reborn in the ashes and the wheel of saṃsāra continually moves again.  
The concepts of time and space in Buddhist thought went through several 
changes from early Buddhism to Abhidharmma scholasticism on to the Mādhyamikas. 
In the doctrines of early Buddhism, the recognition of time is derived from the finite 
segment grasped by the six senses. Time and causation, therefore, are empirical and 
relativistic; they exist in the immediate experience.115 However, after the Buddha 
passed away, Abhidharmma scholasticism developed a more metaphorical idea about 
time. In this tradition, time is analyzed into atomic units that are considered absolute 
 
113 Abhidharmadīpa, ed. P. S. Jaini (Patna, K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1959), 104. In other 
traditions, there are different divisions. For example, post-Buddhaghosan Theravāda recognized three: 
the nascent (uppāda), the static (ṭhiti), and the cessant (bhaṇiga). See Sammohavinodani, ed. A. P. 
Buddhadatta Thero (London: PTS, 1923), 7. 
114 Robert E. Buswell, Encyclopedia of Buddhism (New York: Macmillan Reference USA, 2004), 185. 
115 see The Digha Nikāya, ed. T W Rhys Davids; J Estlin Carpenter (London, PTS, 1890-1911), iii 84-5.  
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and real. These units move fleetingly from the future into the present and from the 
present into the past; only the very moment is real. In this view, the division between 
past, present, and future rests totally on the basis of moments [khanena paricchinna], 
which are isolated and discontinuous.116 
The most influential theory about time in the Chinese Buddhist tradition 
comes from the Mādhyamika school. In the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā [Zhonglun 中論, 
Nāgārjuna 龍樹 (c.150 – c.250 CE) contested the Sarvāstivādā cosmological 
conception by denying reality and the existence of time. Based on the fundamental 
assumption that things are coexistent, dependent, and related, he argued that there 
is no past without a future, and there is also no future without a past. In the 
Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa [Dazhidu lun 大智度論], he argued: 
If the three times each had their own characteristics [svalakṣaṇa], they would always 
be ‘present’ and there would be neither past nor future. If the future existed 
presently, it would not be called ‘future’ but indeed ‘present’. … If the past has 
‘passed,’ it loses the nature of the past; if the past has not 'passed,' it does not have 
the nature of the past.117 
According to Nāgārjuna, the recognition of the past, present and further are 
unjustified. Time is non-enduring, non-static, and unmeasurable. To clarify the 
misunderstandings in the thoughts expressed in the Upanisads and Jainism, he used 
the term samaye [sanmoye 三摩耶] instead of kāla [jialuo 迦羅] to criticize the 
conceptual realism of time and claimed that the term ‘time’ was just an expedient, or 
‘fake name’ [prajbapti, jiaming 假名]. Further, he argued that other relevant 
categories of temporality are also just unwarranted interpretations based on 
language usages. Hence, in Nāgārjuna’s concept, time does not exist [shifa wushi 時法
無實].118 
 
116 see Kalupahana, “The Buddhist Conception of Time and Temporality,” 184–85.  
117 Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra, trans. Étienne, Lamotte, translated from French to English by Gelongma 
Karma Migme Chodron, 2001, chapter ii, p.82. In this treatise, Nāgārjuna dedicated one chapter to 
discussing the issue of time.  
118 Da zhidu lun, CBETA, T25, no. 1509. 65c11 
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By criticizing time and causation in the phenomenal world as ‘fallacies’ 
[mithyā-drsti, xiejian 邪見], Nāgārjuna actually called into question the legitimacy of 
history.  Because the past cannot exist without the present and the future, therefore, 
if the past is past, then it is always extinct; if it is not past, then it does not have the 
character of pastness.119 In this view, in the cycling round of rebirth—the uncertain, 
unstable, and unreal world without ‘time’—history is fundamentally meaningless and 
illegitimate: it is neither the trustworthy record of the past nor the description of any 
cosmic order. The universe of Buddhism places its entirety totally in itself, without 
beginning and end, and thus has no history. The narrative of time only exists in 
conceivable experience as a matter of one single moment [kṣaṇa, shana 剎那], which 
is a microcosm of the cosmos at large. Human agency, trapped in the eternal suffering 
of saṃsāra, is also expelled from the passage of time. Hence, time itself, in the form of 
past, present, and future, cannot be understood, grasped, or recorded.120 The very 
format of the historical writing in Buddhist texts—the use of the term “when,” which 
is mostly an equivalent to the conditional particle “if”—indicates that what happened 
in the past is unreachable, unpredictable, and indescribable; it is not even an absolute 
reality.121  
 
119 Ibid. See also K Venkata Ramanan, Nagarjuna's philosophy: as presented in the Maha-Prajnaparamita-
Sastra, vol. 6 (Motilal Banarsidass Publ., 1987), 197. 
120 In Buddhism, time is inherent in discrete factors that therefore must have a continuous essence 
(dravya), stretching from the past, over the present, to the future. In this sense, the ‘temporality’ of 
discrete factors is superimposed by a subjective observer. In Buddhist vocabulary, this is expressed in 
the concept of the “characteristic marks of the conditioned” (saṃskṛta lakṣaṇa): birth (utpāda), change 
in continuance (sthityanyathātva), and passing away (vyaya). As Sinha (1983, 85) remarked, “It is not the 
reality of past, present, and future as three points of time that is posited by Mahāvibhāṣā; rather, it is 
the reality of things or dharmas as past, present, and future that is admitted here.” Braj M. Sinha, Time 
and Temporality in SāṃkhyaYoga and Abhidharma Buddhism (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal 
Publishers Pvt. Ltd, 1983), 85; See also Kuala Lumpur Dhammajoti, Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma (Hong Kong: 
Centre of Buddhist Studies, the University of Hong Kong, 2009), 117-19. 
121 For further studies on the Buddhist concept of time, see Shoson Miyamoto, “Time and Eternity in 
Buddhism,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion XXVII, no. 2 (1959): 118-26. Also, K. Inada 
Kenneth, “Time and Temporality, a Buddhist Approach.” Philosophy East and West 24.2 (1974): 171–79; 
Bart Dessein, “Time, Temporality, and the Characteristic Marks of the Conditioned: Sarvāstivāda and 




Traditional Buddhist Historiography in PreModern China 
Although Buddhism’s understanding of history is complicated and ambiguous, 
narratives about the past were scattered throughout the early Buddhist literature in 
sūtras, monastic regulations, ritual descriptions, and doctrinal interpretations [jingjie 
經解]. In particular, hagiographical accounts of Buddhist figures widely contributed 
to different Buddhist traditions.122 Terms meaning ‘history’ also appeared in places in 
Buddhist texts, although even inveterate recorders of history such as the Chinese 
have seldom considered these stories to be history. 
In the Chinese tradition, the historical narratives about Buddhism, produced 
by monks, history officers, and some literati, were never categorized into the ‘branch 
of history’ [shibu 史部] according to the traditional standard—‘The Four-Branch 
Classification’ [sibu fenlei fa 四部分類法] that divides literature into Classics [jing 
經], History [shi 史]123, Master [zi 子], and Collections [ji 集]. Until the Late Qing 
dynasty, there was still no clear category for religious literature in any large 
collections of books. For example, in the Siku Qushu 四庫全書, edited during the 
period of Emperor Qianlong 乾隆, texts about Buddhism and Daoism were mainly 
collected into the group of ‘masterworks’; in Huangchao jingshiwen bian 皇朝經世文編, 
edited by He Changling 賀長齡 (1785-1848) and Wei Yuan 魏源 (1794-1857), texts 
related to religious belief were classified as ‘customary’ [fengsu 風俗]. As shown by 
these examples, the traditional historical writing of Buddhism, although it sometimes 
presented itself in the form and style of ‘history,’ was still not strictly regarded in the 
traditional knowledge system as ‘history.’124 
 
122 For example, the biographies of Aśvaghosa, Nāgārguna, and Vasubanghu. See John Kieschnick, 
“Buddhism,” in The Oxford history of Historical Writing (Oxford University Press, 2017), 535.  
123 Originally, the meaning of shi in the Chinese context refers to a history officer; lishi means ‘the 
history of dynasties’ [歷代之史]. In this sense, traditional historical writing on Buddhism can hardly fit 
this definition. For the change in the concept of history, see Masayuki Sato 佐藤正幸, Lishi renshi de 
shikong 歷史認識的時空 (Shanghai: Sanlian shudian, 2019), 4, footnote 1. 
124 In the Chinese traditional context, however, there was not a fixed definition of shi. As François 
Jullien argued, shi can be translated as ‘position’ or ‘circumstances,’ and at other times as ‘power’ or 
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This absence of Buddhism in the ‘branch of history’ was attributed by some 
modern scholars to the innate deficiency of historical consciousness in Indian 
culture. For example, Liang Qichao mentioned in his article “A General Overview of 
Indian Buddhism” disappointedly that “Indian people are lacking in historical 
thinking, so that there is even not a single credible history to provide [us] any 
basis”;125 other scholars, such as Jiang Weiqiao蔣維喬 (1873-1958) and Tang 
Yongtong, made similar statements.126 However, it should be acknowledged that a 
strong penchant for writing and recording the past had infiltrated the Chinese 
Buddhist tradition: the historicity in Chinese Buddhist accounts was indisputable; this 
tradition also encompassed a variety of historiographical formats, including histories 
of monasteries, the bibliographies of Buddhist scriptures, the stories of Buddhist 
figures, and the chronologies of events. Such historiographical touches in these 
traditional writings, although more or less in keeping with the genre of Indian 
Buddhist literature, owed much more to the native historiographical conventions of 
pre-Buddhist China in terms of style, content, framework, and the standard for the 
selection of historical materials. They were fundamentally the outcome of the local 
historiographical culture, especially the historiographical tradition of shi 史, which 
related to Confucian discourses.127 
The earliest credible textual records of Buddhism in Chinese history can be 
found in the Hou Hanshu 後漢書 compiled by Fan Ye 范曄 (398–445). He recorded two 
events that both happened in A.D 65 (the eighth year of Yongping 永平): the Buddhist 
worshipping of King Ying 英 of the Chu kingdom楚128 and the famous story of the 
 
‘potential.’ See François Jullien, The Propensity of Things: Toward a History of Efficacy in China, Janet Lloyd 
trans, (New York: Zone Books, 1999). 
125 Liang Liang Qichao, “Yindu fojiao gaiguan 印度佛教概觀,” in Foxue yanjiu shibapian 佛學研究十八篇 
[SBP] (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2011), 40. 
126 Yongtong Tang, “Yindu zhexue jiangyi 印度哲學講義,” in TYQJ, (Shijiazhuang: Hebei renmin 
chubanshe, 1999), 189. Jiang Weiqiao, Zhongguo gojiao shi 中國佛教史 (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin 
chubanshe, 2007), 1. 
127 For an overall study on Chinese Buddhist historiography, see the unpublished work of John 
Kieschnick, Buddhist Historiography in China, forthcoming.  
128 Fan, Ye 范曄, Hou Hanshu, vol.42. 
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dream of Emperor Ming of the Later Han dynasty.129 These two stories were widely 
accepted and valued by Buddhist historians as authentic and credible descriptions of 
the beginning of Chinese Buddhism. 
Stories about the earliest stage of Chinese Buddhism, which were originally 
vague and mythical, went through a process of ‘narrativization.’ They ceaselessly 
gained detail and were developed into coherent, embellished, plotted texts. The later 
Buddhist historical narratives, although produced in an era that was further away 
from the time the events they described actually happened, continued to accumulate 
detail in their content. This strategy was considered a solution to the problem of the 
inevitable loss of textual records and physical evidence. By adding detail, Buddhist 
historians were able to fill the gaps within the timeline of their narratives, 
compensating for the shortage of historical materials and making their writings 
easier to transmit and to be accepted by their audience. Therefore, these narratives 
were produced by intentional behavior that was motivated both by a religious 
imperative to persuade believers and a responsibility to tell the claimed ‘true’ version 
of a story.  
To a large extent, traditional Buddhist narratives are a kind of literature that 
combines imagination with authentic facts, namely, a hybrid in which miracle tales, 
oral accounts, records of inscription, and archives were utilized without division. 
When compiling histories, Buddhist historians were accustomed to patching together 
different sources into a single narrative or account, and did not waver before the 
fragile balance between truth and faith like their modern counterparts. The 
‘histories’ that they formulated about Buddhism’s past were ‘real’ to them. The 
credibility of these traditional writings, however, seemed very tenuous under the 
scrutiny of modern scholarship. To modern readers, these writings were splendid 
sources of historical data but meanwhile were highly suspect because of their mixed 
content of facts filled in with imaginative deductions. Nevertheless, Chinese 
historical narratives of Buddhism still could be counted as the most systematic and 
 
129 Ibid, vol.2.  
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advanced records in the premodern Buddhist world, not only because of their wide-
ranging content but also because of their various formats and genres.  
Most of the traditional historical writings are collected in the Xuzangjing 續藏
經, which contains around 200 volumes. The predominant form of these writings is 
biography, especially hagiographical accounts of eminent monks.130 However, texts 
about the history of Buddhism demonstrate diversity and flexibility and were 
composed to fulfill different requirements. This phenomenon caused huge difficulties 
in categorization when modern scholars tried to analyze them thoroughly and 
comparatively.     
 Some scholars arranged Chinese Buddhist historical literature into categories 
borrowed from Confucian historiographical tradition.131 However, this categorization 
sometimes led to overlapping sub-catagories and confused frameworks for quoting 
standards based on content and on format at the same time. Chen Yuan, the first 
scholar in modern China who conducted systematic studies of Buddhist literature, 
provided a comparatively reasonable classification by only referring to the contents 
of the texts132: 1) biographies, including the biographies of monks, nuns, and other 
Buddhist figures133; 2) bibliographies, which focus on recording the origin, version, 
content, translation, and contribution process of Buddhist scriptures, as well as other 
 
130 See Kieschnick, “Buddhism,” 536. 
131 For example, Lan Jifu 藍吉富 classified Buddhist historical writings into nine categories: 1. 
biographies; 2. annuals; 3. histories in annual-biography form; 4. institutional history [會要]; 5. event-
based records [jishi benmo ti紀事本末體]; 6. bibliographies; 7. histories of sects; 8. specialized history; 
9. historical manual books; this catalogue, however, ignored the characteristic of Buddhist historical 
materials and overlooked the Buddhism-related texts in the official histories. See Lan Jifu. Fojiao shiliao 
xue 佛教史料學 (Taipei: Dongda tushu gufen youxian gongsi, 1997). 
132 Yuan Chen, Zhongguo fojiao shiji gailun 中國佛教史籍概論 (Shanghai: Shanghai shudian, 2005).This 
book was compiled based on Chen’s early lecture notes and was published in 1962 by Zhonghua Shuju 
中華書局. For a critical review of this book, see Cao Shibang 曹仕邦, “A Study Of Ch’en Yuan’s Chung-
kuo fo-chiao shih-chi kai-lun論陳垣中國佛教史籍概論,” Chung-Hwa Buddhist Journal, no. 3 (1990): 261-
300. 
133 The most representative works in this category are Huijiao’s 慧皎 (497-554) Gaoseng Zhuan 高僧傳 
and the two works that continued this tradition: the Xu Gaoseng Zhuan 續高僧傳 complied by Daoxuan 




general information, such the date, author, and volume134; 3) histories of sects and 
lineages, which are dedicated to establishing the orthodoxy of particular schools or 
sects as well as recording the activities and sayings of the Buddhist masters properly 
according to a lineage of transmission135; 4) catalogues of collections of Buddhist 
historical texts136; 5) historical phono-semantic books, which trace the long-term 
historical development of certain language usages in Buddhist texts and provide 
references to the sounds and meanings of Buddhist terms by quoting numerous 
Buddhist allusions both from scriptures and other branches of Chinese literature.137  
On the one hand, traditional Buddhist historical writings obviously often 
share features with the Chinese historiographical tradition, especially the genre and 
format of the official dynastic histories. The two general histories written by the 
monks of the Tiantai school, Shimen zhengtong 釋門正統 and Fozu tongji 佛祖統紀, for 
example, replicate the annual-biographical format of the official histories in their 
narratives. This framework consists of ‘basic annuals’ [benji 本紀], ‘hereditary 
houses’ [shijia 世家], ‘ranked biographies’ [liezhuan 列傳], ‘treaties’ [zhi 志], ‘tables’ 
[biao 表], etc.138 Other historical writings, such as the Gaosengzhuan, follow the style of 
earlier non-Buddhist historical works, especially Shiji 史記 and Hanshu 漢書, using 
commentaries—both eulogies [zan 贊] and disquisitions [lun 論]—at the end of each 
biography to praise and blame historical figures’ behaviors and actions.  
 
134 The most valuable works contain the Chu sanzang jiji 出三藏記 complied by Seng You 僧祐 (445-
518); Lidai sanbao ji 歷代三寶記 complied by Fei Zhangfang 費長房 (?); and Kaiyuan shijiao lu 開元釋教
錄 compiled by Zhisheng 智昇(?). 
135 For example, Denglu 燈錄 compiled by the Chan school and Fozu tongji 釋門正統 and Shimen 
zhengtong 佛祖統紀 compiled by the Taitai school. 
136 The most important and well-known works are Hongming ji 弘明集, Daoxuan’s Guang Hongming ji 廣
弘明集  and Daoshi’s 道世 (?-683) Fayuan Zhulin 法苑珠林.  
137 Two representative books in this group are Yiqiejing yinyi 一切經音義 by Hui Lin 慧琳 (733-817) and 
Xu yiqiejing yinyi 續一切經音義 by Xilin 希麟 (?). 
138 Shimen zhengtong recorded the Buddha and Nāgārjuna in basic annuals [benji 本紀] and later Chinese 
patriarchs in hereditary houses; it also imitated the style of Jinshu 晉書 to record the historical events 
of the other schools of Chinese Buddhism in the “Appended Records” [Zaiji 載記]. Fuzu tongji, followed 
the style of the Weishu 魏書, had nine treaties compiled at the end of the book, including a 
bibliographical record of the textual canons of the Taitai school, a record of the interactions between 
Buddhism and Taoism, and historical materials about Manichaeism and Zoroastrianism. 
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On the other hand, these Buddhist narratives also profoundly influenced 
historical writings about non-Buddhist traditions as well. Two representative 
examples are the bibliographies of the canon [jinglu 經錄] and the Lamp records. 
Compared to Confucians or Daoists, Chinese Buddhists paid more attention to 
recording the origin, reception, and changes of their scriptures over a long-term 
spectrum. For example, in Chu sanzang jiji, the first systematic bibliography of Chinese 
Buddhist literature, Sengyou set up different categories (including a record of origins 
[yuanji 緣記], a list of terms [minglu 名錄],139 a brief introduction to the scripture 
[jingxu 經序], and biographies of the translators [liezhuan 列傳]) to record useful 
information about Buddhist literature, including translators, exegetes, and dates and 
locations of the translating activities, as well the social background of certain texts.140 
Because the informative content of the Buddhist jinglu, this format of bibliography 
was not only maintained in later Buddhist works, such as Ouyi Zhixu’s 蕅益智旭 
Yuezang zhijin 閱藏知津,141 but also established a pattern for traditional 
bibliographical scholarship [mulu xue 目錄學], a special research field that reached 
its peak of development in the Ming and Qing dynasties.142 
The genre of denglu was created by the Chan school. This kind of historical 
narrative customarily discussed the lives and teachings of a succession of individual 
masters. The status of the Chan school at any given time, therefore, could be defined 
by the biography of the reigning patriarch. Through this approach, the traditional 
orthodoxy of the Chan School could be established by sorting the lineal relations 
 
139 The sub-categories Sengyou applied included: translated canons of past dynasties [lidai chujing歷代
出經], which had a determined title and date; scriptures based on same original Sanskrit text [yichu jing
異出經]; ancient scriptures based on same original text that did not exist anymore [guyi jing古異經]; 
translated scriptures without the name of the translator [shiyijing 失譯經] and Vinaya texts. See 
Sengyou, Chu sanzang jiji, CBETA, T55, no. 2145, 1a07 
140 The original sentence is “緣記撰，則原始之本克昭；名錄詮，則年代之目不墜；經序總，則勝
集之時足徵；列傳述，則伊人之風可見.” See ibid. 
141 Other examples include Lidai sanbaoji and Kaiyuan shijiao lu. 
142 Buddhist bibliographies influenced works such as Chen Zhensun’s Zhizhai shulu jieti 直齋書錄解題, 
Ma Duanlin馬端臨’s Wenxian tongkao文獻通考, Zhu Yizun’s 朱彝尊 Jingyi kao 經義考, and so on. See 
Liang Qichao, “Fojia jinglu zai Zhongguo muluxue zhi weizhi佛家經錄在中國目錄學之位置” (1926), 
in SBP.  
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among Chan masters to show where individual masters belonged in the Chan ‘clan,’ 
which traced itself back to the ‘grand ancestor,’ Śākyamuni Buddha.143 One of the 
denglu, Jingde chuandenglu 景德傳燈錄, is regarded as the prototype for the way in 
which the multi-branched Chan tradition was formed and accepted in intellectual 
circles.144 Under its influence, similar historical writings recording Confucian lineage 
and transmission between Confucian masters were developed in the Song dynasty. 
For instance, Yiluo yuanyuan lu 伊洛淵緣錄 written by Zhu Xi 朱熹, the Mingru xuean 
明儒學案 by Huang Lizhou 黃梨洲, and Ruling zongpai 儒林宗派 by Wan Jiye 萬季野 
all followed the model of denglu and were considered an advanced form of recording 
the development of scholarship.  
Besides, historical data related to Buddhism can also be found in official 
histories. Accounts of the activities of monks and nuns were scattered in the 
biographies of non-Buddhist figures, members of royal families with Buddhist beliefs, 
and elite lay Buddhists. Some historians organized or enumerated Buddhist literature 
in a bibliographical form and wrote brief introductions to these individual texts, as 
Fei Zhangfang did in his Jingji zhi 經籍志 in the Suishu 隋書.145 Records of events 
related to Buddhism or Buddhists had also been recorded by court documents about 
foreign affairs, records of diplomatic activities, and geographic reports.146 Issues such 
as the debates around Buddhist doctrines and local thought, the persecution or 
promotion of Buddhism conducted by emperors, and so on, were also recorded by 
official historians with special attention.147  
 
143 For a detailed discussion about the ‘transmission of the Lamp’ histories, see John R. McRae, The 
Northern School and the Formation of Early Ch’an Buddhism (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1986), 
72-97.  
144 The position of denglu among Chan transmission records is universally acknowledged; see, for 
example, Jan Yün-hua’s entry, “Chan yü-lu” in William H. Nienhauser, ed., The Indiana Companion to 
Traditional Chinese Literature (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 202. 
145 Other examples include the bibliography in Suishu jingji zhi 隋書經籍志. 
146 Both Weishu 魏書 and Yuanshi 元史 contain treaties titled shilao zhi 釋老志. 
147 For example, when compiling Liang shu 梁書, historian Yao Silian 姚思廉 (557-637) recored the 
entire text of Shenmie lun 神滅論 [On the extinguishment of spirit] written by Fan Zhen 范縝 (450-510), 
which attacked the philosophical thesis of Buddhism by rejecting the existence of spirit in the afterlife. 
In Fan Zhen’s biography, Yao also recorded the Buddhist emperor Wu’s response and criticism to Fan’s 
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These writings provided the historians and Buddhist scholars who re-wrote 
the history of Chinese Buddhism with important and reliable information, not 
because of the religious sacredness of these texts, but because of their abundant data 
and scholarly style.148 As early as the time of Sengyou and Huijiao, monastic historians 
had established a strict standard for selecting primary materials and emphasized the 
scholarly activities and pilgrimage of monks. By means of compiling biographies and 
bibliographies, the monastic historians attempted to establish supreme doctrinal 
principles and the moral ideal of the saṃgha through carefully arranging previous 
textual materials and seriously recording the activities of eminent figures.149 Sengyou, 
for example, clearly described this way of writing as “to produce reliable history” 
[cun xinshi 存信史] and “to select accurate records [qu shilu 取實錄]” in his Chu 
sanzang jijj.150 A sense of lineage and orthodoxy might exist in the writings of the early 
Buddhist historians like Sengyou and Huijiao but was somehow extremely dim. They 
were not interested in presenting a balanced assessment of the state of Buddhist 
monasticism over its first 400 years in China151 but composed their works as 
collections of exemplars—models of behavior for future monks—and as evidence for 
believers of the potentiality of perfection.152  
Along with the Sinicization of Buddhism, a genealogical tendency 
to enumerate patriarchal generations—a way of defining Buddhist orthodoxy—
became stronger in historical writings from the Tang dynasty onwards.153 This Chan 
 
article.147 Another example is the records about Huilin 慧琳 (?). His biographical records and his 
famous article Baihei lun 白黑論 were recorded by Nan shi 南史 and Song shu 宋書. However, as a 
‘Buddhist heretic,’ he was intendedly excluded by Hujiao in his Gaoseng zhuan. 
148 Kieschnick, “Buddhism,” 543.  
149 Ibid, 543 
150 Chu sanzang jiji, 1b. Cf. Arthur E. Link, “Shih Seng-Yu and His Writings,” Journal of the American 
Oriental Society 80, no. 1 (1960), 34–40, where the preface is translated in full, with annotation. Sengyou 
expressed similar sentiments in the preface to his now-lost collection of biographies of monks in the 
Sarvāstivāda tradition, in Chu sanzang jiji 12, 89a. 
151 Kieschnick, “Buddhism.” 543. 
152 Ibid, 543. 
153 Hu Shih, “The Development of Zen Buddhism in China,” in The Chinese Social and Political Science 
Review 15.4 (1932): 492. 
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patriarchal tradition reflected a conventional type of “historical consciousness” and a 
fundamental aspect of the Chan monks’ concept of time.154 The historical writings 
after the Tang dynasty, although they demonstrated a fascination with a more 
literary voice, as shown in the Lamp records, should not be interpreted as examples 
of the degeneration of historicity but should rather be treated as examples of the 
contextual production of new ways of establishing sectarian identity and the 
independence of Buddhism. The denglu texts were retrospective in nature; they 
interpreted the past as a means to justify the present. These records were narratives 
that highlighted the ways the Chan tradition wished to remember their own 
champions. Thus, the biographical framework in denglu became the means to reveal 
the hallowed principles of a unique Chan identity. The need to affirm these principles 
drove the interpretation of monks’ lives. In this sense denglu served the didactic 
purposes of Buddhism’s own special version of hagiography, rather than actually 
approaching biography. 
Taking into account their diverse genres and formats, modern scholars read 
the historical narratives of Buddhism in traditional China as layered recollections 
that encompass memories, imagination, legends, and textual records in formats such 
as inscriptions, scrolls, and so on. For example, to Hu Shih, the Lamp Records were 
forged to assert revisionist claims regarding Chan orthodoxy;155 they were best read 
as historical fiction rather than truly biographical records.156 However, although 
these traditional narratives were not ‘perfect’ histories, they actually represented the 
collective memory of Chinese Buddhists and expressed their most cherished 
aspirations. Through the filtered memory of successive generations and the 
exigencies associated with the rising prominence of a sect, recollections of the famed 
masters began to take on system of their own; the lineage of indigenous Buddhist 
sects also began to form. This historical construction, with a particular concern for 
 
154 Bernard, Chan Insight and Oversight,182-183. 
155 John R. McRae, “Religion as Revolution in Chinese Historiography: Hu Shih (1891-1962) on Shen-hui 
(684-758),” Cahiers d'Extrême-Asie 12, no. 1 (2001), 11-65. 
156 The notion that Chan records should be read as fiction was proposed by Yanagida Seizan; see, for 
example, “Shinzoku tōshi no keifu 新続灯史の系譜,” in Zengaku kenkyū 禪學研究 59 (1978): 5. 
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the biographies of Chinese patriarchs and the genealogies of native schools, reflected 
the whole picture of the doctrines and practices of Chinese Buddhism according to 
the requisites of its newfound independence. Finally, along with Chinese Buddhist 
historiography reached its peak in the Song dynasty, Chinese Buddhism eventually 
established its sacred sites, canons, and ideals, as well as its own character. By 
recording and narrating its past, Chinese Buddhism revealed the hallowed principles 
of its unique identity and formed its orthodoxy; and consequently, Chinese Buddhism 
distanced itself from its Indian origin and moved further and further in a direction of 
indigenization or ‘Sinicization.’ 
 
Dao and the Historiographical Duty 
Buddhist historical writings in premodern China are not merely the annotation of the 
Dharma; rather, they demonstrate a religious function of establishing the sacredness 
of Chinese Buddhism and its ethical standards, behavior patterns, and lineage 
orthodoxy. Therefore, organizing and narrating Buddhist traditions in a historical 
form was one unique way through which the Chinese understood and interpreted the 
Buddha’s teaching. This historical recording was deeply influenced by the tradition of 
Chinese historiography, as the Chinese always observed the Buddhist past through 
the Confucian ‘spirit of history’ and actualized the abstract Buddhist Dharma with 
authentic stories, real figures, and secular expressions.    
  When investigating the conceptual foundation of Buddhist historical 
narratives in premodern China, we cannot ignore the Chinese historiographical 
tradition. China has a long, stable structure of history called ‘the official history’ 
[zhengshi 正史]. According to Benjamin Schwartz, this historiographical structure is 
closely related to the “high-culture” constituted by the Six Arts [liuyi 六藝] in the 
Pre-Qin period.157 From the Han dynasty onwards, this knowledge system of the Six 
Arts had been gradually canonized to become the Confucian Five Classics and became 
 
157 Benjamin Schwartz, “History in Chinese Culture: Some Comparative Reflections,” History and Theory 
35, no. 4 (1996), 10 
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the official scholarship [guanxue 官學]. Among these Five Classics, the Chunqiu 春秋, 
which are believed to have been written or edited by Confucius himself, set up the 
paradigm for traditional historiography.  
This paradigm set by the Chunqiu, which was labelled by later historians the 
‘spirit of Chunqiu,’ continued throughout the whole spectrum of Chinese history. The 
core of the spirit of Chunqiu is a normative order, the Dao 道. The Dao, in a 
traditional sense, does not point to an apocalyptic/eschatological destination but 
rather is an abstract ideal with potentiality, waiting to be actualized within the flux of 
history and embraced by all of entire civilized humankind.158 In history, the belief in 
the order of the Dao was paradigmatically expressed by the worship of ancestors or 
sages and the ritual enactment of sacrifices, coronations, and divine activities. 
Through rituals, religious and political elements, from devotion and sacrifice to oath 
and punishment, were closely intertwined. It was the function of history officers to 
witness and record those ritual events as well as the sacred behavior of the emperors, 
which was legitimatized by the Mandate of Heaven[tianming 天命].159  
Indeed, the Dao had its religious function and could be expressed by ritual 
enactment.160 By rationalizing the legitimacy of the ruling clan as the actualization of 
the Mandate of Heaven, religion and politics were closely combined and mixed in 
historical writings.161 In this way, the historiographer derived his or her eminently 
powerful ethic-political position. This position was further reinforced because the 
normative order in Chinese culture was not perceived as accessible to humans 
through divine revelation but was posited as once having been actualized in real 
 
158 Schwartz, “History in Chinese Culture: Some Comparative Reflections,” 27. 
159 For a study of history officers in premodern China, see Denis Twitchett, The Writing of Official History 
Under the T'ang (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
160 Religious elements can be observed in Chinese historiographical traditions, such as the Gonyang 
tradition 公羊. See Joachim Gentz, “Language Of Heaven, Exegetical Skepticism And The Re-Insertion 
Of Religious Concepts In The Gongyang Tradition,” in Early Chinese Religion: Part One: Shang through Han 
(1250 BC-220 AD) (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2009). 
161 Axel Schneider, “Nation, History and Ethics: The Choices of Post-Imperial Historiography in China,” 
in Transforming History: The Making of a Modern Academic Discipline in Twentieth-Century China, ed. Peter 
Zarrow Brian Moloughney (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2012), 274. 
 67 
 
history during the Three Dynasties.162 Unlike the history of the premodern West, the 
Dao, the essential principle represented by shi, was not conceptualized as a 
preordained given. but rather had to be represented through sacred rituals or moral 
examples. To traditional historians, the Dao was the principle of the world and the 
abstract norms of society and human affairs. It provided the ‘standards’ [li 理] for 
changes and individual behavior. Therefore, traditional historiography was a hybrid 
of recording and evaluating; it had as well the dual characteristics of reliability and 
sanctity, and was profoundly involved in the Chinese epistemological and 
sociopolitical systems.163 Shi thus acquired a quasi-absolute status in the field of 
human activity, providing privileged, if not exclusive, access to heavenly truth.164 In 
this sense, history in China sometime took on the sacred role of religion and became 
the proper expression of ultimate order and the principle of value judgment. 165 As we 
can see in the many official histories, deviant behaviors would be condemned by 
history instead of by ‘God’; history also established moral and ethical models.166 
Exemplary historical writings such as the Chunqiu and the Shiji established this 
long-lasting tradition of Chinese historiography, which has been usually called 
‘history as mirror [yishi weijian 以史為鑒]’, alluding to the metaphor of the “mirror” 
that historian Sima Guang 司馬光 (1019-1086) used in the title of his masterpiece, 
Zizhi tongjian 資治通鑑. Writing history, accordingly, ultimately fulfilled two 
complementary functions, closely linked but not without internal tension: written 
history chronicled what had happened in the past by critically examining and 
analyzing  records of past times as truthful as possible; yet it also manifested the 
 
162 Erich Haenisch, “Das Ethos der chinesischen Geschichtschreibung,” Saeculum 1, no. 1 (1950), 111-23. 
163 Yves Chevrier, “La servante-maîtresse : condition de la référence à l’histoire dans l’espace 
intellectuel chinois,” 137. 
164 Masayuki Sato, “The Archetype of History in the Confucian Ecumene,” History and Theory 46, no. 2 
(2007), 218-23. 
165 Stefan Tanaka and Axel Schneider, “Chinese and Japanese Historiography,” in Oxford History of 
Historical Writing, ed. Stuart MacIntyre Daniel Woolf (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
166 Chinese rulers normally were highly self-conscious about their historical legacy. They were 
extremely concerned about how their behaviours would be recorded in history and considered ‘the 
man of historical guilt’ [lishi de zuiren 歷史的罪人] as the most negative epithet.  
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cosmic order by expressing praise and blame [baobian 褒貶].167 In this sense, the 
truth in Chinese history was formed based on ‘real’ facts, as revealed by witnesses 
and records;168 Meanwhile, this kind of truth was not ‘scientific’ but was profoundly 
mixed with the normative judgments of the historians. Therefore, the truth in 
traditional Chinese history was also a selected and constructed reality. When this 
truth conflicted with the historians’ values, they then expressed their confusion and 
criticism through blame.169 These two tendencies were deeply intertwined in 
traditional Chinese historiography and played pivotal roles in the mission of bridging 
‘truth’ and ‘values.’170  
Chinese traditional historiography, in general, was based on the Confucian 
worldview. Certainly, this historiographical tradition was conceptually far away from 
the Buddhist understanding of time and space.171 However, we can still imagine how 
this Confucian historiographical tradition influenced Buddhist historians for 
centuries. Without doubt, they must have felt some parallels between the two 
 
167 Yang Lien-sheng 楊聯陞, “The Organization of Chinese of Chinese Official Historiography: Principles 
and Methods of the Standard Histories from T’ang through the Ming Dynasty,” in W. G. Beasley and E. 
G. Pulleyblank (eds.), Historians of China and Japan (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 44-59. 
168 The historians’ attitude  can be seen in Sima Qian’s writing: In the first sentence of the ‘Arrayed 
Traditions’ [Liezhuan 列傳] section of the Shiji, Sima Qian clarified how he determined reliability in the 
face of an abundance of historical material: “The records and texts of scholars are extremely extensive, 
but we still test reliability in the six arts” [夫學者載籍極博，猶考信於六藝]. 
169 One example is Sima Qian’s comment on Boyi 伯夷 and Shuqi 叔齊, who were both people with 
immoral behaviours but who experienced success lives. He said, “I am so confused with the Dao of 
Heaven”[余甚惑焉，儻所謂天道，是邪非邪？]. See “Boyi, Shuqi liezhuan伯夷叔齊列傳,” in Shiji, 
vol.61.  
170 E.G. Pulleyblank, “Chinese Historical Criticism: Liu Chin-chi and Ssu-ma Kuang,,” in Historians of 
China and Japan, ed. W. G. Beasley and E. G. Pulleyblank (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 2-3, 
135-166. 
171 For example, Wolfgang Bauer has argued that the Buddhist concept of time differs from the 
traditional Chinese cyclic concept of time in that the latter lacks an aspect of progress (in a karmic 
way). See Bauer, Geschichte der chinesischen Philosophie (München: C. H. Beck, 2006), 37-8. Kurita Naomi
栗田直躬 has documented how Chinese time is timeliness, cosmic, natural, or sociopolitical, in his 
Chûgoku Shisô ni okeru Shizen to Ningen 中國思想におけゐ自然と人間 [Nature and the human in Chinese 
thought] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1996), 149-187. For studies of the concept of time and space in 
Chinese history, see also the essays collected in Chun-chieh Huang and John B. Henderson (ed.), Notions 
of Time in Chinese Historical Thinking, (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2006). 
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traditions: the sages in Confucianism and Śākyamuni and his eighteen Arhats in 
Buddhism; the three golden ages in ancient China and the Buddha’s land; the cyclical 
time of wuxing and the movement of saṃsāra; the actualization of the Dao and the 
appearance of the Maitreya Buddhas; and so on.172 The form, content, and style of the 
traditional Buddhist historical writings presented the local influence. The biographies 
of monks, the Lamp Records, and the genealogical narrative of Buddhist lineages and 
sects not only filled the ‘emptiness’ [Śūnyatā, 空] of Buddhist time with some 
continuums (although these were not strictly in chronological order) but also were 
burdened with a similar historiographical duty to the official histories—these 
Buddhist texts were intended to elevate ethical paragons and monastic ideals through 
baobian.173   
What should be underscored here is the very nature of Chinese traditional 
Buddhist historiography: it tells religious stories with a ‘secular’ tone. For example, 
when rendered into the Chinese language, the Buddhist term for ‘prophecy’ 
[vyākarnaṇa], was translated as ‘records’ [zaiji 載記], which had a strong historical 
implication.174 Most importantly, however, the Chinese historical writing of Buddhism 
accepted the presupposition of the Chinese historiographical tradition that there is a 
setting of the Dao and a group of moral archetypes—the sages, who represent the 
proper forms of Buddhist perfection and the bodhisattva path. Entangled with moral 
standards and ethical considerations, the Chinese historical writing of Buddhism 
provided guidance for monastic life, arranged and valued the authentic doctrines, 
formed ‘orthodoxy’ 正統 by establishing the lineage of the transmission of Dharma, 
 
172 In early medieval Chinese discourse, dao—one of the multiple ‘ways’ or ‘paths’—was used as a 
ubiquitous way of nominalizing ‘religion.’ This term can be found in many Buddhist texts. See 
Robert Ford Campany, “On the Very Idea of Religions (In the Modern West and in Early Medieval 
China),” History of Religions 42, no. 4 (2003): 300-06. For the relationship between Buddhism, Taoism, 
and Confucianism on a language level, also see Shi Zhiru, “Contextualizing Buddhist Approaches to 
Religious Diversity,” in Religious Diversity in Chinese Thought, ed. Perry Schmidt-Leukel and Joachim 
Gentz (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
173 Kieschnick, “Buddhism.” 
174 ‘Prophecy’ [shouji 授記/受記] means a buddha predicts that the vow-making bodhisattva in his 
presence will become such-and-such a buddha in the future. However, its Chinese translation contains 
the word ‘ji,’ which originally meant ‘record.’  
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and functioned as an important means for solving the belief crisis and sectarian 
conflict.175 To traditional Buddhist historians, searching for the real successor of the 
Buddha and building the legitimacy of the genealogies of masters were extremely 
important.176 Therefore, Buddhist historians in premodern times paid great attention 
to recording the mysterious rituals of ‘transmission’ and were extremely sensitive 
about the pedigrees of sects or schools. Especially in some more indigenized 
traditions, such as Chan Buddhism, it was very palpable that the loose constellation of 
Indian Buddhism was replaced by a historicized, exclusive system of lineage, which 
was worshiped just like the kinship in the Confucianist tradition.  
 
Facing New Historiography  
As the imperial age came to an end, Buddhism, like other traditions, was faced with 
the task of re-constructing its intellectual foundation based on a new order of 
discourse. In this process, Buddhism began to create its ‘history’ (in the modern 
sense) by adopting new historiographical theories and gradually re-established the 
knowledge about its past. Therefore, the question would be why writing the history 
of Buddhism became meaningful and possible at this time, and what kind of history 
really arose from this process.  
The emergence of the modern historiography of Buddhism is one facet of the 
so-called “revolution of historiography” [shijie geming 史界革命] advocated firstly 
by the leading intellectual Liang Qichao.177 This revolution was dramatic. Modern 
historiography, although sometimes it did not fundamentally change the existing 
system of scholarship or any substructure in people’s ideas, behaviors, or faith, 
 
175 Kieschnick, “Buddhism,” 543.  
176 John Jorgensen, “The ‘Imperial’ Lineage of Ch’an Buddhism: The Role of Confucian Ritual and 
Ancestor Worship in Ch’an’s Search for Legitimation in the Mid-T’ang Dynasty,” Papers on Far Eastern 
History 35 (1987): 89-133. 
177 For the contribution of Liang Qichao to historiography, see Tang Xiaobing, Global Space and the 




evolved along different trajectories to form a modern understanding of China’s past, 
developing new standards, using new vocabulary, and breaking into new domains.178  
Similar to other new historiographical themes that appeared, the core of the 
historiography of Buddhism was the idea of ‘tradition’—namely how historians 
defined the content and boundaries of tradition, looking for its position in a changing 
cultural environment, addressing its relationship with modernity, and responding to 
the built-in tensions. From the perspective of modern Chinese historians, their 
practices of writing the history of Buddhism were motivated by divergent strands of 
inquiry: the recognition of the importance of Buddhism as a form of traditional 
culture, the intellectual conviction of the philosophical and logical assertions 
contained in Buddhism, and many other private or localized factors. Whether they 
were professional historians or believers, their interests in this field can neither be 
simply attributed to religious zeal nor to emotional ties nor to pure academic 
curiosity. Instead, this research trend was closely influenced by internal and external 
forces, such as the passion for defending traditions or beliefs, nationalist sentiments, 
the sense of instability and anxiety caused by the changing environment, and so on. 
Different positions and purposes could be observed within this trend: the desire to 
build a new identity other than Confucianism as an ideological pattern for the coming 
age; or the drive to encompass religious traditions into domains labeled as ‘the 
history of ideas’ or ‘the history of philosophy’ so they could be incorporated into a 
modern knowledge system; or a wish to resist the impacts of modernity and 
fundamentally question its presuppositions and promises from the stances of 
Conservatism or Classicism [fugu zhuyi 復古主義]; and so forth.  
 
 
178 A useful discussion on this issue can be found in Achim Mittag, “Chinas Modernisierung und die 
Transformation des chinesischen Geschichtsdenkens unter westlichem Kultureinfluß–Drei Thesen,” in 
Geschichtesdiskurs: vol.4: Krisenbeweßstein, Katastrophenerfahrungen und Innovationen 1880-1945, 
ed. Wolfgang Kuttler, Jörn Rüsen, and Ernst Schulin (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 
1997). General studies on the history of Modern Chinese historiography, see, for example, Xu Guansan 
許冠三, Xin shixue jiushi nian 1900- 新史學九十年 1900- (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1986).  
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Impact from the West 
In the late nineteenth century, China’s traditional historiography was challenged by 
new concepts of history coming from the West, at the levels of both epistemology and 
methodology.179  
In the West, the new, modern understanding of history as one important 
segment of modernity was deeply rooted in a ‘disenchanted’ worldview. After the 
Enlightenment, the old biblical timeline in historical writing, which promised divine 
revelation and eschatological hope, was replaced by a linear model of movement 
towards a secularized future. The notion of time was neutralized and transformed 
into an abstract, homogeneous, and empty mechanism, in line with the principles of 
modern science. In this process, as Heidegger described, humankind was removed 
from its past and could only gaze at or observe its object: the world.180  
Corresponding to the ‘new (modern) age’, history, in Hegel’s notion, no longer 
entailed the collection of stories (histories, in Koselleck’s term) or led towards divine 
salvation, but pointed to a teleological end—a metaphysical, universal spirit of the 
world.181 As Koselleck argued, this historical consciousness opened up the future as 
“the horizon of expectations” in a utopian fashion while cutting off its link with the 
“space of experience” in the past.182 The meaning of history then was not the 
recollection of memories of the past, but the construction of the experience of 
 
179 For the transformation of Western historiography, see Ernst Breisach, Historiography: Ancient, 
Medieval & Modern, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). Chapter 15-16. Also, Donald R. 
Kelley, Fortunes of History: Historical Inquiry from Herder to Huizinga (New Heaven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 2003), chapter 7.  
180 Martin Heidegger, “The Age of the World View,” Boundary 2 4, no. 2 (1976). 
181 Reinhart Koselleck, "Historia Magistra Vitae: The Discourse of the Topos into the Perspective of A 
Modernized Historical Process,” in Futures Past: on the Semantics of Historical Time (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2004). 
182 For the philosophy of history in Hegel’s style, see Otto Pöggeler, Eine Ende der Geschichte? Von Hegel zu 
Fukuyama (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1995); Joe McCarney, Hegel on History (London: Routledge, 
2000). Jörg Baberowski, Der Sinn der Geschichte. Geschichtstheorien von Hegel bis Foucault (Munich: C. H. 
Beck, 2005).  
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progress, which contained a “historically new quality, constantly subject to being 
overlaid with utopian conceptions.”183 
This consciousness of time and history dramatically expanded the 
differentiation between the future and the past, intensifying the dilemma of 
modernity: as Habermas wrote, “modernity can and will no longer borrow the 
criteria by which it takes its orientation from the models supplied by another epoch; 
it has to create its normatively out of itself.”184 According to Jürgen Habermas, to 
solve the dilemma of self-assurance and to reconcile the gap between past and future, 
two conceptions consequently emerged: on the one hand, “the stubborn belief in 
progress” of evolutionism and the philosophy of history based on subjectivity;185 on 
the other hand, the neutralization of all standards fostered by historicism, as they 
imprison history in the museum and tell the events “like the beads of a rosary.”186 
  From Nietzsche to Ranke down to Heidegger, Hegel’s constructive concept of a 
universal and singular, capitalized ‘History’ and progressivism’s historical-political 
understanding of the “modern age” were contested, because this concept promised 
constant improvements and developments in all fields of human life, regardless of 
the particularity of actions and ideas. To this extent, Hegel’s ‘History’ failed to 
reconcile historical relativity with universal norms. The philosophy of history and 
the concept of progress behind this view of history were replaced by more objectivist 
and fact-based historicism in the middle of the nineteenth century.187 However, this 
 
183 Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, trans. and with an introduction by 
Keith Tribe (New York: Columbia University Press 2004), 266. 
184 Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures, trans. Frederick Lawrence 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1987), 7.  
185 In Hegel’s notion, ‘subjectivity’ refers to a) individualism; b) the right to criticism; c) autonomy of 
action; d) idealistic philosophy. See Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures. 7-
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186 Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures. 11 
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new concept of history was soon criticized as well.188 In Walter Benjamin’s view, 
historicism was merely a functional equivalent of progressivism and the philosophy 
of history.189 By historicizing all standards and ideas, and even the notion of history 
itself, studies on history only demonstrated the relativity of values and revealed the 
meaninglessness of existence. This ‘crisis of historicism,’ as it was called by Ernst 
Troeltsch and Karl Löwith, would lead to a tragic corruption of history: they lamented 
that “the scholarship of history, so central to the formation of the national and social 
identity in the nineteenth century, has lost its relevance.”190 
As the nineteenth century ran its course, the Western concepts of 
historiography travelled globally. The advances in the natural science supported the 
progressive view of history; Ranke’s critical history gained its persuasive power; and, 
later, the increasing challenge to the existing social order gave strength to the 
Marxist idea of history.191 Those currents, nevertheless, profoundly influenced the 
historical understanding of the Chinese.  
 
The Collapse of the Foundation of History 
Modern historiography in China, which was profoundly influenced by both the 
Chinese historiographical tradition and Western theories such as progressivism and 
historicism, was full of controversies.192 Because of constant external stimulus, from 
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192 For the transformation of Chinese Historiography in the nineteenth century to the twentieth 
century, see Axel Schneider, Wahrheit und Geschichte: Zwei chinesische Historiker anf der Suche nach einer 
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the Opium War of 1840 to Japan’s imperialistic aggression during the Second World 
War, the traditional Sino-centric self-image of China fell apart. It was a painful 
experience for the Chinese people, and this experience became even more bitter 
when some insightful intellectuals realized that tradition, which used to be coherent 
and stable (albeit with inner contradictions), was hopelessly left behind in the past 
and no value judgment could rely on it. Regardless of whether they saw traditional 
Chinese views of history as cyclical, linear, or regressive, old histories failed to 
explain the changes they observed and experienced and could not help them to 
understand the new modern world. As the Chinese learned more about the way that 
Western imperialism was helping to entrench the nation-state system around the 
globe, they were forced to rethink their own systems and their knowledge about the 
past.  
This desperate situation led some pioneers to question the ‘old order’ and to 
pursue a new worldview. 193 They realized that truth and value had been torn apart; 
these two dimensions could not be unified in the writing of history, as they used to 
be. Joseph Levenson described this situation as a feeling of “alienation”: 
History and value are worlds apart, but men are drawn to both, with an emotional 
commitment to the first and an intellectual commitment to the second; they need to 
ask the two incompatible questions, and they yearn to be able to answer “Mine” and 
“True.”194 
Levenson considered this dilemma a fundamental intellectual change during the 
modern China period that marked the change from a “culturalist” China to a 
nationalist China. He insightfully noticed the rupture between ‘truth’ and ‘value,’ and 
he described modern Chinese intellectuals as “emotionally tied to but intellectually 
alienated from Chinese cultural tradition.”195 In other words, the modern 
 
193 John K. Fairbank, “Introduction: the Old Order,” in The Cambridge History of China, ed. John K. 
Fairbank (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 2.  
194 J. R. Levenson, “‘History’ and ‘Value’: Tensions of Intellectual Choice in Modern China,” in Studies in 
Chinese Thought, ed. Arthur Wright (Chicago: Univesity of Chicago Press, 1953), 150.  
195 Levenson, Confucian China and its Modern Fate: A Trilogy, 98.  
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intellectuals’ respect for the resources in Chinese tradition was in opposition to their 
new recognition of the universal values represented by the West.  
Other scholars, like Yu Ying-shih 余英時, placed more emphasis on the built-
in tensions within tradition, which led to an internal impulse for self-evolution. This 
critique of tradition was not stimulated by outside impact, but rather began from the 
inside. Traditional China did collapse at the “hardware” level—the level of politics 
and economy—but survived and continued on the level of culture196 through a kind of 
autonomous “inner logic.”197  
Both Levenson and Yü Ying-shih have tackled the ‘gap problem’ and added 
different facets to the overall picture of the conflicts in the intellectual world of 
modern China. Their explanations both basically admit the crucial discontinuity of 
the Chinese tradition in the conceptual dimension and suppose an inevitable 
separation of ‘truth’ and ‘value,’ but their arguments are based on their observations 
of ‘Confucian China.’ Moreover, neither the theory of ‘challenge-response’ nor the 
theory of ‘inner logic’ can answer one crucial question: if Chinese tradition needed to 
be changed and modern Chinese intellectuals were forced to fill the gap between past 
and future and between truth and value in order to respond to the challenge of 
modernity during the nineteenth century, why did the Westernization movement 
and the putative success of modernity quickly lose its attraction for some 
intellectuals, such as Zhang Taiyan, Wang Guowei, Liu Yizheng, Chen Yinke, Qian Mu, 
and even Liang Qichao (in his later years)?198  
One of the reasons why the dilemma of the ‘gap’ in this transition age seemed 
so severe probably was that most of the initial concerns and questions that had 
prompted the intellectuals to venture into the storehouse of traditions—for example, 
which indigenous factors had caused the marginalization of Confucianism in the 
intellectual life of the Chinese? Which cultural elements in Chinese history could help 
 
196 Yü Ying-shih, Fang Yizhi wanjie kao 方以智晚節考 (Beijing: Sanlian, 2004), preface, 9.  
197 Yü Ying-shih, “Qingdai sixiang shi de yige xinjie shi 清代思想史的一個新解釋,” in Lishi yu sixiang 
歷史與思想  (Taipei: Lianjing, 1976), 124-25. 
198 For a discuss of these allegedly ‘conservative’ historians, see Schneider, “Nation, History and Ethics: 
The Choices of Post-Imperial Historiography in China.” 
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to save China from its descent and crisis?—were still highly dependent on value 
judgment and belief. 199 Although at that moment judgments were beginning to refer 
to new standards and beliefs were starting to be expressed in the new terminology, 
these two dimensions, which once constituted the central concern of traditional 
Chinese historiography, were still crucial, or even more crucial than before, because 
they were related to some critical challenges China was encountering, such as the 
reorientation of  national identity, the reassurance of Chinese cultural heritage, the 
reestablishment of the historical continuity of China as a cultural entity, the 
reformation of China’s relationship with the world, and so on.200 These historical 
issues went beyond the domain of the traditional Chinese world of all-under-heaven 
and were therefore less relevant to the old cosmic order and ethical questions.201 
Because of its potential for solving these issues, history was able to maintain its 
responsibility for making evaluations, forming patterns, and resolving the conflicts 
between the old and the new. Therefore, although the foundation of traditional 
history nearly collapsed in the modern period, China’s efforts to understand the 
changing world were constantly transformed into an impulse to read the past 
again.202  
 
The Rise of Historiography 
 
199 History was unique among the other modern disciplines in at least one respect: history had long 
been a clearly defined and integral part of the traditional cultural fabric. Most academic disciplines 
were creations of the modern era. See Moloughney and Zarrow, Transforming History: The Making of a 
Modern Academic Discipline in Twentieth-Century China, 2.  
200 See Achim Mittag, Chinas Modernisierung und die Transformation des chinesischen 
Geschichtesdenkens und westlichem Kultureinfluß,” in Geschichtsdiskurs: vol.4: Krisenbeweßtsein, 
Katastrophenerfahrungen und Innovationen 1880-1945, ed. Wolfgang Kuttler, Jörn Rüsen, and Enrst Schulin 
(Frankfurt: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1997), 355-79. 
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202 Hu Chang-tze, “On the Transformation of Historical Thinking in Modern China,” in Chun-chieh 
Huang, Jörn Rüsen ed., Chinese Historical Thinking: An Intercultural Discussion (Göttingen: V&R unipress 
GmbH, 2015), 65-71. 
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Before Zhang Xuecheng 章學誠 (1738-1801) uttered his famous slogan “the six 
Classics are all history” [liujing jieshi 六經皆史], the Qing scholarship was generally 
“lowering history while raising the Classics” [loushi rongjing 陋史榮經].203 However, 
this situation changed with Zhang and Zhao Yi 趙翼(1727-1814). ‘Historiography’ 
[shixue 史學], which had been treated as an appendage of Classical Learning, began 
to be promoted as the core branch of scholarship.204 After Hui Dong 惠棟 (1697-1758) 
and Dai Zhen戴震 (1727-1777), historians emphasized more and more the texts that 
had been long ignored by former Classical Learning.205 To these Qing scholars, the Six 
Classics were no longer sacred doctrines, but rather textual records about the past. 
The Dao itself, which used to be fixed in the Classics, could or should be 
temporalized/historized.206  
From the Mid-Qing onwards, mainstream Qing scholarship went further in the 
direction of the ‘historicization of the Classics.’207 This re-construction of jing and shi, 
namely the tendency to treat the Classics as the object of history, was widely 
accepted by the next generation of historians.208 When Zhang Taiyan re-proposed the 
slogan “the Six Classics are history,” he further elevated the status of history and 
 
203 See Chen Yinke, “Chen Yuan ‘Yuan Xiyu Ren Huahua Kao’ Xu 陳垣「元西域人華化考」序,” in 
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University of Rochester Press, 2012). 
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齋先生年譜 (Taipei: Yuanliu, 1986), 158. 
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claimed that history is about the whole of society, about the condition of humans. In 
this sense, “ancient histories are also Classics” [gushi jiejing 古史皆經].209 Confucius 
himself, as Zhang Taiyan provocatively remarked, was not a sage, but a historian.210  
These bold and ‘deconstructive’ claims changed the basic principle of 
historiography and thus opened the space for non-canonical materials that had long 
been ignored.211 Traditional textual sources then were equally read as problematic 
data and were labeled as ‘national heritage’ waiting to be arranged via 
historiographical methods and techniques.212 As Fu Sinian 傅斯年 once claimed: 
The national heritage is material, not concept. 國故是材料，不是主義.213 
Basically, the new generation of Chinese historians no longer regarded classics, 
histories, masters, and collected writings as a taxonomy to categorize knowledge but 
 
209 Taiyan Zhang, “Qiushu 訄書 [The Book of Urgency],” in Zhang Taiyan Quanji 章太炎全集 (Shanghai: 
Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1984 [1900]), vol.3. 154. 
210 Ibid. For Zhang’s evaluation of Confucius, also see Chen Bisheng 陳壁生, “‘孔子’ 形象的現代轉折—
章太炎的孔子觀, Zhongguo Renmin daxue xuebao 中國人民大學學報, 3 (2015): 154-162. 
211 For the raising of the status of historiography during the Late Qing period, see Luo Zhitian, “Qingmo 
mingchu jingxue de bianyuanhua yu shixue de zouxiang zhongxin 清末民初經學的邊緣化與史學的
走向中心,” Hanxue yanjiu 漢學研究 15.2 (1997): 1-35.  
212 Before 1900, the term ‘historical data/materials’ [shiliao 史料], which had seldom appeared in texts, 
was not clearly defined or widely used. For example, in the late Ming dynasty, scholar Wang Shizhen 
王世貞 and Dong Fubiao 董復表 compiled a book titled Yanzhou shijiao 弇州史料. However, shiliao here 
means collected materials in text form. Perhaps because the Japanese used the term shiliao to translate 
the concept of ‘the materials of historiography,’ this term was introduced into China as a neologism. 
Liang Qichao first discussed this in his New Historiography. See Max k.W. Huang, Liang Qichao yu 
Zhongguo xiandai shixue zhi zhuixun 梁啟超與中國現代史學之追尋, in Jindaishi yanjiu suo jikan, 
Academia Sinica 中研院近代史研究所集刊, 41 (2002): 183. Traditionally, there is actually huge 
difference between ‘history’ and ‘historical materials.’ See Yü, Lun Dai Zhen yu Zhang Xuecheng: Qingdai 
zhongqi xueshu xixiang shi yanjiu 論戴震與章學誠:清代中期學術思想史研究. Fansen Wang, “The New 
Historiograohy and its Critics in the Republic,” in Zhongguo jindai sixiang yu xueshu de xipu中國近代思
想與學術的系譜 (Taipei: Lianjing, 2003), 377-462.  
213 Fu Sinian, Mao Zishui ‘Guogu yu kexue jingshen’ shiyu 毛子水「國故與科學精神」識語,” in Fu 
Sinian quanji 傅斯年全集 (Taipei: Lianjing聯經, 1980), 4: 1258-60. Further discussion see Sang Bing, “Fu 
Sinian ‘shixue zhishi shiliao xue’ zaixi 傅斯年「史學只是史料學」再析,” Jindai shi yanjiu 近代史研究, 
no. 5 (2007): 26-41. 
 80 
 
rather regarded them as a source providing the basic historical materials for 
scholarly research.214  
But meanwhile, when the ‘orthodoxy’ conveyed by the Six Classics was 
exposed to suspicion and criticism, history kept its cognitive value, even as it lost its 
normative function and its concern for ethics. Historiography became somewhat 
more ‘useful’ [tongshi zhiyong 通史之用] due to its epistemological function. This 
transformation, in general, led to three phenomena: firstly, because all the historical 
data were considered equal, historians paid more and more attention to new 
resources, including newly discovered textual or archaeological materials and long 
reachable but less-read texts in the categories of religion, literature, art, folklore, and 
so on. The horizon of history thus became broader. Secondly, since history somehow 
had escaped from its former burden of Confucian ethics, it became more specialized 
and professional, developing into an independent discipline that relied on a large 
body of evidence and sophisticated methodology and techniques.215 Third, as a wave 
of translated sociological and anthropological books introduced from the West, the 
idea that history was about people, the nation, and society as a whole was reinforced. 
Although this idea had begun to take root in Chinese soil before the demise of 
imperial historiography, it became more powerful in conjunction with the new 
emphasis on the scientific nature of historical research and its social implications. 216   
 
214 Liu Longxin, Xueshu yu zhidu: Xueke tizhi yu xiandai Zhongguo shixue de jianli 學術與制度: 學科體制與
現代中國史學的建立 (Taipei: Yuanliu, 2002), 163. 
215 One related development was the emergence of private historiography. Huang Zongxi, Gu Yanwu, 
Wang Fuzhi, and the later Kaozheng school are all representative examples. See Ng, On-cho. ‘Private 
Historiography in Late Imperial China,' in José Rabasa, Masayuki Sato, Edoardo Tortarolo, and Daniel 
Woolf (ed.), The Oxford History of Historical Writing: Volume 3: 1400-1800 (Oxford, 2012; pubd online Mar. 
2015). Also see On Cho Ng and Q. Edward Wang, Mirroring the Past: The Writing And Use of History in 
Imperial China (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2005), chapter 8. 
216 Some scholars made efforts to group historians into separate schools, each defined by the 
distinctive positions from which they approached the business of researching and writing about the 
past. See Sang Bing “Zhongguo jindai xueshushi shang de daotong yu liupai 中國近代學術史上的道統
與學派,” in Xinyin houchuang yu bupo buli: jindai Zhongguo xueshu liupai yanjiu 先因後創與不破不立: 近
代中國學術流派研究, ed. Sang Bing and Guan Xiaohong (Bejing; Sanlian shudian, 2007), 1-42. 
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Along with the expansion of the historical materials under study, Chinese 
scholarship also entered into a new stage of what Wang Guowei 王國維 (1877-1927) 
called “New Learning” [xinxue 新學]. The ‘newness’ of this trend comprised new 
research perspectives:  
Those who talked about the Classics discussed New Text Confucianism, those who 
studied history discussed the Liao, Jin and Yuan dynasties, and those who studied 
geography brought the four barbarians into their scope. 言經者及今文、考史者兼
遼金元、治地理者逮四裔.217 
As Wang observed, a tendency of “changing everything” [biange yiqie 變革一切] had 
widely emerged in academia. Instead of following “the existing path of scholarship” 
[weixue zhi chengfa 為學之成法], scholars of the new generation “committed to 
doing what no one has done before” [wuwei qianren suo buwei 務為前人所不為].218 
New patterns of scholarship, which Hu Shih described as “the revival of heterodoxy 
[yijun de fuhuo 異軍的復活],219 had inspired Chinese scholars to understand the 
Chinese cultural heritage from new angles.220  
 To the intellectuals who had said farewell to ‘Confucian China’, history 
bridged the new world they were longing for and their cultural home where they had 
grown up. This was the starting point of Liang Qichao’s reformation of Chinese 
historiography. He noted that: 
 
217 Wang Guowei, “Shen Yian xiansheng qishi shouxu 沈乙庵先生七十壽序,” in Guantang jilin 觀堂集林
in Wang Guowei yishu 王國維遺書 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1983). 
218 Ibid. See Luo Zhitian, “‘New Learning’ in Daoguang and Xianfeng Period and Studies on the History 
of Learning in Qing Dynasty: An Introduction to On China’s History of Learning in Recent 300 Years,” in 
Journal of Sichuan University (Social Science Edition), 146 (2006), 8-14. 
219 Hu Shih, “Hu Shih to Qian Xuantong [ 胡適致錢玄同] (1932. 5. 10),” cf. Geng Yunzhi 耿云志, Hu Shih 
nianpu 胡適年譜 (Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1989), 198. 
220 Here, Hu Shih had summarized an important paradigm of research, namely, the study of zhuanshi 
專史. The history of religion can be categorized into this paradigm. See Tang Degang, Hu Shih Koushu 
zizhuan 胡適口述自傳. Chapter 10, “Guogu jikan faxing zongzhi 國故季刊發行宗旨.” 
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Among all the disciplines currently practiced in the West, the only one already 
present in China is historiography. 於今日泰西通行諸學科中，為中國所固有者，
為史學. 221 
Liang underscored both the revolution and continuity of historiography: he felt there 
were some useful insights and methodologies in traditional historiography, but it 
could and should be re-made—China’s survival depended on this. Writing, or 
rewriting, history, he claimed, was the first step in renovating Chinese scholarship 
and thus the first step of rejuvenating the Chinese nation.222 This New Historiography
新史學223 would help Chinese scholarship recover its “most supreme status, and 
become the leader of the world’s academia.”224 Through the discursive, revolutionary 
power of historiography, as conceived by Liang and his peers, the morale of the 
Chinese would be boosted, the nation would be saved from crisis, and China’s 
supremacy in the global order would be recovered.225   
 
The Choice of Chinese Historiography  
 
221 Liang, Qichao, “Xin Shixue 新史學,” in YBSHJ, Wenji: 9, 1. 
222 See Huang Jinxing 黃進興, “Zhongguo jindai shixue de shuangchong weiji: shilun ‘Xinshixue’ de 
dansheng ji qisuo minlin de kunjing中國近代史學的雙重危機：試論「新史學」的誕生及其所面臨
的困境,” in Journal of Chinese Studies中國文化研究所學報 6 (1997): 263-284.  
223 For details and background on Liang’s “New Historiography,” see Tang Xiaobing, Global Space and the 
Nationalist Discourse of Modernity: The Historical Thinking of Liang Qichao (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1996) and Edward Q. Wang, Inventing China through History: the May Fourth Approach to 
Historiography. 
224 “最高尚最榮譽之位置, 而更執牛耳於全世界之學術思想.” Liang Qichao, “Lun Zhongguo Xueshu 
Sixiang Bianqian Zhi Dashi 論中國學術思想變遷之大勢,” YBSHJ, Wenji: 7, 2. 
225 For the political background of Liang’s historiography, see Huang Minlan 黃敏蘭, “Liang Qichao ‘Xin 
shixue’ de zhenshi yiyi ji lishixue de wujie” 梁啟超《新史學》的真實意義及歷史學的誤解, in 
Jindaishi yanjiu 近代史研究 80.2 (1994): 219-35; Wang Fansen 王汎森, “Wan Qing de zhengzhi gainian 
yu ‘Xinshi xue’” 晚清的政治概念與 ‘新史學’, in Ershi shiji de Zhongguo: xueshu yu shehui - shixuejuan 20 
世紀的中國: 學術與社會-史學卷, ed., Luo Zhitian 羅志田, vol. 1, pp. 1-30; Yoshihiro Ishikawa 石川禎
浩 “Ryō Keichō to bunmei no shiza” 梁啓超と文明の視座 [Liang Qichao and the view of civilization] 
Buddhism and Japan), in Kyōdō kenkyū Ryō Keichō: Seiyō kindai shisō Juyō to Meiji Nihon 共同研究梁啓超―
西洋近代思想受容と明治日本, ed. Hazama Naoki 狹間直樹 (Tokyo: Misuzu shobô 1999), 106-131. 
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Facing formidable, rapid, and often violent changes, historians, both in the West or in 
China realized that the old concept of time, no matter whether cyclical or regressive, 
could no longer serve as the framework for the writing of history; it also became 
powerless to depict the changes in a systematic, coherent way.226 The situation of 
China at the turning point of the modern age seemed more complicated due to the 
country’s escalating conflicts with foreign powers. China had to Westernize itself by 
utilizing the new conceptual and technical tools from the West, but it also needed to 
construct its own path that met the special requirements of its local conditions. 
Chinese intellectuals, therefore, needed to overcome the rupture between the 
horizon of expectation and the space of experience; they also needed to recover the 
continuity of their culture in order to establish a national identity once again and, 
moreover, to allow the heritage of Chinese civilization to compete in the global ‘free 
market’ of ideas alongside other thoughts. Because of all these tasks, writing history 
in modern China can be better understood as a discursive activity through which its 
authors tried to form new understandings about their nation, identity, and culture, 
corresponding to the notions of science, rationality, progress, and so on. History, 
then, found itself at the center of the arena where discourses and worldview(s) 
battled.227 
One widely used but somewhat oversimplified classification of modern 
Chinese historiography was a threefold division between the traditionalists, the 
 
226 There are plenty of books and articles on the crisis of history, for example, Jacob Burckhardt, “Die 
geschichtlichen Krisen,” in Jacob Burckhardt, Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen. Über geschichtliches 
Studium. Historische Fragmente (Leipzig: Dieterich, 1985), 155–197; Gerhard Masur, “Crisis in History,” 
Dictionary of the History of Ideas, 4 vols., ed. Philip P. Wiener (New York: Scribner, 1968), vol. 1, 589–596; 
Martin Jänicke, “Krisenbegriff und Krisenforschung,” in Herrschaft und Krise. Beiträge zur 
politikwissenschaftlichen Krisenforschung, ed. Martin Jänicke (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1973), 10–
25; Rudolf Vierhaus, “Zum Problem historischer Krisen,” in Historische Prozesse, Beiträge zur Historik, ed. 
Karl-Georg Faber and Christian Meier (Munich: dtv, 1978), vol. 2, 313–329; Randolph Starn, “Historians 
and ‘Crisis’,” Past and Present 52 (1971): 3–22. 
227 See Axel Schneider, Wahrheit und Geschichte: Zwei chinesische Historiker auf der Suche nach einer 
modernen Identität für China (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1997), chapter 2. 
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liberals, and later, the Marxists.228 This division, basically, rested on the different 
attitudes of each camp towards tradition. However, there were always overlaps and 
contradictions between, or within, these three camps. The traditionalists like Wang 
Guowei, Qian Mu, and Chen Yinke, for example, were engaged in restoring the 
primary status of tradition but were not clones of the ancient dynastic historians; the 
liberals, such as Hu Shih and Fu Sinian, were often iconoclastic and modernists, but 
they were not intent on totally abandoning tradition; and the Marxists, like Guo 
Moruo, Tao Xisheng 陶希聖, etc., seemed to have a purer stand but also filtered 
Chinese tradition very carefully, rather than just ignoring it.229 Behind their different 
stances and practices, two sometimes contradictory but sometimes entangled trends 
shaped or even determined the modern Chinese historians’ understanding of history: 
first, a progressive mode, which accepted the linear, mechanic concept of time and 
narrated histories according a universal framework or paradigm; second, a somewhat 
conservative mode, which emphasized empirical facts and evidence, and respected 
the particularity of every tradition.  
 
Progressivism  
The concepts of progressivism fundamentally changed the Chinese understanding of 
the past. The golden age, in which the Dao perfectly manifested itself, no longer 
maintained its superior, normative status, but was transformed into merely an early 
stage of history. It was Kang Youwei 康有為 who first switched the ‘expectation’ from 
the old ideal of the Three Dynasties [sandai 三代] to a future characterized by the 
Great Harmony. By adopting a periodizing pattern of the ‘three ages’ [sanshi 三世], 
 
228 This divination can be found in Levenson, Confucian China and its Modern Fate: A Trilogy., vol.3, chapter 
4, 106-09. Also, Wang, Inventing China through History: the May Fourth Approach to Historiography, 7. 
229 For an introductory study on modern historians, see Axel Schneider, “Chinese and Japanese 
Historiography,” in Oxford History of Historical Writing, ed. Stuart Macintyre and Daniel Woolf (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 506-17. 
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he broke with the cyclical flux of time and reinterpreted China’s past according to the 
Western idea of linear and teleological time.230  
It was Yan Fu who introduced the Western evolutionary concepts of society 
and history into the intellectual world of modern China.231 Soon, Liang Qichao became 
one of the most influential and active propagators of those concepts. Combining New 
Text scholarship and Western concepts of historiography, Liang firmly rooted his 
early writing of history in a nationalistic and social Darwinist worldview, defining the 
task of historiography as arousing national consciousness among the population.232 In 
line with this view, Liang Qichao sketched a scheme of periodization for Chinese 
history that closely resembled Western examples and tried to implicitly place Chinese 
history into the same framework.233 He posited that the progressive historio-
geographical pattern he adopted was a sequential process of transformation in which 
no civilization could leap over any particular historical stages.234  
According to Liang’s understanding, “history is the description of the 
phenomenon of evolution.”235 It should depict the past of China as a linear, law-like 
 
230 Based on New Text Confucianism, Kang interpreted history as a procession from ‘the age of disunity’ 
[juluan shi 據亂世], through ‘the age of age of rising peace’ [shengping shi 昇平世], to ‘the age of great 
peace’ [taiping shi 太平世]. For Kang’s historical-political views, see Ze Wu, “Kang Youwei gongyang 
sanshi shuo de lishi jinhua guandian yanjiu: Kang Youwei shixue yanjiu zhiyi,” Zhonghua wenshi luncong 
中華文史論叢, 1 (1962): 229-74. Also, Kung-chuan Hsiao, A Modern China and a New World: Kang Yu-wei, 
Reformer and Utopian, 1858-1927 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975), chapter 3-4.  
231 Yan Fu’s idea of evolutionism does not exactly follow the theories of Darwin and Huxley. For the 
difference between them, see Max K. W. Huang, “What is Tianyan? The Meaning and Significance of 
Yan Fu’s Theory of Natural Evolution,” Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica 中央研究
院近代史研究所集刊, no. 85 (2014): 129-87. 
232 See Liang “Xin shixue 新史學,” 1-11, especially 1-4. He explicitly refers to the New Text School and 
its political engagement, Ibid. 26-29. For a brief summary of Liang’s early historiographical theory, see 
Axel Schneider, “Shijie lishi yu lishi xiangdui zhuyi de wenti- 1919 nian yihou liangqichao de shixue 世
界歷史與歷史相對主義的問題 – 1919年以后梁啟超的史學,” in Zhenli yu lishi: Fu Sinian, Chen Yinke de 
shixue sixiang yu minzu rentong 真理與歷史:傅斯年、陳寅恪的史學思想與民族認同 (Beijing: Social 
Sciences Documentation Publishing House, 2008), 238-259 
233 Liang, Qichao, “Zhongguo Shi Xulun 中國史敘論,” in YBSHJ: Wenji, 6, 11-12 
234 Ibid, 9. 
235 “歷史者，敘述進化之現象也.”Ibid, 9. 
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progress concomitant with a periodization based on universal experience.236  With 
enthusiasm, Liang introduced this progressive view of history in his New 
Historiography, in which he blamed traditional historiography for lacking a 
consciousness about the nation and state and for serving only the needs of the ruling 
clan. A ‘new historiography,’ he proclaimed, would write about people and nations, 
recording and explaining “the prosperity and competition” of the human race.237 This 
concept of history based on universal principles of evolution [Jinhua zhi gongli 進化
之公理] and causality [yinguo 因果] was embraced by other intellectuals who were 
eager to transform Chinese historical scholarship into a modern, scientific system, 
especially after the May Fourth movement in 1919.238 This trend also reached the 
Buddhist community.  
The attitude of modern Chinese Buddhists towards progressivism and 
evolutionism was somewhat hesitant. However, most Buddhist modernists attempted 
to respond to this dominant discourse and mediate it with Buddhist doctrines. The 
Buddhist reformer Taixu, for example, was clearly aware of the influence of 
evolutionary theory. In one lecture, which he delivered at the Wuchuan Buddhist 
Institute 武昌佛學院, he mentioned that 
in the past one hundred years, the most popular and influential [theory] is the theory 
of evolution. 近百年來，風行一世，而影響於世界人心最巨者，厥為進化論.239 
He named the theory of evolution the “Tianyan School 天演宗” and claimed that 
“there is a profound and significant relationship between this school and politics and 
scholarship as well as the way of the world and the heart of human beings.”240 
 
236 Ibid, 1-12. 
237 “人種之發達與其競爭.” Liang, Liang, “Xin Shixue 新史學,” 7. 
238 For the reception of the modern linear view of time and its influence upon Chinese historiography, 
see Fansen Wang, “The Impact of the Linear Model of History on Modern Chinese Historiography,” in 
Transforming History: the Making of a Modern Academic Discipline in Twentieth-Century China, ed. Brain 
Moloughney and Peter Zarrow (Hongkong: The Chinese University Press, 2011), 135-68. 
239 Taixu, “Shijian wanyou wei Jinhua yi wei tuihua 世間萬有為進化抑為退化,” TXQS, vol.23, 332. 




As a Buddhist modernist, as Don Pittman described him, Taixu could not 
ignore the tension between Buddhism and modernity, especially the values conveyed 
by progressivism and science. To a certain degree, he accepted the logic of “natural 
selection” [wujing tianze 物競天擇] and applied the term ‘evolution’ to describe the 
process of escaping the six realms of saṃsāra and the fulfillment of the Buddhahood. 
He tried to negotiate the conflicts between Buddhism and progressivism by claiming 
that the path of the Bodhisattva is the ultimate form of progress and by equating 
progressivist causality with the Buddhist concept of ‘cause and fruitions’ [hetu-phala, 
yinguo 因果]. When describing the principle behind the movement of the world, 
Taixu claimed that Buddhism and evolutionism are the same, just as Shi Shanyin 釋善
因 (?- 1947) argued in an article published in 1932: 
Dharmas get together unanimously; to Laozi, this is nature; to Darwin, this is 
evolution [tianyan]; in Buddhist doctrines, this is the Dharma. 諸法際然會合時，在
老子為自然，在達氏為天演，在佛經目為法爾.241 
The understandings of progressivism among modern Chinese Buddhists were vague 
and changing.242 Their acceptance of this theory seldom derived from their interest in 
sketching the developmental stages of Buddhism throughout the past millennia. 
Neiter it derived from the challenge progressivism brought to their views of time and 
history. Rather, their utilization of progressivism was driven by their willingness to 
accomplish the modernization of Buddhism. In this sense, Buddhist believers tried to 
identify parallels between Buddhism and science, progress, and other modern 
concepts, although they often ignored to a great degree the Western (and often 
Eurocentric) presuppositions behind these modern ideas and the anti-religious 
hypotheses in the overall design of modernity. With a very pragmatic attitude, they 
used these theories to justify the modernness of Buddhism and its position in the 
development of human civilization, from the past to the present. 
 
241 Zhuju zhongsheng 竺居眾生( Shanyin 善因), “Lun ziran tianyan faer zhi yitong 論自然天演法爾之
異同,” Haichaoyin 海潮音, 12 (1932): 1317-320. 
242 For the Buddhist response to evolutionary theory and Darwinism, see Justin R. Ritzinger, 
“Dependent Co-evolution: Kropotkin’s Theory of Mutual Aid and Its Appropriation by Chinese 




Tradition, Nation, and Culture 
Ironically, although Buddhist modernists like Taixu, kept an open attitude towards 
progressivism and attempted to testify that Buddhism could promise a supreme 
‘progress,’ some intellectuals began to question this discourse and its 
presuppositions, using Buddhism as their weapon. On the one hand, these 
intellectuals (most of whom had direct contact with the West) observed that the 
legend of modernity went up in smoke during the tragedy of World War I, making 
them question the ‘bright future’ promised by progress. On the other hand, many of 
these intellectuals held a very sympathetic feeling towards Chinese cultural heritage; 
therefore, they were uncomfortable with the concept of evolution because it 
constituted an attack on China’s ‘golden age’ and even destroyed it in both material 
and moral terms.243 They also felt upset because this progressivist concept of history 
undermined the historiographical responsibility of historians: if history was pre-
determined and followed the principles of Darwinism, the subjectivity in the action of 
writing history would lose its meaning.  
As early as in the 1910s, Liang Qichao, an important propagator of 
progressivism, became aware of the pitfalls of the linear concept of history and 
embarked consciously on the search for a historiography better suited to the needs of 
modern China.244 Only one year after the publication of New Historiography, Liang 
confessed in various places that Chinese history could hardly fit into the Western 
model.245 The importation of a pattern from the West was unable to create 
 
243 For a fuller discussion, see Fansen Wang, “Jindai Zhongguo de xianxing lishiguan: yi shehui 
jinhualun wei zhongxin de taolun 近代中國的線型歷史觀: 以社會進化論為中心的討論,” Xin shixue 
新史學 19, no. 2 (2008): 1-46. 
244 For the transition in Liang’s views on historiography in his later career, see Axel Schneider, “Shijie 
lishi yu lishi xiangdui zhuyi de wenti – 1919 nian yihou Liang Qichao de shixue 世界歷史與歷史相對
主義的問題--1919年以后梁啟超的史學,” 238-259.  
245 For example, see Liang Qichao “Lun Zhongguo xueshu sixiang bianqian zhi dashi 論中國學術思想變
遷之大勢” in YBSHJ: Wenji: 7, 1-103. He discussed how the tripartite periodization that divided general 
history into three stages of the ancient age, the Middle Age, and the modern age was not fully able to 
explain the decline of the Chinese empire beginning in the mid-Qing dynasty.  
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subcategories that fitted Chinese history specifically and even produced more 
confusion by introducing more controversial terms and notions. In Liang’s later 
works, he further softened some of his early convictions. For example, in the article 
“What is Culture” [Shenme shi wenhua 什麼是文化] published in 1925, Liang asked 
whether the social Darwinist model could really describe the Chinese historical 
situation. Notions such as “universal principle” [gongli 公理] or “general precedents” 
[gongli 公例] were also partly questioned by him. Instead, he underscored emotion, 
reason, and human will as the agents of history and using Buddhist ideas of karma [ye 
業] and interdependence [huyuan 互緣] to circumscribe ‘culture’ as a concept that 
did not exist by nature and necessity but depended on human norms and actions.246 
From their practices of rewriting Chinese history, more historians had 
realized that, firstly, on a practical level, the adoption of Western schemes of 
periodization as well as other historical categories (‘semi-feudal’ or ‘semi-colonial’, 
for example) failed to neatly fit the factual situation of Chinese history; secondly, 
blindly borrowing external patterns based on experiences that shared little in 
common with the historical and local conditions in China could threaten Chinese 
cultural and historical particularity, and hence hinder the establishment of Chinese 
national identity; and, thirdly, the Eurocentric presupposition behind the Western 
view of history would lead to the judgement of China’s eternal backwardness as a 
nation in the forming global order. A strong and modern China could not be 
envisaged and established by interpreting its history using Western terms and 
patterns. Ironically, the expectation of making China strong and modern was what 
encouraged Chinese scholars to learn from the West and accept the theory of 
progress and evolution in the first place.  
Realizing the shortcomings of progressivism, some historians, such as Zhang 
Taiyan, Liu Yizheng247, and so on, partly or totally abandoned their expectations for 
 
246 Liang, “Yanjiu wenhuashi de jige zhongyao wenti 研究文化史的幾個重要問題 (1922), in YBSHJ: 
Wenji 40, 1-7 
247 Referring to the notions of change, permanence, cyclicality, and so on  derived from the Yijing 易經, 
Liu Yizhang argued that evolutionism, which is based on brutal competition, cannot lead to a better 
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the progressivist model of historiography. They began to criticize the concepts of 
progress and evolution based on Chinese historical experience or from a 
philosophical perspective. For example, Zhang Taiyan contested not only the concept 
of progressivism but also the discourse of modernity itself.248 Although he promoted 
linear time in his early historical works, he soon abandoned this ‘hypnosis’ due to his 
reading of Yogācāra Buddhism. Deely influenced by the Buddhist concept of saṃsāra 
he even claimed that time—what we experience as the flux from the past to the 
future—is only an illusion.249 
 Some other scholars, although they did not often directly criticize the 
concepts of evolution or progress, were never persuaded by the modern/Western 
idea that history moves linearly towards further modernization and unification of the 
world. Chen Yinke, Tang Yongtong, and Chen Yuan belonged to this group. Although 
they were unable and unwilling to distance themselves totally from the influence of 
modernity, they made efforts to avoid blindly embracing the ‘universality’ promised 
by the Western model and persisted in protecting their own cultural tenets.250  
One of the strategies adopted by these intellectuals was to return to the 
ancient world of China and treat it as something special and unique. They believed 
that China’s past was unique but had some universal principles that did not 
contradict modern values. The historical entity	of ancient China was fundamentally 
not one piece of the overall puzzle of the presupposed universalism depicted by 
modern theories, but rather a representation that contrasted with that of Western 
 
future. He then advocated for grounding Chinese history again in Confucian morality and called for re-
establishing the ‘virtue of the historians’ [shide 史德]. 
248 For the further for Zhang’s critique on modernity and its Buddhist background, see Viren Murthy, 
The Political Philosophy of Zhang Taiyan (Leiden: Brill, 2011). 
249 Viren Murthy, “Transfiguring Modern Temporality: Zhang Taiyan’s Yogācāra Critique of 
Evolutionary History,” Modern China 38, no. 5 (2012), 482-522. 
250 The concept of ‘universality’ within Confucianism had profound influence on late Qing reformers, 
such as Kang Youwei. For a discussion on this concept and its parallel to the West’s claims to 
universality, see Young-tsu Wong, “The Ideal of Universality in Late Ch’ing Reformism,” in Reform in 
Nineteenth-Century China, ed. Paul A. Cohen and John E. Schrecker (Cambridge: East Asian Research 
Center, Harvard University, 1976), 150-54. 
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civilization. Through this comparison, China could further understand both itself and 
the West.  
Before opening itself to the rest of the world, China knew little about the 
outside; at the same time, to the Chinese, China’s self-image was also invisible: lacking 
external representation and a sense of confinement, the Chinese would not have been 
able to recognize that they were Chinese. Therefore, looking to the outside world did 
not necessarily entail copying or following its external patterns, but could mean 
gaining a more complete picture of China itself.251 In this way, unlike the liberal and 
leftist historians, these ‘conservative’ historians (including Liang Qichao in his later 
life) emphasized an empathetic understanding of China’s past (‘sympathy with 
understanding  [liaojie zhi tongqing 了解之同情] in Chen Yinke’s words252 or 
‘empathy with tacit resonance’ [tongqing zhi moying 同情之默應] in Tang 
Yongtong’s words]253, instead of resonance with Western voices. This was also what 
Tang Yongtong meant when he cited the clichéd metaphor of the mirror from Shiji 史
記 to describe his historiography. Being a historian, as he quoted, means “living in 
this world, following the old way and reading the past as a mirror of self.”254 To them, 
History, as a mirror, was intended to illuminate the image of China itself so that all 
Chinese people could recognize themselves and their own culture. Some Buddhist 
scholars demonstrated a similar tendency. Historically, as a non-Chinese conceptual 
system, Buddhism was once an ‘other’ that reflected Confucian Han China. However, 
the emergence of the ‘sinicized’ version of Buddhism transformed it from a ‘mirror of 
China’ into a ‘mirror of India.’ During the first half of the twentieth century, scholars 
returned to Buddhism’s past and tried to find its historical image through a mirror-
like comparison between Chinese Buddhist traditions and the original form of 
 
251 The relationship between self and other, particularity and universalism, has been addressed by 
many scholars; see, for example, Naoki Sakai, Translation and Subjectivity: On “Japan” and Cultural 
Nationalism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), chapter 5. 
252 See Chen Yinke, “Feng Youlan Zhongguo zhexue shi shangce shencha baogao 馮友蘭中國哲學史上
冊審查報告, in JMEB, 280. 
253 Tang Yongtong, TYQJ, 655.  
254 Tang, “Wenhua sixiang zhi chongtu yu tiaohe 文化思想之衝突與調和,” in TYQJ, vol.5, 281. 
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Buddhism in India. This is what Yang Wenhui called as “aiming at renaissance” 
[zhizai fugu 志在复古].255  
Carefully avoiding the dangers of applying a Western framework to China’s 
particular historical reality, these historians nevertheless encountered the pitfall of 
relativism.256 Relativism had already caused the crisis of historiography in the West.257 
Similarly, modern Chinese historians needed to overcome the feeling of 
meaninglessness caused by relativism when they questioned the unity and continuity 
of Chinese culture. It was challenging and somewhat ironic for them, because what 
they discovered in historical materials demonstrated that there was no cultural 
entity that could be called ‘China.’ This dilemma also led to the ‘crisis of Chinese 
Buddhism’—modern historiography revealed that the history of Chinese Buddhism 
was full of falsifications, misunderstandings, and distortions. Chinese Buddhism was 
thus in danger of losing its legitimacy.  
 
The Meaning of History  
In the first decade of the twentieth century, whether premodern China had a history 
or not became an issue that provoked debate and controversy. Liang Qichao was one 
of the historians who held the view that China had no history. This idea derived from 
the concept of ‘state-building’. By criticizing the old historiography as 
comprehending “only imperial courts but no nations” [you chaoting er wu guojia 有
朝廷而無國家], Liang proposed that the mission of history was “writing the nation, 
writing the citizen, writing the communities, and writing the society” [xie guojia xie 
 
255 For the difference between fugu and shoujiu, see Fansen Wang, “Cong chuantong dao Fan chuantong 
— Liangge sixiang mailuo de fenxi 從傳統到反傳統—兩個思想脈絡的分析,” in Zhongguo jindai sixiang 
yu xueshu de xipu中國近代思想與學術的系譜  (Taipei: Linking, 2003), 111-32. 
256 For Chen’s “universality of abstract ideals,” see Axel Schneider, “Between Dao and History: Two 
Chinese Historians in Search of a Modern Identity for China,” History and Theory 35, no. 4 (1996). 
257 See Georg G. Iggers, “Historicism: The History and Meaning of the Term.” Journal of the History of Ideas 
56, no. 1 (1995): 129-52. One influential book on this issue is Charles R. Bambach, Heidegger, Dilthey, and 
the Crisis of Historicism (New Heaven: Connell University Press, 1995). 
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guomin xiequn xie shehui 寫國家寫國民寫群寫社會]; without the modern concept 
of the nation-state, it was impossible to consider any writing of ‘history’ as real 
history.258The propositions of national history are closely related to notions such as 
civil rights, citizenship, equality, and so on.259 From this standpoint, Liang advocated a 
historical writing of ‘nationalism’ for the first time. In his New Historiography, he 
claimed that “the reason why European nationalism is so developed, and countries 
are so civilized, must largely be attributed to their accomplishments in 
historiography.”260  
However, there often was a tension between ‘historical truth’ and nationalist 
devotion. Sometimes, the truth discovered by historical studies failed to prove the 
credibility or ‘innocence’ of previously recorded ancient history [gushi 古史], but 
rather provided a fragmentary picture of China’s past. Sometimes, the new 
historiography was not only powerless to build up the Chinese national identity but 
even harmed the recovery of the lost pride and glory of China.261 For example, the 
historian Zhu Xizu 朱希祖 once pointed out that Fu Sinian’s study, which claimed 
that the Cheng Emperor of the Ming dynasty 明成祖 was not Han Chinese but was in 
fact the adopted son of the Shun Emperor of the Yuan dynasty 元順帝, proved the 
weakness of Han China and deeply hurt the confidence and self-respect of the 
Chinese. Such contradictions exemplified how modern Chinese historiography 
inescapably struggled over its dual identity as both protector and destroyer. When 
 
258 See Liang Qichao, “Lun guojia sixiang論國家思想, in “Xinmin shuo新民說,” YBSHJ: Zhuanji 4, 16-23; 
and “Xin shixue新史學.” 
259 The idea of civil rights was introduced into China in the late imperial era. Liang Qichao tried to 
promote the establishment the awareness of civil rights among the Chinese. See “Jinshi guomin 
jingzheng zhi dashi yu Zhongguo qiantu近世國民競爭之大勢與中國前途,” in YBSHJ: Wenji 4, 56-67; 
“Liang Qichao, “Aiguo lun 愛國論,” in YBSHJ: WenJi 3, 47. 
260 “今日歐洲民族主義所以發達，列國所以日進文明，史學之功具其半焉.” Liang, “Xin Shixue 新史
學.” 
261 According to Peter Zarrow, Liang transferred the sage-kings to the nation itself. In this sense the 
sage-kings were desacralized, demoted from their positions as culture heroes and founders of 
civilization to representatives of stages of historical development. By doing so, Liang actually 
destroyed the myth of a golden age but valorized the evolution of the Chinese nation. See Peter 
Zarrow, “Old Myth into New History: The Building Blocks of Liang Qichao’s ‘New History’,” 
Historiography East and West 1, no. 2 (2003): 204-41. 
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intellectuals like Gu Jiegang turned their eyes to the past, what they found was 
primarily not constructive, but deconstructive: the traditional accounts about China’s 
past were revealed as ‘hodgepodges’ composed of fallacies, mysteries, and 
fabrications, and were thus no longer reliable. The new historiography hence became 
a job of “muckraking” [pafen 耙糞] in Hu Shih’s word.262  
 The crisis of historiography also related to the emergence of the tendency to 
construct history as science. In the past, historians and Confucians had sometimes 
been uniformly identified as the ‘literati’, namely the shi 士. To the Chinese literati, 
the dual responsibilities of historiography—recording historical facts and 
blaming/praising—made their works meaningful and noble.  Model historians, like 
Sima Qian and Ban Gu, were considered to be the ideal primarily because they were 
‘Confucian literati’ [wenru 文儒] and only secondarily because of their outstanding 
historical writings. Even in the Mid-Qing dynasty, specialized historical studies 
without reference to the Classics, such as Zhao Yi’s Nianershi zhaji 廿二史劄記, were 
under harsh critique. Following the trajectory of the modernization of history, the 
new generation of scholars, such as Fu Sinian and Gu Jiegang, no longer emphasized 
the ethical role of history but became producers of historical knowledge. They 
formed a new research community, the “professional historians,” whose research 
purpose was to gain an accurate, scientific understanding of what had happened in 
the past.263 These group of historians switched their focuses from abstract theory and 
‘a priori rational argumentation [yili lunzheng 義理論爭] to historical data, empirical 
facts, and variable truth. Hence the moral discourse behind traditional 
historiography was replaced by a positivist attitude that was more ‘scientific,’ 
‘skeptical,’ and secular.264  
 
262 See Reminiscences of Shih Hu : Oral History, ed. Te-kong Tong (Taipei: Yuanliu, 2010). 
263 Fu Sinian, “Lishi yuyan yanjiusuo gongzuo zhi zhiqu歷史語言研究所工作之旨趣” in Lishi yuyan 
yanjiusuo jikan [Bulletin of the Institute for History and Philology] 1: 1 (1928), in Fu Sinian quanji 傅斯年
全集 1980, vol.4, 1314.  
264 Benjamin Elman, “Philology of the Early Modern or the Late Imperial: The Crisis of Chinese Classical 
Learning in the 18th Century,” Frontiers of History in China 6, no.1 (2011):3–25; Elman, “Philology of the 
Early Modern or the Late Imperial: The Crisis of Chinese Classical Learning in the 18th Century.” 
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This view required that historians should ‘study’ instead of ‘practice’ the 
national heritage. This research research intention was explained by Hu Shih in two 
aspects: firstly, a historical vision; secondly, an academic attitude.265 He summarized 
with a metaphor: “a concept is just like a cheque.”266 What the historian should pay 
attention to was not the tradition itself but its historical effects: 
For a certain thought or religion, we should study the real influence it caused ……for 
example, what kind of etiquette system did it produce? What effect did this etiquette 
system have. 我們對於一種學說或一種宗教，應該研究它實際發生了什麼影響⋯⋯
（如）它產生了什麼樣的禮法制度？它所產生的禮法制度發生了什麼效果.267 
From the Movement of Arranging the National Essence to the Doubting 
Antiquity School, ‘scholarship’ [xuewen 學問] had become the equivalent of 
‘knowledge.’ Traditional learning, to a certain degree, was “de-valorized, de-
moralized, de-mentalized,”268 and was hence institutionalized and professionalized as 
a branch of pure research. The epistemological turn in historical studies and the 
knowledge-orientation of historiography clearly indicated that faith or other 
subjective, ethical issues were no longer some of the main foci of historiography. In 
some cases, the impulse to reconceptualize China’s past into a narrative of progress 
further secularized ‘faith’ in historical processes.269 This tendency was also 
remarkable in the scholarship on Buddhism. Historians focused on a corpus of 
religious texts that they read for evidence and data; they swept away its ‘Dharmic’ 
implications and ignored the fact that these texts had been used in rituals, monastic 
life, and other religious practices for centuries. Buddhism then was understood 
within its social-political-economic-cultural setting and thereby tended to be treated 
 
265 Hu Shi, “Lun Guogu xue論國故學,” HSWJ, Original published on Xinchao 新潮, vol.1, issue 1 (1919); 
“Guoxue Jikan fakan xuanyan國學季刊發刊宣言,” in HSWJ. Original published on Sinological Studies 
Quarterly, vol.1, issue 1 (1923). 
266 “一個觀念就像一張支票.” Hu Shih, “Shiyan zhuyi 實驗主義,” in Hu Shih zhexue sixiang ziliao 胡適哲
學思想資料 (Shanghai: Huadong shifan daxue chubanshe, 1981), 58. 
267 Hu Shih, “Wu Yu wenlu xu 吳虞文錄序,” HSWJ, vol.2.  
268 Wang Fansen, “Shishi yu jiazhi de fenli: minguo xinshixue jiqi pipingzhe 事實與價值的分離:民國新
史學及其批評者,” in Zhongguo jindai sixiang yu xueshu de xipu中國近代思想與學術的系譜. 
269 Zarrow, “Old Myth into New History: The Building Blocks of Liang Qichao’s ‘New History’.” 
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strictly as a subcategory of the social sciences and historiography. This switch 
reinforced the division of factual knowledge from understandings related to faith 
commitment and moral commentary; and further led to “narrow and deep” research 
as an apparatus of knowledge production.270  
  
 
270 This tendency reached its peak in thethe Doubting Antiquity school movement and later research 






Buddhism as Religion 
 
 
China had its religious traditions but lacked the lexical equivalent of the concept of 
‘religion’ [zongjiao 宗教].271 There was a deep gap, both conceptual and practical, 
between the traditional Chinese structure of belief and the Western notion of 
‘religion’ that only entered China at the end of the imperial age. This gap became 
more noticeable in recent decades as sociologists began to question the universality 
of the term “religion” and the hypothesis of secularism linked with modernity.272 
Scholars like Talal Asad warned that religion was not an innocent analytical category 
but was colored by the connotations of Western ideology.273 However, neither the 
questionability of the term “religion” itself nor the absence of an equivalent word in 
Chinese can lead to the conclusion that religion was absent from China or that the 
Chinese people lacked religious experiences.   
The usage of ‘zong 宗’ and ‘jiao 教,’ can be dated back to the first Chinese 
writing system, the oracle bone script of the Shang Dynasty (1250-1200 BCE). The first 
Chinese dictionary, the Shuowen jiezi 說文解字, written during the Eastern Han 
dynasty, already contained entries for zong and jiao.274 Jiao was depicted as a 
combination of ‘yao 爻’—a divine act—on the left with a student as well as a teacher’s 
 
271 On the characteristic of ‘modern religions,’ see Joseph M. Kitagawa, “Primitive, Classical, and 
Modern Religions,” in The History of Religion: Essays on Problems of Understanding, ed. Mircea Eliade Joseph 
Kitagawa, Charles Long (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), 39-65.  
272 Smith, Wilfrid Cantwell, The Meaning and End of Religion (1963; rpt. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991), 
12; Jonathan Z Smith, Imagining Religion: from Babylon to Jonestown (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1982), xi.  
273 Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993); see also Timothy Fitzgerald, “A Critique of “Religion” as a 
Cross-cultural Category,” Method & Theory in the Study of Religion 9, no. 2 (1997): 91-110. 
274 Shuowen jiezi used the traditional writing system of the ‘small seal script’ [xiaozhuan 小篆], which 
well preserved the presumed origins of Chinese characters as pictographs. 
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pointer on the right. This pictographic character was explained by the author of the 
Shuowen jiezi as “acting above and following below 上所施，下所效也,” which 
indicates a clear connotation of ‘teaching’ and ‘education.’ The item zong, with the 
components of ‘worship’ [shi 示] and ‘house’ [wu 屋], showed a more straightforward 
image of a rite performed in a holy space, and meant “worshipping at the temple of 
ancestors” [zun zumiao 尊祖廟也]. 
It is obvious that the earliest usages of zong and jiao had already embodied a 
strong religious sense, including ritual practices and some kind of spiritual 
transmission. Historically, jiao and zong were used in various traditions in the Chinese 
context275 and sometimes were combined with the term ‘straight 正’ to refer to the 
establishment of orthodoxy [zhengjiao 正教 or zhengzong 正宗].  
However, these two words indeed fundamentally pointed in different 
directions. Jiao was somewhat culture-neutral and could be more appropriately 
perceived as ‘teachings’ or ‘a set of principles,’ while zong gradually came to connote 
regulation exclusively and emphasized the ‘kinship’ or ‘lineage’ serving as the basis 
for worship. When Zhizhuan 智顓 (538-597) formulated his classification system for 
Buddhism in the Sui dynasty, he used jiao to describe the different traditions of 
Buddhism; specifically, jiao was rendered by Zhizhuan as schools with different 
interpretations of the Dharma. After the Tang dynasty, however, the term zong 
gradually replaced jiao, as shown by the examples of the Chan school, the Tiantai 
school, and so on. This transition revealed an intensified sensitivity to lineage and 
authority.  Although the combination of zongjiao and an ad hoc collocation of jiaozong 
appeared in Tang and later texts—in the works of Fazang 法藏 (643-714) as well as his 
follower Zongmi 宗密 (784-841), for example—zongjiao was not yet firmly established 
 
275 For example, Sanjiao 三教, or ‘three teachings,’ dating from the Tang dynasty, is an indigenous term 
referring to three different traditions (rujiao, daojiao, fojiao) belonging to one category. See Robert Ford 
Campany, “On the Very Idea of Religions (In the Modern West and in Early Medieval China),” History of 
Religions 42, no. 4 (2003): 287-319. 
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as a fixed term.276 These characters only rarely occurred together in the premodern 
period in Buddhist texts.277 
Nevertheless, to the Chinese, the continuity between the usage of premodern 
terminology and the modern concept of religion is relatively apparent.278 Both 
correspond to the long-existing realm of Chinese spiritual life, a space of idols, 
ancestors, rituals, and devotion. The pre-modern usage of jiao and zong, which both 
existed in Buddhist texts implied a rhetoric of the complex religious experience of 
the Chinese. ‘Zong-jiao’, taken together, embodies a loose collection of several ideas, 
secular or non-secular, political or philosophical, sometimes related to knowledge 
and sometimes meaning orthodoxy. These two separate but somewhat intertwined 
terms represented both the fundamental form of Chinese faith tradition and also 
implied the potential difficulties Chinese people encountered when the concept of 
religion traveled to China.279 
 
The Arrival of ‘Religion’ 
 
276 Tim H. Barrett and Francesca Tarocco, “Terminology and Religious Identity: Buddhism and the 
Genealogy of the Term Zongjiao,” in Dynamics in the History of Religions between Asia and Europe, ed. 
Volkhard Krech and Marion Steinicke (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 311-12; and Rebecca Nedostup, “Religion, 
Superstition and Governing Society in Nationalist China” (PhD Dissertation, Columbia University, 
2001). 
277 In Japan’s case: Natamura Hajime has argued that the Sino-Japanese technical language, Shū 
(Chinese Zong) functioned as a translation of the Sanskrit siddhānta, meaning ineffable ultimate 
principle, while kyō translated the Sankrit deśanā, meaning provision verbal explanation. Thus, in its 
premodern Buddhist usage shūkyō referred to a linguistic expression of the ultimate principle of the 
dharma Hajime Nakamura, “Shūkyō to iu yakugo [宗教]という訳語,” Nihon gakushi’in kiyō 日本学士院
紀要 46, no. 2 (1991): 64-68, 146. 
278 Argument on the continuity and discontinuity in regarding to the concept of religion in china, see 
Ford Campany, “On the Very Idea of Religions (In the Modern West and in Early Medieval China)”; 
Vincent Goossaert, “Le concept de religion en Chine et l'Occident,” Diogène 205, no. 1 (2004), 11. and 
Hans Martin Krämer, “Introduction: ‘Religion’and ‘Heresy’ in East Asia between Continuity and 
Discontinuity,” Bochumer Jahrbuch zur Ostasienforschung 33 (2009): 5-16. 
279 For the changes in the concept of zongjiao in modern China and its relationship with Confucianism, 
see Chen Hsi-yuan, “ ‘Zongjiao’–yige Zhongguo jindai wenhuashi shang de guanjian ci 宗教—一個中
國近代文化史上的關鍵詞, in Xin Shixue 新史學 13 (2004): 37-66.  
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The term ‘religion’ was one of the neologisms that flooded China from the West via 
Japan around 1900. It was first translated by the intellectuals in Meiji Japan as 
‘shūkyō’ in the 1860s and was re-imported into China as a “return graphic loan,” in 
Lydia Liu’s words.280 The traditional use of zong and jiao did exist in the Chinese 
language and may have influenced Japanese translators when they tried to find a 
word that meant ‘religion.’ Remarkably, before the redefined term zongjiao became 
popular in China, the modern sense of religious belief as an evangelistic instrument 
or something related to national characteristics had crept into the minds of Chinese 
politicians and intellectuals such as Kang Youwei. (Rebecca Nodostup argued that the 
word jiao, in this case, had taken on the characteristics of zongjiao advant le nom).281 
Starting in the 1910s, with the involvement of religion in public affairs, a clearer 
definition of the compound word zongjiao gradually formed. This new meaning 
corresponded to that of science, politics, and other new terms that, as Asad noted, 
belong to “the domain of power.”282 
Fundamentally, the term ‘religion’ is a European expression, and it has always 
been modeled after Christianity. When the concept entered Japan, ‘religion’ was 
understood by the Japanese as a category of beliefs and rituals related to supernatural 
powers.283 During the nineteenth century, the term shūkyō took on the negative 
meaning of sectarianism and became associated with ‘evil, foreign teachings’ 
antagonistic to the local ideological environment and subversive of native 
authority.284 The Japanese understanding of ‘religion’ went through several 
 
280 Lydia He Liu, Translingual Practice: Literature, National Culture, and Translated Modernity--China, 1900-1937 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 301. 
281 Rebecca Nedostup, Superstitious Regimes: Religion and the Politics of Chinese Modernity (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Asia Center, 2009), 8. 
282 Talal Asad, “The construction of religion as an anthropological category,” Genealogies of Religion: 
Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam (London: The Hopkins University Press, 1993): 27-
29. 
283 Nedostup, “Religion, Superstition and Governing Society in Nationalist China,” 23. 
284 In the context of the Meiji government’s promotion of Shintoism and emperor worship, shūkyō took 
on a negative connotation of sectarianism, as opposed to state doctrine and other laudable 
philosophies. In addition, it defined itself through “opposition” to “all the other major conceptual 
fields.” For negative image of the concept ‘religion’ in Modern Japan, see James Edward Ketelaar, Of 
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changes.285 In 1893, when the Parliament of the World’s Religions was held in Chicago, 
the Japanese cultural notions of religion eventually shed their former prejudices and 
successfully became meshed with positive, instructional discourses.286 
Religion, along with other essential neologisms such as science [kexue 科學] 
and superstition [mixin 迷信], finally landed on Chinese soil at the beginning of the 
new century after a long process of reception. The religious traditions of China, then, 
were faced with the task of reconfiguring themselves in light of this new category. As 
is well known, the Late Imperial period had been characterized by a plural orthodoxy 
overseen by a religiously legitimatized state that assumed the right to determine 
what was orthodox [zheng 正] and what was heterodox [xie 邪]. But the collapse of 
the imperial polity changed this landscape drastically. The orthodox/heterodox 
distinction was replaced with the neologisms of ‘religion’ and ‘superstition.’ This 
discursive shift was given legal force by the new nation-state. Institutionally, this 
meant attempts to establish nationwide organizations to represent particular 
religions and advance their interests; ideologically, this meant that these traditions 
had to present themselves as systems of spirituality, knowledge and ethics which 
dissociate from the “superstitions” of local temple cults. The new nation-state, 
hungry for resources and urgently pursuing its vision of modernity, often 
expropriated popular temples and suppressed local cults. While such selective 
interference by the state was nothing new, the category of superstition swept up a far 
 
Heretics and Martyrs in Meiji Japan: Buddhism and its Persecution (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1993), 41. Also Jason Ānanda Josephson, The Invention of Religion in Japan (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2012), chapter 3; Jun’ichi Isomae, Religious Discourse in Modern Japan: Religion, State, and 
Shintō (Brill, 2014). 
285 Josephson, Jason Ānanda, The Invention of Religion in Japan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2012). 
286 For more details of the Parliament of World Religions, see Lewis Pyle Mercer, Review of the World's 
Religious Congresses of the World's Congress Auxiliary of the World's Columbian Exposition: Chicago, 1893 
(Chicago & New York: Randy, Mcnally & Company, 1893). It should be noticed that, as Diana L. Eck 
clearly pointed out, the predominant vision of the Parliament was not pluralism, but the dawning of a 
new era of unity and universalism. See her forward in Richard Hughes Seager, ed., The Dawn of Religious 




larger proportion of Chinese religiosity than the earlier category of heterodoxy ever 
had.287  
In this process, the three notions of science, religion, and superstition 
discursively formed a closely linked triangle within which Chinese religious heritage 
could be relocated. This structure reflected the dual thrusts of the secularist calculus 
of religion: on the one hand, the intellectual aspect of religions should be rearranged 
and reconfirmed as cultural heritage, which should then be folded into the new 
formulation of religious knowledge and glossed with a different glossary; on the other 
hand, the empirical and ritual elements of religion that could be seen as idolatry or 
overly elaborate rites should be categorized as superstition and therefore be expelled 
from ‘religion.’  
With some hesitation and confusion, as Nedostup noted, the intellectuals and 
religious elites in modern China actually used the category of ‘superstition,’ “the 
opposite of science,” to replace the old aggregation of ‘heterodoxy,’ which had been 
used to define practices seen as illegal, improper, immoral, or impure. In this 
transition, the underpinning of these new categories of science, religion, and 
superstition became “rationality, instead of a sense of impurity.”288 Rationality, based 
on the putative image of Enlightenment, was believed to be the principle that would 
allow people to eradicate ‘superstition’ from ‘religion.’ This idea could be found in 
Liang Qichao’s early works. In an essay he wrote in October 1902, he claimed that 
harmful superstitions can be eliminated from the ‘true faith’ of religion. This 
 
287  These shifts are the subject of a significant and growing body of scholarly work. For an overview of 
these issues in this period, see Goossaert and Palmer (2011, chapters two and three). Vincent Goossaert 
elsewhere offers more narrowly focused treatments of the establishment of national religious 
associations and Christianity’s role in that process (2008) and of the continuities and critical 
discontinuities between Late Imperial Confucian fundamentalist and anticlerical discourse and the 
religion/superstition discourse that took shape in the early twentieth century (2006). Nedostup (2009) 
provides an in-depth examination of the Nationalists’ religious policies and anti-superstition 
campaigns in Jiangsu during the Nanjing Decade, while Poon (2011) examines the negotiations over 
these issues between the common people and the state in Guangzhou. 
288 Steven. A. Smith, “Introduction: The Religion of Fools? Superstition Past and Present,” Past & Present 
199, 3 (2008): 8. 
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viewpoint “formed the key to the cultural reform of the century to come.”289 It 
actually later became the main logic of the religious revolutions as well as the 
academicization of religion during the modern period. This process of eradicating 
superstitious elements from religion was often conducted through political means,290 
for example, through the ‘Switch Temple into School Campaign’ [miaochan xingxue 
廟產興學]291 or the ‘Anti-Superstition Movement’ [pochu mixin yundong 破除迷信運
動]292; Meanwhile, it also happened in intellectual world, when scholars examined and 
described religion as ‘tradition’, ‘philosophy’ or knowledge. All these attempts were 
fundamentally designed not to destroy religions but to control the irrational force 
within them and to strengthen the power of rationality.293  
 
Liang Qichao’s Vacillation  
The indigenization of Western concepts, which Lydia Liu called “trans-lingualism,” 
created a new intellectual realm in which people tried to transcend the origin of 
these concepts and struggled to assimilate them into the local context. Although 
Buddhism and Taoism were somewhat better able than Confucianism to fulfill the 
Western definition of religion with their independent doctrinal canon, 
institutionalized organizations and systematic rituals, they too paid the price of 
 
289 Nedostup, Superstitious Regimes: Religion and the Politics of Chinese Modernity, 8. 
290 Vincent Goossaert, “The Concept of Religion in China and the West,” Diogenes 52, no. 1 (2005): 14-17. 
291 For studies on these two movements, see Matita Tairyō 牧田諦亮, “Seimotsu irai ni okeru byōsan 
kōgaku 清末以來に於ける廟產興學,” in Chūgoku bukkyōshi kenkyu 中國佛教史研究, vol.2, (Tokyo, 
Taito shuppansha, 1984), 290-318; Vincent Goossaert, “Détruire Les Temples Pour Construire Les 
écoles: Reconstitution D'un Objet Historique.” Extrême-Orient Extrême-Occident, no. 33 (2011): 35-51. 
292 Studies on Anti-superstition Movement, see Nedostup, Superstitious Regimes: Religion and the Politics of 
Chinese Modernity. 
293 There were always social and political discourses behind the anti-religion movement. See Vincent 




cutting links with the ritual practices in the local sphere and were forced to stand 
closer and closer by science and nationalism.294    
The acceptance and propagation of zongjiao as a modern notion can be 
primarily attributed to Liang Qichao.295 Liang mentioned this concept as early as 1897 
when he gave the lecture “On China’s revolution of religion” [Lun zhina zongjiao 
gaige 論支那宗教改革] to Japanese audiences. At that time, however, Liang’s 
understanding of religion was quite vague. He employed terms like jiao, xue, and 
zongjiao in his works indistinctly, and they often simply seemed to refer to an overall 
system of thought or ideology. Liang basically continued to treat zongjiao as 
equivalent to its traditional analogue jiao, or ‘teaching,’ while highlighting its political 
facet at the same time.296 Having studied for years under the guidance of his mentor 
Kang Youwei—a “religionist [zongjiao jia 宗教家]” like Martin Luther, as Liang called 
him in his biographical article “Biography of Mr. Kang”297—Liang investigated the 
possibility of creating a national faith based on Kang’s fusion of New Text 
Confucianism with Buddhist sensibilities. He also advocated for ‘proselytizing’ 
Confucian teachings in the manner of Christian missionaries.298 However, Liang did 
not fully agree with what Kang believed in—a Confucian China with rujiao 
 
294 Around 1900, there were many essays on the issue of the relationship between religion and 
nationalism, for example, Cai Yuanpei’s 蔡元培 “Fojiao huguo lun佛教護國論” (1900); Zhang Taiyan’s 
“Lun fofa yu zongjiao, zhexue yiji xianshi zhi guanxi 論佛法與宗教、哲學以及現實之關係” (1901); 
Liang Qichao’s “Fojiao yu qun zhi zhi guanxi 佛教與群治之關係” (1902).  
295 However, evidently Liang Qichao was not the first Chinese scholar to employ the term zongjiao. As 
early as 1890, Huang Zunxian, who served as a secretary of legation in Japan from 1877 to 1882, had 
already utilized this term in his Treatise on Japan [Riben Guozhi 日本國志]. See Huang Zunxian, 
Treaties on Japan (Shanghai: Tushu jicheng, 1989) Reprint (Taipei: Wenhai, 1968) 32:11a. 
296 Marianne Bastid-Bruguière, “Liang Qichao yu zongjiao wenti 梁啟超與宗教問題 [Liang Qichao and 
the Religious Issue],” in Liang Qichao, Mingzhi Riben, Xifang 梁啟超·明治日本·西方, ed. Hazama Naoki 
(Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2001), 414. 
297 Liang Qichao, “Kang nanhai xiansheng zhuan 康南海先生傳,” in YBSHJ Wenji 3, 67-70. 
315 Lionel. M. Jensen, Manufacturing Confucianism: Chinese Traditions & Universal Civilization (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1997), 178-79. See also Chūzō Ichiko, “Hokyō to hempō保教と變法,” in Kindai 
Chūgoku no shakai to keizai 近代中國の政治と社會, ed. Niida Noboru (Tokyo: Toko Shoin, 1951), 115-38. 
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[Confucianism] as its national ‘religion.’299 In this period, Liang’s understanding of 
religion was full of paradoxes. He linked the traditional notion of ‘teaching’—jiao, the 
power of cultivation—with religious belief; however, when he talked about 
Confucianism as jiao, he actually emphasized its non-religious features: its 
‘rationality’ and educational function.  
In 1901, the third year of his political exile in Japan, his concept of religion 
witnessed a sudden transition. He began to discuss this term in the modern sense, 
with its Western meaning as the counterpart of science and its connotation of 
Protestantism. In his essay “How ‘Protecting the Faith’ is Not the Way to Honor 
Confucius” published in 1902, Liang first rejected the components of ritual and 
eschatology in the notion of religion and called them “superstition” [mixin zongyang 
迷信宗仰].300 “Religious awakening” [qixin 起信], he argued, would imprison the free 
thought of human beings by taking advantage of sectarianism to suppress dissent. He 
accused ‘superstitious-ness’ of being an essential feature of Western ‘religions,’ 
arguing that those religions would harm the progress of society and could not 
politically function to build up a modern, secular state.301 
Hesitating over religion as a concept—its definition, its subcategories, and so 
on, Liang formed a new intellectual view in which modern discourses like ‘science’ 
and ‘progressivism’ became the criterion for dividing ‘religion’ (scientific jiao) from 
‘superstition’ (unscientific jiao).302 Based on this categorization, Liang refused to 
categorize Confucianism as ‘religion.’303 He understored the difference between 
 
299 Kang’s idea of Confucianism provoked fierce attacks by many conservative Confucian scholars in the 
late 1890s. See, for example, Kung-ch’uan Hsiao, A Modern China and a New World: K’ang Yu-wei, Reformer 
and Utopian, 1858-1927 (Seattle & London: University of Washington Press, 1975), chapter 4. 
300 Liang, Qichao, “Baojiao fei suoyi zun Kong lun 保教非所以尊孔論,” in YBSHJ: Wenji 9, 52.  
301 Liang argued that “religion is not a tool to make progress; it would be useful in the first stage of the 
progress of human beings but the advantages it brings will not compensate for the disadvantages it 
causes. [故宗教者非使人進步之具也，於人群進化之第一期，雖有大功德，其第二期以後，則或
不足以償其弊也]. See Liang, Qichao, “Baojiao fei suoyi zun Kong lun 保教非所以尊孔論,” ibid. 52. 
302 Vincent Goossaert and David A. Palmer, The Religious Question in Modern China, 50. 
303 See Liang, “Baojiao fei suoyi zun Kong lun 保教非所以尊孔論,” 52. There have always been debates 
on the question of whether Confucianism is a religion or not, both in China and in the West. For a 
summarized discussion, see Hsi-Yuan Chen, “Confucianism Encounters Religion: the Formation of 
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Buddhism as religion and Confucianism as teaching [kongjiao 孔教]: “I think the ‘jiao’ 
of Confucianism means education, instead of religion.” He argued, “this teaching 
advocates practice, instead of faith.”304 At the same time, he suddenly realized that 
religion, as belief, has also a practical function for “civilization [jiaohua 教化],” only 
several months after deprecating religion as ‘superstition.’ In his essay “On the 
Strengths and Weaknesses of Philosophers and Religious Personages” published in 
October 1902, Liang argued for the necessity of religion. Religion could be maintained 
as an edifying power, he claimed, if one could identify the blind and irrational beliefs 
within it and distance oneself from them.305 This transition in attitude happened 
when Liang switched from Confucianism to Buddhism under the influence of the 
Japanese Buddhist reformers Masaharu Anesaki 姉崎正治 (1873-1949) and Inoue 
Enryō 井上円了 (1858-1919).306  
In the same year of 1902, Liang soon published another essay, “On the 
Relationship between Buddhism and Governing Communities” [Fojiao yu qun zhi zhi 
guanxi 佛教與群治之關係] on the instrumental function of Buddhism. Favorably 
comparing elements of Mahāyāna Buddhism to the ideals of social Darwinism and 
Western democracy, he began to interpret Buddhism as a dignified and sophisticated 
 
Religious Discourse and the Confucian Movement in Modern China” (PhD Dissertation, Harvard 
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religiosity of Confucianism. For example, Nobuyuki Kaji 加地伸行 has argued in his book Jukyō to wa 
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Religion: Confucianism] (Tokyo: Tsukuma Shobo, 1994). Julia Ching also emphasized the ritualistic 
dimension of Confucianism, translating lijiao as “ritual religion.” See Julia Ching, Chinese Religion 
(Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1993), 51-65. See also Li Shen 李申, “Guanyu rujiao de jige wenti 關
於儒教的幾個問題” Shijie zongjiao yanjiu 世界宗教研究, 2 (1995): 1-10; Huang Chin-shing 黃進興, 
“Zuowei zongjiao de rujiao: yige bijiao zongjiao de chubu tantao 作為宗教的儒教: 一個比較宗教的初
步探討,” in Yazhou yanjiu 亞洲研究 23 (1997): 184-223. 
304 “吾以為孔教者，教育之教也”; “其為教也，主於實行，不主於信仰.” Liang, “Lun fojiao yu qunzhi 
zhi guanxi 論佛教與群治之關係,” in YBSHJ: Wenji 10, 45. 
305 Liang, Lun zongjiao jia yu zhexuejia changduan deshi  論宗教家與哲學家長短得失.” 
306 for the Japanese influence, see Bastid-Bruguière, “Liang Qichao yu zongjiao wenti 梁啟超與宗教問
題,” 429-32.  
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religion that consisted of, according to his words, “not superstition but intellectual 
belief.”307   
Over the next few months, Liang still vacillated repeatedly over the proper 
position of Buddhism. His book Dashi showed his swaying attitude clearly. In the 
introduction to this booklet, Liang named the absence of religion as a positive feature 
of Chinese civilization and cheered the ‘non-religious’ feature of Chinese scholarship 
while later, in the sixth chapter, “The age of Buddhism” [foxue shidai 佛學時代], he 
described Buddhism (here using the word “fojiao 佛教”) as a unique religion that 
“splendidly lit up China’s history.”308 Afterwards, however, he soon clarified that it 
was the ‘Buddhist philosophy’ [fojiao zhexue 佛教哲學], instead of the religiosity of 
Buddhism, that had made valuable contributions to Chinese culture. His random 
usage of the terms ‘fojiao’ and ‘foxue’ in the same text and his self-contradictory 
statements indicated his ambiguous understanding of religion in general and of 
Buddhism in particular.  
 
Zhang Taiyan’s Buddhist Epistemology  
Liang’s paradoxical and eclectic understanding was echoed by his rival, Zhang Taiyan. 
Similarly, Zhang’s conception of religion went through numerous changes. Before he 
went to prison following the Subao Case 蘇報案 and probed deeply into Buddhist 
classics, he constantly expressed his antagonism towards religion and criticized 
religious beliefs as demonic. However, after 1900, Zhang accepted the Western 
concept of religion as it had been filtered through Japanese thinkers, especially 
Anesaki Masaharu. Perhaps related to his experience in jail, he then began to think 
 
307 “佛教是智信而非迷信,” in Liang, “Lun zongjiao jia yu zhexuejia changduan deshi  論宗教家與哲學
家長短得失.” For an analysis of Liang’s interpretation of Buddhism and Western political ideas, see 
Joseph R. Levenson, Liang Ch’i-chao and the Mind of Modern China (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1959), 129-33. 
308 “放萬丈光焰於歷史上.” Liang, “Lun Zhongguo Xueshu Sixiang Bianqian Zhi Dashi 論中國學術思想
變遷之大勢,” YBSHJ, Wenji: 7, 63. 
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about issues related to the possibility of transcendence within Buddhist thought and 
gradually “understood the meaning of Mahāyāna Buddhism.”309  
In “On Establishing Religion”310, his first essays on Yogācāra Buddhism, Zhang 
followed the theory of Yogācāra311 and its philosophical setting to establish the 
ontological ground of religious belief and criticized Kang Youwei’s efforts to fashion a 
national religion of “Confucianity.”312 Unlike Liang Qichao’s pragmatic view of 
religion, Zhang’s conception went beyond explicit links to nation-saving and 
revolutionary morality. His more abstract reading of Buddhism, especially the 
Yogācāra teachings,313 rarely touched on political ideas such as society, nations, or 
civilization but related to epistemology.  
 
309 Tang Zhijun 湯志鈞, Zhang Taiyan nianpu changbian,189; Zhang, zishu sixiang qianbian zhi ji (自述
思想韆變之跡). See also John Jorgensen, “Indra’s Network: Zhang Taiyan’s Sino-Japanese Personal 
Networks and the Rise of Yogācāra in Modern China.” In John Makeham, ed., Transforming 
Consciousness: Yogacara Thought in Modern China (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 64-99. 
310 Zhang, Taiyan,  “On Establishing Religion [Jianli zongjiao lun 建立宗教論].” 
311 Yogācāra was of all the traditional Chinese philosophical systems, the one that most nearly matched 
the epistemological complexity and rigor of the Western systems, such as the Kantian and neo-Kantian 
systems that had become popular in Europe and Japan. For example, a number of scholars have drawn 
attention to similarities between the Yogācāra notion of vijñapti-mātra (nothing but mental 
construction) and Kant’s Vorstellung (“representation”). See Dan Lusthaus, Buddhist Phenomenology: A 
Philosophical Investigation of Yogacara Buddhism and the Ch’eng Wei-shih Lun (New York: Routledge, 2003); 
also Kern Iso, “Object, Objective Phenomenon and Objectivating Act According to the 
‘Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi’ of Xuanzang (600-664).” in Phenomenology and Indian Philosophy, ed. Debi Prasad 
Chattopadhyaya, Lester E. Embree & Jitendranath Mohanty (Albany: State University of New 
York,1992), 262-69. 
312 Lionel M. Jensen, Manufacturing Confucianism: Chinese Tradition and Universal Civilization (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1997), 187.  
313 The core concept of Zhang’s epistemology is the Buddhist notion “three natures” [tri-svabhāva, 三自
性]. For a detailed analysis of Zhang’s view of these three natures, see Viren Murthy, The Political 
Philosophy of Zhang Taiyan: The Resistance of Consciousness (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 113-17. Also, Wang 
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Based on his understanding of Yogācāra Buddhism, Zhang discussed the 
relationship between religion and knowledge.314 This idea was elaborated in his essay 
“On establishing religion”: 
One cannot determine whether a religion is a base or exalted a priori. I take as a 
standard that religion should not lose truth above, and it should help the people’s 
morality below. 宗教之高下勝劣，不容先論。要以上不失真，下有益於生民之道
德為其准的].315  
Although, in the Qiushu 訄書, Zhang contended that all religions are equal, here, as 
shown by the two labels “above” and “below,” he clearly indicated principles for 
judgment and defined the mission of religion at two levels.  The ‘higher’ religion, for 
example, Buddhism, as he indicated, is oriented toward the search for truth. In the 
lecture “On the Relationship between Buddhist Dharma and Religion, Philosophy and 
Reality,” which he delivered in Japan, he stated that Buddhism, without a belief in 
God or any other supernatural subjects, such as hell and demons, is not a religion but 
essentially an atheism engaged in seeking for “wisdom” or “truth.” In this sense, he 
understood Buddhism as a ‘science’ based on evidence, and called it a “philosophical 
positivism” [zhexue zhi shizheng zhe 哲學之實證者].316  
Zhang’s philosophical interpretation of Buddhism influenced modern Chinese 
intellectuals and Buddhists profoundly.317 It revealed that, besides its political 
functions, religion has an epistemological dimension: it is the domain of knowledge. 
Religion not only has the power to reveal delusion and seize truth, but also is able to 
demonstrate the truth in a way that impels one to action. It was critical, in Zhang’s 
 
314 Young-tsu Wong, Search for modern nationalism: Zhang Binglin and revolutionary China, 1869-1936 (Hong 
Kong: Oxford University Press, 1989), 52-55. 
315 Zhang Taiyan, Mingbao, no. 9 (1906): 19. 
316 Zhang Taiyan, Lun fofa yu zongjiao, zhexue, yiji xianshi zhi guanxi論佛法與宗教、哲學以及現實
之關係[On the Relationship between Buddhist Dharma and Religion, Philosophy and Reality]; C.f. 
Murthy, “Transfiguring Modern Temporality: Zhang Taiyan’s Yogācāra Critique of Evolutionary 
History,” 112. 
317 Named by Gong Jun the “philosophy-type” of Buddhist study. See Gong Jun, “Jindai Zhongguo foxue 




view, that people surrounded by constantly changing phenomena still had a tool for 
reasoning to approach truth.318  And Buddhism could respond to the discourse of 
modernity and could somehow replace the standards imposed by Western science. At 
this point, Buddhism divided itself from superstition and was considered to be able to 
provide answers to questions such as the nature of the noumenon, causality, time, 
space, and so on.319  
 
Response from Buddhism 
Zhang Taiyan’s idea about the epistemology of Buddhism spread throughout the 
Buddhist community. Discussions on the mission of Buddhism and its position in the 
modernizing Chinese society soon expanded to broader debates on the nature of 
religion and the relationships between religion, superstition, philosophy, and science.  
 The concern of Buddhist epistemology within Chinese Buddhist community 
originated from the layman Yang Renshan, who advocated and practiced this 
epistemological Buddhism by revitalizing the translation of Buddhist scriptures, 
initiating modern Buddhist education, and developing the scriptural publication and 
circulation of Buddhist texts.320 Yang’s efforts to recover the true knowledge of 
Buddhism led to the formation of a scholastic Buddhism; it introduced an academic 
approach to rebuilding Buddhism from its doctrinal level and resisting pressure from 
politics and society, as well as from monasteries.  
 
318 Wing-tsit Chan, Religious Trends in Modern China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1953), 106-18. 
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320 For details of Yang Renshan’s career, see Welch, The Buddhist Revival in China, 2-10.; Yü Lingbo, ed., 
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Yang’s student Ouyang Jingwu 歐陽竟無	(1871-1943) continued the 
undertaking of his mentor.321 Ouyang and his followers in the Neixue yuan shared the 
standpoint that Buddhism provided a foundation for knowing and understanding the 
world.322 However, they categorized Buddhism neither as philosophy nor as religion. 
In Ouyang’s essay “The Dharma is neither religion nor philosophy,” he criticized that 
both ‘religion’ and ‘philosophy’ were concepts derived from the West and therefore 
should not be recklessly applied to Buddhism.323 To Ouyang, the Dharma was the 
ultimate wisdom that went far beyond the scope of philosophy and had nothing in 
common with religious beliefs. In a letter from 1925, he further explained: 
Religion has conclusions but no investigation, while philosophy has investigation but 
no conclusion. The teaching of Dharma, however, means studying the ultimate truth 
after the conclusion has been reached, instead of searching for the conclusions 
through study. Therefore, the Dharma is neither religion nor philosophy but another 
branch of scholarship. 宗教有結論無研究，哲學有研究無結論，佛法則於結論後
而大加研究以極其趣，非待研究而希得其結論。是故，佛法於宗教哲學外，而別
為一學也.324 
The analogy between academic research and Buddhism here indicates that Ouyang 
regarded Buddhism as a kind of scholarship, although he rarely used the ambitious 
term foxue 佛學. He devoted a good portion of the same letter to discuss 
epistemological issues in detail, from the essence and origin of knowledge to its 
impact and function. He admitted that there was overlap between Buddhism, science, 
 
321 For Ouyang’s  academic background, see Yu Lingbo, Xiandai fojiao renwu cidian 現代佛教人物辭典; 
Eyal Aviv, Ouyang Jingwu: From Yogācāra Scholasticism to Soteriology, Transforming Consciousness: 
Yogācāra Thought in Modern China, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 287-294. 
322 Scholars including Zhang Taiyan, Xiong Shili, Liang Qichao, Tang Yongtong, Wang Enyang 王恩洋, 
Jing Changji景昌極, Miao Fenglin 繆鳳林, and Zhang Junmai 張君勱 had studied or taught at Neixue 
yuan. For more details about the organization and activities of Neixue yuan, see “Nanjing zhina 
neixueyuan zhi shikuang 南京支那內學院之實況,” Shijie fojiao jushilin linkan 世界佛教居士林林刊, 
issue 5, Section of Zhuangjian, 1924, 1-4; “Nanfang weishixue xuefu zhina neixueyuan gailan南方唯識
學學府支那內學院概覽,” Haichaoyin, vol. 12, issue 5 (1931), section Shicheng 史乘, 7-9.  
323 Ouyang, “Fofa fei zongjiao yifei zhexue 佛法非宗教非哲學.”  
324 Ouyang, “Yu Zhang Xingyan shu 與章行嚴書,” in Ouyang Dashi yiji 歐陽大師遺集 (Taipei: 
Xinwenfeng, 1976), 335 
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and philosophy,325 but, comparing ideas of Yogācāra Buddhis with science and 
philosophy, he insisted that science was limited to the realm of phenomena based on 
sensation; philosophy was powerless to grasp truth except in the realms of logic and 
experience, and would therefore unavoidably fall into agnosticism. Only Yogācāra: 
……is a sophisticated convenient means [upāya] and also an ultimate reasoning.326  
[yukti] 唯識法相，方便善巧，道理究竟. 
Here Ouyang stressed again that the foundation of Buddhist teaching is the notion of 
rectified views [samyagjñāna, zhengjian 正見]. This knowledge-centered 
fundamentalism led Ouyang Jingwu to consider Buddhism the prerequisite for human 
rationality, and superior to science and philosophy.327 For him, the first step toward 
this goal was somewhat deconstructive: we have to sweep away all prejudice and 
illusions, especially false knowledge of Buddhism itself. In his “Today’s Buddhist 
studies,” a lecture he gave at Neixue yuan in 1923, he clarified that there are two 
methodological keys to ‘correct’ Buddhist learning: first, “the principles of the 
development of Buddhism” [dishan zhili 遞嬗之理] need to be clarified; second, the 
truth needs to be recognized in “proper sequence” [zhengqi zhishi 正期之事].328 What 
he advocated here was a critical and historical reading of Buddhist teachings through 
which the origin and nature of Buddhism would be deciphered. His disciple Lü Cheng 
further explained this statement as “from the truth within the development of 
Buddhism to the truth of practice and action” in his speech “Talk on the scholarship 
 
325 Further study on the relationship between Buddhism and science, especially the debates on this 
issue in the modern period, see Erik J Hammerstrom, The Science of Chinese Buddhism: Early Twentieth-
Century Engagements (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015). 
326 Ouyang Jingwu 歐陽竟無, “weishi juezetan 唯識抉擇談,” Ouyang Dashi yiji 歐陽大師遺集 (Taipei: 
Xinwenfeng, 1976), 1360. In the context of Yogācāra, daoli 道理 has the meaning of correct, rational, 
logical; it refers to the correct theory (Skt. nyāya, yukta; Tib. rigs pa dang ldan pa) and reasoning, logic 
(Skt. yukti, artha, yoga; Tib. rigs pa). For example, the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra lists four kinds of reasoning 
四種道理; see Cheng weishi lun 成唯識論, T 1585.31.47a29. 
327 Ouyang Jingwu 歐陽竟無, “Yu Zhang Xingyan shu 與章行嚴書.” 
328 Ouyang Jingwu, “Jinri zhi fofa yanjiu” 今日之佛法研究,	30. See also Cheng Gongrang, Ouyang Jingwu 
foxue sixiang yanjiu 歐陽竟無佛學思想研究 (Taipei: Xinwenfeng, 2000); Li Guangliang 李廣良, Ouyang 
Jingwu de foxue fangfa lun 歐陽竟無的佛學方法論, in Journal of Yunnan Normal University 云南師范大
學學報, 5 (1999): 53-7. 
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of the Institute.”329 Ouyang and Lü’s proposal was aimed at restoring the most 
historically authentic Buddhism, so that what they believed in could be restored and 
an authentic or ‘genuine Buddhism’ could be re-established. With this strong tone of 
scholasticism,330 lay Buddhists in modern China, especially those associated with the 
Neixue yuan, adopted a position that was both radical and conservative.331 In the name 
of reconstructing knowledge, they attempted to rectify fallacies in the interpretation 
of Buddhism, revealing its genuine meaning and preventing its ‘original nature 
[benzhen 本真] from further deviation and distortion.  
This intention of rectifying Dharma and the somewhat rebellious attitude of 
these lay Buddhist scholars profoundly challenged the monastic orthodoxy 
established as early as the Tang dynasty.332 Compared to monastic Buddhism, lay 
Buddhism paid more attention to Buddhism’s philosophical and intellectual 
dimensions instead of its rituals and religious experiences. Issues related to the 
regulatory framework for the saṃgha and monastic community were less discussed. 
This attitude was labeled by Goossaert as “anticlericalism.”333 Targeting “the selfish 
monks” [chujia zili zhiren 出家自利之人], such anticlericalism, as Helen Hardacre 
summarized, not only resulted in more extensive participation in shaping the 
 
329 “由言教變遷之實，求觀行踐證之真.” Lü Cheng, “Tan yuanxue” 談院學,” LFLX, vol.1, 329. 
330 The category of scholasticism as outlined by José Cabezón in his Buddhism and Language. Some of the 
relevant characteristics of scholastic Buddhism mentioned by Cabezón include: (1) formal nature; (2) 
systematicity; (3) preoccupation with scriptures and their exegesis in commentaries; (4) rationalism 
and reliance on logic; (5) dialectics in defense of outlined tenets; (6) a penchant for lists; (7) 
classification and categorization; (8) a tendency toward abstraction. See José Ignacio Cabezón, 
Buddhism and Language: A Study of Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York 
Press, 1994), 15. Also see Eyal Aviv, “Differentiating the Pearl From the Fish Eye: Ouyang Jingwu (1871-
1943) and the Revival of Scholastic Buddhism” (Ph.D Dissertation, Harvard University, 2008). 
331 Dan Lusthaus, “Lü Cheng, Epistemology, and Genuine Buddhism,” in Transforming Consciousness: 
Yogacara Thought in Modern China, 322.  
332 For further studies of the role of laity in modern Chinese Buddhism, see Holmes Welch, The Practice 
of Chinese Buddhism, 1900-1950 (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1967).  
333 Goossaert and Palmer, The Religious Question in Modern China., 308. 
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trajectory of Buddhist institutionalization, but also in a growing skepticism regarding 
monastic superiority in terms of doctrinal, philosophical, and historical knowledge.334  
 Ouyang’s alienation from monastic practices exposed him and the Neixueyuan 
to censure and criticism from Buddhist clergy.335 Compared to Ouyang, Taixu’s 
understanding of religion, philosophy, and science were more unstable. Indeed, he 
was basically convinced that Buddhism was superior to all other thoughts; however, 
he constantly compared Buddhism with science and other modern philosophies and 
did not consider Buddhism to be a self-sufficient system that should be distinguished 
thoroughly from science and philosophy, as Ouyang did. In his essay “My View of 
Religion”, he defined the term zongjiao: 
Now I give a definition to the currently popular term ‘religion’ [zongjiao]. What we 
call ‘religion’ now, according to the meaning of traditional Chinese, should be named 
‘teaching’ [jiao] — such as the three teachings of Confucianism, Daoism, and 
Buddhism, and so on. Teaching equals religion. Therefore, both Buddhism and 
Christianity and so forth can all be called religion. Religion has two dimensions: inner 
realization and public education; the inner cultivation of individuals is called the 
‘foundation’ [zong]; educating others based on this foundation is called ‘religion’. …… 






Taixu’s definition of zongjiao here was broader and more positive. More like Liang 
Qichao than Zhang Taiyan or Ouyang Jingwu, he emphasized the political function 
 
334 Helen Hardacre, “Laity,” in Robert E. Busswell ed. Encyclopedia of Buddhism (New York: Macmillan 
Reference, 2004). 
335 Welch, The Buddhist Revival in China, 117-120; For the first hand sources, see Lingbo, Xiandai fojiao 
renwu cidian 現代佛教人物辭典, “Ouyang Jian”; the influential debate between the Inner Institute and 
the Wuchang Academy included: 1) debate on ‘the selfish monk’; 2) debate on the birth and death dates 
of Śakyamuni Buddha; 3) debate on Buddhist logic; 4) debate on the falsehood of The Treatise on the 
Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith and the Shuangama Sūtra [Lengyan jing 楞嚴經]. 
336 Taixu, “Wo zhi zongjiao guan 我之宗教觀,” TXQS, vol22, 220.  
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and social responsibility of religion. Without hesitation, he categorized Buddhism 
(along with Confucianism and Taoism) as zongjiao, following the traditional 
classification of the “three teachings,” while mixing this classification with the 
modern concept of ‘religion’. Interestingly, Taixu used ‘Dharma’ [fofa 佛法] and 
‘Buddhist teaching’ [foxue 佛學] to refer to Buddhist belief in most of his writings; 
only in the final year of his life did he return to the term ‘Buddhist religion’ [fojiao 佛
教].337  
Although, in Taixu’s view, Buddhism belonged to the category of religion,338 
Taixu believed that Buddhist teaching can be a valid response to modernity, as he 
tried to prove in his discussions of modern philosophies and science, from social 
Darwinism to psychology, biology, and the theory of relativity.339 Buddhist doctrines, 
he emphasized in different articles, have no conflicts with modern tenets, such as 
progress, equality and freedom340; the Buddhist Dharma can even represent the 
perfect ‘pure science.’341 
 Inspired by nationalists like Liang Qichao and Zhang Taiyan, Taixu believed 
that, as a modern religion, Buddhism could and should support the formation of a 
modern state and provide solutions to the social crisis China faced. This expectation 
was also what Taixu read from the past of Chinese Buddhism. He had discussed many 
times the heroic role of saṃgha had played in resisting invasions and defending their 
local community. Although Taixu’s early interest in revolutionary theories had 
subsided by the 1920s, he retained his concern for Buddhism’s social role throughout 
his life. His design of modern Buddhist society came in the form of his “Pure Land in 
the human world” [renjian jingtu 人間淨土] concept in 1926—the notion that, rather 
than focusing on attaining rebirth in the Pure Lands, one should believe that this 
 
337 Nedostup, “Religion, Superstition and Governing Society in Nationalist China,” 35; Goossaert and 
Palmer, The Religious Question in Modern China. 
338 We should note that, on a few occasions, Taixu argued that religion and science are both one part of 
philosophy. See Taixu, Foxue Gailun: jielun 佛學概論: 結論, vol.1, 58 
339 For a detailed discussion on how Taixu used Yogācāra to discuss these topics, see Scott Pacey, 
“Taixu, Yogācāra, and the Buddhist Approach to Modernity.” 
340 See Taixu: ziyou shiguan 自由史觀 in TXQS, vol.24, 116-203 
341 Taixu, “Zhen xianshilun zongyilun (shang) 真現實論宗依論(上),” in TXQS, vol. 34, 159. 
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world itself can be “purified” by making Buddhism the intellectual foundation of 
individual and social life. (Taixu developed this view under the rubric of “Buddhism 
for human life” [rensheng fojiao 人生佛教]; a term he introduced in 1928,342 and later 
(from 1933), “Buddhism for the human world” [renjian fojiao 人間佛教]).343  
 
Building a New Buddhism  
Throughout the twentieth century, the struggle between religion and other 
ideological and political forces was fierce and ceaseless. From 1898 onwards, as 
Goossaert and Palmer showed, the suppression of religion through, for example, the 
confiscation and destruction of temples, was not just a side effect of socio-political 
modernization but the direct result of the general policies that determined the new 
relationship between the state and religious institutions.344 At the same time, 
however, a discursive change took place and somehow preserved the space left for 
religion. Religion was conceived as a moralizing and unifying power behind 
modernization. Modern Chinese intellectuals gained this impression largely from the 
history of the Protestant Reformation in Europe and the experience of Japan. If, as 
they believed, religion could prove its correspondence with science or reshape itself 
as a constructive power supporting the establishment of the nation state, then it 
would survive. What we should notice, however, is that there was a gap between the 
Chinese religious heritage—an integrated system consisting of salvation, spiritual 
techniques, kinship-based rites, communal cults, etc.—and the discourse of a 
 
342 See Taixu 太虛, “Duiyu Zhongguo Fojiao geming seng de xunci 對於中國佛教革命僧的訓詞,” in 
TXQS, 597. 
343 His design of modern Buddhist society came in the form of his “Pure Land in the human world” 
[renjian jingtu 人間淨土] concept in 1926—the notion that, rather than focusing on attaining rebirth 
in the Pure Lands, one should believe that this world itself can be “purified” by making Buddhism the 
intellectual foundation of individual and social life. (Taixu developed this view under the rubric of 
“Buddhism for human life” [rensheng fojiao 人生佛教]; a term he introduced in 1928,  and later (from 
1933), “Buddhism for the human world” [renjian fojiao 人間佛教]).  See Taixu, “Jianshe renjian jingtu 
lun 建設人間淨土論,” in TXQS, vol. 24 (2005 [1926]), pp. 349–424. See also Taixu, “Zenyang lai jianshe 
renjian Fojiao 怎樣來建設人間佛教, in TXQS, vol. 47 [1933], 431. 
344 Goossaert and Palmer, The Religious Question in Modern China. 
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‘modern religion,’ which was considered to produce intellectualization, moralization, 
privatization, urbanization, and other processes that related to the broader 
phenomenon of secularization. In this sense, ‘religion,’ as modern Chinese people 
understood it, would not be a unified entity but a layered structure with different 
hierarchies. This gap between traditional/modern religion, as well as the inherent 
tension inside religion, encouraged many outsiders (mostly historians and 
philosophers) to participate in the discussions on the historical and political 
functions of religion. Most of these discussions did not transform rational atheists 
into believers or vice versa; rather, they consisted of interpretations of different 
religious visions or portraits of different faces of religion. To these non-believers, 
religion was fundamentally an ‘invention’:  they read it, talked about it, imagined it, 
but never lived it. Therefore, it was not surprising that many contemporary scholars 
were addicted to the expressions ‘invented religion’ and ‘inventing religion.’345 These 
phrases indicated that the religious ‘reformation’ or ‘modernization,’ as “an 
institutionally and ideologically independent formation,” was basically again a 
process of “religionization,”346 within which the religious tradition modified its 
discourses, representations, and resources to fit in the new definition of ‘religion’ and 
meet the requirements of the new knowledge system and modern nation-state. 
 The conceptual dilemma caused by this process of invention was intensified 
by the threat Buddhism faced from both outside and inside: social and political 
upheaval as well as the doldrums of Buddhism itself at both the doctrinal and 
practical levels. In Buddhist communities, Buddhist leaders and elites responded to 
critiques of the superstitious elements in Buddhism and the corruption of the saṃgha 
by advocating that Buddhism should change according to the needs of the time.347 
 
345 By ‘invention,’ Tomoko Masuzawa meant that “the modern discourse on religion and religions was 
from the very beginning …clearly a discourse of ‘othering’” or a “secular enterprise.” Masuzawa, The 
Invention of World Religions: Or, How European Universalism was Preserved in the Language of Pluralism. 20.  
346 Robert Weller, “Taiwan and Global Religious Trend” (The First World Congress of Taiwan Studies, 
Academia Sinica, Taipei, April 26-28 2012); see also Robert Weller, Alternate Civilities: Democracy and 
Culture in China and Taiwan (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999).  
347 The concept of mofa had appeared in many modern writings. For example, the reformist monk 
Yakun亞! in his “The Foreword of Buddhism Monthly” [佛教月報發刊詞] stated that, in “the current 
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Meanwhile, they also insisted that the corruption of Buddhism solely indicated the 
degree to which Buddhism had deviated from its spiritual roots. The crisis was not 
caused by Buddhism itself, but rather by the institutional and sectarian misuse of the 
Buddha’s teaching. This attitude has motivated these individuals to continually 
examine and rethink the Buddhist tradition and, in doing so, to seek the possibility of 
understanding and assessing Buddhism again with modern discourses. 
The influence of modern religious scholarship can be discerned in this 
defensive strategy of utilizing the ‘Zeitgeist’ to protect Buddhist values and to sweep 
away doubts and critiques of this mixed, polluted religious tradition.348 In this 
process, the authenticity of the Chinese Buddhist canon became vulnerable under the 
scrutiny of modern Buddhology, which unveiled that what had been read as the 
Buddha’s real words had in fact experienced ceaseless translation, editing, 
modification, and misreading. To solve this issue, Buddhist reformists and defenders 
in modern China envisaged two separate but not mutually exclusive paradigms: 
engaged Buddhism and genuine Buddhism. Despite their teleological and 
methodological differences, those paradigms both responded to the challenge of 
modernity and its components, such as rationality and science as well as the values of 
progress and secularization.  
 
Engaged Buddhism 
To establish Buddhism as an ‘engaged’ 349 or ‘socially engaged’ religion was one of the 
strategies to re-organize its function based on secular values. Opposed to Weber’s 
 
age of mofa, Buddhism need to be reformed” [如今末法時代,……即知宗教亦不得不因時而轉移]; 
Taixu also used this notion in his writings. See Taixu, “Jiren chengfo de zhen xianshi lun 即人成佛的
真現實論,” in TXQS, vol. 47, 457  
348 The ‘Western Zeitgeist’ I refer here to includes (but is not limited to) the legacy of anti-clericism and 
anti-ritualism of the Reformation; the rationalism and empiricism of the Enlightenment; the 
romanticism of figures such as Schleiermacher and Dilthey; and the existentialism of Nietzsche. Robert 
H. Sharf, “The Zen of Japanese Nationalism,,” History of Religions 33, no. 1 (1993): 4. 
349  The concept of ‘engaged Buddhism’ or ‘socially engaged Buddhism’ is translated from ‘le 
bouddhisme engage,’ which was formulated by the Vietnamese Zen master Thích Nhất Hạnh. For 
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idea that Buddhism is apolitical or even anti-political because of its rejection of 
“personality,” those who supported the idea of “engaged religion” claimed that 
Buddhism would be an effective means to obtain human rights and build a civil 
society.350 Combining with the values of freedom, equality, democracy, and so on, 
Buddhism in the modern era became involved in public issues, such as the colonial 
crisis, political disputes, autocratic ruling, and economic inequality.351  
In modern China, the ‘politicization’ of Buddhism was a significant trend 
among the proponents of Buddhist reformation. As a supporter of Buddhism, Liang 
Qichao argued in his 1902 article “On the Relationship Between Buddhism and Social 
Order” that religion was necessary for the progress of Chinese society. Affected by 
the theories of Johann Caspar Bluntschli and Japanese Spiritual Buddhism, Liang 
considered Buddhism to be a method of spiritual mobilization that could boost 
people’s morale and awaken potential political powers.352 
 
further study of ‘engaged Buddhism,’ see Christopher S. Queen and Sallie B. King, Engaged Buddhism: 
Buddhist Liberation Movements in Asia (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996). Also, K. Jones, The Social Face of 
Buddhism: an Approach to Political and Social Activism (London: Wisdom Publications, 1989), 271-76. 
350 There are already several works on this topic. See Sallie B King, Being Benevolence: The Social Ethics of 
Engaged Buddhism (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2005). Fred Eppsteiner ed., The Path of 
Compassion: Writings on Socially Engaged Buddhism (Berkeley: Paradax Press,1988); Kenneth Kraft, The 
Wheel of Engaged Buddhism: The Map of the Path (New York: Weatherhill, 1999); Christopher S. Queen, 
“Engaged Buddhism,” in Charles S. Prebish, Martin Baumann,ed., Westward Dharma: Buddhism Beyond 
Asia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); Charles Prebish, and Damien Keown, ed., Action 
Dharma: New Studies in Engaged Buddhism (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003). 
351 The historical records of the interaction between Buddhism and politics can be found in Buddhist 
scriptures.  For example, Robert Thurman has argued that the political principles of the King Aśoka 
included transcendental individualism, nonviolence, educational evolutionism, social altruism, 
universal democracy, and so on. See Inner Revolution (New York: Riverhead Books, 1998), chapter 4. He 
also discussed the political ideas of Nāgārjuna based on these principles in his “Guidelines for Buddhist 
Social Activism Based on Nāgārjuna’s Jewel Garland of Royal Counsels,” in Fred Eppsteiner ed., the Path 
of Compassion: Writings on Socially Engaged Buddhism (Berkeley: Paradax Press,1988). Also, Ken Jones, the 
Social Face of Buddhism:An Approach to Political and Social Activism (London, Wisdom, 1989), 227-230; Tran 
Thanh Huang, “Buddhism and Politics in Southeast Asia” (Claremont Graduate School, University 
Centre, 1970), Ph.D diss., 11. 
352 Huang, Chi-shing 黃進興, Liang Qichao de zhongji guanhuai梁啟超的終極關懷, Shixue pinglun 史學
評論, 2 (1980), 85-99. 
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To invent a socially-politically engaged ‘new Buddhism’,353 people needed to 
re-interpretate its past and find in history the evidence that Buddhism can bring 
changes. Taixu, for example, attempted to “observe all the new cultures, including 
economy, politics and education, art and science through Buddhism-centric 
concepts.”354 He believed that modern notions like equality and freedom, although 
Western and secular, could only be fully represented and decoded by Buddhism. 
Therefore, Buddhism “should be the foundation of all modern civilization.”355 At 
many places, he investigated some of the core concepts of human society from a 
historical perspective, attempting to demonstrate that important processes in history 
can be explained and illustrated by Buddhism, and thus Buddhism can be involved in 
the future development of the world. He also advocated reflecting on many tenets in 
the history of Buddhism in light of the demands of the present. In the 1930s and the 
1940s, Taixu severely criticized the traditional indifferent attitude towards politics as 
“a view which is out of touch with the trends of the time.”356  
This ‘engaged Buddhism’ is fundamentally conflicted to the historical image of 
Buddhism, which was retreated, self-limited and marginalized in political system.357 
And partly because of this solid historical image and the long-lasting secular forces in 
 
353 According to Taixu, the goal of his Buddhist revolution was to “construct the original Buddhist into 
a new Buddhism which can adjust to the current Chinese environment” [建設原本釋迦佛遺教，且適
合現時中國環境的新佛教]. See Taixu, “Wo de fojiao gaijin yundong lueshi我的佛教改進運動略史,” 
in TXQS, vol.29, 114-115.  
354 “是抱定以佛教為中心的觀念，去觀察現代的一切新的經濟、政治、教育、文藝及科學、哲學
諸文化.” Taixu, “Xin yu rongguan 新與融貫,” in TXQS, vol.1, 375. 
355 “近代文明當以佛為根據.” Taixu, “Dizhi yu shen minzhu yu fo zhi genju 帝制於神民主於佛之根
據,” Haichaoyin wenku 海潮音文庫, vol.1-11 (Taipei: Foxue shuju 佛學書局, 1930). 
356 “不合時代潮流之論調.” Taixu, “Jianshe shiying shidai zhi Zhongguo fojiao建設適應時代之中國佛
教.” C.f., He Jianming何建明, Fofa guannian de jindai tiaoshi佛法觀念的近代調適 (Guangzhou: 
Guangdong renmin chubanshe), 284.  
357 See Gong Jun龔雋, “Tiaoshi yu fangkang – yi jindai dongya fojiao chuantong yu zhengzhi guanxi 
zhong de liangge gean wei zhongxin 調適與反抗——以近代東亞佛教傳統與政治關係中的兩個案例
為中心,” paper presented at Renjian fojiao, xinhuo xiangchuan: Di si jie Yinshun daoshi sixiang zhi 
lilun yu shijian xueshu yantaohui 人間佛教‧薪火相傳: 第四屆印順導師思想之理論與實踐學術研討
會, Taoyuan: Hongshi foxue yuan, 2003. 
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China, the modernization of Buddhism processed slowing and remained unfinished.358 
Buddhism in modern China, although engaged in society more and more deeply, still 
hardly fulfilled or safeguarded those voguish and powerful values that were 
propagated by science, nationalism, Marxism, and so on. Some scholars viewed this 
kind of modernism as ‘reductive’: the spiritual root of Buddhism had been deducted 
or compromised by the needs of secularization.359 To engage in such a modern world, 
Buddhist reformists like Taixu believed that Buddhism had to abandon the old rule 
that it should keep a distance from public life and should become ‘humanized’ 
[renjian hua 人間化]. However, ironically, both history and the current reality 
proved to the reformists that, once Buddhism interfered in the political sphere, it 
would be severely suppressed.  
This path of engaged Buddhism in modern China, to a large degree, stucked on 
a theorical stage or confined to the narratives about Buddhism’s past. Indeed, it still 
indicated a process that was the opposite of ‘secularization’;360 it was not a simple 
separation of religiosity and secularity, but rather a new relationship between these 
two.361 As a core dimension of the classic theory of secularization, “differentiation,” as 
Casanova summarized, underscored the “emancipation” of the secular spheres 
 
358 Taixu, “Wode  fojiao yundong shibai shi 我的佛教運動失敗史,” in TXQS, 19, 29. For the failure of 
Buddhist modernization, see Justin R. Ritzinger, Anarchy in the Pure Land: Reinventing the Cult of Maitreya 
in Modern Chinese Buddhism (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017), 53-71. 
359 Ken Jones, The New Social Face of Buddhism (Wisdom Publications, 1992), 271-76. 
360 For the discussion on the theory of secularization, see Dobbelaere, “Secularization: A Multi-
Dimensional Concept.” Dobbelaere, Secularization: An Analysis at Three Levels; Casanova, Public Religions 
in the Modern World; Danièle Hervieu-Léger, La religion pour mémoire (Paris: Cerf, 1993), 243 -59; Le 
pèlerin et le converti. La religion en mouvement (Paris: Flammarion, 1999), 36-37; “Pour une sociologie 
des ‘modernités religieuses multiples’: une autre approche de la ‘religion invisible’ des sociétés 
européennes.” Social Compass 50, 3 (2003); Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the 
Modern Identity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989). For discussions on multiple secularities 
in non-western areas, see Matthias König, “Religion and the Nation-State in South Korea: A Case of 
Changing Interpretations of Modernity in a Global Context.” Social Compass, 47, 4 (2000). Willfried 
Spohn, “Multiple Modernity, Nationalism and Religion: A Global Perspective.” Current Sociology 51,3-4 
(2003); Masoud Kamali, “Multiple Modernities and Islamism in Iran.” Social Compass 54,3 (2007). 
361 Zhe汲喆, “Ruhe chaoyue jingdian shisuhua lilun? Ping zongjiao shehuixue de sanzhong 
houshisuhua lunshu如何超越經典世俗化理論?評宗教社會學的三種後世俗化論述,” Shehui kexue 
yanjiu 社會學研究 23.4 (2008): 55. 
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(primarily the state, the economy, science) from the religious sphere and the 
“concomitant differentiation and specialization of religion within its own newly 
found religious sphere.”362 Turning to modern China, it is evident that, at a certain 
level, differentiation and specification occurred. However, recent works on Chinese 
religion in modern times have shown that the distinction between religion and 
superstition in China complicated the differentiation thesis of secularization.363 In 
China, the invention of religion was intensely regulated and even tortured by 
ceaseless political campaigns and social movements as well as by the fixed, tough 
historical images of certain religion. The discourse of religion was surpassed, 
criticized, refuted, and promoted by varying policies and ideologies. The attempt to 
build engaged Buddhism indicated that institutionalized religions tried to negotiate 
with secular forces. However, religion was unable to maintain its power when 
colliding with political powers and when being alienate from its existing doctrines, 
systems and identities. Once the wheels of history had moved, religions, no matter 
how engaged they used to be, were facing the crisis of being abandoned or replaced.  
 
Genuine Buddhism 本真佛學 
The radical image of an engaged, this-worldly Buddhism caused the concern that 
Buddhism might lose its unique character and become less ‘Buddhist.’ When the 
reformation of Buddhism became more and more urgent, a crisis of legitimacy arose: 
if Buddhism was not ‘good’ enough, if it needed to be reformed to meet the 
requirements of the time, how could it be the ‘perfect’ teaching? How could it be the 
 
362 Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World. 19 
363  Nedostup and Duara show that differentiation inevitably forced the state into the position of arbiter 
of religion. Nedostup, Superstitious Regimes: Religion and the Politics of Chinese Modernity. Duara, 
“Knowledge and Power in the Discourse of Modernity: The Campaigns Against Popular Religion in 
Early Twentieth-Century China.” Goossaert and Poon show that intervention was a material as well as 
intellectual and political process, with the state, its agents, and local elites laying claim to temple 
property. See Vincent Goossaert, “State and Religion in Modern China: Religious Policy and Scholarly 
Paradigms” (Rethinking Modern Chinese History: An International Conference to Celebrate the 50th 
Anniversary of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, Taipei, 2005); Poon Shuk Wah, 
“Refashioning Festivals in Republican Guangzhou.” Modern China 30,2 (2004): 199-227. 
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basis of faith? Some Buddhist elites, often those with a scholastic background, 
adopted a more conservative position, advocating the removal of accumulated 
misconceptions about Buddhism and a return to the original essence of the Buddha’s 
teachings, i.e. the Dharma. They attributed the crisis in Buddhism, its decline, and its 
lack of power in the modern world to a conceptual misreading of the Dharma, 
namely, an incoherent and distorted exegesis of the real tradition of Buddhism.  
One of their responses to the crisis of Buddhist legitimacy was to position 
Buddhism as a transcending pure spiritual construction closely linked with the 
modern discipline of philosophy. As one form of ‘Buddhist modernism,’ David 
McMahan suggested, this pursuit of Buddhist spiritualization was a pivot towards the 
globalization of Buddhism during the twentieth century.364 The genesis of conceiving 
Buddhism as a transcendent or spiritual belief can be dated back to the Chan Buddhist 
tradition and to modern Western Buddhology initiated by French and German 
scholars in the eighteenth century.365 Modern Buddhology introduced Buddhist 
traditions into scholarship by editing, translating, and interpreting Buddhist 
scriptures from ancient Asian languages into a set of modern intellectual discourses. 
This process produced a wealth of textual studies on Buddhist doctrines and further 
supplemented them with in-depth field work in South Asia as well. This branch of 
scholarship interpreted Buddhism as an advanced intellectual activity based on 
profound, abstract philosophical reflection. Although it ignored the cultural and 
historical connotations of Buddhism in a particular locale, it pointed out a new 
direction for Chinese intellectuals and scholastic Buddhists, inspiring them to pay 
attention to ‘genuine Buddhism’ and the universal, unchangeable knowledge within 
it. 
 
364 See McMahan, The Making of Buddhist Modernism.The formation or ‘invention’ of Buddhism as a world 
religion has Western roots. For an insightful study on this issue, see Masuzawa, The Invention of World 
Religions: Or, How European Universalism was Preserved in the Language of Pluralism.See McMahan, The 
Making of Buddhist Modernism. 
365 On the history of Buddhist studies in the West, see: J.W. de Jong, A Brief History of Buddhist Studies in 
Europe and American; Philip C. Almond, The British Discovery of Buddhism (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988); Urs App, The Cult of Emptiness: The Western Discovery of Buddhist Thought and the 
Invention of Oriental Philosophy (Rorschach and Kyoto: University Media, 2012). 
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Unlike engaged Buddhism, this tendency was an inward-looking transition 
that underscored the doctrinal basis of Buddhist texts and the inherent rationale 
within the texts. Therefore, it rarely touched the social stratum or tried to speak to 
the masses, as engaged Buddhism did. Rather, ‘genuine Buddhism’ was an elite 
discourse limited to intellectual circles. It represented how the educated elite 
controlled and transformed the discourses of religion with different forms of 
knowledge and how they used them to re-define Buddhism.366 This intellectual 
discourse of Buddhism was largely responsible for perpetuating the image of 
Buddhism as a rational, humanistic, contemplative creed that eschews magic and 
empty rituals. This tendency was often linked with the rising status of science and 
rationality. Similar changes had emerged in Europe in the eighteenth century as the 
outcome first of the Reformation and then of the Enlightenment, when modern 
theology was forming.367 In the same way, the ‘genuine Buddhism’ in modern China 
emphasized the unchanging truth in Buddhist doctrines, which could be more 
properly revealed through hermeneutical readings rather ritual practices that were 
controlled by temples.  
One feature of this ‘genuine Buddhism’ pattern was the de-ritualization of 
Buddhism. Chinese Buddhism, although it had a long tradition of rituals, had to be 
 
366 The overall religious landscape of modern China indicated that the binary opposition of the 
elite/the masses was significant, even though this opposition was constructed and without a concrete 
historical base. The division between the elite and the masses may have existed before 1898, rooted in 
the Chinese religious tradition, as Goossaert and Palmer discussed in their book. Traditionally, the 
formation of cosmological and theological thinking was entrusted to clerical specialists who were 
invited by cult communities to write texts to legitimize the cults and place them in a large orthodox 
framework (for example, the Three Teachings). Such activities actually implied a gap between the elite 
and the masses. See Goossaert and Palmer, The Religious Question in Modern China. 21. Some scholars 
therefore have suggested that the ‘Three Teachings’ correspond to an ‘elite religion,’ in contrast to 
‘popular religion.’ Two representative articles summarizing the debates on Chinese popular religion 
are: Stephen F Teiser, “Popular Religion,” The Journal of Asian Studies 54, no. 2 (1995): 387-95; Philip 
Clart, “The Concept of ‘Popular Religion’ in the Study of Chinese Religions: Retrospect and Prospects” 
(paper presented at the The Forth Fu Jen University International Sinological Symposium: Research on 
Religions in China: Status quo and Perspectives, Taipei, 2007).  
367 See T. A. Howard, Protestant Theology and the Making of the Modern German University (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006).  
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“de-ritualized” to accord with notions of rationality. This discourse of de-ritualization 
might relate to the secularization thesis,368 which indicated a tendency towards 
‘privatization’ in which religions retreated from people’s public lives into individuals’ 
private realms. The social function of religious rites in traditional contexts—to 
transform collective experiences of religious practices performed in a sacred space 
into memories of individuals—was weakened and replaced by some abstract and 
intellectual expressions of religion that involved personal practices such as reading 
the canon, doing meditation, or participating in non-ritualized, scholastic activities. 
When the doctrinal orthodoxy was no longer tied to the monastic code as rigorously 
as in the past,369 a radically new force feeding the prosperity of Buddhist scholarship 
arose, showing that every person could acquire Buddhist truth and obtain his/her 
own salvation by ‘probing into the Buddhist classics’ [shenru jinglun 深入經論] 
instead of by participating in rituals or obeying the Vinaya principles.  
After diluting the mysterious, ecstatic elements of Buddhist texts and 
practices, the religiosity of Buddhism was replaced with a new discourse of Buddhism 
that was neutral, objective, and trustworthy. This is what Buddhist scholars like 
Ouyang and Lü Cheng suggested: ‘to return to the original texts’ and form the 
‘genuine Buddhism’; in this way, a new Buddhist scholarship pursuing “the learning 
of truth” [zhenshi zhixue 真實之學] would be established.370  
Basically, as Robert Sharf argued, the “logic structure” behind this modern 
interpretation of Buddhism was a fundamental distinction between the “essence” of 
the Buddhist tradition and its “cultural manifestations.”371 The real face of Buddhism, 
 
368 The privatization sub-theses have undergone numerous critiques and revisions in the last fifteen 
years. See José Cassanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1994), put into question the empirical as well as the normative validity of the privatization thesis. 
369 Robert H. Sharf, “Buddhist Modernism and the Rhetoric of Meditative Experience,” Numen 42 (1995), 
258. 
370 Lü Cheng, “Neixueyuan yanjiu gongzuo de zongjie he jihua 內學院研究工作的總結和計畫,” in 
Jinxiandai zhuming xuezhe foxue wenji 近現代著名學者佛學文集, ed. Huang Xianian 黃夏年 (Beijing: 
Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1995), 301. 
371 Robert Sharf, “Whose Zen? Zen Nationalism Revisited,” Rude Awakenings: Zen the Kyoto School, and the 
Question of Nationalism (1995): 44. 
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which should be an ahistorical truth logically prior to its superficial phenomena, was 
always covered or shaped by exterior contingencies.372 Behind this view was a 
timeless notion of ‘pure origin,’ presupposing that the original expression of Dharma 
most perfectly reflected its constant essence.373 The mission of ‘genuine Buddhism,’ 
was the same. Unlike the monastic scholars, these lay Buddhists who advocated 
‘ genuine Buddhism’ paid less attention to duḥkha, karma, mokṣa [emancipation, jietuo 
解脫], and other soteriological or eschatological concepts. By contrast, it was more 
interested in the way in which Buddhist doctrines were or should be read or 
understood, and sought to change the declining status quo of Chinese Buddhism by 
critiquing and exposing its flaws and deviations from the original words of the 
Buddha. Although the delimitation of ‘original’ was often ambiguous and even 
arbitrary, ‘genuine Buddhism’ and its tendency of “perusing and respecting the 
truth” [cunzhen qiushi 存真求實]374 expanded the Buddhist ‘communities’ within 
which believers and non-believers could talk together about the Dharma instead of 
simply listening to sermons; it also lit up another path towards the ‘revival’ of the 
Chinese Buddhist tradition—the way of academization: namely, turning Buddhism into 
knowledge. 
 
The Failure of Buddhist Nationalism  
To the early twentieth century China at the century’s turn, the power of modernity 
was irresistible; both engaged Buddhism, with its revolutionary standpoint, and 
‘genuine Buddhism,’ with its more conservative, retrospective perspective, sought to 
understand and respond to the phenomena they faced. The former saw its goal as 
reforming Buddhism to address the pressing needs facing modern society. The latter, 
 
372 Ibid. 
373 Bernard Faure, The Rhetoric of Immediacy: A Cultural Critique of Chan/Zen Buddhism (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1994). 
374 See the letter Lü wrote to Xiong Shili, in Lü Cheng xiansheng wenji 呂澂先生文集 (Taipei: Wenshu 
chubanshe 1988), 267. For further study of the discussions between Lü and Xiong, see Jiang Canteng 江
燦騰. “Lü Cheng yu Xiong Shili lunxue haogao pingyi 呂澂與熊十力論學函稿評議,” Dongfang zongjiao 
yanjiu 東方宗教研究, 1 (1990): 219-261.    
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maintaining the Buddhist ‘other-worldly’ principles and keeping a distance from 
‘reality,’ also had an ‘expected horizon’ behind its interpretation of Buddhist 
tradition—a hermeneutic system that rested on modern discourses imported from 
the West (mainly through Japan). Its aim of returning to the Indian origins of 
Buddhism was also led, albeit well disguised, by modern inquiry. Meanwhile, besides 
the proponents of Western-style modernity, some other intellectuals, following their 
Japanese precursors, for example the Kyoto school philosophers like D.T Suzuki 
(1870-1966) and Nishida Kitarō (1870-1945), took the same standpoint as Zhang 
Taiyan and argued that Buddhism was immune to the accusation of superstition from 
Enlightenment secular-rationalism because it was not a religious belief but rather an 
epistemological base, a rational and empirical mode of inquiry into the true nature of 
the world. Although, at first glance, all these paths towards modernization were 
different or even contradictory to each other to a certain degree, they all showed the 
intention of establishing a Buddhism that belongs to China and respond to the needs 
of nationalism.  
Robert Sharf offered a broad definition of nationalism when discussed Modern 
Japanese Buddhism: no matter whether it refers to a nation, a state, or an ethnic or 
racial group, nationalism can be defined as an ideology well expressed in the 
“collective past,” a conceptual form of identity.375 A ‘nation’ [minzu 民族/guozu 國族], 
which has been defined as ‘an imagined political community’, often bounded together 
by an ‘imagined’ common history.376 In modern China, nationalism became a 
keyword, since, during that period, national identity surpassed all other identities—
whether racial, ethnic, or religious. The emergence of national identity in modern 
China was perceived as a natural outcome of globalization, because contact with 
other cultures and civilizations not only opens a window to the outside world but also 
 
375 Sharf, “The Zen of Japanese Nationalism.” 
376 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: 
Verso. 1991), 6-7; Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 5-
7; Adrian Hastings, The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism (New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), 3-4. For ‘religious nationalism,’ see Rogers Brubaker, Grounds for 
Difference (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015). 
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to the inside so that one can recognize oneself through the ‘other.’377 To ‘semi-
colonial’ China, globalization was always a rhetoric of ‘Westernization’ in realms from 
science and technology to values, disciplines, and habits. Nationalism, to China in 
crisis, was a promising alternative that would restore or preserve indigenous 
political, social, and moral norms in the face of the threat of foreign cultural 
‘hegemony.’378  
In modern China, religious identity was always bound up with national 
identity. As Holmes Welch pointed out, to choose Buddhism in the search for 
religious identity meant that one was choosing to be Chinese. It was an expression of 
cultural loyalism, a denial that things Chinese were inferior.”379 Influenced by the 
‘religious reformist’ Kang Youwei but realizing his inevitable failure to establish 
Confucianism as the state religion, Liang Qichao and Zhang Taiyan turned to 
Buddhism and explored the possibility of establishing Buddhism as the base for a 
Chinese identity, either from an ethical or epistemological perspective. Soon, many of 
the Buddhist elites, who had remained sensitive to the ‘national calamity’ [guonan 國
難], began to explore the possibility of establishing a national identity via Buddhism.  
In the first issue of the Buddhist Studies Magazine [Foxue congbao 佛學叢報], the 
famous lay Buddhist Pu Yicheng 濮一乘 argued for a ‘nationalist Buddhism’ in his 
article “The Buddhist view of the Republic of China”: 
Buddhism is the only national essence of the Republic of China; the special 
scholarship of the Republic of China; the supreme soul of the Republic of China 佛教
者，中華民國唯一之國粹也，中華民國特別之學術也，中國民國無上之靈魂也.380  
 
377 Julia Schneider, Nation and Ethnicity: Chinese Discourses on History, Historiography and Nationalism 
(1990s-1920s) (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 13-61. 
378 For further studies on the mutual relationship between Buddhism and nationalism in a broader 
context, see Thomas Borchert, “Buddhism, Politics, and Nationalism in the Twentieth and Twenty-First 
Centuries,” Religion Compass 1 (2007): 529-46; Matthew J. Walton, “Buddhism, Nationalism, and 
Governance “ in The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Buddhism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).  
379 Holmes Welch, The Revival of Chinese Buddhism, 261. 
380 Pu Yicheng, “Zhonghua mingguo zhi Fojiao guan 中華民國之佛教觀,” MFQ, vol.1, 22.  
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Buddhism, as he claimed in the latter part of this article, was the real ‘value 
foundation’ [jiazhi jichu 價直(值)基礎] of a modern, democratic, and free China. In 
the fourth issue of the same periodical, eminent monk Wumu Shanseng 烏目山僧 
(1865-1921) also claimed that Buddhism could serve as the moral and ethical base for 
Chinese civilization; Buddhism was not only the compensation for law and politics, he 
believed, but also the prerequisite to the natural rights of human beings.381 
The expectation that Buddhism could become ‘the Chinese spirituality’ had 
been embodied distinctly in the writings of modern Chinese Buddhists. This 
phenomenon does not seem unusual if we consider the development of modern 
Buddhism in the overall context of East Asia. In Meiji Japan, the propagators of 
Buddhism also analogically advocated establishing Zen Buddhism as “Japanese 
spirituality.” With the efforts of Shaku Sōen (1859-1919) and his disciples, like D.T. 
Suzuki, Nyogen Senzaki (1876-1958), and Nishida Kitarō (1870-1945), Zen was 
transformed into a modern religion, touting itself as “the very heart of Asian 
spirituality, the essence of Japanese culture, and the key to the unique qualities of the 
Japanese race.”382 The military expansion of Japan in Asia from 1895 to 1905383 brought 
a sense of cultural and moral superiority to the Japanese. With the efforts of Shaku 
Sōen (1859-1919) and his disciples, like D.T. Suzuki, Nyogen Senzaki (1876-1958), and 
Nishida Kitarō (1870-1945), the Japanese began to combine Bushidō, the ancient 
“samurai code,” with the spirituality of Zen Buddhism to build a ‘Japaneseness’ that 
later developed into the so-called ‘nihonjinron,’ an ideological expression of the 
national identity of modern Japan. 384 This New Buddhism of Zen, on the one hand 
 
381 Zongyang had argured that Buddhism had the potential to become the ‘national religion’ of China or 
even a world belief that should stand alongside other universal creeds “in the competitive world of the 
20th century to restore civilization標立於二十世紀競爭世界，以光復文明.” Zongyang 宗仰, “Lun 
zunchong fojiao wei jinri zengjin guomin daode zhi qieyao論尊崇佛教為今日增進國民道德之切要.” 
Fojiao congbao 佛教叢報 (1913. 4), MFQ vol.2, 11.  
382 Sharf, “The Zen of Japanese Nationalism,” 6. 
383 Here this refers especially to the victories over the Qing dynasty in 1895 and the Russians in 1905 
and to Japan’s colonial activities in Korea, Manchuria, and Taiwan.  
384 Various scholars have tried to identify this basic core of Japanese self-identity. The anthropologist 
Robert. J. Smith has suggested Confucianism in his Japanese Society. Tradition, Self and the Social Order 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983, 37-38), as have R. S. Ellwood and R. Pilgrim [in Japanese 
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promised the solidarity and modernity of Japanese culture;385 on the other hand, as an 
accomplice in the promulgation of Kokutai [national policy] ideology, it justified 
Japanese colonist power by claiming an ‘Oriental ideal’ that was exclusively 
transmitted by the essence of Japanese Zen.386  
The nativist theme of ‘nihonjinron’ and its Buddhist background inspired 
modern Chinese intellectuals and Buddhists, especially those who had close official or 
personal relationships with Japan.387 The success of Japanese Zen Nationalism, in 
particular, gave them an impression (or illusion, as some scholars declared) that 
Buddhism would promote China’s modernization and further make China prosperous 
and powerful. Chinese Buddhism, like Japanese Zen, could be transformed into the 
core of the Chinese spirit, morality, and aesthetics.  
However, the project of building up Buddhism as a national religion that 
formed the ‘soul of China’—	‘Chineseness’ based on Buddhist thought, equivalent to 
Zen in Japan—failed. Unlike Japan, the Chinese were always struggling with the 
colonial situation and had to firstly save the country from being destroyed. 
Therefore, instead of declaring its cultural or moral superiority, China could hardly 
build up its ‘confidence.’ Chinese Buddhism, meanwhile, was always deployed from a 
very instrumental perspective and echoed political voices passively. No matter how it 
was packaged as scientific, democratic, or even communist, Buddhism in modern 
 
Religion: A Cultural Perspective (Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall 1985),130]. Jan Swyngedouw has argued that the 
basic religious value, and therefore the value that integrates the sociocultural order, is Japaneseness 
(kokutai). See Jan Swyngedouw, “Japanese Religiosity in an Age of Internationalization.” Japanese Journal 
of Religious Studies, 5 (1978): 92. 
385 Soyen Shaku, Sermons of A Buddhist Abbot [Zen for Americans], D.T. Suzuki trans., Sermons of a 
Buddhist Abbot (Chicago, the Open Court Publishing Company, 1906), 211-12. Also see Nukariya Kaiten, 
Religion of the Samurai: A study of Zen philosophy and Discipline I China and Japan (London: Luzac & Co, 
1913). 
386 For a historical investigation of the formation of Japan’s ‘Oriental ideal,’ see Stefan Tanaka, Japan's 
Orient: Rendering Pasts into History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).  
387 Ge Zhaoguang 葛兆光, “Kongjiao, Fojiao yihuo Yejiao: Yi jiu ling ling nian qianhou Zhongguo de 
xinli weiji yu zongjiao xingqu” 孔教、佛教抑或耶教─ 一九零零年前後中國的心理危機與宗教興趣, 
in Zhongguo jindai sixiangshi de zhuanxing shidai 中國近代思想史的轉型時代, ed. Wang Fansen 王汎森 
(Taipei: Lianjing, 2007), 201-240.  
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China never reasserted itself at an ideological level and displayed itself as an 
independent theoretical entity.   
The failure of Buddhist nationalism in China can also be attributed to the 
persistence of Confucianism. Despite the decline of Confucian authority, there was 
still an emotional reassurance to Confucian tradition among intellectuals. With a 
strong willingness to rebuild Confucianism again as the base of national ideology, 
some philosophers, such as Xiong Shili (1885-1968) and Liang Suming (1893-1988), 
who were known as the “New Confucianists,” borrowed conceptual resources from 
Buddhism to establish a new philosophized Confucianism with ontological and 
epistemological dimensions.388 To these philosophers, Confucianism was always the 
prior choice, although their interpretations of Confucianism were heavily based on 
their critical readings of Buddhism.389  
Moreover, because of the ‘secular’ character of Confucian tradition, the 
attitude of the Chinese towards religion was very ambivalent and hesitant. After the 
concept of religion entered China, debates on whether the traditional three 
teachings—Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism—were religions never ceased. 
These debates even evolved into a widespread suspicion that China might not have 
religion at all.390 One well-cited story is that when the Japanese monk Sōen preached 
 
388 For the philosophy of Neo-Confucianism, see John Makeham: Lost Soul: Confucianism. Contemporary 
Chinese Academic Discourse (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 2008); Also. John Makeham ed. 
New Confucianism: A Critical Examination (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). Umberto Bresciani, 
Reinventing Confucianism: The New Confucian Movement (Taipei: The Taipei Ricci Institute for Chinese 
Studies, 2001). 
389 For the influence of Buddhism on Xiong Shili and Liang Shuming, see Thierry Meynard, The Religious 
Philosophy of Liang Shuming, The Hidden Buddhist (Leiden: Brill, 2011); John J. Hanafin, “The ‘Last 
Buddhist’: The Philosophy of Liang Shuming,” in New Confucianism: A Critical Examination, ed. John 
Makeham (New York: Palgrave, 2003), 187-218. Lin, Chen-kuo 林鎮國, “Hsiung Shih-li’s Hermeneutics 
of Self: Making a Confucian Identity in Buddhist Words.” NCCU Philosophical Journal 8 (2002): 69–90; John 
Makeham, “Xiong Shili’s Critique of Yogācāra Thought in the Context of His Constructive Philosophy,” 
in Transforming Consciousness: Yogacara Thought in Modern China, 242-282; Takahiro Nakajima, “New 
Confucianism and Buddhism: Liang Shuming, Xiong Shili, and Mou Zongsan,” in Shiso no.9 (2007): 80-
104. 
390 See Chen Hsi-yuan, “Confucianism Encounters Religion: the Formation of Religious Discourse and 
the Confucian Movement in Modern China.” 
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Buddhism as a “universal religion” in harmony with other religions as well as science 
and philosophy at the Parliament of the World’s Religions in Chicago in 1893391, Peng 
Guangyu 彭光譽, a diplomat representing Confucianism, became opposed to 
portraying Confucianism as a ‘religion’ and claimed that the proper Chinese 
equivalent of ‘religion’ would be ‘wu 巫’, a term associated with Shamanism.392 Not 
surprisingly, modern Chinese Buddhism, no matter how active and engaged it might 
be in political and social life, was never able to escape the censorship that classified it 
as ‘superstition’; it was always struggling to distance itself from negative impressions 
and to survive under the pressure of changing social conditions and policies. 
Although it experienced a ‘revival’ in Republican times, Buddhism went through a 
very tough period when the May Fourth discourses and Communist ideology became 
stronger and dominant.  
Nationalism, therefore, was not a ‘intentional’ choice for modern Chinese 
Buddhism, but fundamentally a compelled, desperate option. The ‘sanjie reformation’ 
[sanjie geming 三界革命] conducted by Taixu, Yuanying 圓瑛 (1878-1953), and other 
Buddhist leaders, while visionary and far-reaching, was extremely vulnerable, always 
struggling to maintain a shaky balance between monasteries, the government, and 
other social forces. None of these Buddhist modernists clearly realized that a 
modernized Buddhism could and should be an expression of the ‘self-ness’ of 
Buddhism itself, rather than only the annotation of a Western ideal. Under the 
pressure to subsist in a colonial society, there were no Chinese monks who could, like 
Sōen, clearly state that Buddhism was a universal religion before all other religions; 
 
391 For the activities of Japanese Buddhists in the Parliament in Chicago, see Shokin Furuta, “Shaku 
Soen: The Footsteps of a Modern Japanese Zen Master.” Philosophical Studies of Japan 8 (1967):80. For 
details about this congress, see Richard Hughes Seager ed., The Dawn of Religious Pluralism: Voices from 
the World’s Parliament of Religions, 1893 (Illinois: Open Court, 1993), xiv. All the conference papers were 
compiled in John Henry Barrows ed., The World’s Parliament of Religions (Chicago: The Parliament 
Publishing Company, 1893). For the general program of this Congress and a detailed list of the issues 
discussed and the participants who came from all over the world, see The World’s Religious Congresses of 
1893: General Programme (Chicago & New York: Randy, Mcnally & Company, 1983), 23-33. 
392 Chen His-yuan, “Confucianism Encounters Religion: the Formation of Religious Discourse and the 
Confucian Movement in Modern China” (PhD dissertation, Harvard University, 1999), 28. 
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there were also few Chinese Buddhists who could, like Suzuki and Nishida, 
successfully promote Buddhism as an Oriental wisdom to the West and further 
convert Buddhism into the core of ‘Chinese-ness.’ In most cases, modern Chinese 
interpretations of Buddhism were full of home-grown connotations, yet, at the same 
time, awkward attempts to use crude comparisons to appeal to Western audiences. 
In 1928, as the representative of Chinese Buddhism, Taixu was invited by 
Sylvain Levi (1863-1935) to deliver a lecture in Paris.393 His speech on the affinity 
between Buddhism and science did not sound impressive to his audience. The 
response Chinese Buddhism received was somewhat of a disappointment, especially 
in comparison with Japanese Zen, which had successfully touted itself as the essence 
of Oriental culture and had influenced several Western thinkers, such as Heidegger. 
The success of Japanese Buddhism indicated that what the West needed from 
Buddhism was something exotic and unfamiliar through which the West could define 
itself as ‘the West.’ This tendency was one of the reasons why Suzuki’s empirical, 
spiritual Zen was embraced by the rationalized West, while Chinese Buddhism was 
not. 
Under the ‘sea tide’ of Buddhist modernization, however, the real question 
might have been obscured: why did Chinese Buddhism have to be accepted and 
welcomed by the West? And was there still any way out for Chinese Buddhism, if the 
Chinese abandoned the desire to propagate Chinese Buddhism to the rest of the 
world? And what Buddhist really mean to China? Those questions were noticed and 
raised the concerns of some ‘outsiders’: historians with little or no faith in Buddhism, 
such Hu Shih, Chen Yinke, Chen Yuan, and Tang Yongtong.  
 
393 The title of Taixu’s talk was “Exposé concis des principes du Bouddhisme Chinois.” Technically, the 
effectiveness of the talk was severely hampered by an ill-prepared translation; the content of his talk, 
as well, failed to engage the interest of the Western audience. The perception was that Taixu was more 
concerned with impressing Westerners with his knowledge of science and philosophy (which surely he 
was) than in discussing in detail, as they had hoped, the theoretical, cultic, and institutional 
dimensions of the revitalization of Buddhism in China. See the recollections of an informant in Bulletin 
de l’Association Française des Amis de l’Orient, no.7, 93-94, cited by Holmes Welch, The Buddhist Revival in 
China, 60-62.  
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To Japanese Zen scholars, Buddhism in spirit is close to science but maintains 
its religious essence, which is transcendental, heuristic, aesthetic, and mindful.394 
Chinese non-Buddhist historians, in contrast, never accepted this prerequisite. Hu 
Shih, for example, kept a distance from Buddhism and other religious traditions, such 
as Daoism, because of their irrational elements. Other scholars like Chen Yinke and 
Tang Yongtong, although more neutral or sympathetic to Buddhism, also tried to 
dilute its religiosity by treating Buddhism as one element of Chinese cultural 
heritage. To them, the dilemma Buddhism faced in modern times was similar to the 
condition of all other Chinese traditions, from literature to art, and from Daoism to 
Mohism. Their interests in Buddhism belonged to their broader concerns for the fate 
of Chinese culture rather than the project of Buddhist modernization. Therefore, they 
did not focus on philosophical dimension of Buddhism but on its various 
manifestations in the historical context.  
Realizing that, without Buddhism, it would be impossible to reestablish the 
continuity of Chinese history, these scholars tried to position Buddhism in the 
historical panorama of China. The path these outsiders took was one of 
‘historicization’—converting Buddhism into the object of historiography and 
reading, reorganizing, and re-interpreting it through historical writings.395 As Hu Shih 
elaborated in 1919: 
Toward the old learning and thought, we make positive only one proposal, which is 
‘reorganize the national past’ … Because ancient learning and thought until now has 
not been organized, had no starting point, and had no system; therefore, the first step 




394 see Paul Carus, The Religion of Science (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company, 1893).  
395 Irene Eber, “Hu Shih and Chinese History: The Problem of Cheng-li Kuo-ku,” Monumenta Serica 27, 
no. 1 (1968). 169-207. 
396 Hu shih “Xin sichao de yiyi 新思潮的意義.” Xin Qingnian 新青年 7.1 (1919). Translation see Eber, 
“Hu Shih and Chinese History: The Problem of Cheng-li Kuo-ku.” 172. Eber pointed out that, in 1917, 
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The agenda of Hu Shih’s studies on Buddhism summarized this new pattern of 
Buddhology—the historiography of Buddhism. Until today, this historiographical 
path still dominant the scholarship of Buddhism in China. As Ge Zhaoguang 
observerd, research on Buddhism in Chinese academia is still “walking on the 
extended line of Hu Shih.” Scholars still maintain the presupposition that it is not the 
philosophical connotations of Buddhism, but the historical effects and impacts that 
Buddhism brought to China. The cultural accretions of Buddhism and its religious 
manifestations, which consisted of mystical, irrational, and supernatural 
components, should be re-depicted and valued based on textual or extra-textual 
evidence. This path makes the study of Buddhism in China different from both the 
Western model of religious anthropology and sociology and the Japanese model of 
philosophy. And in Ge’s view, this is precisely the characteristic rather than the 
defect of Chinese Buddhology. 
In general, Buddhism, as a tradition, needed to regain its legitimacy in a 
modern context. There were different ways to approach this goal, such as getting 
support from political forces, attracting more believers, reaching a consensus with 
science, and so on. Recent scholarship has discussed more about the socio-political 
background of Buddhist reformation and the relationship between the government 
and Buddhist communities. However, Buddhism’s tendency to shift into scholarship 
[xueshu hua 學術化] has been comparatively overlooked. This change has indicated 
that there is a neglected dimension beyond the widely accepted discursive framework 
of the so-called ‘reform’ or ‘revival’ paradigm, a paradigm which is constructed based 
on a pyramid of the monks, elite laymen, and ordinary believers. It cannot be ignored 
that, besides all these ‘insiders,’ there was still a group of ‘outsiders’ who did not 
directly participate in the modernization of Chinese Buddhism but more or less 
formed our knowledge of Chinese Buddhism and our attitude towards it.  
  
 
Hu Shih had used the English word “systematize” as an equivalent for ‘zhengli’ [整理], but that 



















Histories and Historians 
 
 
As the modern scholarship of religion emerged in the latter decades of the nineteenth 
century,397 Buddhism became an important research subject. For modern 
Buddhologists, Buddhism was presumed to be a specific, historically unique tradition 
and its history, which had previously relied on records of monastic activities such as 
scriptural translation, pilgrimage, Dharma transmission, and so on, was now seen as a 
field that should be re-narrated through new methodologies and discourses. From the 
beginning of the twentieth century, Chinese Buddhist scholars and historians also 
participated in the research trend of re-writing the history of Buddhism. This trend 
was influenced both by the modern religious scholarship that emerged in the West, 
and also by the Qing Learning as well as the ethos of the literati community of the 
time. Although this trend never formed any schools or professional organizations 
with a unified foundation of epistemology and methodology, it was rooted in a 
common historical awareness: Buddhism needed to be re-interpreted in the modern 
context, both historically and conceptually. 
 
The Western Gaze 
Although Asian countries had read, studied, and practiced the Dharma for a long 
time, ‘Buddhism’ as a ‘religion’ was newly ‘discovered’ in the West during the first 
half of the nineteenth century.398 It cannot be denied that there had been periodic 
 
397 The 1870s are often regarded as the beginning of Religionwissenschaft, or the modern science of 
religion. See Guy G. Stroumas, A New Science: The Discovery of Religion in the Age of Reason (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2010); also see Mazuzawa, The Invention of World Religion, 107-109. 
398 My arguments on the early understanding of and attitude towards Buddhism in the West rely 
heavily on the exposition of Philip C. Almond in his book The British Discovery of Buddhism, especially 
chapter 1, “The Discovery of Buddhism,” 7-32. Also see Li Silong 李四龍, Oumei fojiao xueshu shi: 
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encounters between the West and Asian Buddhist traditions. However, those early 
contacts left little impact on the Western understanding of Buddhism.399 It was only 
after the middle of the nineteenth century that the term ‘Buddha’ (‘Buddoo’, 
‘Bouddha’, ‘Boudhou’, etc.) began to gain currency in the Western-language-speaking 
world.400 Gradually, ‘Buddhism’, as a term with philosophical implications (indicated 
by its suffix ‘-ism’), had been constructed and recognized as a diverse, diffused 
cultural-religious phenomenon shared by different civilizations throughout Asia.401  
The religion of the Buddha or Buddhism entered into the purview of Western 
academia in the 1820s.402 Before this very early phase of the formation of Buddhism as 
a ‘religion,’ Buddhism had been an imagined ‘other’ that existed in the memoirs of 
travelers, diplomats, missionaries, and traders.403 During the first four decades of the 
nineteenth century, this situation changed. Buddhism, which originally had existed 
‘out there,’ gained a constructed tradition that was primarily located in ‘the West,’ 
 
xifang de fojiao xingxiang yu xueshu yuanliu 歐美佛教學術史: 西方的佛教形象與學術源流 (Beijing: 
Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2009). 
399 From A.D. 1000, a version of the life of the Buddha in the form of the legend of Barlaam and Josaphat 
influenced the Western Christian ascetic ideal. Moreover, from the thirteenth to the eighteenth 
centuries, there had been a succession of contacts: Willian van Ruysbroeck, Macro Polo, John of Monte 
Corvino, and Dominican, Jesuit, Capuchin, and Franciscan missionaries to Japan, China, and Tibet, had 
all encountered Buddhism and reported their findings to a curious West.  
400 An entry for ‘Buddha’ or ‘Buddhism’ could be found in dictionaries and encyclopedia as early as in 
the 1810s. In the English Encyclopedia of 1802, the Buddha was explained as “one of the Ceylonese Gods.” 
An entry for the Buddha also appeared in the Encyclopedia Perthensis, the Encyclopedia Britannica, the 
Pantologia, and the London Encyclopedia.  
401 The very term ‘Buddhism’ proves that, in the Western world, Buddhism was understood as a religion 
centred on the Buddha—namely, the Buddha’s ‘ism’ rather than the Dharma’s ‘ism’—which indicates 
the influence of Christianity, a religion centred on ‘Christ.’ See Masuzawa, The Invention of World 
Religions: Or, How European Universalism was Preserved in the Language of Pluralism. 121-131. 
402 As early as in 1693, Simon de la Loubèré, an envoy of Louis XIV, described the origin of Chinese 
Buddhism as Siam (today Thailand) based on his experience there. Lieutenant-Colonel William 
Francklin of the East India Company saw Buddhism as having reached China and Japan from Ceylon via 
Ava; John Crawfurd and Horace H. Wilson, in contrast, concluded that Buddhism originated in 
Magadha, the modern Bihar. Only by 1854 was India basically established as the birthplace of 
Buddhism. See, p.11 
403 Almond, The British Discovery of Buddhism, 13; Also see Richard King, The Orientalism and Religion: 
Postcolonial Theory, India and “The Mystic East” (London: Routledge, 1999).  
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where the amassed collection, translation, and publication of its textual past had 
been preserved. As Philip C. Almond discussed, 
Buddhism, by 1860, had come to exist, not in the Orient, but in the Oriental libraries 
and institutes of the West, in its texts and manuscripts, at the desks of the Western 
savants who interpreted it. It had become a textual object, defined, classified, and 
interpreted through its own textuality.404  
It is clear that because of its material possession of the texts and artifacts of 
Buddhism, the West largely controlled Buddhism’s past and also dominated discourse 
about its essence. Based on this ownership, the scholarship about Buddhism was 
established within the Western setting of knowledge by the 1850s.  
The increasing presence of Buddhist textual materials in the centers of 
Orientalism scattered across Europe, especially in Germany, France, England, and 
Russia made possible significant works on the history of Buddhism.405 Achievements 
that appeared included the works of Kalparoth, Schmidt, Rémusat, and Landlesse on 
Chinese and Mongolian texts; of Hodgson on Sanskrit and Tibetan texts; and of 
Alexander Csoma of Körös on the Tibetan bkah-hgyur. All these studies showed that 
Buddhism, in the view of modern Western scholarship, was less a living religion but 
more a showcase for information and knowledge that had been discovered and 
recovered from manuscripts, inscriptions, and rubbings.406  
 
404 Almond, The British Discovery of Buddhism, 12-13 
405 The early achievements of Buddhist studies were concentrated on linguistics. The most influential 
work of the Early Modern period was Siddhānta-Kaumudī by Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita (in the seventeenth century) 
and its various derivative versions by Varadarāja. European grammatical scholarship began in the 
eighteenth century with Jean François Pons and culminated in the exhaustive expositions by 
nineteenth-century scholars such as Otto Boehtlingk, William Dwight Whitney, Jacob Wackernagel, 
and others. In 1824 the first Pali grammar was published in Columbo by the Wesleyan missionary 
Benjamin Clough; more significant was Burnouf and Lassen’s Essai sur le Pali, the first Pali grammar to 
be published in Europe. 
406 J. W. De Jong, in his A Brief History of Buddhist Studies in Europe and America, has made it quite clear that 
there was a significant upsurge in the editing and publishing of many Pali and Sanskrit works from 
1877 onwards, especially after the creation of the Pali Text Society by T. W.  Rhys Davids in 1881. See 
J.W. de Jong.  
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From the middle of the nineteenth century, Western scholarship developed 
various hermeneutical approaches to sorting, classifying, and interpreting the 
artifacts and texts of Buddhism. Behind these endeavors was an impulse to elucidate 
and clarify the historical ‘truth’ of Buddhism. Alongside the process of the 
textualization of Buddhism, there was also a simultaneous movement of the 
historicization of Buddhism. This was first expressed in a search for or, more 
precisely, the creation of the historical Buddha (both as a hero and as a mentor)407, 
and then eventually took on an intense but controversial struggle for the essence of 
the Buddha’s words. 408 
Around the 1880s, the first methodological manifestos of Buddhist studies 
appeared. In the introduction to the 1882 edition of his Essai sur la légende du Buddha, 
Émile Senart clarified his critical methodology of the interpretation of the 
biographical narrative of the Buddha. He followed biblical scholarship and considered 
the records of the life of the Buddha to be a mixture of legendary and historical 
elements that was waiting for a ‘criticism’ to sift the truth from the mythological 
accretions. He named his method ‘historical methodology’ in order to distinguish it 
from the prevailing ‘comparative methodology’ inherited from Max Müller. Later, 
related to but different from Senart’s idea of Buddhism as mythology, T.W. Rhys 
Davids and Hermann Oldenburg undertook a method of textual archaeology to 
discover the historical truth of Buddhism and compose a historical biography for the 
Buddha through a ‘scientific method’ of textual criticism.409  
 
407 This can be found especially in the writing of C. A. F. Rhys Davids.  
408 This issue has been discussed by Michael Pye in his article “Comparative Hermeneutics in Religion” 
in the Cardinal Meaning: Essays in Comparative Hermeneutics, Buddhism and Christianity, ed. Michael Pye 
and Robert Morgan (The Hague: Mouton, 1973). Relying on Ernst Troelsch’s argument on the ‘essence 
of Christianity,’ Pye argued that the objectivity of history existing purely in the texts was an illusion; 
the essence of Buddhism was defined by the interpreter of its past through what Troeltsch called a 
‘creative act’ in which history and theology merge. Therefore, any efforts to provide meaning to the 
past would lead to irony.  
409 Hermann Oldenburg, Buddha, Sein Leben, seine Lehre, seine Gemeinde (Berlin: W. Hertz, 1881). This work 
was translated into English soon its original publication under the title of “Buddha: His Life, His 
Doctrine, His Order,” (London: William and Norgate, 1882); T.W. Rhys Davids, Buddhism: Being a Sketch of 
the Life and Teachings of Gautama, the Buddha (London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1899).  
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 At the heart of the effort to construct a credible biography of the Buddha and 
a history of early Buddhism, there was always a pre-imaged ‘essence’ of Buddhism. 
Scholars believe, that before the time of Aśoka, Buddhism had existed for a long time 
in some sort of pre-canonical form that was ‘primary’ or ‘essential’; this primary 
Buddhism was gradually lost in the following centuries, after the death of the 
Buddha. This essence—the ‘lost sutras,’ as well as the lost fragments of the Buddha’s 
life—was considered to be both the historical and ideological foundation for the 
Buddhist tradition.410 This predisposition towards ‘essence’ had a crucial impact on 
the entire history of Western Buddhist studies. On the one hand, it sustained several 
methodologies, from historiography to philology; on the other hand, it led to 
contempt for Chinese Buddhism or Buddhist texts written in Chinese. Chinese 
Buddhism was believed to have been contaminated by other local ideological 
traditions and largely lost its credibility and value.  
Only near the beginning of the twentieth century did a new generation of 
scholars turn their view towards Chinese Buddhism and other Buddhist traditions in 
East Asia.411 The main change brought about by these scholars was the discovery of 
 
410 Western Buddhologists before the twentieth century, although they had different methodological 
standpoints, generally accepted the concept of ‘essential/original Buddhism.’410 For example, in C.A.F. 
Rhys Davids’s book Sakya, or Buddhist Origins, she used textual criticism to classify and examine the 
ancient sūtra in the Pāli literture to search for the historical Buddha and his essential teaching. 
German Indologist Hermann Oldenburg as well set his sights on the ‘more essential ideas’ [die 
wesentlicheren unter den Gedanken]; in his most influential book, Buddha, sein Leben, seine Lehre, seine 
Gemeide, he sought the core of this essence in early Brahmanism and attempted to reveal this core 
through a comparison between Buddhist and non-Buddhist texts. Russian Buddhologist Theodor 
Stcherbatsky attempted to reconstruct the logic of Buddhism through a historical hermeneutic, as he 
‘rendered the philosophical meaning and not the literal sense.’410He believed that the meaning of 
history was always maintained in the context in which the Buddhist terminology was originally 
developed and deployed. A useful taxonomic scheme of Western Buddhist scholarship was introduced 
by Constantin Regamey, who said that there were three schools: the Anglo-German school, the Russian 
school, and the Franco-Belgian school. The first one included C.A.F. Rhys Davids and Hermann 
Oldenburg. See also De Jong, A Brief History, 47 
411 According to de Jong, this generation of scholars included R. Otto Franke (1862-1928), Serge 
d'Oldenburg (1863–1934), Sylvain Levi (1863-1935), Th. Stcherbatsky (1866–1942), F. W. Thomas (1867–




non-Indian Buddhist materials, including the Buddhist literature written in Chinese, 
Korean, and Japanese.412 Historical comparative linguistics gradually became the 
dominant methodology of Buddhist scholarship. One pioneer in this field was Sylvain 
Levi (1863–1935). Partly because of his Japanese monk students, Fujishima Ryōon藤
島了穩 (1852–1918) and Fujieda Takutstū藤枝沢通 (1861–1920), from the Nishi 
Hongganji 西本願寺, Levi soon realized the significance of Chinese Buddhism, not 
only for the study of Buddhism but also for the study of the history of India. Almost at 
the same time, studies on the history of Chinese Buddhism, such as J. Edkins’s Chinese 
Buddhism, a Volume of Sketches, Historical and Critical (1880), Notices of the Chinese 
Buddhism (1885), and S. Beal’s On Buddhist Literature in China (1884) and Buddhism in 
China (1886), emerged in Europe.413 These studies influenced Buddhologists such as 
Louis de La Vallée Poussin (1869–1938)414 and Jean Przyluski (1885–1944).415 However, 
compared to the efforts these Western scholars made on Indian Buddhism, their 
studies of Chinese Buddhism were still limited.  
From the nineteenth century until the early twentieth century, the Western 
scholarship of Buddhism was an ongoing attempt to demythologize and historicize 
Buddhism. The history of Buddhism ‘created’ by modern scholars “criticized the 
tradition, it claims to represent the tradition, and it reshaped, extended and 
 
412 Even after the 1990s, when more and more scholars (such as Gregory Schopen, Paul Harrison, Seishi 
Karashima 辛嶋靜志, Jan Nattier and so on) began paying attention to Chinese Buddhist texts and 
other sources , the gap between Buddhology (which mainly was based on Indian materials) and 
Sinology, however, continued to exist. See the critique of Sharf, Coming to Terms With Chinese Buddhism: 
A Reading of the Treasure Store Treatise.,1.    
413 These works were some of the few studies available to the Chinese in the modern period. See Lü 
Cheng, Fojiao Yanjiufa 佛教研究法, 51-52. However, Lü was not satisfied with them. Pye, “Comparative 
Hermeneutics in Religion.” 
414 The main contribution of Poussin was his works on what he called “the philosophical school of 
Mahāyāna,” especially his translation and editing of the Abhidharma texts. In his Buddhisme, which 
appeared in 1898, Poussin discussed many problems, such as the value of the Pāli sources, the nature of 
popular Buddhism, Buddhist yoga, etc.  
415 Jean Przyluski did excellent work in translating the Chinese texts concerning northwestern India, 
the Buddha’s parinirvāna, the legend of Aśoka and the Council of Rājagrha. Przyluski attached much 
importance to geographical factors in the development of Buddhist schools. His work on the Council of 
Rajagrha was inspired by some rather wild sociological ideas. 
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transmitted the tradition.”416 Meanwhile, this history to certain extent neglected 
some elements of Buddhist tradition at the same time: These (for example, the 
Chinese Buddhist tradition) were selectively excluded from the scope of the Western 
Buddhist historiography according to the discourse of the ‘essence’.417 Only as late as 
in the 1960s did this research paradigm begin to receive questioning from scholars 
such as Dumont, Gombrich, Schithausen, and Schopen. They realized that building up 
a definitive bridge between Western researchers’ own world and their object, when it 
was an ‘other’ that was culturally and historically remote, could be much more 
difficult than one might imagine. It became more and more clear that “the Western 
conceptions of history are necessarily ethnocentric or socio-centric.”418 Related to 
such methodological reflections, later studies on Buddhism discerned a ‘major shift’ 
from philology towards a kind of anthropological-sociology that largely 
acknowledged the diversity of the historical experiences in all the places Buddhism 
had reached and intended to understand the particularity of different Buddhist 
traditions in their own social and historical contexts. 
 
Buddhism of the Late Qing Literati 
The developments and achievements of modern Buddhist scholarship began to 
influence Chinese researchers beginning in the early twentieth century when 
academic exchanges between China and the world become more frequent. However, 
some domestic changes had emerged several decades earlier. From the mid-
 
416 Pye, “Comparative Hermeneutics in Religion.” 42. He here presented a brief but useful overview of 
orthodox Buddhist hermeneutical methods. Pye, “Comparative Hermeneutics in Religion.”36-53  
417 It should be noted that, influenced by this discourse, Japanese scholars of Buddhism from the Meiji 
era made great endeavours to prove that the essence of Buddhism lay in Japan and that Japanese 
Buddhism persevered the most pure and ahistorical form of the Buddhist doctrine and the Dharma. 
See Kotatsu Fujita藤田宏達, “原始仏教・初期仏教・根本仏教	[“Early” Buddhism, “Primitive” 
Buddhism or “Original” Buddhism].” Hokkaido journal of Indological and Buddhist Studies 印度哲学仏教
学,2 (1987): 20-52. 
418 Louis Dumont, La civilisation indigenen et nous: Esquisse de sociologie comparée (Paris: Librairie Armand 
Colin, 1964).  
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nineteenth century, reading, studying, and practicing Buddhism became a trend 
among Chinese literati. This phenomenon was caused not only by outside impacts (in 
particular from Japan) but also by an internal transformation that took place in the 
intellectual life of the elites and educated people.  
First, related to the widening divergence between the elite and popular 
culture419 as well as the emergence of a new intelligentsia, a scriptural/discursive 
(textual-based) modality of Buddhism saw an upsurge and developed into a discursive 
exegetical mode of reading, commenting, and interpreting a wide range of religious 
texts. 420 This trend can be dated back to Late Qing literati such as Shen Zengzhi 沈增
植 (1850–1922)421 and Yu Yue 俞樾 (1821–1907)422 and the ethos of “following the 
 
80 Some scholars have taken the view that this divergence had already existed before the modern era. 
For example William Rowe, in his analysis of the attitude of the Mid-Qing upper officials, mentioned 
the ‘great religious war waged by lixue 理學’ [Neo-Confucianism] against the Buddhist and Taoist 
beliefs and practice” and the “more persistent assaults on popular culture.” See William T. Rowe, 
Saving the World. Chen Hongmou and Elite Consciousness in Eighteenth-Century China (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2001), 436. However, some other scholars have rejected this thesis. They have 
suggested that, rather like the elite in ancient-régime European societies, those Qing elite lived in a 
state of bi-culturality, managing to participate not only in a culture (including a religious culture) 
belonging to their own milieu but also to a culture belonging to the broader community. See Donald S 
Sutton, “From Credulity to Scorn: Confucians Confront the Spirit Mediums in Late Imperial China,” 
Late Imperial China 21, no. 2 (2000): 23-24. 
420 The other four modalities are: the self-cultivational, the liturgical, the immediate practical, and the 
rational/organizational (organizing festivities, managing temples). See Adam Yuet Chau, “Modalities of 
Doing Religion and Ritual Polytropy: Evaluating the Religious Market Model from the Perspective of 
Chinese Religious History,” Religion 41, no. 4 (2011): 549. 
421 Shen Zengzhi’s research on Buddhism was mainly concentrated in the period from 1898 to 1907. In 
the last years of Guangxu, Shen travelled to Japan and “returned to China with the full collection of 
Buddhist scriptures and then he devoted himself to these scriptures.” In his postscripts and notes, 
there are many historical sources related to Buddhism and ground-breaking insights about Chan 
history. Important inscriptions and postscripts include his “A Postscripts to the Platform Sutra” 
[Tanjing ba 壇經跋] (collected in the second episode of his Meisou tiba 寐叟題跋); in his Hairilou 海日
樓 collection, there are also many Dunhuang scriptures. See Wang Juchang王遽常, Qingmo Shen Meisou 
xiangsheng nianpu 清末沈寐叟先生年譜 (Taipei: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1982). 
422 Yu Yue was known for his central status in the social network of the elite in Jiangnan district, and he 
also kept a close association with Buddhist communities, especially the Japanese monks from the 
Higashi Honganji. His commentary on Buddhist texts, for example, the Diamond Sūtra, was from the 
standpoint of a classicist. For example, he quoted Confucian terms to criticize Buddhist belief. 
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Confucian manner on the outside while holding Buddhism on the inside.”423 To be 
sure, Buddhist practices, such as worshiping the Buddha [baifo 拜佛], sitting 
meditation [zuochan 坐禪], prophecy 經讖 [jingchan], transcribing scriptures 
[chaojing 抄經], burning incense [shaoxiang 燒香] and so on, were widely welcomed 
by intellectuals,424 which indicated a particular ‘religiosity’ in Chinese society during 
this period.425 These intellectuals maintained contacts with the local religious 
communities and did not  isolate themselves from rituals, although they consciously 
maintained their academic works ‘religion-free.’ 
Admittedly, there were various strata within the ‘elite’ itself, as demonstrated 
in Barend Ter Haar’s model. 426 For the ‘higher elite,’ who were different from the 
‘gentry’ that shared a more varied religious identity, their religious participation and 
concerns were carefully conserved within a private realm and small circles and were 
 
However, some private writings have revealed that he followed the Buddhist lifestyle and had 
considerably understanding of the religious world of the common people. See Vincent Goossaert, “Yu 
Yue (1821-1906) Explores the Other World : Religious Culture of the Chinese Elites on the Eve of the 
Revolutions,” in Religion in Taiwan and China, ed. Hsun Chang and Benjamin Penny (Institute of 
Ethnology Academia Sinica, Peter Lang AG, 2017). 
423 “外襲儒風，內宗梵行.” See Shen Zengzhi, Zajiayan: hairi lou zhacong雜家言:海日樓札叢, vol. 4. 
This kind of scholar also included Wen Tingshi 文廷式, Chen Baozhen 陳寶箴, Song Shu 宋述, Peng 
Shaosheng 彭紹升, Yang Du 楊度 and so on.  For a study on these lay Buddhists, see Jiang Haishu蔣海
恕, Wanqing zhengzhi yu foxue晚清政治與佛學 (Shanghai: shanghai guji chubanshe, 2012). 
424 For example, Kang Youwei, the leader of the “Confucian Learning reformation,” “read numerous 
Buddhist canon” 讀佛典甚多 and had written about his own experience with Buddhist sitting 
meditation. Tan Sitong, one of the disciples of Kang, also had said that he “vowed to the Buddha again 
and held the Buddhist mantras day after night” 晝夜精持佛咒，不少間斷. 
425 This religiosity included some ‘superstitious’ activities. See Vincent Goossaert on Yu Yue: Goossaert, 
“Yu Yue (1821-1906) Explores the Other World : Religious Culture of the Chinese Elites on the Eve of 
the Revolutions.” 59-107. The concept of religiosity, Vincent Goossaert argued, could offer a more 
fruitful avenue of investigation. 
426 According to Ter Haar, the higher elite had the duty to maintain the rule of the empire, which was 
often severe on religious matters (though in practice, tolerance and negotiation were the ways the 
ruling agents dealt with local religion), while the gentry who were not state functionaries, on the other 
hand, had a looser definition of their vocation as teachers for their local communities. See Barend ter 
Haar, The White Lotus Teachings in Chinese Religious History (Leiden: Brill, 1992). 
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expressed only in their personal literary works, such as diaries, poetry, and essays.427 
However, near the beginning of the twentieth century, discussion on Buddhism 
became increasingly open and wide, but usually had a strong scholarly tone. The 
upper strata of the Buddhist clergy also became members of the elite group and 
began to speak out publicly.428 Religious reformists, officials, missionaries, educated 
monks, scholarly laymen, and professional scholars formed a Buddhist academic 
community and constructed intimate domestic and international scholarly 
associations.429 Although still limited, the concern for a ‘scholastic’ Buddhism had 
risen on a national scale and profoundly influenced the academic path of the next 
generation of the intellectual elite, such as Chen Yinke, Hu Shih, Tang Yongtong, Lü 
Cheng, and so on. 
Second, Japanese Buddhism’s experience of modernization was introduced 
into China. In 1873, when Ogurusu Kōchō 小栗棲香頂 (1831–1905), a Jōdo Shin monk 
of the Higashi Honganji 東本願寺, began his ‘journey of seeking Dharma’ [qiufa 求法] 
in Peking, Chinese Buddhism was reeling from the blow delivered by the Taiping 
Rebellion (1850–1864) and was experiencing the unprecedented impact of Christian 
proselytization. Some scholars believe that Ogurusu’s journey marked the renewed 
beginning of contacts between Chinese and Japanese Buddhism.430 Previously, 
Japanese monks had traveled to China to learn Dharma, but now, they were more like 
 
427 Records show that some of them dedicated themselves to a moral or religious cause and expended 
much time and financial resources to improve the local religious environment. See Jessup, “The House 
Holder Elite: Buddhist Activism in Shanghai, 1920-1956.” 
428 Stefania Travagnin, “Concepts and Institutions for a new Buddhist Education: Reforming the 
Saṃgha Between and within State Agencies,” East Asian History 39 (2014). 
429 One case was that of the famous French sinologist Paul Pelliot伯希和 (1878-1945), who visited Shen 
Zhengzhi and Shen’s private library, Hairi lou海日樓 in 1916. See Ye Changzhi 葉昌熾, Yuandu lu riji 
chao 緣督盧日記鈔 [Dairies of the Hall of Yuandu] (丙辰六月廿二日). For the relationship between 
Paul Pelliot and modern Chinese academia, see Bing Sang, “Boxihe yu Zhongguo jindai xueshujie 伯希
和與中國近代學術界 [Paul Pelliot and the Modern Chinese Academia],” Lishi yanjiu 歷史研究, no. 5 
(1995): 115-38. 
430 Ogurusu’s ideas concerning the need for mission work in China are outlined in detail in his Shina 
kaikyō mikomi 支那開教見込 [The Prospects for Mission Work in China]. See Chen Jidong, Ogurusu 
Kochō no Shin matsu Chūgoku taiken: Kindai Nitchū Bukkyō kōryū no kaitan小栗栖香頂の清末中国体験: 近
代日中仏教交流の開端(Tokyo: Sankibo, 2016). 
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missionaries and tried to introduce and preach Japanese Buddhist doctrine to Chinese 
people. Regardless of the motivation behind these efforts,431 this “repaying favors 
[fan’en 返恩]” or “flowing backward” [daoliu 倒流] 432 did contribute to the Buddhist 
revival in modern China. Local elites built up a very close association with these 
Japanese missionaries.433 branch monasteries [bieyuan 別院] and study halls [xuetang 
學堂] of Japanese sects were also founded in Shanghai, Hangzhou, Suzhou, and many 
other cities. 
Indirect influence from Japanese Buddhist scholarship can be observed widely 
in the development of Chinese Buddhism.434 The large scale of the Buddhist scriptures 
 
431 The missionary motivation behind the activities of these Japanese Buddhists caught the attention of 
some Chinese Buddhists and was criticized by them. For example, Yang Wenhui wrote to 南條文雄 to 
criticize the interpretation of the Lotus Sūtra by the Japanese monk 幻人 and also to express his 
concern about religious infiltration from Japan. See Yang Renshan, “Yu Shi Huanren shu與釋幻人書,” 
“Yu riben nantiao wenxiong shu與日本南條文雄書,” in Yang Renshan jushi yishu 楊仁山居士遺書, 
CBETA, B28, no.0157 p.65b19, p.698a14. Lay Buddhist reformer Wang Kangnian 汪康年 also wrote an 
article criticizing and questioning the transmission of Japanese Buddhism. He complained, “I do not 
know what is the meaning of Japan’s repeated requests for transmission Buddhism in our country” [吾
不知日本屢以在吾國傳播佛教為要求，果何意也]. See Wang, Yinian 汪詒年, Wang Rangqing yizhu
汪穰卿遺著 (Taipei: Chaohua chubanshe, 2017), vol.3, 23-24. 
432 Ge, Zhaoguang, Xi chao que zi dongying lai—riben dong benyuan si yu Zhongguo jindai fojiao de 
yinyuan 西潮卻自東瀛來-日本東本願寺與中國近代佛教的因緣, in Xichao you dongfeng: wanqing 
minchu sixiang, zongjiao yu xueshu shilun 西潮又東風: 晚清民初思想宗教與學術十論(Shanghai: 
Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2006), 47-66; Ji, Xianlin, “Fojiao de daoliu 佛教的倒流” in Fojiao shiwu ti 佛
教十五題 (Beijing: zhonghua shuju, 2007).   
433 For the details of the activities of the monks of Higashi Honganji in China, see Takanishi, Kenshō 高
西賢正 (ed.), Higashi Honganji Shanghai kaikyō rokujūnen shi 東本願寺上海開教六十年史 (Shanghai: 
Higashi Honganji Shanghai Betsuin, 1937); Also, Kikanishi, Hiro 北西弘, “Meiji shoki ni okeru Higashi 
Honganji no Chūgoku kaikyō” 明治初期における東本願寺の中國開教, Bukkyō daigaku sōgō 
kenkyūjo kiyō 仏教大学総合研究所紀要,1 (1994): 331-49.Ge, Zhaoguang, “Kongjiao, fojiao yihuo 
yejiao? – 1900 nian qianhou Zhongguo de xinli weiji yu zongjiao xingqu孔教、佛教抑或耶教? —1900
年前後中國的心理危機與宗教興趣, in Zhongguo jindai sixiangshi de zhuanxing shiqi 中國近代思想
史的轉型時期, Wang, Fansen王汎森 (ed.), (Taipei: Lianjing chubanshiye youxian gongsi, 2007), 218 
434 In 1878, only few months after Yang Wenhui wrote a letter to Nanjō Bunyū, the Buddhist priest of 
Jōdo Shin who currently lived in London and studied Sanskrit and Indian philosophy under the 
supervision of Max Müller, they met in person in London. Bunyū helped Yang to acquire three 
hundred volumes of Chinese Buddhist texts that had long been lost in China. Those texts later were 
reprinted at Yang’s printing house in Nanjing,the Jingling Sūtra Press [Jinling Kejing Chu 金陵刻經處]. 
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rediscovered in Japan promoted the distribution of the Buddhist canon in China. At 
the end of the nineteenth century, dozens of works of Buddhism were introduced 
into China from Japan.435 Books such as the Jōsei indo shūkyōshi上世印度佛教史
written by Masaharu Anesaki 姉崎正治	(1873–1949), and Bukkyō katsuron joron仏教活
論序論	written by Inoue Enryō 井上円了 (1958–1919) were widely read by Chinese 
intellectuals and officials, such as Wen Tingshi 文廷式 (1856–1904) and educator Cai 
Yuanpei 蔡元培 (1868–1940).   
            Due to the success of the Meiji Restoration, Japan became an ‘enlightened 
model’ that perfectly combined modern advances with traditional ‘Eastern values.’ 
Japanese Buddhism bonded itself together with the larger aspiration of the formation 
of Japan as a modern nation and embarked on a series of movements to unify and 
coordinate the different sects into a new ‘Buddhism.’436 Buddhism then justified itself 
as a national religion of Japan in the process of forming a discursive order that could 
be called “Japan’s Orient: [tōyō], as Stefan Tanaka has suggested.437 This modern 
image of Buddhism introduced a fresh understanding of Buddhism back into China, 
encouraging the Chinese to reform Buddhism through producing new knowledge, 
forming new organizations, and fulfilling new social and political roles.  
 Third, a series of institutional transformations and the more intensive 
academic engagement of Buddhism shaped the new form of knowledge production.438 
The institutionalization of Buddhism as one branch of modern Chinese scholarship 
had two main implications: Buddhism’s entry into the higher education system and 
 
435 See Ni Guanning 倪管寧, “日本近現代佛教歷史學的發展與反思,” Shiyuan luntan 史原論壇 
(2020.8.26)， http://shi-yuan.blog.ntu.edu.tw/xuexunaug20/.  
436 For the development of Japanese Buddhism in Meiji, see Shigeyoshi Murakami村上重良, Zongjiao 
yu riben xiandaihua 宗教與日本現代化 (Beijing: Jinri Zhongguo chubanshe, 1990), 2-3; Senjō 
Murakami村上專精, Riben fojiao shigang 日本佛教史綱, in Lan Jifu藍吉富(ed.), Shijie foxue mingzhu 
yicong世界佛學名著譯叢, vol.53 (Taipei: Huayu chubanshe 1988), 359.  
437 Stefan Tanaka, Japan's Orient: Rendering Pasts into History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1995): 1-28.  
438 Innovative production of religious knowledge is a crucial theme for the transformation of Chinese 
religion. See Paul R. Katz, “‘Superstition’ and its Discontents – On the Impact of Temple Destruction 
Campaigns in China, 1898-1948,” in Disijie guoji hanxue huiyi lunwenji: Xinyang, shijian, yu wenhua tiaoshi 
第四屆國際漢學會議論文集: 信仰, 實踐, 與文化調適 (Taipei: Academia Sinica, June 2013), 606. 
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the emergence of forums and portals for academic discussion—publications and 
periodicals.439 
After the Wuxu Reform and the breakdown of civil exams in the Late Qing 
era,440 China began to reform its education system using a Western model.441 Due to a 
national project of converting religion-related knowledge into disciplines,442 
Buddhism then was shifted from its previous vague position in the traditional 
category of Chinese scholarship and was placed into the Western-style curriculum as 
an interdisciplinary branch of philosophy.443  
As many scholars have analyzed, education reforms under slogans like “saving 
the country through education” [jiaoyu jiuguo 教育救國] played a vital role in the 
modernization of Chinese society.444 New concepts in education brought significant 
changes to the curricula and structure of schools: scientific subjects were introduced 
in schools; Classical Learning was downgraded to a research subject; Western models 
of education took over the Confucian system; the old imperial examinations [keju 科
舉] were abolished in 1905; and the traditional literati gradually were replaced by the 
 
439 For the relationship between print culture and knowledge in a general sense, see Adrian Johns, The 
Making of the Book: Print and Knowledge in the Making (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1998). Also, 
Cynthia J. Brokaw, and Kai-wing Chow (ed.), Printing and Book Culture in Late Imperial China (Berkeley, 
University of California Press, 2005); Philip Clart, and Gregory Adam Scott, ed. Religious Publishing and 
Print Culture in Modern China, 1800-2012 (Boston and Berlin: De Gruyter: 2015). 
440 For the role of the civil exams in Late Qing China, see Benjamin A Elman, A Cultural History of Civil 
Examinations in Late Imperial China (Berkeley: Univ of California Press, 2000). 
441 For the establishment of the modern university in Republican China, see Wen-hsin Yeh, The 
Alienated Academy: Culture and Politics in Republican China, 1919-1937, vol. 148 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
Univ Asia Center, 1990).  
442 For a detailed discussion on Zongjiao xue, see Christian Meyer, “The Emergence of “Religious Studies 
(zongjiaoxue) in Late Imperial and Republican China, 1890-1949.” Numen, 62 (2015), 40-75. 
443 In the early establishment of the academic disciplines in modern China, the study of religion, 
including theology and religious history, was basically left out. See Michael Lackner, Iwo Amelung, and 
Joachim Kurtz, New Terms for New Ideas: Western Knowledge and Lexical Change in Late Imperial China, vol. 
52 (Leiden: Brill, 2001). Also see Michael Lackner and Natascha Vittinghoff, Mapping Meanings: The Field 
of New Learning in Late Qing China, vol. 64 (Leiden: Brill, 2004). 25-30.  
444 R. P. Scott, ‘The Boxer Indemnity in its Relation to Chinese Education,’ Journal of the British 
Institute of international Affairs 2.4 (1923): 149–67 
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new community—rooted in Western culture—of the intellectuals.445 In 1898, the first 
Chinese university based on a Western model, Peking University, was established.446 
The famous lay Buddhist Jiang Weiqiao 蔣維喬 (1873–1958), the Counselor of the 
Ministry of Education of the Republican government, wasthe crucial figure who 
promoted Buddhism’s entry into the classrooms of Chinese universities.447 
 At the same time, there were educational reforms for Buddhists (monastics as 
well as laity) in the Buddhist community.448 In 1903 the Hunan Saṃgha Study Hall 湖
南僧學堂, the first new-style Buddhist study institute, was established.449 Later, 
institutes of Buddhist studies [foxue yuan佛學院]—a new form of saṃgha 
education—were built nationwide. The emergence of these research institutes 
showed that modern Buddhist educational institutions had gradually replaced the 
previous monastic study seminars. Buddhist education and monastic education[seng 
jiaoyu 僧教育] became important slogans; a more Western-style and comprehensive 
pedagogy was also slowly established in monasteries.450  
With the promotion of Yang Wenhui and Taixu,451 the years 1914 to 1944 saw 
the actual establishment of more than 30 Buddhist institutes, including the most 
important ones, the Wuchang Buddhist institute and the China Inner Learning 
 
445  Y. C. Wang, Chinese Intellectuals and the West 1872-1949 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1966), vii–xiv 
446 For more details on education in this period, see Chiang Monlin, ‘Chinese Education: Force for 
Democracy,’ Far Eastern Survey 14.13 (1945): 181; Chen Qingzhi 陳青之, Zhongguo jiaoyu shi中國教育
史 (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2009), 503–94.  
447 The original text in Chinese is: “我國大學之有佛教課程, 蓋自此始.” See Jiang Weiqiao蔣維喬, 
Yinshi xiansheng zizhuan因是先生自傳, in Bian Xiaoxuan卞孝萱, Minguo renwu beizhuan ji民國人物
碑傳集, vol.5 (Nanjing: Fenghuan chubanshe, 2011), 393. 
448 See Travagnin, “Concepts and Institutions for a new Buddhist Education: Reforming the Saṃgha 
Between and within State Agencies.” 
449 Ding, Gang 丁鋼, Zhongguo fojiao jiaoyu 中國佛教教育 (Chengdu: Sichuan jiaoyu chubanshe, 2010), 
167. 
450 He jinlin 賀金林, “Qingmo seng jiaoyu yu siyuan xingxue de xingqi 清末僧教育會與寺院興學的興
起,” Anhui shixue安徽史學, 6 (2005): 28-64 
451 Taixu’s highest ideal of education was the so-called “Buddhicized education” (Fohua jiaoyu 佛化教
育). It was the study of the ‘Buddhist five vehicles’ (wu cheng 五乘). See Taixu: On education 論教育
(1924), TXQS, vol. 24, 340.  
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Institute.452 This phenomenon represented a vital turning point in the history of 
saṃgha education, which Dongchu clarified as the shift from a sectarian-doctrinal 
form of education to a style based on the ‘school format” [xuexiaohua zhi seng jiaoyu 
學校化之僧教育]. This transformation consequentially changed the knowledge 
discourse in the realm of Buddhist scholarship.453 If one considers the changes that 
occurred between the ‘Switch temples into schools’ movement in 1898454 and the 
rapid growth of Buddhist education or academic institutes, it is evident that the 
combination of Buddhism with secular education provided ample space for an 
upgrade of Buddhism’s role in the hypothetical ‘Chinese Renaissance’—the encounter 
with modern scientific thought, or the establishment of identities.  
Meanwhile, the appearance of Buddhist periodicals and publications produced 
in movable type by modern commercial publishing houses formed new platform for 
knowledge production and communication. This phenomenon was termed by scholar 
Gregory Adam Scott a “publishing revolution” with dual meanings: firstly, this was a 
new means of publishing texts with new requirements of xylography; secondly, the 
content of these periodicals was often revolutionary in tone, calling for radical 
changes within the Buddhist world such as new forms of education and new types of 
religious organizations, and engaging in debates over intellectual and cultural issues 
unfolding in Chinese society.455 
The first Chinese-language periodical specializing in Buddhist content was 
Foxue congbao, published in twelve issues between October 1912 and June 1914.456 
 
452 See Gong Jun 龔雋, “Jindai Zhongguo fojiao jingxue yanjiu: yi Neixueyuan yu Wuchang foxueyuan 
weili 近代中國佛教經學研究: 以內學院與武昌佛學院為例,” Xuanzang foxue yanjiu 玄奘佛學研究, 24 
(2015): 85-116.  
453 For the reinvention of the relations between religion and state starting from the end of the Qing era, 
see Goossaert and Palmer, The Religious Question in Modern China.; Nedostup, Superstitious Regimes: 
Religion and the Politics of Chinese Modernity. 
454 For more details on education in this period, see Chiang Monlin, “Chinese Education: Force for 
Democracy,” Far Eastern Survey 14.13 (1945): 181. 
455 Gregory Adam Scott, “Conversion by the Book: Buddhist Print Culture in Early Republican China” 
(Ph.D Dissertation, Columbia University, 2013), 130. 
456  The term congbao [叢報] was coined by Liang Qichao as a translation of the Japanese zasshi 雜誌, 
meaning a weekly or monthly periodical. Several issues of Foxue congbao were published a month later 
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Foxue congbao was not a temple-based publication; its format to a certain degree 
imitated secular periodicals, combining editorials, serialized scholarly works, news, 
poetry, biographies of eminent figures, and advertisements for publishers and 
scripture distributors.457 Although it was not fully academically oriented and only ran 
for a short period, Congbao set the standard for later Buddhist periodicals, in terms of 
both  format and content.458 Around the 1920s, the second generation of Buddhist 
periodicals emerged. These Buddhist periodicals were produced and distributed 
through a network of local bookstores, lay associations, scriptural publishing houses, 
seminaries, and commercial presses.459 The most representative and influential one 
among them was the Voice of the See Tide [Haichaoyin 海潮音], a new monthly Buddhist 
periodical first published in 1919 under Taixu’s leadership. It ran throughout the 
entire Republican period, with 352 issues published in total. Haichao yin had a 
significant impact on both scholarly and non-specialist views of Chinese Buddhism. A 
large group of eminent monks, intellectuals, and scholars contributed to this 
publication or were its readers, including Taixu, Zhang Taiyan, Liang Shuming, Tang 
Yongtong, and many more.460  
 
than their scheduled publication date. Welch’s book The Buddhist Revival in China (p. 100) has a brief 
mention of this title. Original printings can still be found in some libraries; the library of the Institute 
of Chinese Literature and Philosophy 中國文哲研究所  at Academia Sinica 中央研究院  has a set of 
original issues that were bound into volumes at some point, possibly after 1949 given the binder's 
imprint. The entirety of its print run is reprinted in the MFQ collection, volumes 1-4. 
457 Authors published in Congbao included Taixu, Dixian 諦閑 (1858–1932), Yuexian 月霞 (1858–1917), 
Zongyang 宗仰 (1865–1921), Jichan 寄禪, and lay Buddhists such as Pu Yicheng, Yang Renshan,  Gao 
Henian 高鶴年(1872–1962), Ouyang Jingwu, Li Yizhuo 李翊灼 (1881–1952), Luo Jialing 羅迦陵 (1964–
1941), and so on. 
458 Varying slightly from issue to issue, the basic structure of this periodical consisted of an ‘editorial’ 
section [lunshuo 論說], with political articles related to Buddhist cultivation; a ‘scholarship’ section 
[xueli 學理], with research articles focused on questions of doctrine; a ‘history’ section [lishi 歷史], with 
research essays on the history of Buddhism; a ‘special matters’ section [zhuanjian 專件], with public 
statements or letters from nascent Buddhist associations; a ‘news’ section [jishi 紀事], with short pieces 
related to Buddhism from other print sources; and a ‘miscellaneous’ section [zazu 雜俎], with recurring 
articles written by certain authors. 
459 Scott, “Conversion by the Book: Buddhist Print Culture in Early Republican China,” 247-249. 




From Congbao to Haichaoyin, these periodicals functioned as a platform for 
ideas concerning the transformation of Buddhism, a venue in which a new 
understanding of Buddhism could be critically discussed and reflected upon, a source 
of news on current events related to Buddhism, and a showcase for works of various 
genres, including translated texts and early drafts of works-in-progress.461  In addition 
to the periodicals, scholarly works on Buddhist history, biography, and philosophy in 
the forms of monographs or collections received support from commercial presses 
such as the Commercial Press 商務印書館 and Chunghwa Book Company 中華書局. 
These periodicals and publications not only provided a space in which scholars could 
communicate and make their voices available to other experts as well as a mass 
audience but also, pragmatically, they support these scholars’ careers financially and 
helped them to maintain their livings as professional researchers. Although they took 
the form of commercial enterprises, most of these periodicals and publishing houses 
remained committed to a non-profit business model, gaining no profit from their 
publishing and often depending on donations to cover costs. This mechanism, to a 
large extent, maintained the independence of academic works and connected authors 
and readers together. 
 
Historians and Their Agendas    
The discovery of Buddhism in Western scholarship introduced new methodologies—
comparative religious studies, linguistics, historical hermeneutics, and so on—into a 
tradition that existed ‘out there.’462 However, unlike their Western counterparts, 
Chinese scholars, due to their cultural background, more or less considered Buddhism 
 
461 Scott, "Conversion by the Book: Buddhist Print Culture in Early Republican China."265 
462 For a general study on the development of Chinese modern Buddhist scholarship, see Chen Bing and 
Deng Zimei, Ershi shiji Zhongguo gojiao 二十世紀中國佛教(Beijing: Minzu chubanshe 民族出版社). For a 
biographical study on the historians who wrote the history of Buddhism in the modern period, see 
Zhou Xia 周霞, Zhongguo jindai fojiao shixue mingjia pingshu 中國近代佛教史學名家評述 (Shanghai: 
Shanghai shehui kexueyuan chubanshe, 2006).  
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as something of their ‘own’ and maintained interpretations that were based on their 
own historical experience.  
 
Liang Qichao 
Along with the rising interest in Buddhism, there was a dramatic surge in popular 
writing about Buddhism aimed at non-expert readers in publication markets during 
the first decade of the twentieth century. Almost at the same time, writing on 
Buddhist history emerged on a larger scale under the dual influence of the domestic 
Chinese Buddhist revival as well as the flourishing trend of religious studies from the 
West and Japan. Issues related to the history of Buddhism soon attracted the 
attention of Chinese intellectuals, in particular those who were more sensitive about 
the encounter between the outside world and traditional China.  
One pioneer who propagated a modern historiography of Buddhism was Liang 
Qichao.463 Although his study of Buddhism remained unfinished and was not 
systematic, he brought this theme into the scope of Chinese academia. In his 1902 
article on the history of Chinese scholarship and thought, he, for the first time, 
described Buddhism from a historical viewpoint as a crucial element of Chinese 
culture by placing Buddhism into the pedigree of scholarship. This attempt 
announced the beginning of this new research domain.464 
 
463 Joseph R. Levenson’s famous biographical study divided Liang’s life into three stages: his youth as a 
reformist (1873–1898) (“Metamorphosis”); his exile in Japan (1898–1912) (“Bravo the new world”); and 
the years after he returned back to China (1912–1929) (“remembrance of things past”). His studies on 
Buddhist history mostly happened during the third stage. See Levenson, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the Mind of 
Modern China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953). 
464 although in the first two decades of 20th century, there were already several studies on Buddhism 
history, mostly in article form. For example, Zhang Qiqin張其勤’s Xizang zongjiao yuanliu西藏宗教
源流; Li Yizhuo李翊灼’s Xizang Fojiao lueshi西藏佛教略史;  Chen Yuan陳垣’s “Ji Datong 
Wuzhoushan shikusi 記大同五州山石窟寺”; and Shen Zhenzhi’s discussions on the history of Indian 
Buddhism, the origin of Tibetan Buddhism and so on, in his Hairilou zhaji海日樓札記. However, these 
works are still very limited in length and content.  
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Liang’s interests in Buddhism started from a very early age when he was a 
young student at Kang Yuwei’s Wanmu Caotang 萬木草堂 from 1891 to 1898.465 He 
was impressed by the “comprehensiveness and profoundness” of Buddhist teaching 
when reading Buddhist canon under Kang’s supervision.466  Although he said that he 
himself was unable to really grasp such great wisdom, he was fully convinced by the 
power of ‘awakening’ promised in Buddhist doctrines.467 Interrupted by the turmoil of 
Chinese politics and society, Liang’s study of Buddhism stopped for a few years. Only 
in the last ten years of his life did he continue his writing on Buddhism. 
Liang’s impetus to writing the history of Buddhism was no doubt initially 
inspired in part by the popularity of reading and discussing Buddhist doctrines 
among Chinese intellectuals during this period. Besides Kang, Liang’s personal 
interest in Buddhism was also directly influenced by his friends, such as Xia Zengyou 
夏曾佑 (1863–1924) and Tan Sitong 譚嗣同 (1865–1898). After the failure of the Wuxu 
Reform, his reception and understanding of Buddhism was developed during his stay 
in Peking and later in Shanghai. At a certain moment, he even considered becoming a 
devoted Buddhist. However, because of the changing political situation, he soon 
returned to the harsh reality. In addition to his interest in some primary Buddhist 
texts, such as the Sutra on the Deeds of the Buddha [Abhiniṣkramaṇasutra 本行經], his 
empathy with Buddhism grew stronger and his attempts to “save the heart” [jiuxin 
救心] and further “save the world” [jiushi 救世] through Buddhism never ceased.  
The second stage of Liang’s writing of Buddhist history was the 1920s, during 
which his attitude towards Chinese tradition became more sympathetic. When he was 
in Nanjing, he followed Ouyang Jingwu to study Buddhism, attending lectures at the 
China Inner Institute “with great endeavor [kewei pingming 可謂拼命].468 After 
learning the Treatise of the Establishment of Consciousness Only [Chengweishi lun 成唯識
論] from Ouyang, his interests in abstract Buddhist philosophy and terminology 
 
465 See Ding Wenjiang ed., Liang Qichao nianpu changbian 梁啟超年譜長編 (Shanghai: Shanghai 
Renmin chubanshe, 2009).  
466 Liang Qichao, “Sanshi zishu 三十自述,” in YBSHJ: Wenji 11, 17.  
467 Ibid. 
468 Ding Wenjiang ed., Liang Qichao nianpu changbian 梁啟超年譜長編, vol.10: 1922. 11.8 
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developed; his opinion about religious ‘truth’ and its historical magnifications 
became deeper. It seems that after Liang abandoned his former political ideal, 
Buddhism filled up the intellectual vacuum in his mind. Especially after his visit to 
Europe, he returned to Buddhism and used it to reflect critically on the overall 
project of modernization. Buddhism, he remarked in the farewell talk he delivered at 
South-eastern University, defined his general view of life and the world. But until the 
1920s, Liang had not really touched on the spiritual regime of Buddhism. He 
ceaselessly was rooted in the real world; only in the last years of his life did he start to 
“firmly believe in Buddhism” [duxin fojiao 篤信佛教]. Earlier, although he had had 
no faith in Buddhism, he behaved like a real Buddhist believer, placing many hopes of 
reformation and salvation in Buddhism; now, he ‘detached’ Buddhism from his 
political expectations and pragmatic criteria. Now he did not hope to establish 
Buddhism as a national religion, but only wished to keep its status as a valuable piece 
of cultural heritage.  
In addition to his early introductory studies on Buddhist history that 
remained as chapters in his two monographs—The Outline of Chinese History 
[Zhongguoshi xulun 中國史敘論] and The Major Trend of the Changes in Chinese 
Scholarship and Thought—he wrote later works on Buddhism, most of which were 
compiled into a collection entitled Eighteen Essays on Buddhist Studies [Foxue yanjiu 
shibapian 佛學研究十八篇].469 Although these essays seemed isolated from each 
other and appeared in a random sequence, they were all part of Liang’s unfinished 
general history of Buddhism. Claiming to use a modern “scientific methodology,”470 in 
these essays Liang provided several insightful but sometimes controversial ideas, for 
example, the sea route hypothesis of the import of Buddhism and the authenticity of 
 
469 For details about the compilation and publication of this collection, see Chen Shiqiang’s 
introductory preface. Chen, Shiqiang, “Foxue yanjiu shibapian daodu 佛學研究十八篇導讀,” in Liang 
Qichao, SBP, 4-7. 
470 Liang Qichao, “Dasheng qixinlun kaozheng xu 大乘起信論考證序,” in SBP, 388-92. In this article, 
Liang wrote: “The seven volumes of the Dazang Jing must be organized. And to organize, [we] must use 
the modern scientific method”七千卷之大藏，非大加一番整理，不能發其光明，而整理之功，非
用近世科學方法不可], SBP, 392.  
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Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith.471 Examining Buddhism from a historical perspective, he 
then suggested, was the first step of propagating Buddhism.472 
As more of a cultural achievement rather than a philosophical ideal, Buddhism 
was considered by Liang to be one of the greatest achievements of human 
civilization473 and the most important “side-line” of Chinese scholarship.474 In the 
later phase of his life, writing the history of Buddhism became one of the key tasks in 
Liang’s pursuit of constructing the history of Chinese scholarship. Liang’s entire 
project about the history of Buddhism was centred on one core, yange沿革, a notion 
containing two opposite sides: continuity and reform. As I will show in the next 
chapter, he was trying to construct a comprehensive narrative about Buddhism from 
a macroscopic view. Only the big events, or the milestones, caught his attention, such 
as the earliest contact between China and India, or the first Buddhist canon produced 
by the Chinese. In his proposal, the whole story of Buddhism could be divided into 
two stages, the Buddhism before Sinicization and the Buddhism after Sinicization. 
Articles like “General Survey of Indian Buddhism” [yindu fojiao gaiguan 印度佛教概
觀], and “Buddhism and Western regions” [fojiao yu xiyu 佛教與西域] clearly focus 
on the first stage; others, such as “The Early Import of Buddhism” [fojiao zhi 
chuchuanru 佛教之初傳入] and “The Outline of the Development of Chinese 
Buddhism” [Zhongguo fofa xingshuai yu yange shuolüe 中國佛法興衰沿革說略] 
belong to the second stage. 
 
471 Liang, “Dasheng qixinlun kaozheng xu 大乘起信論考證序,” ibid, 388-92 
472 “今後而欲昌明佛法者，其第一步當自歷史的研究始,” ibid, 391. 
473 Liang, “Zhiguoxue de liangtiao dalu 治國學的兩條大路” in YBSHJ: Wenji 39, 199. 
474 Liang, “Zhongguo lishi yanjiu fa bubian中國歷史研究法補編,” in YBSHJ: Zhuanji 99: 144-148. In this 
article, he discussed how to write the history of “religion” [zongjiao shi 宗教史] and “the Chinese art of 
the Dao” [Zhongguo daoshu shi 中國道術史]. Daoshu, in Liang’s view, meant actual scholarship. He 
considered the development from the teachings of the masters in the Pre-Qin era to the Neo-
Confucianism in the Song and Ming periods to be the mainstream history of Chinese scholarship. It 
should be noted that there have been discussions and critiques on the reduction of the traditional ‘art 
of the Dao’ to the academic discipline of ‘philosophy’ in the established institutional structures of the 
modern university. See Sébastien Billioud and Joël Thoraval, “The Contemporary Revival of 
Confucianism: Anshen liming or the Religious Dimension of Confucianism,” China Perspectives, 3 (2008): 
88-106.   
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In general, Liang brought new paradigms and concepts to the scholarship of 
Buddhism. Firstly, he introduced a suite of discourses and methodologies based on 
modern science and historiography; secondly, he opened up the horizon of Chinese 
Buddhism and conceived of it as a ‘world religion’;475 thirdly, he formed a China-
centred narrative, which valued Chinese Buddhism as the superior outcome of the 
progress of Buddhism; and finally but most controversially, he highlighted the 
sequence of the historical developments of Buddhism and the thread that ran 
through them while largely overlooking the discontinuities, trivial factors and subtle 
changes. However, what Liang achieved through his more than thirty articles, was 
not promoting Buddhism as a cultural heritage, as he wished, but was something 
more deconstructive, namely, shaking the foundation of the old system of Buddhist 
knowledge.   
 
Textbooks on the History of Buddhism  
Since the 1910s, new-style educational organizations, institutes, and universities had 
emerged that made the compilation of modern, readable, and systematic 
introductory teaching materials highly important.476 The first batch of writings on the 
topic of Buddhist history intended for classroom use were introduced into China.477  
These early works, in particular those on the general history of Chinese 
Buddhism, were produced by a group of Japanese scholars. The first work on this 
 
475 Liang Qichao was the first one (also probably the only one) who noticed the global academic trend 
centred on ‘essential Buddhism’ or the essence of Buddhism.’ See Chen Huaiyu. Zaixifang faxian 
chenyinke 在西方發現陳寅恪. 
476 Another genre of didactic text that served for similar purpose is the introductory text or book for 
beginners [chuxue 初學 or rumen 入門], which has played a crucial role in the personal religious 
histories 
of many Chinese Buddhists. Dozens of such texts were produced from the late nineteenth century 
onwards and continue to occupy bookstore shelves today. See Gregory Scott, “The Publishing of 
Buddhist Books for Beginners in Modern China from Yang Wenhui to Master Sheng Yen,” in Shengyan 
yanjiu 聖嚴研究 5 (2014): 51-107. 
477 See Xiao Ping 蕭平, Jindai Zhongguo fojiao de fuxing – Yu riben fojiaojie de jiaowanglu 近代中國佛教的復
興——與日本佛教界的交往錄 (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 2003 ). 
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topic was Sankoku Bukkyō ryakushi 三國佛教略史, originally published in 1890 by Jōdo 
shinshū Buddhist priests Shimaji Mokurai 島地墨雷 (1832–1911) and Oda Tokunō 生
田得能 (1860–1911). This article provided a neat summary of the historical 
development of Buddhism in India, China, and Japan. It was soon translated into 
Chinese by Li Yizhuo 李翊灼 and published in 1912 in the Foxue congbao, the first 
Buddhist periodical in modern China. Around a decade later, young Buddhist 
scholar Yo吉永智海 published a book that, for the first time, generally outlined the 
history of Chinese Buddhism and used the term “Chinese Buddhist history” in its title. 
Before this book, the periodical Bukkyō Shirin 仏教史林, which was launched in 1894 
by Murakami Senshō 村上專精 (1851–1929), Washio Junkei 鷲尾順敬 (1868–1941), 
and Sakaino Satoru 境野哲 (1871–1933), as well as other works, such as Murakami 
Senshō’s Nihon bukkyōshi kō 日本仏教史綱 (1898) and Maeda Eun 前田慧雲 (1855–
1930)’s Daijo Bukkyo shi ron 大乗仏教史論 (1904), introduced the perspective of ‘new 
historicism’ into Buddhology. In 1905, Sakaino Satoru published his model work on 
the general history of Chinese Buddhism titled Shina bukkyōshi kō支那佛教史綱.478 
Satoru’s book received wide attention in both Japanese and Chinese academia.  
In 1923, lay Buddhist Shi Yiru 史一如(1876–1925), a professor of the Wuchang 
Buddhist Academy, compiled several textbooks on the history of Chinese Buddhism, 
such as The History of Chinese Buddhism [Zhonghua fojiaoshi 中華佛教史], The History of 
Indian Buddhism [Yindu fojiaoshi 印度佛教史] and The History of Buddhism in Several 
Countries [Geguo fojiaoshi 各國佛教史], based on Japanese textbooks.479 Also referring 
 
478 Sakaino Satoru was a priest in the Ōtani sect 大谷派 of the Jōdō Shinshu Japanese Buddhist 
tradition. As a child, he read Inoue Enryō 井上円了, which sparked his interest in Buddhism, and later 
in 1894 he was involved with the periodical Bukkyō Shirin 佛教史林 [Histories of Buddhism] published 
by Murakami Senshō 村上專精 (1851-1929). In 1900 he founded the periodical Shinbukkyō 新佛教 [New 
Buddhism], which was used as a platform for the Shin Bukkyō dōshikai 新佛教同志會 [New Buddhist 
Association], of which he was a member. His Shina bukkyōshi kō 支那佛教史綱 [Outline History of 
Buddhism in China] was published in 1907 in Tokyo by Morie Shoten森江書店. 
479 See Shi Dongchu 釋東初, “Jindai fojiao zhi chengjiu 近代中國佛教之成就,” in Zhongguo fojiao jindai 
shi 中國佛教近代史 (Taipei: Zhongguo fojiao wenhua guan, 1974): 5-9  
 162 
 
to Japanese works, another scholar, translator Chen Binhe 陳彬和	(1897–1945), 
also published a small booklet on the history of Chinese Buddhism in 1927.480 
 In this early phase, the phenomenon of “borrowing from Eastern books” [jiezi 
yu dongji 借資於東籍] was very common.481 With the motivation of promoting 
Buddhist education in the newly established institutes, lay-Buddhist educator Jiang 
Weiqiao compiled his work on the general history of Chinese Buddhism, The History of 
Chinese Buddhism [Zhongguo fojiaoshi 中國佛教史], based on Sakaino Satoru’s Shina 
bukkyōshi kō.482 This book was considered to be the first general history of Chinese 
Buddhism in China that adopted a modern historiographical structure.483 Exactly 
when Jiang saw Satoru’s book remains uncertain; but there is no doubt that Jiang 
gained abundant materials and information about the latest research in this new 
scholarly branch of Buddhist history in Japan during his two visits in 1917 and 1926.484 
 
480 Chen Binhe陳彬和,	Zhongguo fojiao xiaoshi 中國佛教小史 (Shanghai: Shijie shuju, 1927). 
481 See Jiang Weiqiao 蔣維喬, Zhongguo fojiaoshi 中國佛教史(Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2005), 
Xuyan 敘言. For the phenomenon of “borrowing from Japan,” see Ge, Zhaoguang, “Xi chao que zi 
dongying lai—riben dong benyuan si yu Zhongguo jindai fojiao de yinyuan 西潮卻自東瀛來-日本東本
願寺與中國近代佛教的因緣,” in Xichao you dongfeng: wanqing minchu sixiang, zongjiao yu xueshu shilun 
西潮又東風: 晚清民初思想宗教與學術十論 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2006), 47-66. 
482 Jiang’s writing basically followed the outline of Satoru’s book with two additional chapters, “Jinshi 
fojiao 近世佛教” [Buddhism in the contemporary period] and “Jinshi gezong 近世各宗” [the 
Buddhist sects in the contemporary period], extending the narrative of Chinese Buddhism from the 
Ming dynasty up to the modern age; Jiang also added a chapter about Buddhist statuary art and 
inscription. 
483 See the preface [敘言] and Editorial Guide [凡例] of Jiang Weiqiao’s The History of Chinese Buddhism. 
See also Huang Canhua’s comment in the preface of his The History of Chinese Buddhism. Huang Chanhua, 
Zhongguo fojiaoshi中國佛教史 (Changsha: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1940), 1. 
484 Jiang Weiqiao visited Japan twice, in 1917 and 1926. According to Deng Zimei, Jiang saw Satoru’s 
book in 1917, because Jiang wrote in the preface to the ‘history’ that he had made great efforts to 
search for books on Buddhism and had written to many temples during his investigation. See Deng 
Zimei, “Daodu 導讀,” in Jiang Weixiao, Zhongguo fojiao shi 中國佛教史, 4-5; However, Zhou Xia has 
argued that, because during this short trip in 1917, the places Jiang visited were most primary and 
middle schools and Jiang was not yet a Buddhist, therefore, he probably got Satoru’s book during his 
second visit to Japan in 1926. According to Jiang’s autobiography, in 1926 he visited Japan again and he 
had many contacts with Japanese Buddhists this time. For example, on 1926-04-23, he met Takakusu 
Junjirō 高楠順次郎, the editor of the Taisho. He also visited Zojo Temple 增上寺 in Tokyo and Hōryū 
 163 
 
In the preface to this book, Jiang explicitly emphasized the importance of 
historiography in Buddhist studies. He wrote: 
In all scholarship, there are two kinds of studies: doctrinal studies and historical 
studies; How can Buddhism be different? After its importation into China in the Han 
dynasty, Buddhism in China has become particularly advanced in terms of doctrine; 
there have been those [monks] who devoted themselves to thinking and absorbing 
the teachings from the West [India] to form its own sects, such Taitai and Huayan. On 
the history of Buddhism, however, there was still not any systematic literature 
available for reference in the past thousands of years due to the complexity of the 
historical facts; studying the history of Chinese Buddhism was like searching in the 
darkness, and it was hard to gain any progress…The reason for this is that Buddhists 
lack historical concepts, as is already the case in India, and our people are also under 
its influence. However, if the study of doctrine can be based on history, the results 
will be more precise. This is why the study of history is sufficient as an aid to 







This passage indicates Jiang’s judgment of the former Buddhist historical writings 
and his opinion about the relationship between Buddhist doctrine and Buddhist 
history. Considering history to be the basis for and companion to doctrinal 
understanding, he investigated the development of Buddhism from the Han dynasty 
onwards to the Republican era. In so doing, he attempted to shed light on the 
“general principles [tongli 通例] of history.”486 Compared with Satoru’s book, Jiang 
 
Temple 法隆寺 in Nara. For the details of Jiang’s visit in Japan, see Zhou Xia, Zhongguo jindai fojiao 
shixue mingjia pingshu 中國近代佛教史學名家評述, 86-87. 
485 Jiang Weiqiao 蔣維喬, Zhongguo fojiaoshi 中國佛教史(Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1933), xuyan. 
486 As Jiang claimed, he wrote this history to compensate for  traditional writings such as Feiying 




added a chapter in his general history of Buddhism to discuss the development of 
Buddhism in the Qing dynasty, investigating the religious policies of the Qing court 
and analysing the impact of many deconstructive socio-political factors, such as the 
Taiping Rebellion, on Buddhism in a broader historical context.487 Besides his 
discussion of the degeneration of clerical Buddhism, he also expanded his research 
beyond the framework of sectarian classification, elaborating on the revival of lay 
Buddhism from the late Ming to the Qing dynasty.  
Another influential general history of Buddhism was The General History of 
Chinese Buddhism [Zhongguo fojiaoshi 中國佛教史] written by lay Buddhist Huang 
Chanhua黃懺華 and published in the early 1930s. Similar to Jiang’s work, Huang’s 
writing covers a wide time span, from the Wei-Jin dynasties to the early modern 
period. Before this book came out, Huang had already published several articles and 
books on the history of Chinese Buddhism, for example, The Drifts of Buddhist Sects 
[Fojiao gezong dayi 佛教各宗大意], An Introduction to Buddhism [Foxue gailun 佛學概
論], An Outline of the History of Indian Buddhism [Yindu fojiao shigang 印度佛教史綱], 
and so on. Many of these works were selected as textbooks for the new-style Buddhist 
institutes and are in use today. The form of Huang’s General History was influenced by 
Shina bukkyōshi 支那仏教史 written by Japanese scholar Hakuju Ui 宇井伯壽.488 Both 
of these two books divided the history of Chinese Buddhism into four stages 
(beginning, development, flourishing, and decay), and both their books emphasized 




487 Ibid, chapter 17 “Buddhism in Modern Time” [jinshi zhi fojiao 近世之佛教] and chapter 18 “Sects in 
Modern Time” [Jinshi gezong 近世各宗], 264-327. For further details see Jiang Weiqiao, Zhuweng ziding 
nianpu 竹翁自訂年譜, Shanghai Library, vol.3, 15-17.  
488 Lü Cheng, Zhongguo fojiao yuanliu luejiang中國佛教源流略講, 18. 
489 “學系的相承與師資的脈絡上.” Shigeo Kamada鐮田茂雄, “Jindai Riben de Zhongguo fojiaoshi 
yanjiu 近代日本的中國佛教史研究,” Shengkai聖凱 trans. Fayin法音 2,(2000): 25-29. 
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Around the 1930s, a new generation of historians began their careers as professors in 
universities. Due to their vital, creative writings and teachings, studies on the history 
of Buddhism switched from an introductory, general level to a more detailed, 
microscopic level: the developments of Chinese Buddhism were thoroughly 
investigated as historical phenomena; Buddhist scriptures were read as historical 
materials critically and prudently; the concepts and linage of sects were examined, 
judged, and organized according to the standards of modern historiography. These 
studies provided new angles on this field that were innovative, thoughtful, severe, 
and sometimes challenging and controversial.   
The reasons why these scholars became interested in Buddhism were varied 
and somewhat vague; however, the religious tradition of their families and their 
educational backgrounds always played a crucial role. Chen Yinke, for example, was 
born into an elite family with a solid Buddhist atmosphere and was raised by his 
grandfather Chen Baozhen 陳寶箴 (1831–1900), an upper official and a leading 
literatus, who maintained an extensive collection of Buddhist texts and kept close 
association with Buddhist circles.490 Before Chen was officially introduced to 
Buddhism, he had access to a voluminous Buddhist literature at a very young age 
through his family’s book collection.491   
 
490 His grandfather, Chen Baozhen (1831-1900) was a famous politician and reformer in the late Qing 
period and was one of the main supporters of the Hundred-Days Reform. Partly for this reason, he had 
a close relationship with Kan Youwei, Liang Qichao, and other the reformers who were immersed in 
Buddhism. 
491 According to the memoirs of Chen Yinke’s nephew Fengxiong 封雄, Chen Yinke started to read 
Buddhist canons collected by his great-grandfather before he was ten years old; “he felt those Buddhist 
canons were difficult to understand but he still was very interested in them” [覺其怪奧難懂，但頗感
興趣]. See Chen Fengxiong 陳封雄. “Shixuejie mianhuai yidai zongshi Chen Yinke—Canjia jinian Chen 
Yinke guoji xueshu yantaohui de ganxiang史學界緬懷一代宗師陳寅恪—參加紀念陳寅恪國際學術
討論會的感想.”Renmin ribao Haiwaiban人民日報海外版 (1988.6.21). Chen’s niece Fenghuai 封懷 also 
recalled that, from Chen Yinke’s teenage years until the period when he returned from Japan, he 
“buried himself in voluminous ancient Books and Buddhist texts day after day. He browsed through all 
of them” [他終日埋頭於浩如煙海的古籍以及佛書等等，無不瀏覽]. See Bian Senghui 卞僧慧, Chen 
Yinke xiansheng nianpu changbian 陳寅恪先生年譜長編 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2010), 47. 
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It is also remarkable that Chen Yinke’s father, Chen Sanli 陳三立 (1853–1937), 
was even more active in Buddhism-related activities and kept a close personal link 
with the Buddhist community in the Jiangnan area. After going into internal exile 
near Nanchang and later in Nanjing, he dedicated himself to rescuing the local 
Buddhist tradition and re-building Buddhist monasteries. He not only had studied 
Buddhism at Jinling Sūtra Press under the guidance of Yang Wenhui since 1899, but 
also donated to the establishment of the first Chinese Buddhist academies, including 
Jetavana Hermitage 祇洹精舍 and the Seminar of Buddhist studies 佛學研究會 in 
Nanjing. With his close friends Shen Zengzhi, Pu Yicheng, Mei Guangyi 梅光義 and so 
on, he sponsored the program of sending monk-students to India to study Dharma.492  
However, Chen Yinke’s own attitude towards Buddhism was complex and 
sometimes vague. Undoubtedly, he maintained a deep empathy towards Buddhism 
and valued it as a pivotal element of Chinese culture. However, the Dharma seemed 
never to convince him. He neither treated Buddhism as a religion that could provide 
solutions for Chinese society nor placed any practical expectations on it. Keeping a 
distance from ritual practices and monastic circles, he observed Buddhism only 
through the window of historiography. As his close friend, Yu Dawei 俞大維(1897–
1993), noted in his commemorative article on Chen Yinke, Chen’s interests in 
Buddhism focused only on its historical influences, instead of on its philosophical 
teachings, such as Buddhist logic and dialectics.493 
One story may reveal Chen’s stance. Chen’s niece Fenghuai recalled in the 
essay “Chen Yinke had held the position as the secretary of Cai Songpo” [Chen Yinke 
ceng ren Cai Songpo mishu 陳寅恪曾任蔡松坡秘書] that, after the Marco Polo 
 
492 See Wu Zongci, 吳宗慈 “Chen Sanli zhuanlue 陳三立傳略,” in Bian Senghui 卞僧慧, Chen Yinke 
xiansheng nianpu changbian 陳寅恪先生年譜長編, 13. Shen Zengzhi was also a donator.  
493 Yu also mentioned in another article that he once read Fyodor Shcherbatskoy’s argument on the 
Indian Yogācāra canons of Dharmakriti法稱 and the newly translated 藏文所譯龍樹迴諍論（梵文本
亦發現）to Chen, but Chen he did not show any special interest in them. However, in contemporary 
Western academia, studies on Dharmakriti were very popular, especially among the scholars of the 
Vienna School, such as Erich Frauwaller, Ernst Steinlellner and so on. See Chen Huaiyu 陳懷宇 Chen, 
Zai xifang faxian Chen Yinke: Zhongguo jindai renwenxue de dongfangxue yu xixue Beijing 在西方發現陳寅恪: 
中國近代人文學的東方學與西學背景 (Beijing: Beijing Normal University Press, 2013). 110. 
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Bridge Incident, Chen’s father, Sanli, committed suicide by starvation in protest of 
the Japanese invasion.494 According to the family tradition, a group of Buddhist monks 
should have been invited to chant at the funeral. Chen Yinke opposed this plan firmly 
and said: “I have read numerous Buddhist doctrines; all of them were cheating.” He 
then even refused to attend the funeral and left Peking immediately with the 
students of Tsinghua University.495  
Clearly, Chen’s approach to Buddhism rested basically on his academic 
intentions and his research background, instead of any religious commitment or 
feeling. Chen maintained his position as an ‘outsider,’ although he sometimes, 
especially in his later life, felt that his mind “went closer and closer to Chan 
Buddhism day by day [riru chanzong 日入禪宗].496  
During his early career, Chen Yinke’s studies focused on the philological 
analysis of “the literature of the foreigners” [shuzu zhiwen 殊族之文].497 By adopting 
a comparative linguistic method, Chen re-evaluated and reinterpreted many ancient 
religious texts from new perspectives for the sake of making them ‘accessible’ or 
‘readable’ again. From 1925 to 1932, Chen reached the peak of his research career on 
the topic of the history of Buddhism when he was appointed to the Department of 
Chinese Literature at Tsinghua University. He taught several introductory courses on 
religious literature and methodology related to the historiography of Buddhism, 
including “The Bibliology of Oriental studies in the West,”498“Sanskrit Grammar,” 
 
494 Chen Yinke, “Diqici jiaodai gao 第七次交代底稿,” in Jiang Tianshu蔣天樞, Chen Yinke xiansheng 
biannian shiji 陳寅恪先生編年事輯 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1981), 103. 
495 Bian Senghui 卞僧慧, Chen Yinke xiansheng nianpu changbian 陳寅恪先生年譜長編, 179-80. 
496 See Wang Zhongmin 王重民’s letter to Hu Shih, in Hu Shih wanglai shuxin xuan 胡適往來書信選 
(Hong Kong: Zhonghua shuju, 1983), vol. 3, 110.   
497 See Yü Ying-shih 余英時, “Chen Yinke shixue sanbian陳寅恪史學三變,” in Chen Yinke wannian 
shiwen shizheng 陳寅恪晚年詩文釋證 (Taipei: Dongda chuban gongsi, 1998), 331-377.  
498 For the academic background to Chen’s interest in the bibliology of Oriental studies, see Chen 
Huaiyu, “Chen Yinke suowei zongfangxue zhi muluxue zhi yuanliu 陳寅恪所謂東方學之目錄學之源
流, in Chen, Zai xifang faxian Chen Yinke: Zhongguo jindai renwenxue de dongfangxue yu xixue Beijing 在西方
發現陳寅恪: 中國近代人文學的東方學與西學背景. 165-97.  
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“Translated Buddhist Literature,” “Studies on the Biographies of Eminent Monks,” and 
“Chan Buddhist Literature.”499  
During the 1930s, Chen also published several articles on Buddhist history; 
most of them were short research essays and book reviews. These works covered a 
wide range of topics: 1) comparative studies on original Buddhist texts and their 
Chinese translation;500 2) Chinese interpretations of Buddhist teaching and their 
cultural background;501 3) the relationship between Buddhism and other local 
conventions and concepts;502 4) the influence of Buddhism on Chinese political and 
intellectual personalities.503 Mainly, he sketched several representative examples of 
how Chinese people translated, interpreted, and even misunderstood intellectual 
thought from the outside and how they utilized these external resources to 
strengthen the “position of the nation” [benminzu zhi diwei 本民族之地位].504 
Behind these seemingly independent studies, Chen’s emphasis on the historical 
manifestation of China’s cultural particularity was the  thread that closely combined 
his ideological and methodological views. This historically formed particularity, in 
Chen’ view, would not slip into relativism, as represented by Zhang Taiyan and his 
 
499 The term ‘wenxue’ Chen used here is actually ‘philology’ [yuwenxue 語文學] rather than ‘literature.’ 
Chen dealt with scriptures, inscriptions and other religious texts using a comparative linguistics 
method rather than literary criticism.  
500 For example, “An Epilogue to the Record of Retribution in Suvarṇaprabhāsôttama-sūtra” [懺悔滅罪
金光明經冥報傳跋], “Notes on the Story of the Ordination of the Bhikkhunī Uppalavaṇṇa Therī” [連花
色尼出家因緣跋], “Notes on the Dunhuang Version of Vimalakīrti-Nirdeça-Sūtra” [敦煌本維摩詰問疾
品演義書後], and so on. 
501 For example, “An Epilogue to the Essays on the Meanings of Mahāyāna Buddhism” [大乘義章書後], “An 
Analysis of the Dharma Transmission Verse of the Sixth Patriarch of Chan” [禪宗六祖傳法偈之分析], 
“An Epilogue of the Vow Established by the Great Dhyana Master from Southern Peak” [南嶽大師立誓
願文跋] and so on.   
502 Including “An Examination of Zhi Mindu’s Work” [支愍度學說考], “Explorations into the Origins of 
Xiang Xiu, Guo Xiang and Zhidun’s Commentaries on ‘Free and Easy Wandering’ [Xiaoyao you]” [逍遙遊
向郭義與支遁義探源], and so on. 
503 “Empress Wu and Buddhism” [武曌與佛教], Cui Hao and Kou Qianzhi [崔浩與寇謙之], “The 
Relationship between Bai Juyi’s Thinking, Behavior and Buddhism/Taoism” [白樂天思想行為與佛道
關係], and so on. 
504 Chen Yinke, “Feng Youlan Zhongguo zhexue shi xiece shencha baogao 馮友蘭中國哲學史下冊審查
報告,” in JMEB, 282-85.  
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concept of the ‘national essence’. Chen made clear in several key texts that he 
regarded the history of the Chinese nation as a spatio-temporally special 
manifestation of ‘abstract ideals.’ Buddhism was one of the crucial elements that had 
influenced the establishment and development of these ideals—the Chinese ‘national 
spirit.’ By depicting Buddhism as a dynamic element in the formation of this spirit, 
Chen combined his respect for traditional heritage, his value standard based on 
Confucian ethics, and his view of historiography together.505 
After the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Chen was forced to suspend and 
eventually give up his planned projects on Buddhism, in particular, on Gaoseng zhuan, 
because of the loss of primary resources and his bad health.506 In his later career, the 
political history of medieval China became the main theme of his research.507 
However, the historical representation of religion, include Buddhism, remained a 
focus, as shown in his works such as the Comments on the Poems of Yuan Zhen and Bai 
Juyi [Yuanbai shi jianzheng gao 元白詩鑒證稿], and An Unofficial Biography of Liu Rushi 
[Liu Rushi bizhuan柳如是別傳] . Switching between different objects and angles, 
Chen still paid close attention to the religious issues in Chinese history, especially the 
role religion had played in the formation of the Chinese ‘national culture.’  
Some other historians, also as ‘outsiders,’ developed their interests in 
Buddhist history from a perspective of trans-cultural comparison, which was 
stimulated by new theories rather than reflection on indigenous traditions. Tang 
Yongtong was one example. Born into a well-educated gentry family in Huangmei黃
 
505 For a detailed study on Chen’s historiographical theory and concepts, see See Axel Schneider, 
Wahrheit und Geschichte: Zwei chinesische Historiker auf der Suche nach einer modernen Identität für China 
(Wiesbaden, Harrassowitz, 1997), 124-46.  
506 See Chen Yinke, “Chen shu liaoshi buzhu xu 陳述遼史補注序,” in JMEB, 264. 
507 In two articles Chen wrote in 1942, he had discussed this switch in research direction. See his “Zhu 
Yanfeng Tujue tongkao xu 朱延豐突厥通考序,” in HLTJ, 162-163, and “Chen shu liaoshi buzhu xu 陳述
遼史補注序.” Several scholars have discussed the reasons for Chen’s switch in his research foci. 
According to their investigations, the lack of primary Buddhist materials might be one important 
reason; see Ye Wenshin. There were also some deeper reasons related to Chen’s fundamental concept of 
history; see Yü Ying-shih 余英時, “Chen Yinke shixue sanbian陳寅恪史學三變,” in Chen Yinke 
wannian shiwen shizheng 陳寅恪晚年詩文釋證 (Taipei: Dongda chuban gongsi, 1998), 331-377。 
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梅 in the province of Hubei, Tang grew up in a town where a solid tradition of 
Buddhist faith was preserved (though there is no direct evidence showing that Tang 
in his early life had any personal contact with Buddhist believers and communities). 
508 During his childhood, he gained rich experience of reading histories under the 
influence of his family.509 Later, he went into a family-based school with a very open-
minded environment and received a Confucian-Western mixed education during his 
schooldays.  
In 1908, Tang was admitted to the Shuntian Learning Hall 順天學堂 in 
Beijing.510 As one of the earliest schools offering the new-style education, Shuantian 
Xuetang attracted many outstanding young students from all over the country, 
including Tang and Liang Shuming. Afterwards, Tang entered the Tsinghua school in 
1911 and spent seven years there. In 1918, like his classmate Wu Mi, Tang was given 
the opportunity to study in the United States. Tang first went to Hamline University, 
where he received systematic training in Western philosophy,511 and then he pursued 
his studies further at Harvard, joining the new generation of Chinese philosophers 
alongside Wu Mi, Mei Guangyi 梅光義, Chen Yinke, and so on. 
Before his Harvard period, there is no evidence to show that Tang had any 
particular interest in Buddhism. On the contrary, he held a Confucian standpoint and 
asserted that he himself was willing to ‘beg for the medicine for saving the spiritual 
 
508 As early as in the Tang and Song dynasties, Huangmei was a sacred site of Chan Buddhism. The 
fourth patriarch, Daoxin 道信, and the fifth patriarch, Hongren 弘忍, of the Chan sect both established 
their ancestral temples in Huangmei; in legend, it was also in Huangmei that the sixth patriarch, 
Huineng 慧能, wrote his famous verse “Bodhi is not a tree” [puti ben wu shu 菩提本無樹] and became 
the authentic successor of the Chan lineage. Therefore, it was very possible that Tang had at a very 
young age an intuitive impression of the rituals and social functions of Buddhism in the local sphere. 
509 See Bian, Senghui 卞僧慧. Chen Yinke xiansheng nianpu changbian 陳寅恪先生年譜長編, 46-7. 
510 Shuntian Learning Hall was a representative modern school that provided Western-style education. 
According to the memoirs of Tang’s schoolmate Liang Shuming, Shuntian school offered courses in 
both Chinese and English, from Classical Learning to science. See Liang Shuming梁漱溟. Yiwang tanjiu 
lu憶往談舊錄 (Beijing: Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe 1987), 12- 14. Also, Zhao Jianyong ed., Tang 
Yongtong biannian shiji 湯用彤編年事輯 (Beijing: zhonghua shuju, 2019). 
511 His courses included English writing, German, psychology, the history of philosophy, economics, 




weakness of China from the teaching of Zhuxi 朱熹.’512 Partly based on this stance, he 
chose the “history of philosophy in China” as the topic of his study after he entered 
Harvard. Like his peers who had studied philosophy in Western universities, such as 
Hu Shih, Feng Youlan, and Chan Wing-tsit, Tang attempted to reinterpret Chinese 
philosophical thinking using a theoretical foundation borrowed from the West. By 
this means, he established his studies as ‘comparative’ with a transcultural 
background. Although a subject called Chinese Studies or Sinology had not yet 
appeared in Western universities at that time, professors in the departments of 
philosophy, history, literature, and language were curious about the traditions of the 
Far East and encouraged a research model of East-West comparison. This atmosphere 
further led Tang to turn his eyes back upon Chinese philosophical thinking, especially 
Buddhism. 
 Compared with Chen Yinke, Tang was more sensitive about the conceptual 
correspondence between Eastern and Western philosophies. To him, the constants of 
human nature in general were always accompanied by the particularities of time and 
place. This standpoint, which leaned towards the humanism of Tang’s mentor, Irving 
Babbitt,513 later became the ‘meaning’ of his writing on Buddhist history, under his 
own rhetoric of “empathy with tacit resonance.”514  
 
512 Tang, Lixue chanyan 理學, in TYQJ, vol.5, 3. 
513 For a brief summary of the life and work of Irving Babbitt, see the “Minute on the Life and Services 
of Professor Irving Babbitt,” which was placed on the records of the Harvard Faculty of Arts & Sciences 
at its meeting of October 3, 1933. The first Chinese disciple of Professor Babbitt was May Kuang- ti梅光
迪, who was educated the longest and most profoundly. Following him were Wu Mi, Tang Yongtong, 
Chang Hsin-hai張歆海, Lin Yutang 林語堂, Liang Shih-ch’iu 梁實秋, and Kuo Pin-ho. See Wu Mi, “In 
Memory of Mr. Babbitt,” Dagong Bao (Literature Supplement), (Dec. 25, 1933). 
514 There is no direct evidence of the extent to which Tang Yongtong was affected by Babbitt. Tang did 
not mention Babbitt and New Humanism specifically in his works. See Ma Tianxiang 麻天祥, Tang 
Yongtong pingzhuan 湯用彤評傳 (Nanchang: Baihuazhou wenyi chubanshe, 1993), chapter 5.    
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After finishing his study of oriental philosophy and Indian languages515 under 
the supervision of Sanskrit expert Professor Charles R. Lanman,516 Tang returned to 
China and began his own academic pursuits as a historian.517 During his first 
appointment as a professor in Nanjing, he not only taught several courses on 
philosophy, such as ethics and logistics, at Southeastern University, but also 
delivered lectures on Palī texts and Buddhist history at the China Inner Studies 
Institute.518 Before he fully turned to the study of the history of medieval Chinese 
Buddhism, he published several articles to introduce the basic concepts of Indian and 
Western philosophy and religion to both academic and general audiences.519 He also 
participated in discussions on the issue of ‘reconciliation of cultures’ with other 
scholars, as a member of Xueheng school 學衡派.520  
 
515 At Harvard, Tang took an elective course in “the system of Indian philosophy” provided by Prof. 
James H. Woods. This introductory course focused on the schools of Vedanta, Sankhya, and Yoga from 
a perspective of comparative philology. Prof. Woods was the student of Paul Deussen (1845-1919), one 
of the founders of Indic studies in Europe. After 1903, he was appointed to the Department of 
Philosophy as Instructor and then Professor of the Philosophical Systems of India. He taught several 
courses on Greek and Indian philosophy as well as Sanskrit.  
516 As recorded by Wu Mi, from 1919 to 1921 there were four Chinese students who took the Sanskrit 
course with Lanman: Yu Dawei, Chen Yinke, Tang Yongtong, and Li Ji. However, Yu and Li did not 
finish the entire curriculum. Impressed by their performance, Lanman mentioned in a letter to the 
president of Harvard University, Prof. Abbott Lowell, that Chen and Tangwere two ‘outstanding’ 
Chinese students; in another letter, he also commended Chen and Tang by saying they “have excellent 
wisdom.” These two letters were translated by Zhao Jianyong 趙建永 and published in Zhongguo shehui 
kexue bao 中國社會科學報, 2013. 
517 After he returned back China, Tang still kept close contact with Lanman. In 1922, he wrote a long 
letter to him from Nanjing. He called Lanman as “Old Guru” and introduced the China Inner Studies 
Institute in Nanjing to him. 
518 See his lecture notes: “Wendian changahan youxingjing yanxi 文典長阿含遊行經演習,” “Jin qishi 
lun jieshuo 金七十論解說,” and “Shijia shidai zhi waidao 釋迦時代之外道.” 
519 His articles on Indian religions and philosophy, such as “The Origin of Indian Philosophy [Yindu 
zhexue de qiyuan” [印度哲學之起源, “The non-Buddhist Teaching in the Age of Shakyamuni “Shijia 
shidai zhi waidao” [釋迦時代之外道] and so on, were published with some related lecture notes under 
the title of A Brief History of Indian Buddhism [Yindu fojiao shilue 印度佛教史略] by the Commercial Press.  
520 Tang Yongtong’s son, Tang Yijie had said that his father was a member of Xueheng; see Tang Yijie, 
Women sandairen 我們三代人, 7,15. However, there is a disagreement among scholars as to whether 
Tang Yongtong belongs to the Xueheng school. See Sun Shangyang孫尚揚, “Zai qimeng yu xueshu 
zhijian 在啟蒙與學術之間：重估學衡.” Ershiyi shiji 4 (1994). Tang published seven articles on 
 173 
 
Beginning in 1922, Tang became a professor of the Department of Philosophy 
at Peking University. During his stay Peking, especially in the 1930s, Tang published a 
dozen articles on Buddhist history from the Han to the Tang dynasties. Most of the 
articles were closely related to the draft of his masterpiece History of Buddhism in the 
Han, Wei, Jin, and Northern and Southern Dynasties [Hanwei liangjin nanbeichao fojiao shi 
漢魏兩晉南北朝佛教史], which was the first and most systematic study of the 
history of Chinese Buddhism of the Pre-Sui era. This book, which was published in 
1938, was just one part of his plan to write a comprehensive history of Chinese 
Buddhism. The second part of this project, the history of Buddhism from the Sui to 
the Tang dynasties, however, remained as two volumes of lecture notes.521 These 
notes, along with some of his published articles on related topics, were collected and 
compiled by his son, Tang Yijie 湯一介 (1927–2014), and published under the title of 
The Draft of the History of Buddhism in the Sui and Tang Dynasties [Suitang fojiao shigao 隋
唐佛教史稿].         
 Despite having a similar background to Tang, philosopher Hu Shih approached 
Buddhism with a different attitude. As a leading intellectual and famous philosopher, 
as well as an anti-traditionalist, Hu Shih was widely known as an ideologue behind 
the May Fourth Movement of 1919 and his several ‘movements’ of reforming Chinese 
tradition—which belonged to, in his words, the project of “Chinese Renaissance.” 
Among all his academic activities, his subversive reading of the historical materials of 
the Chan school was the most ‘fruitful’ part of his entire scholarship, according to his 
self-evaluation.522 
Growing up in a family with a strong atmosphere of Song-Ming rational 
idealism, Hu was inculcated deeply with the ‘secular,’ ‘pragmatic’ spirit of 
 
Xueheng to criticize the “New Culture School.” For the details of this debate and the activities of the 
Xueheng School, see Shen Sung-Chiao 沈松僑, “Xueheng Pai yu Wusi Shiqi de Fan Xinwenhua 
Yundong 學衡派與五四時期的反新文化運動,” (Taipei: National Taiwan University, 1984); Lin Liyue
林麗月, “Xueheng yu xinwenhua yundong <學衡>與新文化運動,” in Zhongguo xiandaishi lunji 中國現代
史論集, vol,6 (Taipei: Lianjing, 1980), 505-528.  
521 One volume of the mimeographed handout was printed at Central University 中央大學 in Nanjing; 
one volume of the stereotyped handout was printed at Peking University. 
522 Tang Degang 唐德剛, Hushi koushu zizhuan 胡適口述自傳, chapter 10, 12.   
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Confucianism, which made him antagonistic to Buddhism and Daoism.523 More or less 
as a behaviorist performance, young Hu Shih smashed three Buddhist statues when 
he was fourteen, announcing his iconoclastic personality and his antipathy towards 
Buddhism. In his two autobiographical articles “My Faith” [Wo de xinyang我的信仰] 
and “My Autography at Forty Years Old” [Sishi zishu 四十自述] , he repeatedly 
recalled one detail: above the front door of his uncle’s house, there was a plaque with 
the characters for “No Affinity to Buddhism and Daoism” [sengdao wuyuan 僧道無
緣] on it. This slogan, in fact, described his overall attitude towards Buddhism.  
It was history, especially, he claimed, the writings of Sima Guang 司馬光 and 
Fan Zhen范縝, that triggered “a dramatic switch” in his “religious life,” helping him 
“shake off the nightmare of causal determinism.”524 He then confirmed himself as an 
atheist and a stubborn rationalist, or in his own words, an “unconverted heretic” 
[weijing ganhua de yiduan 未經感化的異端].525  
With a strong suspicion of Chinese tradition, he entered into the realm of 
Chinese philosophy. Beginning in 1912, he went to study philosophy at Columbia 
University, where he was greatly influenced by his professor John Dewey. Hu became 
Dewey’s translator and lifelong advocate. After finishing his doctoral studies, he 
returned to lecture at Peking University. There, he quickly gained much attention 
and became one of the leaders of the May Fourth Movement and later the New 
Culture Movement. His most important contribution to modern Chinese scholarship 
was the promotion of vernacular Chinese to make Chinese easier for ordinary people 
to read and write. As a result of this movement, as John Fairbank put it, “the tyranny 
 
523 According to Hu’s own words, his father “was a classist, a man who insisted on the ethical principle 
of Neo-Confucianism and harshly opposed Buddhism and Taoism.” Hu Shih, “Wo de Xinyang 我的信
仰,” in HSWJ, 7.  
524 “未經感化的異端,” in Hu Shih, “Sishi zishu 四十自述,” in Hu Shih Wenji 胡適文集 (Beijing: Beijing 
daxue chubanshe (2013) 1, 185.  
525 Ibid.  
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of the Classics had been broken”;526 in Hu’s own case, his stress on folk literature led 
him to some Buddhist literature produced in medieval China.  
 As a ‘cultural destroyer’ but also a historian, Hu devoted a great deal of 
energy to applying his ideas to China’s own background, rather than blindly relying 
on imports from the West. As his biographer Jerome Grieder put it, Hu’s approach to 
China’s “distinctive civilization” was “thoroughly critical but by no means 
contemptuous.”527 Among Hu Shih’s wide-ranging humanistic interests and expertise, 
writing the history of Chinese philosophy was one of his main research foci. His 
initial interest in Chan Buddhism originated from this monumental project of writing 
a comprehensive history of Chinese philosophy done according to a strictly modern 
methodological standard. After writing a ground-breaking dissertation at Columbia 
University on the patterns of thought shared by the ancient Chinese philosophers,528 
Hu made plans to carry his project on through the medieval era as well. According to 
John R. McRae, his research was actually undertaken in two stages: during the years 
1924–1935, he established his own methodological system and formulated his general 
theories and style of interpretation; in the second stage, from 1952 to 1962, he 
continued his early work by incorporating new implications and hypotheses.529     
In the context of this general agenda, Hu decided to write a history of the 
Chan school. It was this juncture that he became fascinated by Shenhui 神會, a long-
forgotten Chan monk. As Hu himself described, his doubt about the identity and 
image of Huineng 慧能 and Shenhui in the historical texts of the Chan school arose in 
 
526 John K. Fairbank and Meler Goldman, China: A New History, Second Enlarged Edition ed. (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 266.  
527 Jerome B. Grieder, Hu Shih and the Chinese Renaissance Liberalism in the Chinese Revolution, 1917–1937 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), 161–162. 
528 Title: The development of the Logical Method in Ancient China (Shanghai: Oriental Book Co., 1922; 
Reprinted New York: Paragon Book Reprint Co., 1963). This dissertation appeared in an extended form 
in Chinese in 1921 as the first volume of a projected multi-volume work: Outline of Chinese Philosophy 
[Zhongguo zhexueshi dagang 中國哲學史大綱] (Shanghai: The Commercial Press, 1921). 
529 The political turmoil surrounding World War II and the continuing Chinese revolution kept Hu Shih 
from serious scholarship on the Chan school for more than a decade. Only in the last ten years of his 
life did he returns to this area and write another dozen articles and letters to discuss the issue of the 
history of Chan Buddhism. 
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1924 when he was attempting to write the draft of a history of the Chinese Chan 
school. New materials he collected in Europe, including three versions of Shenhui’s 
recorded sayings in Paris and later Shenhui’s Xianzong ji顯宗記, confirmed his 
hypothesis.530  
Based on these materials, Hu quickly finished his monograph The Lost Collection 
of Monk Shenhui [Shenhui heshang yiji 神會和尚遺集]. From the 1920s to the early 
1930s, he published several articles relevant to this study, including analyses of the 
Buddhist meditation tradition prior or related to the Chan school, textual and 
biographical studies of Chan figures, and historical summaries of the development 
and lineage transmission of the early Chan school.531 Besides these articles, Hu also 
left dozens of letters to scholars in China and Japan in which he discussed many 
crucial issues related to the history of the Chan school. Some of the letters and 
disputes are arranged by Yanagida Seizan into a collection titled Hushi’s Chan Study 
[Ko Teki zengaku an 胡適禪學案].  
By making Shen Hui the key figure of the Chan school, Hu “almost thoroughly 
re-wrote the history of Chan Buddhism” and “exposed the falsification of the monks 
and Daoist priests,” as he claimed.532 Hu’s new narrative of the history of Chan 
Buddhism as well as his interpretation of the transformation of Chinese culture in the 
medieval period [Tang Song zhibian 唐宋之變] were rooted in his broader historical 
 
530 Hu Shih, Lost Collection of Monk Shenhui [Shenhui he shang yiji 神會和尚遺集], 1-3, see John McRae, 
“Religion as Revolution in Chinese Historiography: Hu Shih (1891-1962) on Shen-hui (684-758),” 61. The 
original volume of the Yiji was published in 1930; all the references in this dissertation are to the 
second edition, 神會和尚遺集(附胡先生最後的研究) (Taipei: Hu Shih jinian guan 胡適紀念館), which 
includes copious handwritten annotations by Hu Shih reproduced with black, red, and green ink. The 
second edition contains what at the time were complete versions of all Shenhui’s known works, edited 
by Hu in part on the basis of newly discovered manuscripts obtained through the efforts of Suzuki and 
Gernet. See John McRae, “Religion as Revolution in Chinese Historiography: Hu Shih (1891-1962) on 
Shen-hui (684-758),” 61. 
531 In his article “Religion as Revolution in Chinese Historiography: Hu Shih (1891-1962) on Shen-hui 
(684-758),” John R. McRae enumerated Hu Shih’s works on the Chan school in detail. A list of Hu Shih’s 
work on this topic can be found in the appendix of this dissertation. 
532 Original text: “我幾乎將一部禪宗史完全改寫⋯⋯揭穿認真作假的和尚道士.” Tang Degang 唐德
剛, Hushi koushu zizhuan 胡適口述自傳, chapter 10.  
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theory of the “Chinese Renaissance.” He tried to demonstrate that China was divested 
of its intellectual and religious domination by India and had reverted to the simple, 
humanistic rationalism of its native tradition during the Tang and Song dynasties.533 
From a methodological perspective, Hu held to his historiographical method more 
rigorously and consciously than most of his peers. He remained extremely sceptical 
of Chinese traditional historical narratives and developed an analytical approach 
based on the combination of traditional textual criticism and modern scientific 
procedures. He insisted on this research path throughout his career. Compared with 
other scholars, he was willing to offer bold and fresh interpretations and then tried to 
expound and prove these interpretations inductively; in some circumstances, he 
seemed to indicate that the logical sequence between events and ideas could be 
established prior to their detailed investigation. This methodical strategy made his 
study a controversial hybrid with comprehensive, critical, and imaginative facets.534   
However, no matter how controversial Hu’s study was, in general, his 
persistence in searching for rare texts, as well as his important discoveries and 
subsequent publication of a detailed study of Chan figures’ biographies, was the 
catalyst for the discovery of more Chinese Buddhist material throughout all of east 
Asia and was a major stimulus for the emergence of the field of Chan/Zen studies.535 
Hu’s strand of atheism formed the fundamental key to his interpretation of 
Buddhism; another historian, Chen Yuan, was, on the other hand, attempting to 
exclude the religious imprint from his research and to think and write neutrally. 
 
533 See Hu Shih, The Chinese Renaissance: the Haskell Lectures, 1933. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1934. 
Rep. with new introduction, New York: Paragon Book Reprint Corp., 1963. Other important literature 
on this topic include: “Religion and Philosophy in Chinese History,” in Sophia H. Chen Zen ed., A 
Symposium on Chinese Culture, Shanghai: China institute of Pacific Relation, 1931, 31-58; and “The 
Indinization of China: A Case Study in Cultural Borrowing, in Independence Convergence and 
Borrowing in Institutions, Thought and Art,” Harvard Tercentenary Publication (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1937), 219-247. 
534 Hu Shih and his attitude towards religion will be investigated in detail in Chapter 5 of my 
dissertation.  
535 Yanagida Seizan 柳田聖山, Goroku no rekishi — Zen bunken no seiritsu-teki kenkyū 語錄の歷史ー
禪文獻の成立的研究. [A Historical Survey of the Recorded Saying of Chan Masters in view of the 
Formation of Chan Literature], Tōbō gakubō 東方學報 Kyoto 57 (1985): 365. 
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Among all the historians in this field, Chen Yuan was the only one who had a religious 
background—a belief in Christianity. Against this background, his comparative 
standpoint rested on the opposing positions of Buddhism and Christianity, instead of 
the dichotomy between ‘tradition/modern’ or ‘China/West.’  
Chen Yuan was born into a family in the medicine business in Xinhui county 
新會縣 in Guangdong 廣東. He received a classical Confucian education from his 
family, but he failed in the provincial examination. This failure, together with a 
realization that the old order was fast collapsing, made Chen subsequently give up 
the path to imperial officialdom but instead actively participate in social movements. 
In his youth, Chen spent several years studying Western medicine at Boji 
Medical School 博濟醫學院, a Protestant missionary medical school in Guangzhou 廣
州, and later at Guanghua Medical School 光華醫學院, which he co-founded. His 
experience of studying medicine not only led to his conversion to Protestantism536 
and his establishment of close ties with the missionary enterprises in China, but also 
trained him in his later academic life to observe and deal with his objects as 
meticulously as a surgeon.  
Partly because of the influence from his schoolmate Sun Yat-sen, Chen was 
active in political activities. He later became a member of the National Assembly of 
the Republic of China after the success of the revolution in 1911 and was appointed as 
Deputy Minister of Education in 1921. However, he soon left the realm of politics to 
pursue an academic career.537  
Chen Yuan’s research focused on two themes: history and religion. Beginning 
in 1923, when he taught the course in “the history of Christianity in China” 
 
536 As Chen described, “for years I believed in Christianity and thought only it can save the world” [邇
年以來，余篤信敬天愛人之學，以為非此不能夠救世]. See Chen Yuan陳垣. “Chongkan Duoshu xu”
重刊鐸書序 (1919). Chen became a Christian himself. 
537 After 1921, he became the second president of Fu Jen Catholic University 輔仁大學, a position he 
held from 1926 until the closure of the university in 1952 and the forced merger of its departments 
into other universities, notably Peking Normal University 北京師範大學, of which Chen Yuan 
continued to serve as president until his death in 1971.  
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[zhonghua jidu jiaoshi中華基督教史] at Yenching University,538 he devoted 
enormous energy to the field of religious history. Based on his reading of the Wenjing 
Ge 文津閣 version’s Siku quanshu 四庫全書, he started his project of writing the 
history of Chinese Christianity and also planned to write a bibliographical work to 
organize the Chinese Christian literature, following the style of Zhu Yizun’s 朱彝尊
Jingyi kao 經義考 and Xie Qikun’s 謝啟昆 Xiaoxue kao小學考. In 1916, Chen published 
one of his most influential works, A Study of Erkeun in Yuan Dynasty [Yuan yeli kewen 
jiao kao 元也里可溫考]539 – the one that launched his scholarly career – with 
materials from the private collection of Ying Lianzhi.  
Due to his personal belief in Christianity, Chen Yuan’s study on the history of 
religion brought new perspectives to this field.540 From 1917 to 1923, he published 
three other important articles on Manichaeism, Zoroastrianism, and Judaism. These 
works, with the abovementioned study on Christianity, became his famous “Four 
 
538 Yenching University was formed through the merger of four Christian schools. It was founded and 
directed by the famous missionary educator John Leighton Stuart 司徒雷登. Yenching Univeristy 
gained financial support from American foundations and maintained a close link with western 
academic institutes, such as Harvard University and Princeton University. Because of its Christian 
background, Yenching University gave major support to the School of Theology (which became the 
School of Religion in 1925), where Chen Yuan served as a professor in the Department of the History of 
Religions 宗教史學系. According to the Bulletin of The School of Religion, its aim was to “help in laying 
the foundation of Christian thought for China and in building up Christian life in China, ……with the 
historical sense and the scientific attitude and technique.” Besides studies on the history of 
Christianity, the Department of the History of Religions also offered courses on Buddhist history and 
Sanskrit. See Bulletin: School of Religion, Yenching University (1929-1930) 
http://divinity.adhoc.library.yale.edu/UnitedBoard/Yenching_University/Box%20315/RG011-315-
4819.pdf. 
539 “Yelikewen 也里可溫” was an ambitious term derived from the Syriac term “arkagun,” meaning 
“blessed people,” and in Yuan times included Nestorianism as well as Catholic Christianity. Chen Yuan, 
Jidujiao ruhua shi 基督教入華史 [A history of Christianity’s arrival in China], in Chen Yuan xueshu 
lunwen ji 陳垣學術論文集, vol.1 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1980), 102. 
540 Because Chen seldom talked about his religious belief openly, there is some discussion about his 
status as a Christian. See Wang Hao王皓, “Chen Yuan shixue yu jiaohui yinyuan 陳垣史學與教會因
緣” [The Relationship between the Historical Studies of Chen Yuan and the Society of Jesus], Zhongyang 
yanjiu yuan jindaishi yanjiu suo jikan中央研究院近代史研究所集刊, 97 (2017): 87-121; also Liu Xian劉
賢, “Chen Yuan jidujiao xinyang kao陳垣基督教信仰考,” Shixue yuekan史學月刊, 10 (2006): 83-91. 
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Studies on the Ancient Religions” [gujiao sikao 古教四考].541 Later he wrote his 
second monograph, The Sinicization of the Western Region people during the Yuan Dynasty 
[Yuan xiyuren huahua kao 元西域人華化考], which focused on the interaction 
between different religions and the changing social context surrounding them.  
Chen Yuan’s concern for Buddhist issues derived from his trans-religious and 
trans-disciplinary studies. His earliest study about Buddhism appeared in his 
investigation of Christianity in the Yuan period. He used two chapters in his Yuan 
Yekeliwenjiao Kao to discuss the relationship between Christianity and Buddhism and 
the influence of Buddhism on Christianity in a broad historical context. One year 
later, Chen published his first article on the history of Buddhism, “On the Grotto 
Temple in Mountain Wuzhou, Datong” [Ji Datong wuzhoushan shiku si 記大同武州山
石窟寺]. Other essays, such as “The Difference Between the Beliefs of Yelu Chu Cai 
and His Son” [Yelü Chucai fuzi 耶律楚材父子信仰之異趣], “ The Translation of 
Scriptures in Yungang Temple and Liu Xiaobiao” [Yungang shikusi zhi yijing yu Liu 
Xiaobiao 雲崗石窟寺之譯經與劉孝標], “ The Author of Great Tang Records on the 
Western Regions, Bianji” [Datang xiyuji zhuanren Bianji <大唐西域記>撰人辨機] and 
so on, were also published in the following years. In his works on other Chinese 
religions, he paid special attention to issues related to Buddhism; for example, in his 
monograph Yuan Xiyuren Huahua Kao, he dedicated one chapter, “Buddhism and 
Taoism,” to investigating the beliefs and practices of Buddhism among foreign people 
in Yuan China and discussed the role Buddhism played in their process of Sinicization 
[huahua 華化]; in his article “The Life of Wu Yushan No. 5: Wu Yushan and His Chan 
Friends” [Wu Yushan shengping zhi wu: Wu Yushan yu Chanyou 吳漁山生平之五：
 
541 For Chen Yuan’s achievements in the study of religious history, there are a couple of works (besides 
the ones mentioned above): see Liu Xian 劉賢, “On Chen Yuan’s Study of Religions”, Diss. The Chinese 
University of Hong Kong, 2005; Niu Runzhen 牛潤珍, Chen Yuan xueshu sixiang pingzhuan 陳垣學術思想
評傳 (Beijing: Beijing tushuguan chubanshe, 1999). Articles: Xu Guansan 許冠三, Chen Yuan: tufa 
weiben yangfa weijian 陳垣:土法為本洋法為鑒,” in Xin shixue jiushi nisn 新史學九十年 (Changsha: 
Yuelu shushe, 2003) 118-146; Chen Lesu 陳樂素, “Chen Yuan tongzhi de shixue yanjiu 陳垣同志的史學
研究,” Zhongguo shi yanjiu 中國史研究,4, (1980), 3-17; Ge Zhaoguang 葛兆光, “ ‘Xinshixue’ zhihou – 
1929nian de Zhongguo lishi xuejie 《新史學》之後——1929年的中國歷史學界,” Lishi yanjiu 歷史研
究, 1, (2003), 82-97. 
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吳漁山與禪友], he investigated the close contact between Wu Yushan, a Chinese 
Christian priest, and Buddhist monks in the Kangxi period of the Qing dynasty. He 
also discussed the so-called “Yuan fo ru ye 緣佛入耶” interpretation strategy—the use 
of Buddhist concepts and terms to explain the doctrines of Christianity—in his 
articles on Christianity.542 
During the 1930s and 1940s, the history of Buddhism (especially Buddhism in 
the Yuan, Ming, and Qing dynasties) took up a remarkable portion of his study. In 
1931, he arranged and catalogued the Dunhuang manuscripts in the Beijing Library 
and compiled a bibliographical work entitled Catalogue of Manuscripts from Dunhuang 
Remaining after the Theft [Dunhguang jieyu lu 敦煌劫余錄]; later, he published another 
bibliography of Buddhist literature, Introduction to Chinese Buddhist Historical Texts 
[Zhongguo fojiao shiji gailun中國佛教史籍概論], in which he arranged some important 
Chinese Buddhist literature with his own summary and comments.  In 1938, another 
reference book, titled Record of Dubious Dates of Buddhist Monks [Shishi yinian lu釋世疑
年錄], was published; in this book, Chen examined and listed the biographical 
information of more than 2,000 Buddhist monks and nuns. All these works provided 
considerable information and materials for the scholarship of Chinese Buddhism.  
More important are his two monographs on Ming-Qing Buddhism: A Study on 
Buddhism in Yunnan and Guizhou Provinces in Mid-Ming [Mingji dianqian fojiao kao明季
滇黔佛教考] and Debates Between Monks in the Early Qing Dynasty [Qingchu sengzheng ji
清初僧諍記]. Both of these two studies were based on Buddhist literature he 
discovered in the archives of the Ming-Qing inner court. Instead of establishing a 
linear, meta-view of the development of Buddhism or providing historical 
interpretation based on any philosophical presuppositions, these studies aimed at 
constructing a narrative history of “events” or “phenomena” through reliable 
primary sources. Chen covered a wide range of topics in these two case studies, 
including the changing political background of Buddhism, the organization and 
 
542 Chen, Jidujiao renzi shiyi xu 基督教人子釋義序, CYQJ, vol. 7, 406-07. 
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economy of monasteries, the conflicts among different Buddhist sects, and the 
relationship between monastic communities and the local literati. 
As one of the ‘old-fashioned’ historians543 and a confessed Christian, Chen 
Yuan might not meet the criteria of a ‘modern researcher.’ Because of his alleged 
conservatism (e.g., writing in classical Chinese, emphasizing textual support, and 
avoiding popular theories544) and his rare expertise, Chen has been depicted more as a 
dispassionate scholar specializing in classical texts, non-native religions, and 
bibliography, instead of as a penetrating thinker. Mostly, he has been credited for his 
broad historical knowledge and his dedication to modern pedagogy as a successful 
educator.545 Therefore, his contribution to the scholarship of Buddhism, especially his 
textual study of Buddhism, has been regarded as partly serving the purpose of 
teaching and has been overshadowed by his ground-breaking research on 
Christianity, Islam, Manichaeism, Zoroastrianism and the communication between 
Chinese/foreign religions. However, Chen was a distinguished historian of Buddhism, 
as well as a scholar who was “participating in the trend” [yuliu 預流].546 By offering 
 
543 During his whole life, Chen did not go abroad; however, he had some connection with Western and 
Japanese academia. For example, he built a close relationship with Paul Pelliot伯希和 and Jitsuzō 
Kuwabara桑原鶩蔵. See Sang Bing桑兵, Boxihe yu jindai Zhongguo xueshujie 伯希和與近代中國學
術界,” Lishi yanjiu歷史研究, 5 (1997): 125-126; also see Masaaki Chikusa竺沙雅章, Chen yuan yu 
Sangyuan Wuzang陳垣與桑原鶩藏,” Lishi yanjiu歷史研究 1 (1991): 13-19. Chen also had direct 
contact with Western educational circles when he served as the president of Fu-Ren University.  
544 However, late in his career, he accepted the mainstream of historiography, Marxism. For details see 
Chen Zhichao 陳智超, Chen Yuan laiwang shuxin ji 陳垣來往書信集 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji 
chubanshe, 1990), 709-10; also see his letter to Hu Shih, in Chen Yuan laiwang shuxin ji 陳垣來往書信集, 
192-94. For the context of this change, see Wang Fansen, “ ‘zhuyi chongbai’ yu jindai Zhongguo xueshe 
shehui de mingyun – Yi Chen Yinke wei zhongxin de kaocha,” in Zhongguo Jindai Sixiang Yu Xueshu De 
Xipu中國近代思想與學術的系譜, 471-77.  
545 For Chen’s theory of pedagogy, see Chen Yuan xiansheng de shixue yanjiu yu jiaoyu shiye—jinian Chen 
Yuan xiansheng danchen 130 zhounian xueshu lunwenji 陳垣先生的史學研究與教育事業——紀念陳垣先
生誕辰 130週年學術論文集 (Beijing: Beijing Normal University Press, 2010).  
546 The word ‘yuliu’ is originally a Buddhist term. In his article “Chen Yuan Dunhuang jieyu lux u 陳垣
敦煌劫餘錄序,” in JMEB, 266. Chen Yinke used this term to summarize Chen Yuan’s study. For a 
further discussion on this term in the context of modern Chinese scholarship, see Ge Zhaoguang 葛兆
光, “Yuliu de xuewen: chongfan xueshushi kan Chen Yinke de yiyi”預流的學問：重返學術史看陳寅
恪的意義,” Wenshizhe文史哲, 5 (2015). 
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informed accounts of Chinese religion, Chen created new themes, new vocabularies, 
and new perspectives for discussing religious traditions in a broader textual, 
historical, and political context. Equally important, he helped to bring Chinese 
scholarship on religious history into a global academic dialogue, joining the 
discussions and responding to the voices overseas directly and indirectly.547   
 
Buddhist Historians 
Along with the revival of Buddhism and the popularity of the consciousness-only 
school among modern Chinese intellectuals, a new trend in the historical studies of 
Buddhism emerged. This trend aimed to rebuild the doctrinal tradition, which had 
been long lost after Master Xuanzhang, and to re-link Chinese Buddhism with its 
Indian origin. The most representative Buddhist historian who pursued this direction 
was the lay Buddhist scholar Lü Cheng.  
Lü Cheng was born in Danyang County, Jiangsu.548 It was under the influence of 
his elder brother, Lü Fengzi 呂鳳子 (1886–1959), a famous artist and lay Buddhist who 
learnt Buddhism from Yang Wenhui, that Lü Cheng became interested in both 
Buddhism and art. It was also through Fengzi that young Lü Cheng met Ouyang 
Jingwu in Nanjing and then became one of the first members of the Buddhist 
Seminary 佛學研究部 established by Ouyang as an affiliated institute of Jinling Sutra 
Press 金陵刻經處. 
In 1917, Lü traveled to Japan to study language and art; however, due to the 
anti-Japanese sentiment in China, he returned to China in 1918. Although Lü’s stay in 
Japan was comparatively short, his connection with Japan played an essential role in 
 
547 I discussed in detail Chen Yuan’s study of Ming-Qing Buddhism, including the methods he used and 
the academic and religious standpoints behind his study, in the paper “Juwairen de shijiao: Chenyuan 
yu jindai mingqing fojiao lishi yanjiu” that I presented at the Conference of Early Modern Asian 
Buddhism held in Taiwan, May, 2021.  
548 Lü Cheng, “My Experience and the History of the China Institute of Inner Learning [wo de jingli yu 
neixue yuan fazhan licheng 我的經歷與內學院發展歷程].” This was a document written in 1959, 
when Lü worked at the Chinese Academy of Social Science. 
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his academic career. Beginning in 1919, Lü worked with Ouyang in setting up the 
China Institute of Inner Learning. During the same period, Lü was also appointed as 
the dean of academic affairs at the Shanghai School of Art, teaching aesthetics and art 
history. In 1922, Lü became one of the leading figures of Neixueyuan when the 
institute was officially established. He then devoted himself entirely to the study of 
Buddhism and gave up his interests in art.  
Throughout his entire career, Lü was highly influenced by his mentor Ouyang 
Jingwu. However, unlike Ouyang, who had never been trained in Sanskrit or Tibetan, 
Lü’s language ability allowed him to deal with both Chinese and other language 
resources. He firstly studied Tibetan and Sanskrit with Huang Shuyin 黃樹因 (1898–
1925)549, a young colleague who had learned Tibetan at Yonghe Lamasery 雍和宮 in 
Peking, and he continuously studied Sanskrit with Ferdinand Lessing (1882–1961),550 a 
German linguist living in Shandong, and also with Baron Alexander von Stäel-
Holstein (1877–1937), a Russian Sanskrit scholar who taught at Peking University 
from 1918 to 1929.551 Language training was a crucial skill that helped Lü complete the 
compilation of the Essentials of the Buddhist Cannon [Zangyao 藏要].552  
 
549 For the biography of Huang Shuyin, see Ouyang Jingwu, “Huang Jian shilue 黃建事略,” Niexue I 
(1924): 179-180. See also the talks of Ouyang Jingwu and Lü Cheng given on the occasion of the opening 
of Shuyin Seminar: On the Opening of Shuyin Seminar [Shuyin yanjiu shi chengli ji 樹因研究室成立記], 
Neixue 3 (1926): 172-178. 
550 Lessing, who perhaps was best known for his works on Tibet, “Lamaism,” and Tantra, came to China 
in 1907 and spent seventeen years there teaching languages and philology at various institutions. 
551 On Baron Stäel-Holstein, see Wang Qilong 王啟龍, Ganghetai xueshu nianpu jianbian 鋼和泰學術年譜
簡編 [A Brief Chronological Biography of Alexander von Stäel-Holstein] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 
2008), and a shorter English version, Wang Qilong, “A Brief Review of Alexander von Stael-Holstein: A 
Great Scholar in Asian Studies,” Chinese Tibetology 1 (2008): 80–93. For examples of the Baron’s 
scholarship, cf. Baron A. von Stael-Holstein, Kāśyapaparivarta (China: 1923) [correlated Sanskrit, 
Chinese and Tibetan editions of the text, with an English introduction]; “The Emperor Ch’ien-lung and 
The Larger Śūraṃgamasūtra,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 1, no. 1 (1936): 136–146; “Avalokita and 
Apalokita,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 1, no. 3 (1936): 350–362; and “On a Peking Edition of the 
Tibetan Kanjur which Seems to be Unknown in the West,” edited and introduced by Jonathan 
Silk, Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 22, 1 (1999): 215–249. 
552 Lü emphasized the mutual relationship between China and Tibet. See Lü, “Hanzang foxue gongtong 
de diyibu 漢藏佛學溝通的第一步,” LFLX, 1402. Short summery see Zhou Xia, Zhongguo jindai fojiao 
shixue mingjia pingshu 中國近代佛教史學名家評述, 261-269. 
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Lü’s main contribution to modern Chinese Buddhology was that he built up 
the academic style and research standard for modern Buddhist education when he 
served as the dean of Neixueyuan. He noted in a work statement in 1950 that the 
mission of the institute was to restore ‘genuine Buddhism’ and to distinguish it from 
‘fake imitations’ [xiangsi foxue 相似佛學]. To Lü, the Yogācāra tradition developed by 
Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, and others Indian masters, and promulgated in China by 
Xuanzang, Kuiji, etc., provided the necessary basis—doctrinally and 
methodologically—for the modernization of Buddhism. According to Lü, this mission 
would be accomplished in three steps: the first step was critically arranging and 
editing Buddhist texts referring to the Pali, Sanskrit, Tibetan, and credible Chinese 
versions of these texts; the second step was establishing accurate knowledge of 
Indian Buddhism and then using it as a criterion for re-evaluating Chinese Buddhism, 
especially the native sects, such as Chan and Huayan, from a historiographical 
perspective. The last step was establishing a comprehensive curriculum of Five 
Subjects [wuke 五科]553 as the structure of a new Buddhist education system. Lü 
expected the Neixueyuan model to embody the ideal of modern Buddhist education; 
this model also implied a revival of the traditions of Nālandā University, the premier 
Indian Buddhist institution where Xuanzang had studied.  
Lü’s studies focused on Buddhist epistemology and logic [hetuvidyā, 因明], 
especially the study of Ālambana-parīkṣā.554 His reading of Yogācāra texts made him 
suspect the sufficiency and authenticity of Chinese Buddhist resources. He believed 
that the ‘genuine origin’ of the Buddhist philosophical setting should be recovered 
through careful textual analysis of different translated and commentated versions of 
 
553 The Five Subjects include: Abhidharma [毗曇], Prajñā [般若], Yogācāra [瑜伽], Nirvāṇa Sūtra [涅槃], 
Vinaya  [戒律]. 
554 Ālambana-parīkṣā was superseded in India (and later Tibet) by more sophisticated and complex 




texts. This research model paved the way for subsequent studies, such as those by 
Yamaguchi Susumu 山口益 and Ui Hakuju 宇井伯壽.555 
Based on his understanding of Buddhist doctrines, especially the Yogācāra 
teaching, Lü developed his historiographical concept from a similar ‘fundamentalist’ 
perspective on the development of Buddhism. In particular, he considered the 
emergence of its Chinese manifestations to be a deviation from its Indian origin. His 
studies of the history of Buddhism in general, with this presupposition in mind, 
focused on two divided but closely related themes: the critical textual analysis of 
Chinese Buddhist literature, and a retrospective, reconstructive narrative of the 
historical changes of Chinese Buddhism and their roots in Indian Buddhism. 
Beginning from his provocative study “One Hundred Things Wrong with the 
Śūraṅgama [sūtra]” [Lengyan bai wei 楞嚴百偽], he published several articles about 
‘spurious’ Chinese Buddhist scriptures [weijing 偽經], including the Renwang jing 仁王
經, Brahmajāla-sūtra 梵網經, Dasheng qixin lun 大乘起信論, Yuanjue jing 圓覺經, and 
Zhancha yebao jing 占察業報經. His critique of these texts, especially some key terms 
in them, such as the ‘inherent enlightenment’ [benjue 本覺], demonstrated his 
tendency to read Chinese Buddhist texts more comparatively and more ‘historically’. 
To Lü, all Buddhist texts, especially the Chinese ones, were productions of particular 
historical conditions and therefore could not fully demonstrate the teachings of the 
Buddha; the genuine truth of Buddhism, which presented itself differently or even 
sometimes distortedly in history, should be uncovered, deciphered, and extended, 
but not altered, changed, or developed.  
 
555For example, Ui’s study of Dignāga, Jinna chosaku no kenkyū 陳那著作の研究  (Tokyo: Iwanami 
shoten, 1958), includes his study of Ālambana-parīkṣā (pp. 24–130, with his Japanese translation of the 
Paramārtha, Xuanzang, and Yijing versions), and studies of three other Dignāga texts. This 
comparative study was conducted partially on the basis of Lü’s contribution. Yamaguchi Susumu also 
acknowledged his indebtedness to Lü’s exegetical reading of Dharmapāla’s text. See Yamaguchi 




Before his intellectual career was interrupted by the political turmoil during 
the Cultural Revolution (1966),556  Lü worked as a lecturer at the Seminar of Buddhist 
Study in Nanjing beginning in 1949. The notes for his two lectures on the history of 
Buddhism during this period were published with the keywords ‘origin’ and ‘change’ 
in their titles: The Origins and Changes of Indian Buddhism [Yindu fojiao yuanliu lüejiang
印度佛教源流略講] and The Origins and Changes of Chinese Buddhism [Zhongguo fojiao 
yuanliu lüejiang 中國佛教源流略講]. In these studies, Lü not only discussed the 
history of certain Buddhist texts—their translation, distribution, and acceptance in 
the Chinese context—but also clarified the traces of how these texts were used, 
understood, and misread by different Buddhist sects again and again based on their 
different intellectual backgrounds. Partly inheriting the ‘traditional’ pattern of 
classifying Buddhist teaching, namely the ‘doctrinal classification’ [panjiao 判教], he 
linked those ‘local’ or ‘temporal’ manifestations back to the ‘reasoning of the sacred 
words’ [shengyan liang聖言量]—the essence of Buddhist Canon, as Lü indicated in 
the name of his collection of Buddhist classics, Zangyao. 
During the early twentieth century, with the emergence of more and more 
educated monks, the Buddhist monastic circle began to ‘organize Buddhist heritage’ 
using the new academic discourse to establish the past of Buddhism. When the 
historical ‘truth’ contradicted their commitments to belief, these ‘insiders’ always 
had their own means of reconciling these different opinions and resolving the 
 
556  Most of Lü’s manuscripts were lost during this political turmoil. Only in recent years have some of 
Lü Cheng’s unpublished works been discovered and published. Here are some of the most important 
findings: (1) A Chinese draft translation of Dignāga’s Ālambana-parīkṣā from the Tibetan version, which 
was completed before the finalized version in Neixue 4 (1928). See Gao Shanshan 高山杉, “Zhina Neixue 
Yuan Foxue shiliao sanzhong 支那內學院佛學史料三種,” in Shijie zhexue 世界哲學 3 (2012): 151–160. 
(2) A Chinese translation of Bhāvaviveka’s (sixth century) Madhyamakahṛdaya, Chapter V, 
“Yogācāratattvaviniścaya” [中觀心論•入決擇瑜 伽師真實品], which was completed in the 1950s, 
in Shijie zhexue 6 (2011): 72–91. (3) A modern Chinese translation of Vasubandhu’s Viṃśatika. See Lü 
Cheng, “Modern Chinese translation of Viṃśatika“ [二十唯識白話譯本], in Shijie zhexue 1 (2009): 120–
133. (4) A lecture on the Diamond Sutra. See Lü Cheng, “Lecture on the Diamond Sutra” [金剛般若經講
義], in Zhongguo zhexue shi 4 (2008): 5–15, 24. 
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‘challenge’ caused by history. Interesting enough, the customary tactic they used was 
still history, or historiography.  
Taixu, one of the most important Chinese Buddhist monastics of the twentieth 
century, is known chiefly for his attempts to demonstrate Dharma’s relevance to the 
modern intellectual landscape of Republican China. To underscore its resonance with 
contemporary scientific and ideological trends, Taixu presented his views on the 
Dharma under the rubric of “Buddhism for human life” [rensheng fojiao 人生佛教] (a 
term he introduced in 1928)557, and later (beginning in 1933), “Buddhism for the 
human worl” [renjian fojiao 人間佛教]. Compared to his vigorous activities in 
religious revolution, Taixu’s academic activities were sometimes overlooked. Never 
labelling himself a ‘scholastic monk’ [xuewen seng 學問僧], Taixu, nevertheless 
devoted a great portion of his endeavour to historical and doctrinal studies of 
Buddhism. He also encouraged later Buddhist scholars, such as Yinshun and 
Shengyan, to enter the field of Buddhist studies.  
Taixu was born in a small village in Haining county in northern Zhejiang 
province. As an orphan, he was raised by his maternal grandmother, a devout woman 
who had good reading and writing ability, and his uncle, a local schoolteacher but 
also an opium addict. Through them, Taixu received a passable primary education 
and was introduced to Buddhism via frequent visits to local temples and pilgrimages 
to some nearby sacred mountains.558 Probably because of the need to sustain a living, 
Taixu chose to become a monk at a young age and undertook ritual service for the 
local community for years. As part of the generation that was born during the final 
years of Imperial China and came of age during a time of instability, revolution, and 
new possibilities, Taixu inevitably encountered the issue of whether the 
modernization of China could also bear Buddhist values or not. His inquiry into the 
fate of Chinese Buddhism intensified after he was introduced to the works of new 
modernizing intellectuals: Kang Youwei, Yan Fu, and Liang Qichao. All these 
 
557 See Taixu 太虛, “Duiyu Zhongguo Fojiao geming seng de xunci 對於中國佛教革命僧的訓詞,” in 
TXQS vol. 17 (2005 [1928]), 597. 
558 Yinshun 印順, Taixu Dashi nianpu 太虛大師年譜 (Taipei: 1973); originally published in Hong Kong 
in 1950, 24. Also see Taixu, “Taixu zizhuan太虛自傳,” in TXQS, 19, 187.  
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theoretical stimuli deepened his reflections and were eventually absorbed into his 
well-planned prospect of Buddhist revolution, from doctrinal updates to a new form 
of monastic economy.  
As a crucial part of his reform, Taixu advocated a secular-style education 
among the saṃgha—a systematic curriculum that was resonant with the modern 
knowledge structure. History as a discipline, although not the ultimate goal of 
studying Buddhism, provided an overall picture of Buddhism’s past and could help 
people better understand its current condition. Therefore, although he was a 
modernist and reformer who was staring at the future, Taixu began to describe his 
grand plan of reforming Chinese Buddhism by recalling its remote past. Basically, 
Taixu’s writing maintained the traditional system of panjiao559 and the themes that 
could be found in pre-modern Buddhist historical writings, such as the lineages of 
different sects. Also, he uncritically used Chinese materials to reconstruct the history 
of Indian and Chinese Buddhism, even though those materials had already been 
questioned by scholars. He seemed less interested in newly discovered materials, 
such as the Dunhuang scriptures, and did not concern himself with the studies of his 
contemporaries from academia, such as the works of Hu Shih, Tang Yongtong, and 
Chen Yinke. He indeed read some of their works, but he seemed have not to have 
been influenced by any new trends in historiography. However, despite his limited 
interest in historiography, Taixu was one of the few Buddhists who intentionally 
pondered over the concept of history in his writings. When discussing the 
relationship between Buddhism and concepts from other disciplines, such as science 
and philosophy, he proposed a view of Buddhist history that was based on the key 
term of Buddhist teaching: independence [yuan 緣]. In the article “The Dependently-
Originated Conception of History” [yuancheng shiguan 緣成史觀], he used this 
concept to reach a balance between the modern idea of progressivism and Buddhist 
cosmology. History, as Taixu noted, was determined by a Buddhist causality and 
 
559 From 1908 to 1914, Taixu made a distinction between ‘zong’ (‘lineage’) and ‘jiao’ (school) when he 
discussed the issue of unity and diversity in the development of Buddhism [fo fa de pan she 佛法的判攝] 
See Gao Yongxiao 高永霄, “Taixu dashi de sixiang tixi 太虛大師的思想體系,” in Xianggang fojiao 香港
佛教, 286, (1960): 27. 
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moved toward its teleological end: the actualization of the Pure Land through the 
Bodhisattava path. This is exactly what he pursued via his Buddhist reforms.560   
Besides the historians and scholars mentioned above, there were still many 
individuals who participated in this research trend and contributed to the field of the 
historiography of Buddhism through their vigorous teaching and writing activities, 
for example, Zhou Shujia 周叔迦, Meng Wentong 蒙文通, Yinshun 印順, Tanxuan 談
玄, Fafang 法舫 and on on.561 Although this research trend—the historiography of 
Buddhism—remained a sub-branch of both historiography and Buddhist studies, it 
demonstrated a common historical awareness: Buddhism needed to be re-interpreted 
in the modern context, both historically and conceptually. This awareness led to the 
endeavour to reconstruct the past of Buddhism and changed our knowledge and 




560 Further discussion on this issue, see Chapter 4 of this dissertation.  






The General History of Chinese Buddhism 
 
 
China has a long tradition of recording, narrating, and commemorating events that 
happened in the past and has continually revered historical texts, archives, and 
antiquities.562 Over its two-millennia enterprise of record-keeping and history 
making, nuances in conceptions of time and space with varied temporalities have 
always coexisted. For example, Joseph Needham has argued that the Chinese concept 
of history is mainly linear;563 however, other interpretations have tended to see the 
traditional Chinese view of time as circular.564 Basically, as many current scholars 
believed, ‘historical’ time in China, represented by the social-political order centered 
on the activities of ruling clans and the worship of ancestors, reflected a cosmic time 
marked by the rhythms of yin-yang and the Five Elements 五行.565 It rationalized the 
Mandate of the Heaven and provided legitimacy and a rationale for changes in 
dynasties. The historicity of time was reinforced by the fact that the ideal order, the 
Dao, would not be made accessible through an act of divine revelation, but could be 
 
562 See Endymion Wilkinson, Chinese History: A Manual, Harvard Yenching Institute Monograph Series, 52 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asian Center, 2000). 
563 Joseph Needham, “Le temps et l’homme oriental,” in La chinoise et l’Occident: le grand titrage, 1977, 201. 
564 For a strong argument favouring an understanding of traditional Chinese historiography as cyclical 
see Luke S. K. Kwong, “The Rise of the Linear Perspective on History and Time in Late Qing China 
c.1860-1911,” Past and Present 173 (2001): 160-65. For further discussions of Chinese concepts of time see 
Chun-chieh Huang, “‘Time’ and ‘Supertime’ in Chinese Historical Thinking,” in Notions of Time in Chinese 
Historical thinking, eds. Chun-chieh Huang and John Henderson (Hong Kong: The Chinese University 
Press, 2006), 19-41. Julius T. Fraser and Francis C. Haber, eds. Time, Science, and Society in China and the 
West (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1986); Liu Shu-hsien, “Time and Temporality: The 
Chinese Perspective,” Philosophy East and West 24.2 (1974): 145-53; Edward Q. Wang, Time Perception in 
Ancient Chinese Historiography, in Storia della Storiografia 28 (1995): 69-86.  
565 For the Chinese ‘correlative thinking’ on time, see Marcel Granet, La penseé chinoise, (Paris, Albin 
Michel, 1968); Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss, Primitive Classification. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1963 [1930]), 3. 
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possibly measured through history.566 History, shi, in China, therefore, was entrusted 
with the power of providing access to divine truth.567 This concept of shi differed from 
the modern Western notion of history, which was conceived as contingent and 
irreversible.”568  
 The encounter with the West from the nineteenth century challenged the 
declining traditional Chinese historiography with new concepts, methods, and 
patterns, which were labeled as ‘modern’ or ‘civilized.’ The old historiographical 
framework was contested since it failed to reveal the principles and logos behind 
changes and was unable to solve the real crisis China faced. The traditional historical 
writings were considered false and fabricated, mixed with myths, legends, stories, 
and other distorted narratives. As a result, a trend to organize past events in a 
coherent, scientific, chronicle-like manner emerged.569 Writing the general history of 
Buddhism was one important attempt in this trend.  
 
The Consciousness of General History 
Comprehensiveness 通  
The term ‘general history’ [tongshi 通史] had its cultural roots in the Chinese 
historiographical tradition. As early as the Han dynasty, historian Sima Qian had 
described the mission of his masterpiece shiji as “to comprehensively penetrate the 
 
566 Axel Schneider and Stefan Tanaka, “Historical writings in China and Japan,” in Stuart Macintyre, 
Juan Maiguashca, and Attila Pók ed., The Oxford History of Historical Writing: 1800-1945 (Oxford: University 
of Oxford Press, 2011), 492. 
567 Twitchett, The Writing of Official History Under the T’ang. 
568 Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1975), 3 
569 Original text: 現時代之潮流. In Zhang Mantao 張曼濤 ed., “Bianji zhiqu 編輯旨趣,” in Xiandai fojiao 
xueshu congkan 現代佛教學術叢刊 [XFXC] (Taipei: Dasheng wenhua chubanshe, 1979), 1. Zhang Mantao 
named the study of Buddhist history one of “the three trends of the modern Chinese Buddhist studies.” 
See Also Tan Xuan 談玄, “Fojiao lishi yanjiu fa 佛教歷史研究法.” XFXC, vol.41.  
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changes of the past and present 通古今之變.”570 Sima Qian’s ideal of 
“comprehensiveness” in historical writing was held in high esteem by a significant 
number of Chinese historians, inspiring them to entitle their magnum opuses as 
‘comprehensive’ [tong 通].571 Zhang Xuecheng’s wenshi tongyi 文史通義, for example, 
not only utilized tong as the name of the book but also dedicated one chapter to 
discussing the definition of ‘tong’ as well as the emergence and development of tongshi 
in the Chinese historiographical tradition. According to Zhang, the writing model of 
‘general history’ derived from Ban Gu’s班固 Baihu Tongyi 白虎通義 and Ying Shao’s 
應劭 (140-206) Fengsu Tongyi 風俗通義; it grew under the promotion of the emperors 
of the Liang dynasty572 and reached its apogee in the works of Zheng Qiao 鄭樵(1104-
1162), Sima Guang, Du You 杜佑(735-812), and Pei Lin 裴潾 (?-838).573 When Zhang 
Xuecheng listed the advantages and shortcomings of ‘general history,’574 he continued 
a line of thought already expressed by Song dynasty historian Zheng Qiao.575 Instead 
 
570 Sima Qian, “Bao Ren An sh u 報任安書,” translated by Burton Watson, in Ssu Ma Chien Grand Historian 
Of China, 66. 
571 Shiji has also been considered a paradigm of general history, for it is a “whole corpus of a general 
history of several millennia.” See Chen Shih-Hsiang, “An Innovation of Chinese Biographic Writing,” 
Far Eastern Quarterly, 13, I (1953), 44-62. See also Watson, 122. 
572  According to Zhang, to overcome the shortage of dynastic history (Hanshu, Sanguo zhi, etc.), 
Emperor Liang Yuan commissioned his historians to compile a history covering a time span from the 
three dynasties to the Liang dynasty, titled ‘tongshi’ 通史 [‘General history’], with 600 fascicles in its final 
version. Zhang Xuecheng, “Shi Tong釋通,” Wenshi tongyi 文史通義 (Taipei: Huashi chubanshe, 1980), 
133. 
573  The four works are Zheng Qiao’s Tongzhi 通志; Simaguang’s Tongjian 通鑑; Du You’s Tongdian 通典; 
and Pei lin’s Tongxuan 通選. Zhang commented that these four books “either maintain the principle of 
the Official Histories, or rectify the order of chronological histories, or using allusion as its outline, or 
preserving poems and literature. The comprehensiveness of history reaches its peak” [或存正史之
規，或正編年之的，或以典故為紀綱，或以詞章存文獻，史部之通，於斯為極盛也]. Ibid.  
574 Zhang listed several advantages of tongshi and praised it as a superior narrative technique. 
According to him, tongshi “avoids overlaps” [mian chongfu 免重複], “uses a wide variety of examples” 
[jun leili 均類例], “facilitates the classification of facts” [bian quanpei 便銓配], “balances rights and 
wrongs” [ping shifei 平是非], “ends contradictions” [去牴牾] and “gives detailed accounts of 
neighboring countries” [xiang linguo zhi shi 詳鄰國之事].Zhang Xuecheng, “Shi Tong釋通,” ibid, 133. 
575 See Zhang Xuecheng’s 章學誠 inquiry into the concept of tong and his defence to Zheng Qiao: “Shi 
tong 釋通,” “Shen Zheng 申鄭,” and “Da ke wen, shang 答客問上,” in Wenshi tongyi 文史通義. 
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of considering Ban Gu as the master-historian par excellence like his contemporaries,576 
Zheng Qiao in his Tongzhi criticized that after Ban Gu’s dynastic history577, the spirit of 
‘comprehensiveness’ of Chunqiu and Shiji gradually was lost.578 He thus advocated a 
‘‘synthetic comprehension” [huitong 會通] and ‘‘causal relations” [xiangyin 相因], 
emphasizing that history was the distillation, synthesis, and integration of the 
principles of the world, through which the pervasive Dao can be comprehended.579  
 In the modern context, the idea of ‘comprehensiveness’ was interpreted as an 
ability or ‘historical insight’ that could grasp, comprehend, and explain the changes 
across different times. It requires a focused, time-indexed approach with a deeper 
insight into the reception, adoption, and modification of Chinese historical views 
along the line of time from the past to the present. Following Zhang Xuecheng,580 
 
576 Some scholars have mentioned that, from a practical perspective, the dynastic history was the 
mainstream of traditional historical writing. See Achim Mittag, “Cultural Differences as an 
Inspirational Source of Historical Knowledge – Random Notes on Three Approaches to Chinese 
Comparative Historiography,” in Chun-Chieh Huang, Jörn Rüsen ed., Chinese Historical Thinking: An 
Intercultural Discussion (Göttingen: V & R Unipress, 2015), 89-93 
577 Zheng Qiao’s Tongzhi is a general history of 200 fascicles, covering history from antiquity to the Tang 
dynasty. It is ambitiously modelled after Sima Qian’s Shihji. The largest part of this book adopted the 
annals-biography (jizhuan) or composite style of the standard histories. See Thomas H. C Lee, ‘‘History, 
Erudition and Good Government: Cheng Ch’iao and Encyclopaedic Historical Thinking,’’ in Thomas H. 
C. Lee ed., The New and the Multiple: Sung Senses of the Past (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 
2004), 163–71; Edwin G. Pulleyblank, ‘‘Chinese Historical Criticism: Liu Chih-chi and Ssu- ma Kuang,’’ in 
W. G. Beasley and E. G. Pulleyblank ed. Historians of China and Japan (London: Oxford University Press, 
1961), 150–151; Albert Mann, ‘‘Cheng Ch’iao: An Essay in Re-Evaluation,’’ in D. C. Bauxbaum and F. W. 
Mote ed., Transition and Permanence in Chinese History and Culture: A Festschrift in Honour of Dr. Hsiao Kung-
ch’üan (Hong Kong: Cathay Press, 1972), 23–57; Du Weiyun 杜維運, Zhongguo shixueshi 中國史學
史,vol. 3 (Taipei: Sanmin shuju. 2004), 99–102. 
578 See Zheng Qiao, “Zongxu 總序,” in Tongzhi 通志, reprinted in 4 vols., (Taipei: Xinxing, 1965), 2. 
579 Thomas H. C Lee, ‘‘History, Erudition and Good Government: Cheng Ch'iao and Encyclopaedic 
Historical Thinking,’’ 172–179; Lin, Shimin 林時民, ‘‘Zheng Qiao de Tongzhi lüe ji qi shixue 鄭樵的通志
略及其史學’’, Xingda lishi xuebao 5 (1995): 61–95; Pulleyblank, Edwin G, ‘‘The Historiographical 
Tradition.’’in Raymond Dawson ed., The Legacy of China (London: Oxford University Press, 1964); Tao 
Fanbing 陶懋炳. Zhongguo gudai shixueshi lue 中國古代史學史略 (Changsha: Hunan renmin 
chubanshe, 1987), 330–32, 335–37. 
580 Zhang Xuecheng may be the first one who advocated writing a ‘real’ general history. See Mary G. 
Mazur, “Discontinuous Continuity: The Beginning of a New Synthesis of ‘General History’ in 20th 
 195 
 
historian Liu Xianxin 劉咸炘 (1896–1932), for example, further interpreted the 
notion ‘historical insight’ as “observing trends in history” [guan shiji zhi fengshi 觀史
蹟之風勢], highlighting that a historian had to be able to cope with the underlying 
fabric of historical development [fazhan mailuo發展脈絡].581 Liang Qichao 梁啟超, as 
well, understood historical ‘comprehensiveness’ as “capability of observation” 
[guancha nengli 觀察能力], namely, to “look at a thing and thoroughly examine its 
source and further development.”582 By stressing the power of ‘comprehension’, 
modern historians actually further separated historical knowledge, which is 
descriptive and evidential, from the ‘moral integrity of the historian’ [shide 史德]583 
and defined tongshi as an informative, neutral, and systematic narrative based on 
persuasive materials and scientific principles. 
The term ‘national history’ was introduced from the West through Japan in 
the early years of the twentieth century. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, 
Japanese historians had already published many Western-style textbooks on Chinese 
history. Some of these works, such as A General History of China584 by Naka Michiyo 
(1851–1908) and Oriental History by Kuwabara Jitsuzo,585 exerted an inspiring influence 
on Chinese historians. Jitsuzo’s work, which was published in 1898, was immediately 
translated into Chinese and enjoyed great success in the Chinese academic world.586 
 
Century China,” in Tze-ki Hon and Robert J. Culp eds., The Politics of Historical production in Late Qing and 
Republican China (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 112.  
581 Liu Xianxin 劉咸炘, Zhishi Xulun治史緒論 (Taipei: Huashi Chuban 1980), 12. 
582 The original text is “看一件事情，把來源去脈都要觀察清楚.” Here Liang Qichao adopted the idea 
of the four specialties of a historian 史家四長 – four essential abilities – discussed by Liu Zhiji as well 
as Zhang Xuecheng, in Liang, “Zhongguo lishi yanjiu fa bubian中國歷史研究法補編,” YBSHJ, Zhuangji 
73, 22. 
583 To Zhang Xuecheng, he never left the pattern of exemplary historical thinking. The concept of “a 
historian’s moral integrity” merged completely with the concept of assessing historical examples – 
“historical insight.” See Zhang Xuecheng, “Shide,” in: Wenshi Tongyi, Taipei: Shijie Shuju, 1962, 45–47. 
584 Naka Michiyo 那珂通世, Shina tsūshi 支那通史, (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1938–1941). 
585 In 1899 Shanghai Dongwen xueshe 東文學社 introduced and published this book for Chinese 
readers. It was translated by Fan Bingqing 樊炳清 with a preface by Wang Guowei 王國維 and was 
published under the title Dongyang shiyao 東洋史要. 
586 Zhu Weizheng 朱維錚, ed., Zhou Yutong jingxueshi lunzhu xuanji 周予同經學史論著選集 (Shanghai: 
Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1983), 534–536. 
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Chinese intellectuals who took refuge in Japan, such as Liang Qichao, Zhang Taiyan, 
and Liu Shipei 劉師培 (1884-1919), were deeply influenced by the Japanese works on 
Western history and social sciences during their stay and thereby acquired a 
comparative perspective hitherto unknown in Chinese historiography. Although they 
held different, even opposing political standpoints, these intellectuals nevertheless 
joined hands in starting a revolution in historiography that led to the rise of 
“national history” as a new paradigm.  
In July 1902, Zhang Taiyan returned from his second trip to Japan and planned 
to write a general rather than dynastic history of China, calling for understanding of 
the path of progressive developments.587 According to Yü Ying-shih, a ‘general 
history’ in Zhang’s view had two meanings: first, it was to be a thorough history from 
remote antiquity to the recent past, thus cutting across all the boundaries of 
dynasties; and second, it was to be an interdisciplinary history focusing primarily on 
institutional, psychological, social, and religious developments. With both themes, 
Zhang clearly broke away from the ‘clan-based’ historiographical tradition.588 He also 
wished to establish valid generalizations to explain the internal political changes in 
Chinese history and to revitalize the ethos of the people in order to inspire and guide 
China in its search for a viable future through his writing.589  
Liang Qichao responded to Zhang’s idea of a general history with great 
enthusiasm. He also moved in a very similar direction by compiling a ‘general history 
of China.’ In 1901, he published the outline of his planned project, namely, the 
“Prolegomena to Chinese History” [Zhongguoshi xulun 中國史敘論]. This trailblazing 
work “marks the beginning of the transition of Chinese historiography from 
traditional to modern.”590 Through his writing, Liang tried to define China vis- à- vis 
 
587 Zhang Taiyan, “Zhonggguo tongshi lueli 中國通史略例”, in Qiushu (Taipei: Shijie shuju), 1971.  
588 Ying-shih Yü, “Changing Conceptions of National History in Twentieth-Century China,” 276. 
589 Zhang’s letter to Liang is quoted in Tang Zhijun 湯志鈞, Zhang Taiyan nianpu changbian 章太炎年譜
長編 (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1979), 1: 139–140. 
590 Ying-shih Yü, “Changing Conceptions of National History in Twentieth-Century China,” 276. 
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the history of the world; as he indicated, after the 1800s “China has become the China 
of the world.”591 
In his programmatic article “New Historiography”592, Liang complained that 
the biggest flaw of traditional historiography was that it was explicitly rooted in the 
“dynastic” paradigm, which based its chronological order on the genealogies of the 
ruling houses and focused almost exclusively on narratives about how an Imperial 
court conquered, ruled, and finally lost the ‘All-Under-Heaven.’ With ‘basic annals’ 
and ‘biographies’ as its main categories, ‘dynastic history’ recorded only the activities 
of certain individuals but ignored China as a collective whole.593 Moreover, the history 
of a dynasty was always compiled or written after the demise of the previous dynasty; 
therefore, it inevitably gave rise to an ‘antiquarian fallacy’ whereby the traditional 
historians were always collectors of dead facts and shunned contemporary 
developments. To overcome the faults of China’s old historiographical tradition, 
Liang emphasized the function of historical knowledge in the establishment of 
China’s national solidarity, advocating a new national history based on universal 
ideas such as citizenship, popular sovereignty, and constitutional monarchy, rather 
than on criteria of a particular race or culture.594 His historiographical claims deeply 
influenced the next generation of historians, such as Hu Shih, Liu Yizheng, and Qian 
Mu.  
Overall, as China turned towards a new century and faced a new role in the 
global context, the old tradition of ‘comprehensiveness’ was redefined by modern 
Chinese historians under the rubric of ‘general history’ with several defining factors: 
1) extended time span and geographical scope that surpassed dynastic boundaries; 2) 
 
591 Liang Qichao, “Zhongguoshi xulun 中國史敘論,” YBSHJ, Wenji 6, 11–12. 
592 According to Yü, there was a subtle shift in emphasis between the “Prolegomena to Chinese 
History” of 1901 and “New History” of 1902. In the former essay, Liang was seeking to redefine Chinese 
history from the perspective of world history, whereas in the latter he was looking for the “spirit” or 
“ideal” in Chinese history from the national point of view. Ying-shih Yü, “Changing Conceptions of 
National History in Twentieth-Century China,” 279. 
593 Tang Xiaobing, Global Space and the Nationalist Discourse of Modernity: The Historical Thinking of Liang 
Qichao (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996). 
594 See Chang Hao, Liang Ch’i-ch’ao and Intellectual Transition in China. 
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observation with historical insights and national standpoint; 3) systematic, organized 
framework and periodization based on Western theories; and 4) historiographical 
interpretations based on universal principles. 
 
Genealogy   
Compared to the official histories, which ordered their narratives according to the 
sequence of emperors, traditional Buddhist historians tended to apply a genealogy of 
lineage—a succession of masters—as the paradigm of historical narrative.595 As 
enumerated by Lü Cheng, traditional historical writings with ‘general history’ form 
included Fei Zhangfang’s Lidai sanbaoji 歷代三寶記, Zhipan’s 志磐 Fozu tongji 佛祖統
紀, Zuxiu’s祖琇 Longxing biannian tonglun 隆興編年通論596, Benjue’s 本覺 Shishi 
tongjian 釋氏通鑒, Nianchang’s 念常 Fozu lidai tongzai 佛祖歷代通載; Xizhong’s 熙仲 
Lidai shishi zijian 歷代釋氏資鑒; Jue’an’s 覺案 Shishi jigu lue 釋氏籍古略, and so on.597 
These ‘general histories,’ according to Lü, constituted a significant part of the 
traditional historical writings on Buddhism apart from the monk biographies.  
 As the word ‘comprehensive’ used in some of these works indicated, a 
consciousness of ‘general history,’ inherited from Shiji, had influenced Chinese 
Buddhist historians from a very early age.598 Later, a paradigm of genealogy could be 
observed in the works of Tiantai and Chan monks, who adopted a Sinicized historical 
viewpoint on Buddhist tradition. Beginning in the Tang dynasty, Chinese Buddhist 
sects placed their efforts into historical writing in order to establish their own 
 
595 John Kieschnick, Buddhist Historiography in China, forthcoming, 30. ‘Genealogy’ was also a form of 
historical thought in Renaissance Europe, see Anthony Grafton, What Was History? The Art of History 
in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 153-163. 
596 In Longxing biannian tonglun, a strict chronological history of Buddhism modelled on the Zizhi 
tongjian, the compiler, Zuxiu, prudently begins his work with the entrance of Buddhist to China, 
perhaps because of the difficulties with determining accurate dates for events and figures in India. 
597 See Lü Cheng 呂澂, Huang Chanhua 黃懺華, Foxue yanjiu fa •Foxue gailun 佛學研究法· 佛法概論 
(Yangzhou: Guangling shushe, 2009), 49. 
598 One representative example is Sengyou 僧祐’s Shijia pu 釋迦譜(T. no.2040, vol.50), in which he 
attempted to   
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lineages by linking native masters to Indian patriarchs. Demonstrating various levels 
of sophistication and authenticity, their historical writings served the purpose of 
legitimating their own traditions.599 Driven by sectarian agendas, most of the works 
after the Tang dynasty, such as the Lidai fabao ji 歷代法寶記 and the Baolin zhuan 寶林
傳, emphasized the transmission line of the Dharma from one patriarch to the next 
and limited their narrative to one certain school.600 Buddhist historians inherited the 
‘genealogy’ genre as one prominent paradigm of Buddhist historiography and 
complicated it by adding elements from other historiographical traditions, for 
example, dynastic histories and Confucian clan-genealogies [pudie 譜牒 or jiapu 家
譜].601 
The Song witnessed an unprecedented flowering of Buddhist 
historiography.602 As this era experienced an overall development of Chinese 
traditional historiography, including the formation of the conception of historical 
entity and a growing emphasis on institutional history, new comprehensive history 
was produced, modeled on the official imperial histories and influenced by the 
historiography of Sima Guang and Ouyang Xiu 歐陽修—despite the fact that neither 
 
599 For the Tiantai lineage, see Linda Penkower, “In the Beginning… Guanding (561-632) and the 
Creation of Early Tiantai,” in Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, 23,2 (2000); for the 
lineage of Chan, see John R. McRae, The Northern School and the Formation of Early Ch’an Buddhism 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1986); Bernard Faure, The Will to Orthodoxy. A Critical Genealogy of 
Northern Chan Buddhism (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1997). 
600 See John Kieschnick, Buddhist Historiography in China, forthcoming, 252. Other Buddhist historians, 
who had no strong sectarian identity, then referred little to the history of Indian Buddhism in their 
works.  
601 Helwig Schmidt-Glinzer, Die Identität der Buddhistischen Schulen und die Kompilation 
Buddhistischer Universal geschichten in China (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner.1982), 5-6. 
602 An overview in English is Jan Yün-hua, “Buddhist Historiography in Sung China.” Zeitschrift der 
Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, 114, 2 (1964), 360-381. Chen Yuan offered in-depth discussions 
of a few works. See Chen Yuan 陳垣, Zhongguo fojiao shiji gailun 中國佛教史籍概論 (Peking: Zhonghua 
shuju, 1962). Also see Schmidt-Glinzer, Die Identität der buddhistischen Schulen und die Kompilation 
buddhistischer Universalgeschichten in China. Ein Beitrag zur Geistesgeschichte der Sung Zeit and Cao Ganghua 




Sima nor Ouyang were friends of Buddhism.603 Due to the exemplary effect of the Zizhi 
tongjian as well as the changing political and historical conditions, Buddhist historical 
writings in Southern Song and the Yuan continually formed their narratives using 
the annalistic style [biannian 編年].604 The most significant work of Buddhist 
historiography in premodern times—Zhipan’s Fozu tongji 佛祖統紀—was a ‘general 
history’ in the form of biannian 605 that cast all parts of the official histories into a 
Buddhist mold in its fifty-four fascicles.606 Although Zhipan began his chronology 
from the birth of the Buddha and gave a year-by-year account, the connection to 
India became discernably less and less important in the narratives of Tiantai and 
Chan, for the bone of contention was usually which Chinese lineage should be given 




603 Richard L. Davis, “Chaste and Filial Women in Chinese Historical Writings of the Eleventh Century.” 
J. of the American Oriental Society 121, no.2 (June 2001): 205. 
604 Cao Ganghua listed the surviving works in this style during the Song in his work. The majority of the 
works were written by Chan monks or laymen affiliated with Chan school. See Cao Ganghua, Songdai 
fojiao shiji yanjiu 宋代佛教史籍研究.  
605 Fozu tongji “in more than one regard is the apex of the historiographical efforts of [Chinese] 
Buddhists.” See Helwig Schmidt-Glinzer, Die Identität der Buddhistischen Schulen und die Kompilation 
Buddhistischer Universal Geschichten in China, 105. For an overall investigation of Zhipan and his Fozu 
tongji, see Jan Yün-hua, “The Fo-tsu-t’ung-chi, a Biographical and Bibliographical Study,” in Oriens 
Extremus, 10, 1 (1963): 61-82. 
606 The basic annals [benji本紀] were used to record the lives of Śakyamuni and the Tiantai patriarchs. 
The genealogies of noble houses [shijia 世家] of the Confucian model were used by Zhipan to provide 
information on groups of Tiantai monks who were ordained under the same master [zhuzu pangchu 
shijia 諸祖旁出世家]. Biographies [liezhuan列傳] became hagio-biographies of eminent Tiantai monks 
[zhushi liezhuan 諸師列傳]. Tables [biao 表] illustrated the Tiantai lineage [lidai chuanjiao biao 歷代傳教
表]. Monographs and miscellaneous essays [zhi 志] were used to elaborate on topics such as Buddhist 
cosmography ( as the Shijie mingtizhi 世界名體志) or rebirth in the Pure Lands (such as the Jingtu lijiao 
zhi 淨土立教志). Especially valuable is a long annalistic section disguised as a monograph: the 
“Monograph on the Vicissitudes of the Teaching” [Fayun tongsai zhi 法運通塞志] in fifteen chapters. 
For the structure of the Fuzu tongji, see Jan, “The Fo-tsu-t’ung-chi, a Biographical and Bibliographical 
Study,” 72-74. In this article, Jan also collected some historians’ comments on this text and comments 
from Dong Qichang董其昌 (1555-1636) and Yang Wenhui.    
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Although Buddhist historiography in pre-modern China had demonstrated a strong 
sense of ‘comprehensiveness’ and a unique style of ‘genealogy,’ the traditional 
‘general histories’ of Buddhism were still fragmentary, sect-centric, and biased. As 
Japanese scholar Taiken Kimura 木村泰賢 criticized, when traditional writings of 
Buddhism went into details, “the overall view [about Buddhist history] then became 
less-organized and lacking in order.”607 To overcome this shortcoming, the modern 
historiography of Buddhism paid particular attention to constructing a continuum 
between events and an overall historical framework.  
Historical interpretation, significantly, is an irreducible and inexpungable 
element in all historical narratives. With the reflections on the relationship between 
‘data’ and ‘theory’ as well as the tendency of ‘combining’ these two elements together 
[shilun jiehe 史論結合],608 more historians felt that they should read their materials 
by constructing a moving pattern of images in which historical processes could be 
located and further interpretated.609 Given the fact that historical data is both too 
‘massive’ and too ‘sparse,’ it is the historians’ task to choose and organize what they 
need for their representation of a given slice of history while excluding anything 
from their account that is irrelevant to their underlying purposes. They also have to 
interpret their materials to fill in the gaps in information on inferential or 
speculative grounds. History is thus a congeries of facts, linked by adequate or 
inadequate explanations.610  
 
607 Taiken Kimura, “Fojiao yanjiu shi dafangzhan佛教研究之大方針,” in XFXC, vol.41, 94. His opinion 
had a profound influence on modern Buddhist studies in China. Taixu had a response to Kimura’s idea. 
See Taixu, “Du Mucun boshi fojiao yanjiu zhi dafangzhen shuhou讀木村博士佛教研究之大方針書
後,” TXQS, vol. 16, 102-103. 
608 For an interesting discussion of premodern Chinese historiography and its close relation to the topic 
of this dissertation see: Yves Chevrier, “La servante-maitresse: condition de la reference a l’histoire 
dans l’espace intellectual chinois,” Extretne-Orient-extreme occident, Cahiers de recherches comparatives 9 
(1987), 117-144 
609 For the development of the relationship between shi and lun, see Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, 
“On Shi and Lun: toward a Typology of Historiography in the PRC,” in History and Theory, 35, 4 (1996): 
74-95. 
610 Hayden White, “Interpretation in History,” New Literary History, 4, 2 (1973): 281-314. 
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For ‘general history’ in the modern sense, a universal order behind the 
confusing changes and an ineluctably intention to interpret were admitted as 
premises. To modern Chinese historians, formulating new interpretations was 
perhaps the only way to ‘protect’ the past of China. Therefore, some historians 
believed that, for the sake of establishing a ‘comprehensive’ history that could depict 
the panorama of the past, scattered materials needed to be narrated in certain 
sequences in order to prove that the speculative philosophy of history would be valid 
in different time spectra. The explanatory and interpretative facets in historical 
narratives thus tended to be integrated in order to tell what had happened and to 
elucidate why it had happened as it did. This tendency palpably was demonstrated in 
the writings of Liang Qichao, Hu Shih611, Jiang Weiqiao, and Taixu, who traded in more 
or less a ‘meta-narrative’ of history instead of circumspect ‘descriptions’.612 Others, 
such as Tang Yongtong, Chen Yinke, and Chen Yuan, by contrast, did not devote 
themselves to writing general histories; they eschewed the impulse to solve ‘the 
riddle of history’ and to identify the plan or goal of the historical process as a whole, 
but pursued more concrete aims, for example, investigating particular historical 
manifestations of the Chinese national spirit. However, even Chen Yinke, who had 
been called—although misleadingly—the “Chinese Ranke,”613 maintained an 
underlying philosophical presupposition by which to justify their interpretative 
strategies were necessary for the representation of a given segment of the historical 
process.  
 
611 Hu Shih is discussed here, although he did not write any general history of Buddhism, because he 
dedicated great efforts to writing the general history of Chinese philosophy, in which Buddhism played 
a crucial part.   
612 According to White, the term “meta-history” was used as a synonym for “speculative philosophy of 
history” by Northrop Frye in “New Directions from Old,” in Fables of Identity (1963), 52-66. On the 
conception of “speculative philosophy of history” as implicit mythopoesis, see Karl Löwith, Meaning in 
History: The Theological Implications of the Philosophy of History (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1949) and Hayden White, “Interpretation in History.” 
613 For a thorough investigation of the misleading description of Chen Yinke and Fu Sinian, see Axel 
Schneider, Wahrheit und Geschichte: Zwei chinesische Historiker auf der Suche nach einer modernen Identität 
für China (Wiesbaden, 1997). 
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Historians such as Liang Qichao, Hu Shih, and Taixu made efforts to establish a 
pragmatic, critical, and conceptual history based on their understanding of the 
mechanism running the world, which, they believed, provided shi—the historical 
facts—principle and meaning. They thus narrated historical events into histories 
according to a certain order. In this process, histories gain their explanatory effect 
not merely by their success in making stories out of chronicles but also by “the 
encodation of the facts contained in the chronicle as components of specific kinds of 
plot structures.”614 
Hu Shih, for example, followed his mentor John Dewey and advocated that the 
“intelligent understanding of past history is to some extent a lever for moving the 
present into a certain kind of future.” As Eber described it, that history in Hu’s view 
was “a kind of dynamic continuum.”615 In a 1919 lecture, Hu stated: 
……very few of the former scholars who studied the ancient books had held the 
outlook of historical evolution; they were not at all particular about origins and 
learning and the causal relations of thought ……前人研究古書，很少有歷史進化的
眼光的，故從來不講究一種學術的淵源，一種思想的前因後果616  
According to Hu, a new historiography needed to figure out how all learning and 
thought arose, and after arising, what influence and results it had; after thoroughly 
verifying and rendering the meanings of the ancients, historians could reveal the 
“true face” [zhen mianmu 真面目] and “true values” [zhen jiazhi 真價值] of every 
concept and thought.617  
For Liang, historical records had to be interpreted through an ‘observation’ 
that could penetrate the reality of history as well as grasp the thread of historical 
development. This ‘observation’ was a cognitive act, which, in Liang’s view, had to be 
 
614 Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth Century Europe (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1973), 7-11, esp. 8. 
615 Eber, “Hu Shih and Chinese History: The Problem of Cheng-li Kuo-ku.” 172. 
616 Hu shih “Xin sichao de yiyi 新思潮的意義.” Xin Qingnian 新青年 7.1 (1919). Translation see Eber, 
“Hu Shih and Chinese History: The Problem of Cheng-li Kuo-ku.” 172. Also, Eber, “Hu Shih and Chinese 




distinguished from the traditional narrative of ‘praise and blame’ based on Confucian 
moral standards. Therefore, he emphasized the ‘basic principles’ [yuanli 原理] in 
history and causality, advocating a combination of factual representations and 
conceptual embodiments. To Liang, there was a “necessary relationship” in history618 
through which the innate meaning and coherence within it would come into view 
and historical facts would be plotted into an identifiable and predictable history that 
could explain the present and foresee the future. 
Both Liang Qichao’s and Hu Shih’s interests in writing the history of Buddhism 
were mainly stirred up by their impulse to write an ‘intellectual history’ of China. Hu 
Shih, for example, began his research on the history of Chan Buddhism when he 
attempted to expend the pattern in his dissertation, which was about pre-Qin 
philosophy, to the medieval era and to write a general history of Chinese philosophy 
as a whole.619 In the context of this larger agenda, he encountered the problem of 
Buddhism.620 Liang Qichao, as well, proposed his project of writing a comprehensive 
history of Chinese Buddhism when he compiled his long article “The Major Trends of 
 
618 I borrowed the term “necessary relationship” from Axel Schneider. He has defined it as “assuming 
that the principles governing history are pre-given (be it as immanent or transcendent) and just have 
to be discovered.” He also has referred to a “pluralistic relationship,” a situation where the historian 
has to apply different possible interpretations to history in order to judge their plausibility, as well as 
to an “arbitrary relationship,” which is a situation in which everybody ends up being his own historian 
because history is essentially meaningless and has to be invested with meaning from an always-
changing present perspective. See “世界歷史與歷史相對主義的問題 – 1919年以后梁啟超的史學” 
[World history and the problem of historical relativism: Liang Ch’i-ch’ao’s historiography after 1919], 
in Zhenli yu lishi: Fusinian, ChenYinke de shixue sixiang yu minzu rentong真理與歷史：傅斯年、陳寅恪的
史學思想與民族認同 (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2008), 238-259. 
619 McRae, “Religion as Revolution in Chinese Historiography: Hu Shih (1891-1962) on Shen-hui (684-
758).” 68. 
620 Hu’s dissertation The Development of the Logical Method in Ancient China appeared in expanded form in 
Chinese in 1921 as the first volume of a projected multi-volume work called Outline of Chinese Philosophy 
(Volume One) [Zhongguo zhexue shigang 中國哲學史綱] (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1921). This was 




Chinese Scholarship.” Later in 1920, when Liang returned from Europe, he developed 
this project into a separate study of the ‘general history’ of Buddhism.621  
We do not have to match these Chinese historians’ work with Hayden White’s 
classification of the modes of emplotment, since this concept was grounded in the 
tradition of Western literature.622 However, it must be admitted that there was always 
a plot structure in their narratives, even in the more ‘synchronic’ histories, such as 
Chen Yuan’s studies of Ming-Qing Buddhism, which discussed less about 
‘developments’ and ‘changes.’ No matter how these historians differed from each 
other over the frameworks they applied and over the, the history of Buddhism was 
narrated again and again with different time frames, interpretative patterns, and 
philosophical or religious archetypes. These narratives demonstrated the historians’ 
efforts to bridge segments in history with continuity and their assessments of the 
impact, influence, or significance of empirically established facts.623 
  
Evolution and Buddhism 
The first question historians encountered when they tried to write a general history 
of a certain tradition was how to re-organize the scattered materials into a 
systematic, logical framework. From the Confucian theory of the “three ages 三世” 
propagated by Kang Youwei, to Liang Qichao’s view of historiographical revolution 
inspired by nineteenth century nationalism and social Darwinism, to the movements 
of “organizing the national past” and “doubting antiquity” led by Hu Shih and Gu 
Jiegang, and onward to the application of Marxist theories, Chinese historians were 
 
621 When Liang began to plan his writing on the general history of Buddhism in 1920, his idea of 
historiography experienced a big change. For a study on this topic see Axel Schneider, “Shijie lishi yu 
lishi xiangdui zhuyi de wenti – 1919 nian yihou Liang Qichao de shixue 世界歷史與歷史相對主義的問
題--1919年以后梁啟超的史學”, 238-259. The transformation of Liang’s historiography after 1919 and 
the influence of Buddhism in this transformation will be further elaborated in the latter part of this 
chapter.  
622 White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe. 7-11. 




constantly looking for answers from external intellectual sources. In this process, 
many professional historians and Buddhist scholars made efforts to narrate the 
history of Buddhism in accordance with modern discourses linked with the 
progressive, scientific, and secular modernity based on Western experience. 
  
Linear Time 
The deep conflict between the Buddhist concept of time and China’s lasting tradition 
of historiography existed for quite a long time. However, in modern era, it was 
engulfed by the huge challenge caused by the concept of linear time coming from the 
West.624  
In Chinese culture, at least in the Confucian and Daoism traditions, the 
heterogeneous and discontinuous nature of time prevented the notion of linear time 
from evolving into a priori understanding of cosmos and history, although traditional 
Chinese histories indeed contained certain linear elements.625 Time in the Chinese 
conception was generally empirical and moved cyclically. Neither the introduction of 
Buddhism nor the rise of Chan could successfully establish an abstract, transcendent 
concept of time in Chinese people’s minds. Notions of emptiness and impermanence 
had never shaken the dominance of ‘empirical’ time in the spiritual world of the 
Chinese.  
Buddhism, admittedly, did bring changes to the existing cosmology of the 
Chinese people; for example, based on the doctrines of Mahāyāna Buddhism, such as 
the Heart Sūtra, Chinese Chan master Dahui Zonggao 大慧宗杲(1089-1163) had 
realized that “past, present, future are all delusions;” because these three periods 
 
624 Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss, Primitive Classification. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963 
[1930]), 40-47.    
625 An example is the Three Age theory of New Text Confucianism. Joseph Needham (1900–1995) even 
believed that ancient Chinese models of history were essentially linear—see Luke S. K. Kwong, “The 
Rise of the Linear 
Perspective on History and Time in Late Qing China c. 1860–1911,” Past and Present 173 (2001): 165–66. 
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“are ultimately empty and still.”626 The ‘pure experience’ of samādhi also led Chinese 
Buddhist practitioners to claim a transcendent time. As early as the Jin dynasty, 
Master Huiyuan stated explicitly in a letter to the emperor that the first principle he 
pursued was “not to be obedient to changes.”627 This claim was judged radical in 
Huiyuan’s time, even in Buddhist circles, and was believed to cause immediate karmic 
retribution. One interesting and often quoted story in Chan literature about the 
karma caused by a wrong time view was the meeting of master Baizhang Huaihai 百
丈懷海 and a fox: appearing as an old monk, the fox told Huaihai that he was 
formerly a Chan master. However, for once saying that the enlightened master is not 
subject to the law of change, he was condemned to be reincarnated in this animal 
form during five hundred lifetimes. Nevertheless, he finally gained redemption from 
his suffering fate as a fox when Huaihai confirmed to him that the enlightened man 
would live in but never be opposed to changes. The lesson of this story is 
ambiguous—it seems to promise a path to escape from time and change but at the 
same time, it asserts that everyone should yield to the power of changes.   
 The Buddhist view of history originated from its two overlapping, entangled, 
but fundamentally antithetical views of time. One is the cyclical time of the 
movement of saṃsāra; the other one is the linear time of the corpus of the Buddha. 
Together with the circular notion of cosmic time—the kalpa, which was derived from 
the cosmology of Hinduism—Buddhism maintained a kind of linear time in its 
doctrines, especially in the Vinaya teachings—the chronology of Buddha’s life and 
the “Dotted record” of the Vinaya transmission.628 Due to this linear time, as Hubert 
Durt has pointed out, “one can detect in almost all Buddhist countries a relation 
 
626 Clearly, Thomas and J. C. Clearly, trans. The Blue Cliff Records. vol.3, (Boulder: Shambala), 24-25. 
627 Hongming Ji 弘明集, T. 52, 2102, 29-32. 
628 The ‘Dotted records’ [Shengdian ji] was a copy of the Vinaya transmitted to China; it was allegedly 
written down at the first Council and subsequently dotted at every annual assembly [pravāranā]. It is 
quoted twice in the Lidai sanbaoji. See T.49, 2034: 23a, 95b. The number of dots allowed scholars to 
reconstitute the date of the Nirvāna of the Buddha as 485 B.C. On this question, see Hubert Durt, “La 
date du Buddha en Corée et au Japon,” Heinz Bechert ed., Die Datierung des historischen Buddha, 
Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1991). Also, W. Pachow, “A Study of the Dotted Record,” Journal of 
the American Oriental Society, 85, 3 (1965): 342-349. 
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between monastic discipline and historiography.”629 Such a tradition in the Vinaya 
school grew out of the necessity of tracing the emergence of monastic regulation 
back to particular events that happened during the lifetime of the Buddha. For 
example, the cult of worshiping relics encouraged people to discover the history of 
these relics and inspired the compilation of chronicles such as the Thūpavaṃsa.630 
Thus Buddhist historical narratives developed hand in hand with hagiography, which 
always adopted a linear form of the time spectrum. This linear time, however, is 
different from linear time in modern sense; the emphasis on the cult of the tooth relic 
of the Buddha or of the Arhat Piṇḍola in China must be understood as an attempt to 
link Chinese Buddhism to the sacred time in which the Buddha lived and finally 
gained enlightenment, instead of a presentation of any universal principles.631  
The temporality in Buddhism, on the one hand, had also been interpreted as 
regression, declining from the perfection of the time in which the Buddha lived to the 
age of the declining Dharma, the most corrupt age waiting for doom. Although 
initially derived from the cyclical theory of kalpa, the notion of the ‘declining 
Dharma’ was used in China to establish a periodization that had been prevalent from 
the sixth century onwards to the end of the Imperial time. On the other hand, this 
linear time could be also progressive, theoretically. Some scholars, like Bernard 
Faure, believe that the concept of progress was innate in Chinese Buddhism. It 
justified the founding of the new schools via a ‘doctrinal classification’ system [panjiao 
判教], which was based on a teleological model that gave primacy to one school over 
all others. According to Faure, this kind of progress also affected the formulation of 
geographic notions such as the ‘central kingdom,’632 serving as the rationale for the 
 
629 Hubert Durt, “La date du Buddha en Corée et au Japon,” in Die Datierung des Historischen Buddha 
(Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1991), 465. 
630 B. G. Gokehale, “The Theravāda-Buddhism View of History.” Journal of the American Oriental Society, 
85, 3 (1965): 356. 
631 Bernard, Chan Insight and Oversight.178. 
632 In the early narrative, India was undoubtedly the ‘central land.’ See, for example, Guṇabhadra’s 
statement in the Lengqie shizi ji 楞伽師資記: “This land [China] is located at the Eastern outskirts and 
[its inhabitants] do not have a method to cultivate the Way… in my middle Kingdom there existed an 
orthodox Dharma, but it is secret and is not transmitted [at random].” T. 85, 2837: 1284a.   
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transformation through which China promoted itself from a peripheral, barbarian 
country to the center of the Buddhist world.  
The idea of a circular cosmic time marked by saṃsāra, the traditional Chinese 
concept of cyclical changes, as well as the linear time in Vinaya and later in some 
Chinese Buddhist doctrines, determined the multifaceted, contradictory strata of 
time in the traditional Buddhist historiography. With this hybrid concept of time in 
mind, ordinary practitioners as well as clergy worshiped the Buddhist masters as 
ancestors, were fascinated with relics and funerary, and were extremely sensitive 
about the ages and the death dates of eminent monks. The pessimistic feeling of 
change and transience also constantly incited Buddhist followers to dig into the 
mythical past or wait for the future Buddha, Maitreya, to appear.  
Only in the modern age was this view of time fundamentally challenged. In 
the West, the linear conception of time had been since Kant accepted as a prior 
category of perception and an absolute condition of the world of phenomena. This 
conception, which of course was a product of history itself, paved the way for a 
reorientation of historical knowledge from the past to the future and profoundly 
changed the cosmological and epistemological view of people, who were physically 
and mentally in the distance. The Chinese, although they were physically and 
mentally distinct from Kant, began to develop a new abstract sense of time that was 
associated not only with new techniques, such as modern clocks and calendars,633 but 
also with Western philosophy.634   
The defeats China suffered in wars and the weakness of its economy, at times, 
led to the pain of failure and a strong sense of ‘lagging behind’ among the late Qing 
intellectuals, bringing a feeling of crisis and uncertainty about China’s future. 
Western history then became a mirror through which countries like China could see 
 
633 Bastid-Brugière, “Jikan kaishaku to Nihon eikyô -- Chûgoku kindai ni okeru kako, gendai, mirai no 
gainen” 時間解釈と日本影響ー中国近代における過去、現代、未来の概念, in Hazama Naoki 狭間
直樹 ed., Seiyō kindai bunmei to Chūka sekai 西洋近代文明と中華世界, Kyoto, Kyoto daigaku gakujutsu 
shuppankai , 2001, 41-54 
634 Peter Zarrow, China in War and Revolution, 1895-1949 (New York: Routledge, 2005), Chapter 1 and 3.   
 210 
 
the road ahead.635 In this sense, China accepted modern linear time and reoriented 
itself to the future, which became imagined or shaped based on the Western model. 
This Western concept of linear time thus was silently substituted for traditional 
Chinese temporality; a gap between ‘ancient’ and ‘modern’ then emerged and 
increased.636 
Modern Chinese intellectuals made efforts to establish a new worldview, 
grappling with the conflicts, tensions, and confusion they faced. Tan Sitong, for 
example, attempted to synthesize Buddhism, Confucianism, and modern science to 
explain historical developments.637 Kang Youwei’s theory of the three ages638 and Yan 
Fu’s creative interpretations of Herbert Spencer and Thomas Huxley were attempts 
to combine Confucianism or Taoism with evolutionary temporality in order to 
construct a moral vision of progress. In modern China, progressivism and social 
Darwinism opened a window for intellectuals to observe and understand the outside 
world and their own traditions. It convinced them to believe hopefully in the rise of 
China as a civilized, modern nation. As Benjamin Schwartz argued in Yan Fu’s case, to 
the intellectuals “groping towards the notion of China as a society-nation,” 
 
635 This view was deeply influenced by the form of ‘civilizational history’ [wenming shi 文明史] in Japan, 
especially the works of Fukuzawa Yukichi 福澤諭吉 and Taguchi Ukichi 田口卯吉. See E. G. 
Pulleyblank and W.G. Beasley, ‘introduction’ in Historians of Japan and China (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1971), 15.  
636 According to Wang Fan-sen, the concept of linear time, which is usually compared to a cyclic or 
regressive historical concept, assumes that time is linear, purposeful, directional, and progressive, and 
that it never repeats or reverses. See Wang Fansen, “Jindai Zhongguo de xianxing lishiguan, yi shehui 
jinhualun wei zhongxin de taolun 近代中國的線性歷史觀: 以社會進化論為中心的討論,” Xin Shixue 
新史學, 19, 2 (2008): 1-46.  
637 Tan Sitong, An Exposition of Benevolence: the Jen-hseuh of Tan Ssu-t’ung, Chan Sinwai trans., (Hong Kong: 
The Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 1984), 132–33; Tan Sitong, Renxue 仁學, (Beijing: Huaxia 
chubanshe, 2002 [1896]), 80. 
638 Kang divided history into three ages: the age of disorder [juluanshi 據亂世], the age of ascending 
peace [shengpingshi 昇平世], and the age of great peace [Taipingshi 太平世]. See Wu Ze 吳澤, “Kang 
Youwei gongyang sanshi shuo de lishi jinhua guandian yanjiu: Kang Youwei shixue yanjiu zhiyi 康有為
公羊三世說的歷史進化觀點研究：康有為史學研究之一, in Zhonghua wenshi luncong 中華文史論叢, 
vol.1, (Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju,1962), 229-74.  
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progressivism and Spenser’s vision of the social organism provided the “most vivid 
possible image of the nation.”639  
Tangling with the sense of nationalism, concepts of progressivism and linear 
time were well popularized throughout China.640 When the new century came, 
‘progressivism’ and ‘evolutionism’ had become common slogans in historical writing; 
even historians in the ‘conservative’ camp sometimes acknowledged that they were 
inspired by these theories.641 As analyzed by Wang Fansen, this new paradigm 
transformed history into a map with blanks framed by timelines. Historians then 
merely needed to do the filling-in exercises—fitting the Chinese data into the scale of 
development.642 The past, which had been seen as “a fixed entity, like a tangled ball of 
thread,”643 was unraveled into a single linear development. Therefore, the ‘universal 
pattern’ of progressivism, which had been proved by the experience of the West, was 
also possible and suitable for the Chinese case. This reception of the progressive view 
of history, as Praesenjit Duara suggested, was a consequence of the desire to depict 
China as a cohesive society and to emplot the Chinese experience as historical 
progress that evolved towards a modern nation-state.644   
 
639 Benjamin Schwartz, In Search of Wealth and Power (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), 
56. 
640 For the reception of linear time, see Wang Fansen, “Jindai Zhongguo de xianxing lishiguan, yi shehui 
jinhualun wei zhongxin de taolun 近代中國的線性歷史觀: 以社會進化論為中心的討論.” Also see 
Luke S. K. Kwong, “The Rise of the Linear Perspective on History and Time in Late Qing China c. 1860-
1911,” Past & Present, 173 (2001), 157-190. 
641 Wang, Fansen, “The Impact of the Linear Model of History on Modern Chinese Historiography,” 
Brian Moloughney and Peter Zarrow ed., Transforming History: The Making of a Modern Academic Discipline 
in Twentieth Century China (Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 2012), 139.  
642 Ibid., 142. 
643 Ibid. 
644 Presenjit Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1995), 4, 25, 28. According to Duara, nationalists used the evolutionary 
narrative to legitimatize the nation-form as an advance beyond the previous political organization. 
However, Duara’s argument on the nature of modern Chinese historiography is based primarily on 
more radical essays. Actually, there was a distance between such proclamations for change and the 
type of historical narrative produced. See Q. Edward Wang, Inventing China through History: The May 




Reflections on Evolutional Theory 
The model of progressivism was welcomed by the Chinese in the modern period since 
it had to a certain degree been proved to be valid, at least in the realms of technology 
and science.645 However, difficulties remained when this model was applied to China’s 
particular situation. When Chinese intellectuals encountered the progressive West, 
they always felt a bitter dilemma between the promised brighter future and the 
seemly endless misery China was experiencing at that very moment. All the meta-
narratives of history, even the felicitous notion of the ‘end of history,’ were ironically 
related to a tension between an ideal human order and the disorder of the past 
(although that ideal order could be conceived as having been actualized). They 
realized that, more or less from an emotional perspective, the age they lived in could 
never be a good time that had evolved from the past, but on the contrary, was the 
worst time. This was, to some of them, what the Buddhist doctrines had predicted 
and revealed: the dark age of the declining Dharma.646 
Around the Meiji Restoration, intellectuals in Japan had already attempted to 
link Buddhism with evolutionary theories. In the debate between Katō Hiroyuki 
(1836–1916) and Inoue Enryō (1858–1919) over the relationship between Buddhism 
 
645 In this sense, the term ‘progress’ was understood as equivalent to ‘modernity’ and a tool of 
competition with other civilizations. See Wang Fansen, “The Impact of the Linear Model of History on 
Modern Chinese Historiography.” For other discussions on this topic, see Zhang Pengyuan張朋園, 
“Shehui daerwen zhuyi yu xiandaihua: Yan Fu and Liang Qichao de Jinhua guan 社會達爾文主義—嚴
復、梁啟超的進化觀,” in Tao Xisheng xiansheng bazhi rongqing lunwenji 陶希聖先生八秩榮慶論文集 
(Taipei: Shihuo chubanshe 1979), 187-230; Yoshihiro Ishikawa 石川禎浩 “Ryō Keichō to bunmei no 
shiza 梁啓超と文明の視座 [Liang Qichao and the view of civilization],” in Kyōdō kenkyū Ryō Keichō: 
Seiyō kindai shisō Juyō to Meiji Nihon 共同研究梁啓超―西洋近代思想受容と明治日本,106-131. 
646 There were, of course, other factors that led to the Buddhist critiques of modernity and linear time. 
For example, in Japan, the newly imported theory of evolution evoked debates among intellectuals, for 
example, the debate between Katō Hiroyuki (1836-1916) and Inoue Enryō (1858-1919) over the 
relationship between progressive conceptions of history and Buddhism. It is precisely because Meiji 
Japan was successful in modernization that some intellectuals began to reflect on the dark underbelly 
of capitalist modernity. 
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and progressive concepts of history647, Buddhist philosopher Inoue Enryō advocated 
an idea of ‘bi-directional’ evolution, that is, evolution could also be retrograde and 
lead to degeneration. As Funeyama Shinichi has explained, in Inoue Enryō’s view, 
“evolution is not one-sided, but also encompasses its opposite, namely regression.”648  
This view influenced Zhang Taiyan, and he developed it into his own theory of 
evolution—the ‘double-edged evolutionism [jufen jinhualun 俱分進化論]—and his 
critique of progressivism.649 In his early article “Basic Guidelines of Chinese History” 
[Zhongguo tongshi lueli 中國通史略例] in the Qiushu, published in 1900, Zhang adopted 
the idea of linear time as a universal pattern (although with some reservations) and 
believed that all of humanity followed the laws of progress.650 However, when he 
revised his Qiushu in 1913, he omitted this article, indicating that he had abandoned 
making progress a historical principle.651 Realizing the inherent pitfall of modernity 
and its unsuitability for the Chinese context, Zhang began to censure linear, capitalist 
progressivism harshly and formed a new concept of history based on a Buddhist 
worldview.652 By using Buddhist concepts and categories, such as ālaya and manas, he 
 
647 Viren Murthy, “Transfiguring Modern Temporality: Zhang Taiyan’s Yogacara Critique of 
Evolutionary History,” Modern China, 38,5 (2012): 495. 
648 Shinichi Funeyama, Funeyama Shinichi chosakushū [Selected works of Funeyama Shinichi], vol. 6 
(Tokyo: Kobushi-shobō,1996), 358. 
649 Because Zhang explicitly mentioned the thinking of famous Japanese intellectuals, such as Anesaki 
Masaharu’s ideas about religion and German idealism, it is certain that he was familiar with Japanese 
assessments of the concept of evolution. Kobayashi Takeshi has provided a great amount of evidence 
to show that Zhang was deeply immersed in Meiji philosophical texts, including Inoue Enryō’s 
Tetsugaku yōrei [Outline of Philosophy]. See Kobayashi Takeshi, Shō Heirin to Meiji shichō mō hitotsu 
no kindai 章炳麟と明治思潮:もう一つの近代 [Zhang Taiyan and Meiji intellectual trends: another 
modernity] (Tokyo: Kenbun shuppan. 2006). 
650 Zhang Taiyan, “Zhongguo tongshi lueli 中國通史略例,” Qiushu 訄書 (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 1998 
[1900]), 201. 
651 Chang Hao has pointed out that the early 1900s were a turbulent period in Zhang’s life. He 
experienced physical and mental abuse in prison and his close friend and fellow revolutionary Zou 
Rong died in jail. Such “boundary situations” probably encouraged him to use Buddhism to go beyond 
conventional limits and to question concepts taken for granted by his Chinese and Japanese 
contemporaries. See Chang Hao, Chinese Intellectuals in Crisis: Search for Order and Meaning 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 120. 
652 For the overall thought of Zhang Taiyan and his “Buddhist worldview,” see Chang Hao, ibid, 105-145 
and Wang Hui, Xianzai Zhongguo sixiang de xingqi 現代中國思想的興起 (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 2002); 
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counterposed a relativistic or pluralistic model to the unilinear one of progress, and 
meanwhile, grounded his model in the play of karmic forces.653 
In his essay “On Double-Edged Evolution,” published in 1906, Zhang 
interpreted history as a movement of ālaya consciousness according to the Yogācārin 
doctrine of karmic seeds.654 In Zhang’s view, the problem with Western evolutionary 
theories was not in the descriptions they made, but rather in their evaluative 
dimension. He argued that “one cannot negate that fact of evolution, but one should 
not accept the effects of evolution on us.”655 Under the influence of the pessimistic 
view of German philosopher Schopenhauer, Zhang asserted that evolution could not 
guarantee a better future in any sense; on the contrary, it was neutral, 
interdependent, and karmic, moving in two directions at the same time: evil grows 
with good, pleasure goes with pain. History, as the presentation of karmic seeds, 
similarly, had such a dual-oriented structure as well.656 Therefore, against the ideas of 
people like Kang Youwei, Zhang rejected the premise that, at the ‘end of history,’ 
good will eventually prevails if evolution runs its course properly; instead, he 
contended that “it is better to leave this world earlier and seek enlightenment 
beyond sight, hearing, words and thought, saving all living things, and negating 
them” [miedu zhi 滅度之].657  
Zhang’s notion, although radical, aroused sympathy among other intellectuals 
who were also interested in Buddhism. Wang Enyang, for example, was an important 
figure who used Buddhism to criticize evolutionary theory. As a lay believer, he 
rejected the prevailing view of evolutionism that saw Buddhism as a barbaric myth, 
 
Kobayashi Takeshi has discussed Zhang’s Buddhist thought in relation to Meiji intellectual trends; see 
Kobayashi Takeshi 小林武, Shō Heirin to Meiji shichō mō hitotsu no kindai 章炳麟と明治思潮:もう一つの
近代(Tokyo: Kenbun Shuppan, 2006). 
653 Murthy, The Political Philosophy of Zhang Taiyan.136. For a contextualized discussion on Zhang’s 
critique of linear time and the progressive view of history, see the chapter 4 of this book.  
654 Zhang Taiyan, “Jufen Jinhua lun 俱分進化論,” in Jiang Fen 姜玢 ed., Gegudingxin de zheli: Zhang 
Taiyan wenxuan 革故鼎新的哲理: 章太炎文選 (Shanghai: Shanghai yuandong chubanshe, 1996), 150. 
655 Ibid., 151. 




refuting the opinion of ‘Mahayana is not Buddhism’ [dasheng feifo 大乘非佛] based 
on evolutionary theory.658 He criticized that there are three major false assumptions 
in evolutionary theory: first, it assumes that the evolutionary track will always move 
from simple to complex, from barbarian to civilized; second, it relies heavily on 
causality; third, it predicts that the encounter of two forces will create a third one. All 
these assumptions are incompatible with Buddhism and thus fail to prove the 
universality of evolutionary theory.659  
Liang Shuming, “this century’s foremost Confucian traditionalist,”660 
surreptitiously used a multi-directed notion of ‘change’ to substitute for the 
assumptions of linear time and progressivism. To answer the question of “whether 
Eastern cultures should be eradicated from their roots, or can they come back to life,” 
which he asked in his Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, Liang rejected 
the portrayal of an antithetical modern/traditional division; he emphasized a 
synchronic cultural pluralism instead of a diachronic opposition between modern 
and premodern.661 To a certain extent, Liang utilized the theory of progressivism to 
prove Buddhism to be “the true religion of pure transcendence”; for example, he 
referred to the idea of progress to criticize the authority of the Dasheng Qixin lun.662 At 
 
658 Since 1900, there has been a trend in Japanese scholarship which advocated that “Mahayana is not 
Buddhism,” asserting that Buddhism developed gradually from primitive Buddhism, sectarian 
Buddhism, Exoteric Mahayana, and Esoteric Mahayana. In 1923, Wang wrote the article “On the Saying 
of ‘Mahayana is Not Buddhism’ [Dasheng feifo shuo bian 大乘非佛說辨] to refute the phenomenon 
that “all the Mahayana classics were said to be forgeries of later generations, and that the teachings of 
Buddhism were developed by the evolution of thought and not founded by Buddha alone” 咸謂大乘契
經皆后世偽作，佛法教理實由思想進化次第發展，非佛一人所創立. Wang Enyang, “Dasheng feifo 
shuo bian 大乘非佛說辨,” [Haichaoyin, 4,5 (1923)], in MFQ, vol.156, 203-16. 
659 Wang Enyang, Zhongguo fojiao yu weishixue 中國佛教與唯識學 (Beijing: Zongjiao wenhua chubanshe, 
2003), 127-28. 
660 Guy Alitto, The Last Confucian: Liang Shu-ming and the Chinese Dilemma of Modernity (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1986) 3, 9. Notably, Liang himself openly rejected the notion that he 
could be classified as a conservative. See Liang Shuming 梁漱溟, Liang Shuming quanji 梁漱溟全集, 
vol.8, Committee of the Academy of Chinese Culture ed., (Jinan: Shandong Renmin, 2005), 1175. 
661 Thierry Meynard, The Religious Philosophy of Liang Shuming: The Hidden Buddhist (Leiden and Boston: 
Brill, 2011), 34. 
662 Liang Shuming, Yindu zhexue gailun 印度哲學概論, in Liang Shuming quanji 梁漱溟全集, vol. 1, 28. 
See also Thierry Meynard, The Religious Philosophy of Liang Shuming: The Hidden Buddhist, 105-110. 
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the same time, he established his ‘process philosophy’663 by adopting Yogācāra 
epistemology. In Liang’s view, the issues humans faced were changing. Material 
problems could be resolved -- Westerners had successfully demonstrated how to 
dominate nature and modify the natural environment in order to satisfy the basic 
needs of humanity; however, dissonance, uncertainty, polarity, and other problems 
pertaining to the interactions between human beings would be aroused. Therefore, 
Western modernity would ultimately head towards a revival of ‘oriental cultures,’ 
which had the potential to solve these issues in the spiritual sphere. He then placed 
the West in a peripheral position in his framework of progress, arguing that the West 
represented only a partial and limited image of the universal entity of modern 
culture. By this means, Liang reinserted his own understanding of ‘tradition’ within 
his teleological narrative of modernism, and thus reauthorized the supremacy of 
Chinese culture, although at the cost of making Chinese traditions de-complexified, 
homogenized, and de-historicized.664 
Unlike Liang Qichao and Zhang Taiyan, who chose Buddhism in their 
historiographical narratives due to strategic considerations but were not committed 
Buddhists, Liang Shuming’s understanding of history was largely presupposed on his 
philosophical ideas and religious commitment.665 His view of progressivism actually 
influenced his ambivalent position vis-à-vis Buddhism. He did share the idea of Taixu, 
Xiong Shili, and others, who found in Buddhism a metaphysical blueprint through 
which Buddhism as a perfect religion could lead to a supra-mundane reality. 
However, he emphasized the transcendental character of Buddhism and tried to keep 
Buddhism “intact and held in reserve for eschatological times.”666 He believed that it 
 
663 Wu Zhanliang 吳展良, “Liang Shuming de shengsheng sixiang jiqi dui xifang lixing zhuyi de pipan 
(1915-1923) 梁漱溟的生生思想及其對西方理性主義的批判,” in Dangdai ruxue lunji: chuantong yu 
chuangxin 當代儒學論集: 傳統與創新 (Taipei: ), 9-14. 
664 On the tendency of modern Chinese intellectuals to portray the Chinese tradition as a homogeneous 
whole that either should be or was in fact independent of foreign influence, see John Makeham, 
“Disciplining Tradition in Modern China: Two Case Studies,” in History and Theory 51 (2012): 89–103. 
665 In his youth and later years, he had a long experience of practicing Buddhism. On several occasions, 
he declared himself a Buddhist.  
666 Thierry Meynard, The Religious Philosophy of Liang Shuming: The Hidden Buddhist, 129. 
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was immoral and irresponsible to practice Buddhism in an age of turmoil, for it would 
lead to social escapism and weakened efforts toward national salvation.667 On this 
count, he had little sympathy for Taixu and Yinshun’s attempts at inventing a 
Buddhist ‘social gospel.’  
The prominent force of progressivism in the first decades of the twentieth 
century and the increasing opposition to it led to ceaseless debates within and 
between the circles of historians and Buddhists. The attitudes of the modern Chinese 
intellectuals towards progressivism were always divergent and ambiguous, varying 
from individual to individual.668 Not only did Zhang Taiyan reject the assumptions of 
linear time and progressive history, other intellectuals, like Wang Guowei, Chen 
Yinke, and Liu Yizheng, also questioned the validity of modernity by emphasizing the 
multi-layered changes operating in each age and the particularity of Chinese cultural 
tradition.669 Facing the challenge of modernity and the social upheaval China had 
undergone, modern intellectuals were forced to moderate the tension between the 
chaos in the present and the promise of the future, the universal pathway of progress 
and the particularity of each tradition, mundane issues and the transcendental ideal. 
Liang Qichao and Taixu, despite their different stands, are two representative 
examples who can show how the modern Chinese were attracted by the theory of 
progressivism and how they strategically attempted to utilize this theory or reconcile 
the serious disagreements it provoked.  
 
Narrating the Evolution of Buddhism  
 
667 Liang, Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, in Liang Shuming quanji 梁漱溟全集, vol. 1, 
533–534. 
668 Brain Moloughney and Peter Zarrow, Making History Modern: The Transformation of Chinese 
Historiography, 1895-1937, in Transforming History: The Making of a Modern Academic Discipline in Twentieth 
Century China, 27-32. 
669 One of the famous statements is Wang Guowei’s ‘every age had its own literature.’ See Yuan 
Yingguang 袁英光 and Liu Yinsheng 劉寅生, Wang Guowei nianpu changbian 王國維年譜長編 (1877-
1927) (Tianjing: Tianjing remin chubanshe, 1996), 91.  
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Had Chinese Buddhism evolved or regressed vis-a-vis its Indian origin? This was a 
very crucial question that Liang Qichao asked but did not answer.670 It was, of course, 
difficult for historians to answer such a question, for the standard of progress varied. 
More fundamentally, this question was associated with the discursive meaning of 
‘progress’ or ‘regress’ itself and hinged on how these notions were defined and 
conceptualized. Many modern Chinese intellectuals, no matter to which degree they 
embraced the modern definition of time, were attempting to legitimatize changes 
and reunite the split time dimension—whether it was linear, regressive, or cyclical—
into a historical continuum, when they were writing histories. This phenomenon is 
also evident in the modern historiography of Buddhism. Liang Qichao and Taixu are 
two representative examples. 
 
Liang Qichao: Nationalist Progressivism  
The influence of linear history and Progressivism on Liang Qichao was profound. 
When he participated in the Wuxu Reform in 1898, Liang’s definition of history was 
still characterized by a moral cosmology, although a distinctive touch of 
progressivism can be observed.671 Following the views of his mentor, Kang Youwei, 
the history of China, to young Liang, was a part of the three-phase movement that 
was proceeding towards an end, when the world would be united in the Great 
Harmony maintained by moral perfection.672 After the failure of the Reform, however, 
Liang abandoned these pretensions but more firmly supported a worldview deeply 
rooted in a nationalistic and evolutionary concept of history. He advocated a history 
 
670 Liang, “Fojiao jiaoli zai Zhongguo zhi fazhan 佛教教理在中國之發展,” in SBP, 149. This article was 
one chapter of Liang’s planned general history of Chinese Buddhism. According to Liang’s plan, he 
would discuss the development of every sect of Chinese Buddhism after this overall investigation.  
671 Chang, Hao, Liang Chi’-chao and Intellectual Transition in China, 1890-1907. 1971. Also Joseph Levenson, 
Confucian China and its Modern Fate, 1968.  
672 According to Levenson, in this phase (1989-1912), a paradigm shift could be observed in Liang’s 
discourse: the “precarious Confucian-Western” structure Liang had achieved in the 1890s readily gave 
way to a history-oriented belief in progress and nationalism. See Joseph Levenson, Liang Ch’i-ch’ao and 
the Mind of Modern China, 84-92. 
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that could provide an explanation for the course of history so that anticipation of the 
future and guidance for political and social movements would be possible.   
In Liang’s booklet On the Trends of the Chinese Scholarship published in 1902—his 
early attempt to systematically summarize and narrate the historical trends of 
Chinese scholarship—he placed ‘the age of Buddhism’ after ‘the age of Daoism’ 
(approximately from the Late Han to the Jin dynasties), marking it as one part of the 
zenith of Chinese civilization.673 Here, Liang Qichao adopted an ‘eight-ages’ scheme of 
periodization,674 which was developed from the thesis of Kang Youwei’s three epochs 
and resonantly matched the Western model of historical progress.675 In this 
introductory work, Liang’s study of Buddhism did not go beyond the framework set 
by several Japanese works, including Gyōnen’s 凝然 (1240-1321) Hasshū kōyō八宗綱
要, Kōchō Ogurusu’s Bukkyō jūnishū kōyō佛教十二宗綱要 (1886), and the five volumes 
of Bukkyō kakushū kōyō佛教各宗綱要 (1896) compiled by Shimaji Mokurai 島地默雷
(1838-1911).676 Referring to these works, Liang itemized ten sects and summarized 
their history very briefly and in order. At this time, Liang’s idea of the new 
historiography was still in its embryonic stage, but he had consciously improved the 
traditional historiographical model of ‘rise and fall,’ introducing the idea of 
progressivism in his writing. As indicated by the subheadings in this chapter on 
Buddhism, his study focused on investigating the ‘beginning’ [faduan 發端] and 
‘gradual flourish’ [jianci fada 漸次發達] of Buddhism in China.677 To Liang, the story 
of Chinese Buddhism could be, to a certain degree, considered a typical example of 
successful evolution: a foreign ‘other’ adapted to a new environment, rooted in new 
 
673 According to the proposal Liang listed in the ‘General Introduction,’ there was an ‘age of Buddhist-
Confucianism’ [儒佛混合時代] after ‘the age of Buddhism.’ However, he did not finish this part 
ultimately. 
674 Liang, “Zhongguo xueshu sixiang bianqi zhi dashi 中國學術思想變遷之大勢,” YBSHJ, Wenji: 7, 1-103.  
675 For the acceptance and critique of progressivism in modern China, see the articles in Thomas 
Fröhlich and Axel Schneider eds. Chinese Visions of Progress, 1895 to 1949, (Leiden, Brill, 2020). 
676 Liang noted that although he had strong interests in Buddhism, his knowledge in this domain was 
still limited. He then listed the works he had referred to. Liang, “Zhongguo xueshu sixiang bianqi zhi 
dashi 中國學術思想變遷之大勢,” YBSHJ, Wenji: 7, 71. 
677 Ibid. 62-63. 
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soil, took in nutrients from indigenous elements and grew into prosperity. 
Meanwhile, this foreign thought also breathed new air into the native culture and led 
it to “the full bloom” [quansheng 全盛].678  
Also, Liang tried to build up a causal link between the prevalence of Buddhism 
and the advanced native culture of China, portraying the history of Buddhism with a 
seminal progressive narrative and a nationalist concern. In the chapter ‘The Age of 
Buddhism,’ Liang suggested that Chinese Buddhism was a “new civilization of our 
nation”; it was not a simple inheritance of the Indian tradition, but was an innovative 
outgrowth of the Chinese people. He interpreted the acceptance of Buddhism as an 
active choice, a natural result of the evolution of Chinese civilization. As he 
suggested, the prevalence of Mahāyāna Buddhism could be attributed to the fact that 
“religion also complies with the universal principle of evolution”;679 that is, people 
would by instinct choose more mature, advanced religion. Following the track of the 
‘evolutionism of religion,’ he argued that people’s spiritual condition would evolve 
from “terrorism to salvationism, from egoism to altruism.” Therefore, the 
embracement of Mahāyāna Buddhism, which Liang believed to be the most spiritual 
part of Buddhism, demonstrated that the Chinese had already arrived at a higher 
stage of evolution compared to people in India and other regions, such as Tibet and 
Mongol, for they chose to believe in a more altruist, rationalized version of 
Buddhism.680  
A distinct methodological consciousness, especially a confidence in the 
method of science, permeated Liang’s writings on the history of Buddhism. For 
example, he delicately attempted to discover a ‘universal pattern’ of the distribution 
of Buddhism in China, applying the theory of historical geography to explain the 
early transmission of Buddhism with the paradigm of ‘Northern and Southern 
divergence.’681 He propagated as well the idea that we should understand the 
 
678 Ibid., 63.  
679  Ibid., 3. 
680 Ibid. 
681 Here Liang might be influenced by Yu Yue’s “Jiujiu Xiaoxia lu” 九九銷夏錄 and Huang Yizhou 黃以
周’s “Ziyou Zixia wenxue shuo” 子遊子夏文學說 as well as studies of historical geography written or 
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development of Buddhism as an evolutionary progression in a biological sense, since 
the development of Buddhism in China adhered to “the universal pattern of 
physiology” [shenglixue zhi gongli 生理學之公例] in which crossbreeding between 
populations often has positive effects on fitness-related traits (he cited grafting 
technique in botany and the principle of human and animal reproduction as 
evidence).682 
This view of progressivism led him to sing the praises of the achievements of 
Chinese Buddhism, which, he believed, would help China regain its dignity. The 
successful Sinicization of Buddhism historically proved that, as Liang claimed, China 
would again create a brilliant, unique, and extraordinary civilization by creatively 
synthesizing different thoughts into a harmonious entity, just as the ancient Chinese 
Buddhists did. The purpose of his writing of Buddhist history, then, was to eulogize 
the “great cause of those eminent Buddhist figures in the Sui and Tang dynasties” and 
to further “encourage our new youth” to dedicate themselves to the same calling.683 
His concern with the youth was not surprising, giving the symbolic existence of 
Liang’s multiple identities—a dedicated historian, a professional journalist, and an 
active educator. To him, Buddhism was not just a passive or silent object of 
historiography but a powerful tool of intellectual reformation: It was an ideal 
exemplar of the progress of religion, and also convincible evidence that optimistically 
ensured a successful revival of culture.   
In 1918, after a prolonged interruption of his academic career, Liang 
eventually returned to his large project of writing a general Chinese history,684 in 
 
translated by some modern Japanese historians, such as Ukichi Taguchi, Shigetaka Shiga, and so on. 
For this issue, see Chen Jingxu 陳經序, “Nanbei wenhua guan 南北文化觀,” in Lingnna xuebao 嶺南學
報, 3, 4 (1934). 
682 Liang, “Zhongguo xueshu sixiang bianqi zhi dashi 中國學術思想變遷之大勢,” 3.   
683 Ibid., 72.   
684 As early as 1902, Liang had already planned to write a ‘general history of China.’ He considered it as 
one of the most important projects of his academic life. In 1901, he published his Zhongguo shi xulun, 
which was, as planned, the introduction to his general history. Another article, Xin shixue, was 
considered the theoretical framework for this project. See Ding Wenjiang 丁文江 ed., Liang Qichao 
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which he planned to write a chapter on a comprehensive investigation of Chinese 
‘religions.’ However, only a few months later, this plan was disrupted again by a 
severe illness. During this period, Liang immersed himself in Buddhist literature, such 
as the Sutra of Perfect Enlightenment [Yuanjue jing 圓覺經] and the Śūraṅgama Sūtra 
[Shou lengyan jing 首楞嚴經], as well as the essays written by Ouyi Zhizu, Hanshan 
Deqing 憨山德清 (1546-1623) and other eminent monks of the Ming era to “console 
his ‘guilt’ of idling his time away.”685 In December 1918, Liang boarded a Japanese ship 
in Shanghai for the South Pacific to begin a year-long journey across Europe, which 
was still embroiled in the catastrophe inflicted by World War I. The Buddhist image of 
the ‘declining Dharma,’ which is miserable, unpredictable, and ceaselessly moving, 
accorded with what Liang observed in Europe. The devastated postwar landscape and 
the rampant social crises, together with the pessimism prevailing among European 
intellectuals, led to some serious transformations of Liang’s understanding of 
modernity.686  
In Europe, the crisis of modernity had emerged in the late nineteenth century. 
Accompanying this crisis was the long-term failure to reestablish a universal 
teleology of history. Universal reason, the backbone of the Enlightenment, was 
explicitly denied as the dominant factor in history and became itself historicized.687 
By the time of Liang’s travel in Europe, he sensitively realized there had been a 
change: the setting of modernity was experiencing a steady decline. Controlled by 
dis-causality and discontinuity, crises were increasing both ontologically and 
epistemologically. When he returned to China in 1920, Liang had concluded that the 
project of modernization had to be reimagined; otherwise, it would never be 
 
nianpu changbian 梁啟超年譜長編 (Shanghai: Remin chubanshe, 2009), 157. By 1904, Liang had 
completed 200,000 words and later published them under the title Guoshi gao國史稿. 
685 Ding Wenjiang ed., Liang Qichao Nianpu changbian 梁啟超年譜長編. 
686 Tang, Global Space and the Nationalist Discourse of Modernity: The Historical Thinking of Liang Qichao. 4-5. 
687 See Jörn Rüsen: Konfigurationen des Historismus. Studien zur deutschen Wissenschaftskultur (Frankfurt a. 
M: Suhrkamp, 1993), 18-113; as well as Friedrich Jaeger, Jörn Rüsen, Geschichte des Historismus: Eine 
Einführung (München: Verlag C.H. Beck, 1992).   
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completed as a truly global experience.688 His resistance to modern ideologies began 
with his action against the iconoclastic May Fourth movement in 1919 and continued 
into debates on Eastern/Western cultures689 and on science and metaphysics.690 In the 
next few years, he published a series of influential articles, increasingly doubting the 
evolutionary view of history that he had previously propagated.691 At the same time, 
he returned to Buddhist history and proposed writing a new general history of 
Buddhism. 
According to Liang’s uncompleted plan, the general history of Buddhism 
would consist of two stages: first, Buddhism before Sinicization and second, post-
Sinicized Buddhism. He further divided the first part into two chapters: Buddhism in 
India, which included his several articles on textual studies of original Buddhist 
literature, and Buddhism in the Western region [xiyu 西域]. The second part focused 
on the development of Buddhism after it had entered into China—namely, the “rise 
and fall” [xingshuai 興衰] of Chinese Buddhism692, including a series thematic articles 
focusing on topics such as the distribution of Buddhism, the translation of Buddhist 
scriptures, the formation of sects, and so on. 
 
688 Liang did not give up the project of China’s modernization and rejected the value of science. See 
Liang, “Kexue jingshen yu Dongxi wenhua 科學精神與東西文化” (8.20.1922), in YBSHJ: Wenji 39: 1-9, 
especially 8-9. “Rensheng guan yu kexue” (5.23.1923), in YBSHJ: Wenji 40, 20 -27.  See Tang, Global Space 
and the Nationalist Discourse of Modernity: The Historical Thinking of Liang Qichao. 5.  
689 Alitto, Guy, The Last Confucian, Liang Shu-ming and the Chinese Dilemma of Modernity, 1979. 
690 Kwok, D.W.T., Scientism in Chinese Thought, 1900-1950 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965) and 
Furth, Charlotte, Ting Wen-chiang: Science and China’s New Culture (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1970). 
691 See his “Ou you xinying lu 歐遊心影錄” (10-12.1919), in YBSHJ: Zhuanji 23:1-162, “Kexue jingshen yu 
zhongxi wenhua 科學精神與中西文化”; “Guanyu xuanxue kexue lunzhan zhi ‘zhanshi guoji gongfa’ 
關於科學玄學論戰之戰時’國際公法’” (1923), in YPSHJ: Wenji 40: 27-28, “Rensheng guan yu kexue 人
生觀與科學” (1923), 21-27; see also Joseph Levenson, Liang Ch’i-ch’ao and the Mind of Modern China, 84-
169. 
692 According to Liang’s plan, this article would be the second chapter of the second part of his general 
history of Buddhism. The first chapter of this part, “Fojiao zhi chushuru” 佛教之初輸入, had already 
been published in the journal Gaizao 改造 in August 1921. Later, Liang reassigned this article as an 
introductory chapter to the second part of his general history of Buddhism.  
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A nationalist historiographical view continued in Liang’s works of Buddhism, 
although he gradually gave up some of his former presuppositions, such as the 
universal progress of religion.693 He focused his studies on “the distinctive 
characteristics of Chinese Buddhism,” or what he called the “real face” of Buddhism: 
not the Indian origin of Buddhism but the real development of Buddhism throughout 
Chinese history. For example, in 1922, Liang Qichao wrote an article expounding that 
Dasheng Qixinlun was produced by Chinese Buddhists. However, instead of blaming 
Chinese Buddhism for its infidelity or lack of authenticity, he boasted, from a 
nationalistic perspective, that Chinese people should take pride in having created 
such a profound text by themselves.694  
However, there were many contradictions in Liang’s writing on the history of 
Buddhism. On the one hand, he stressed the immanence of meaning in particular 
history and tried to define Buddhism as a part of the unique identity of China; on the 
other hand, he searched for universal coherence to depict Buddhism as a world 
religion and integrate China into world history.695 In “The Early transmission of 
Buddhism,” the first article he wrote about the history of Buddhism during this 
phase, he suggested the mission of history was to clarify the developmental stages of 
Buddhism as one segment of the ‘universal pattern’ of intellectual evolvement.696 
However, he soon realized that it would be problematic to judge something as 
complex as Buddhism by such a subjective and dualist standard as ‘progressiveness’: 
If Chinese Buddhism had evolved from an Indian origin, how could Chinese Buddhism 
really be Chinese? If it was a result of evolution, how could it originate from a 
 
693 Liang’s political position as well as his view of religion and history experienced a turn at the end of 
1918. However, many scholars, such as Guo Peng, Xiao Wanyuan, and so on, have ignored this 
conceptual turn when discussing Liang’s Buddhist study. See Guo Peng 郭朋, Zhongguo jindai foxue 
sixiangshi中國近代佛學思想史稿, chapter 12; Xiao Wanyuan 蕭萬源, Zhongguo jindai sixiangjia de 
zongjiaoguan yu guishenguan 中國近代思想家的宗教觀與鬼神觀 (Hefei: Anhui renmin chubanshe, 
1991), chapter 4.    
694 In 1924, Liang Qichao published Dasheng qixinlun kaozheng 大乘起信論考證 (Beijing: Shangwu 
yinshuguan, 1924).  
695 Axel Schneider, “Shijie lishi yu lishi xiangdui zhuyi de wenti – 1919 nian yihou Liang Qichao de 
shixue 世界歷史與歷史相對主義的問題--1919年以后梁啟超的史學,” 238-59.  
696 Liang Qichao, “Fojiao zhi chushuru 佛教之初輸入,” in SBP, 29. 
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declining Indian Buddhism? And how could it become lifeless and corrupt after the 
Song dynasty? If Chinese Buddhism was basically created by the Chinese, how could it 
fit into the universal pattern of the evolution of Buddhism? This dilemma 
unavoidably led Liang to the dangerous and paradoxical conclusion that Chinese 
Buddhism was not Buddhism at all.  
Interestingly, Liang had never tried to cut the link between Chinese Buddhism 
and Indian Buddhism but rather placed great emphasis on the coherence between 
them. Among the over thirty articles he wrote on Buddhism from 1920 to 1925, 
around one-third were about the “primary Buddhism in India” or Indian Buddhist 
texts, such as Abhidharma Mahāvibhāṣā Śāstra and āgama. This tendency made Liang 
the first modern historian to break regional boundaries and write a general history of 
Buddhism from the age of the Buddha onwards to the full establishment of Chinese 
Buddhism. It represented his proposal to write a ‘global cultural history,’ which, some 
scholars believe, was based on his conceptual construction of the “global imaginary of 
difference.”697 In Liang’s view, Buddhism in India, following the ‘universal pattern of 
organic growth,’ determined the “characteristics of species” of Buddhism, based on 
which Chinese Buddhism developed its own features.698 He described this relationship 
as ‘evolving in parallel’ [pianjin 駢進], which differed from his earlier use of 
‘evolution’ [jinhua 進化].  
Knowing the transcultural process of ‘pianjin’, Liang claimed, was “the basic 
preparation for writing the histories of every Buddhist sect.”699 Here, Liang implied a 
comparative way of thinking, which further led him to emphasize the particularity of 
different traditions. Using Buddhism as one example, he tried to contextualize the 
coherence in cultural development with the real objects of history—the concrete 
experience caused by the ‘pianjin’ between different cultures. From this comparative 
perspective, he avoided the model of “survival of the fittest” in his early narrative 
and abandoned his former framework of the ‘the universal pattern of physiology,’ 
 
697 See Tang, Global Space and the Nationalist Discourse of Modernity: The Historical Thinking of Liang Qichao. 5. 
But I do not agree Tang’s idea that Liang gave up his ‘history writing in the nationalist tradition.”   
698 Liang Qichao, SBP, 40 
699 Ibid, 41. 
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which involved a deterministic teleology and an oversimplified logic based on 
science. However, he still attempted to resurrect some sort of certainty and 
maintained that there is a tendency of moving towards this certainty in history.  
After he wrote a dozen articles on Buddhist history, Liang published in the 
autumn of 1921 one of the most important theoretical works on the ontology and 
methodology of historiography: Methods for the study of Chinese history [Zhongguo lishi 
yajiu fa中國歷史研究法].700 As indicated in this text, Liang’s theory had profoundly 
changed. One year later, Liang further systematized his developed ideas on history as 
supplementary remarks on methods in the article “What is Culture”701 [Shenme shi 
wenhua 甚麼是文化] and in his talk under the same title at Jingling University. 
Inspired by Buddhism, especially the Yogācārian doctrines, which he was studying 
under the guidance of Ouyang Jingwu, he redefined “culture” by introducing the 
Buddhist term of karma [deed, ye, 業], and further drew a distinction between 
“individual deeds” [bieye 別業] and “general deeds” [gongye 共業]. Liang argued, the 
latter, which was involved in the construction of culture, was not a preset structure, 
but heavily depended on human agency. Hence, culture was not determined by 
causality but by human creation and imitation, which was free, limited, and 
interdependent.702 By distinguishing individuality from eternal values, Liang stressed 
the occasional, subjective, and emotional factors in history.703 This transition had 
already appeared in his writings of the history of Buddhism. In one article, he 
discussed the function of one human free will, ‘the will for knowledge [xuewenyu 學
問慾], in the acceptance of Buddhism among the learned Chinese.704 In another 
article, he stressed this “will for knowledge” and “the wish for mental comfort” as 
essential motivations behind Buddhism-related historical events and activities, such 
 
700 This text is based on a series of lectures Liang Qichao gave at Nankai University during which he 
obviously started to reconsider his view of history; thus, he ended the sixth and last lecture by 
contradicting the first one.  
701 Liang, “Shenme shi wenhua 什麼是文化,” YBSHJ, Wenji 39: 97-104. 
702 Ibid.  
703 Axel Schneider, “Shijie lishi yu lishi xiangdui zhuyi de wenti – 1919 nian yihou Liang Qichao de 
shixue 世界歷史與歷史相對主義的問題--1919年以后梁啟超的史學,” 251. 
704 Liang Qichao, SBP, 4. 
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as the pilgrimages of Chinese monks to India and the early undertakings of 
translation of Buddhism doctrines.705 These immanent factors related to human free 
will, to Liang, may not have been the fundamental cause of historical developments 
but were a dimension that should not be overlooked when examining historical 
changes. 
  Oscillating between his respect for particular identity and his wish to envision 
a normative and universal core of history, Liang attempted to find ways to reconcile 
the paradox of nationalism and modernity by borrowing from Buddhism, a resource 
he believed to be “the supreme cultural outcome of human beings.”706 In the essay 
“Several Important Questions of Studying Cultural History” he published later, Liang 
stressed again the element of culture behind historical issues and once more defined 
the subject matter of history as individual and particular in both temporal and spatial 
dimensions.707 Here, Liang borrowed the Buddhist notion of “interdependenc” 
[huyuan 互緣] and used it to replace the mechanical, unidirectional concept of 
causality.708 According to him, one should avoid readily associating historical 
phenomena with philosophical laws. He was also opposed considering the mission of 
history to be describing one facet of our physical world and further rejected an 
objective historiography. In his Buddhist history, Liang had realized ‘the intellectual 
undercurrent’ and ‘the background of time’ behind the transmission, acceptance, and 
Sinicization of Buddhism in China, which have been to some extent occasional, 
emotional, and unique.709  
Liang’s sustained effort to write the history of Buddhism had profoundly 
influenced his whole scholarship. Current studies on Liang’s historiography, however, 
 
705 Ibid. 
706 Ding Wenjiang, “Wei chuanban wenhua xueyuan shi qiuzhu yu guozhong tongzhi為創辦文化學院
事求助於國中同志” in Liang Qichao xiansheng Nianpu changbian, 梁啟超先生年譜長編, 1223.  
707 Liang, “Yanjiu wenhua shi de jige zhongyao wenti 研究文化史的幾個重要問題” (1922), in YBSHJ: 
Wenji 40, 1-7. 
708 There were still realms that Liang insisted were controlled by the universal law of evolution, for 
example, natural science. See Liang, “Zhongguo lishi yanjiu fa (bubian) 中國歷史研究法(補編),” 
YBSHJ, Zhuanji, 73: 111-113. 
709 Liang Qichao, SBP, 5 
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have focused too heavily on external impacts, Western ideologies, political forces, 
and so on while ignoring his critical reflections on modernity and his adaption of this 
concept by picking over concepts and theories from native thought. It is important 
that, no matter how hard he promoted new theories, the Sino-centric discourse in his 
writings remained emphatic and decisive. Buddhism, which fundamentally 
contradicted his earlier belief in Darwinist progressivism, did not bring him any 
feeling of repugnance but, in contrast, helped to form his cosmology and his own 
outlook on life.710 Buddhism helped him to banish his too-optimistic faith in certainty 
and causality and inspired him to reflect on national particularity, historical 
coherence, and cultural interdependence. Therefore, Liang was not ‘unwittingly’ 
revealing the meaning of modern Chinese history, as Levenson has described, but 
consciously attempting to overcome the pitfall of progressivism and the 
shortcomings of modern historiography, amending them with Buddhist and some 
other traditional discourses (Confucianism, for example).711  
 
Taixu: Buddhist Evolutionism 
As a Buddhist reformer, Taixu made efforts to visualize Buddhism as a ‘modern, 
global and useful religion.’ He called for several innovative but sometimes ‘radical’ 
religious changes, including institutional reorganization, a new style of monastic 
education, compassionate social action, and global ecumenical missionaries. Instead 
of pursuing rebirth in the Western Paradise of Amitābha, Taixu was concerned more 
about the fulfilment of the Pure Land in this world. This conception of Buddhist 
modernism was provocative at that time.712 Behind this groundbreaking manifesto of 
 
710 Ibid, 1217. About what he learnt from Buddhism, he noted especially two points, which both related 
to his view of time and space: 1. The cosmos is not perfect; 2. Humans cannot exist fully independently.   
711 Joseph Levenson, Confucian China and its Modern Fate, A Trilogy (Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1970), 1. 
712 For example, the respected Pure Land Master Yinguang portrayed Taixu as gifted but dangerously 
strident and disruptive voice in the Buddhist community. See Pittman, Toward a Modern Chinese 
Buddhism: Taixu's Reforms. 2   
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“Buddhism for the human world” was Taixu’s novel but controversial understanding 
of Buddhist history and his critical interpretation of evolutionary theory.  
Similar to many young people in that era of transition, Taixu considered 
modern theories, which had been introduced from the West to China by intellectuals 
such as Kang Youwei, Yan Fu, Zhang Taiyan, and Liang Qichao, to be instruments for 
his plan of building a relevance between Buddhism and modern society. His 
envisioned plan, according to Don. A. Pittman, was to propagate Buddhism all over 
the world through well-educated and modern-style clergy. To Taixu, the 
rehabilitation of saṃgha as well the global transmission of Buddhism as a world 
religion would be fulfilled not through reliance on the spiritual merit and power of 
other great bodhisattvas and buddhas, but through the qualified dedication and 
sacrificial hard work of thousands of average Buddhist believers.713 Therefore, Taixu 
emphasized the systematic preaching of Buddhist teachings to massive audiences 
with lucid, updated, or ‘fashionable’ expressions. History and science were two main 
tactics he used to interpret Buddhist doctrines to make them seem more 
comprehensible, convincing, and attractive.  
Among Taixu’s voluminous works, a short essay “A Brief History of Buddhism” 
[Fojiao shilue 佛教史略] is not conspicuous but important. Published in 1909, this work 
demonstrated Taixu’s view of Buddhism in world history. Under the influence of 
newly written books on world history, for example, H.G. Wells’ A Short History of the 
World,714 Taixu made his first attempt to describe the creation, development, and 
distribution of Buddhism from the Buddha’s time to a globalizing age in a simple, 
grand outline, targeting common readers who had limited knowledge of Buddhism. 
Describing India as the origin of Buddhist history, Taixu in this writing roughly 
 
713 Pittman, Toward a Modern Chinese Buddhism: Taixu's Reforms, 222. 
714 In a review of Wells’ book, full of references to evolution, geology, progress, and science, Taixu 
criticized Wells for his treatment of both Chinese and Buddhist history. See Taixu “Lun Shijieshi gang
論世界史綱,” in TXQS, vol.16, 256-264. Wells had consulted with Fu Si-nian for his chapters on China, 
so ironically Taixu’s primary contact with Fu Sinian’s historiography was through the Chinese 
translation of Well’s work. For an analysis on this issue, see John Kieschnick, Buddhist Historiography in 
China, forthcoming. 310. For Wells and Fu, see Wang Fansen, Fu Ssu-nien: A Life in History and Politics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 57-58. 
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depicted a larger Buddhist world that included Tibet, Ceylon, and the pan-East Asian 
area. Besides, he used a new pattern of periodization to replace the traditional 
doctrinal classification system and lineage-based narrative, arranging Buddhist 
history into a framework combining religious priority with a secularized geographic 
principle.715 He first divided the history of Buddhism into two stages: the age of 
creation [chuangpi shidai 創闢時代] and the age of dissemination [liuchuan shidai 流
傳時代]. Then he applied a historio-geographical framework to further divide post-
Buddha Buddhism into three branches: the Indian Age, the Asian Age, and the Global 
Age. He further demarcated two phases of development in the Asian Age: “from 
embryonic to flourishing” [cong kaichuang dao quansheng 從創開到全盛]” and 
“from transforming to declining” [cong biantong dao shuailuo 從變通到衰落]. He 
indicated in this essay that if there was no complete history of Buddhism that could 
record events that manifested Buddhism’s rise and fall and convey its universal and 
supreme principles, the “reasons” [yuanyin 原因] or “spirits” [jingshen 精神] within 
Buddhist teaching would not be uncovered. 716  
In this early text, Taixu tried to locate Chinese Buddhism in the broader, 
transregional historical context. To him, Buddhism was, from the Buddha’s time, 
initially a religion for all sentient beings. He emphasized that the history of 
Buddhism—with all its developments, divergencies, and changes—was the 
representation [yinghuag 應化] of an ultimate root: the Buddha’s teaching.717 This 
“principle of the development of the Dharma,” which determined Buddhism 
historically, in Taixu’s words, was the Buddha’s “heart seal” [xinyin 心印].718 
Therefore, when discussing the changes in Buddhism over a longer period of time, 
Taixu always referred to the Buddha’s time as a criterion. He organized historical 
phenomena and made judgments, according to his dichotomic frame of time: a 
 
715 Taixu might have been influenced by Liang Qichao. Liang had applied a similar framework in his 
Dashi. However, their views differed in some ways. For example, Liang dismissed the legend of the 
early transmission of Buddhism in Han China in his article “Fojiao zhi shuru 佛教之初輸入.” 
716 Taixu, “Fojiao shi lüe 佛教史略,” TXQS, vol.1, 895. 




primary, original, Indian age and a diverse, derivative, global age. In the chapter 
“History of Teaching” [xueshi 學史] in his General Introduction to Buddhism [Fofa 
zonglun 佛法總論], this framework was continuedly used but with some slight 
changes: Buddhist history was summarized into two major categories: “Indian 
Buddhism with three stages” and “global Buddhism with three pedigrees.”719  
Taixu’s account of Chinese Buddhism relied heavily on traditional narratives 
that had been circulated in China for centuries.720 For example, Taixu’s discussions of 
Chinese Buddhist history conventionally bridged Chinese lineages with Indian 
masters by referring to doctrinal evidence; he also uncritically accepted the 
traditional story of Buddhism’s early transmission in the Later Han dynasty, which 
had been widely contested by many historians and Buddhism scholars as lacking 
textual evidence,721 and he showed less interest in newly discovered materials, such 
as the Dunhuang scriptures. Partly influence by the legendary deeds of ancient 
Buddhist figures (Aśvaghoṣa, Nāgārjuna, Vasubandhu, Asanga, Emperor Yang of Sui, 
Emperor Taizu of Ming, etc.) Taixu emphasized a historical heroism, which he 
believed responded to the call for a Buddhist ‘revival’ in the modern age. With his 
statement that “history is the genealogical records of heroes”722, he encouraged 
modern saṃgha and Buddhist believers to take up the burden of responsibility of 
writing and publicizing “a national history of Chinese Buddhist heroes” for the sake 
of encouraging changes and revolution.723  
As early as when Taixu wrote of the shilüe, he had realized with full self-
consciousness that he was not a ‘good’ historian; but rather, he would be someone 
who would witness, participate in, and also create history. Partly because of this hope 
 
719 TXQS.vol.1 
720 For example, he claimed that the first scripture the Buddha preached was the Avatamsakasūtra. 
721 In Taixu’s time, there were several debates on the beginning of Chinese Buddhism; most of them 
were first started by Liang Qichao. Other debates focused on the issue of the authenticity of some 
important Buddhist scriptures, such as the Dasheng qixinlun 大乘起信論 and Mouzi lihuo lun 牟子理惑
論. For a detailed study on these debates, see chapter. 5.   
722 “歷史第為英雄之牒譜.” Taixu, “Fojiao shi lüe 佛教史略,” in TXQS, vol.1, 895. 
723 Taixu, “Fojiao zhi Zhongguo minzu yingxiong shi 佛教之中國民族英雄史,” in Haichaoyin, 24, no.6: 2; 
in MFQ, v.201, 226. 
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to contemplate the future of Buddhism in a more independent and theoretical way, in 
October 1914, Taixu entered a voluntary isolated study and meditation known as 
“sealed confinement” [biguan 閉關] for three years.724 Surrounding by silence and 
tranquility on Putuo Island, Taixu devoted himself to an extensive reading program 
ranging from the Buddhist canon and Chinese classics to modern Western literature. 
New ideas and theories, especially in the works of Yan Fu and Zhang Taiyan, inspired 
him to scrutinize the Tripitaka from some new angles.725 After this seclusion, Taixu’s 
reflection on the past and future of Buddhism had deepened. Besides his general 
preaching of Buddhist wisdom in comprehensible, simple language, he began to 
establish a Buddhist worldview—a synthesized, hybrid discourse of cosmology on 
time, space, and humankind. By doing so, Taixu explored, from a historical 
perspective, the possibility that Buddhism could explain past and present changes, 
solve the current dilemma, and promise this world the fulfillment of the Pure Land—
namely, the possibility that Buddhism could become “the sound of the sea tide” for a 
new era.  
 From 1915, the notion of ‘evolution’ became one of the key words in Taixu’s 
writing. However, Taixu always used ‘evolution’ in a strategical manner. In 1915, he 
published a text entitled “On the School of Evolutionism” [Lun tianyan zong論天演
宗], providing a critical commentary on the theory of evolution from the perspective 
of Buddhism. In this article, he described evolutionism as the most influential school 
of thought宗 during the nineteenth century, which was developed from Kant, 
Spenser, to Darwin and other philosophers and sociologists. He discussed that the 
theory of evolution was an expression (in the sense of language) of the universal 
pattern of changes under the rubric of modern science, which, according to him, 
shared a common foundation of the Dharma. Similar to the Buddhist doctrines, Taixu 
argued, this theory also had four dimensions: phenomenon [guandai daoli 觀待道理], 
 
724 Biguan, as a ritual of self-isolation, is a highly respected religious practice of self-discipline for 
Chinese monks, during which they are released from the usual expectations associated with communal 
living and permitted to read and meditate on their own. On the practice of biguan, see Welch, The 
Practice of Chinese Buddhism, 1900-1950 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), 321-322.  
725 Pittman, Toward a Modern Chinese Buddhism: Taixu's Reforms. 83. 
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definition [zhengcheng daoli 證成道理], function [zuoyong daoli 作用道理], and 
essence[faer daoli 法爾道理], which generally corresponded to the domains of 
phenomenology, epistemology, teleology, and ontology in the framework of Western 
philosophy.726  
However, as mentioned above, Taixu’s utilization of ‘evolution’ was always an 
‘expedient means’. He had never been entirely convinced by this modern discourse or 
related theories such as social Darwinism and progressivism. Taixu acknowledged 
that evolutionism had a positive impact on civilizations because it not only 
contributed to the birth and development of science but also encouraged people to 
pursue a better future through expanding the realm of knowledge and following the 
principle of causality.727 However, although Taixu admitted that the theory of 
evolution “is extensive, profound and has the insights into changes and details,”728 he 
pointed out that the scope of this theory was still temporally and spatially limited; it 
was only an imperfect description of the ‘fa’ 法, the truth of the inherent law of the 
universe.729 
Further, Taixu pointed out that the theory of evolution encountered several 
dilemmas. First, according to the theory, things can change or move only when a 
power triggers the movement in the very first place. Therefore, ‘evolution’ has its 
beginning and end; it is controlled, determined, and can be accelerated or stopped. 
Taixu named the driving force suggested by the theory of evolution “the power of 
meta-material [yuanzhi li 原質力].” This power, in Taixu’s view, is however 
unknowable and untouchable. Questions about the intrinsic characteristics of this 
meta-material power, for example, whether it is homogeneous or heterogeneous, 
cannot be answered. Therefore, the theory of evolution is not perfect; this power of 
meta-material, as Taixu’s argued, is essentially equivalent to ‘God’, in the Western 
 
726 TXQS, 287. 
727 Ibid, 299. 
728 Ibid, 284. The original text is: “察化知微, 思精體大.” 




religious sense. Therefore, the whole setting of evolutionism is not as ‘scientific’ as it 
claims. 
Second, Taixu compared the theory of evolution to the Buddhist teaching of 
‘yuanqi’ [pratītya-samutpāda; dependent origination; 緣起]. Taixu suggested that the 
assertions of the theory of evolution, such as the law of conservation of energy, the 
connections and differentiations between things, the principle of movement, etc., 
had already been elaborated by the Buddhist idea of twelve-fold links [nidāna; shier 
yinyuan 十二因緣] and the Buddhist logico-epistemology. For example, the term 
‘material’ in the theory of evolution was equivalent to the Buddhist concept of rūpa 
[form; se 色]; the term ‘force’ was similar to the Buddhist skandha [the aggregates of 
clinging; yun 蘊].730 Almost every concept of evolutionism had been already 
elaborated by the Buddhist doctrine of “the craving [Taṇhā; ai 愛], clinging [Upādāna; 
qu 取] and becoming [Bhava; you 有] of yuanqi [yuanxing yuanqi zhi ai qu you san zhi 
緣性緣起之愛取有三隻].” Very sensitively, Taixu asked a crucial question in this 
essay: after observing the degeneration, corruption, and chaos of our world, why did 
the Tianyan school still wish to justify the process of evolution? To Taixu, the theory 
of Tianyan, which targeted this phenomenal world, was “the illusory principle of the 
universe [yuzhou jiafa 宇宙假法].” It would inevitably fail to lead people to real 
‘liberation.’ Moreover, its concepts overstressed the ‘function’ or ‘effect [yeyong 業
用]’ of human actions but ignored the transcendental essence of the ‘heart’. The 
mechanical causality it advocated, Taixu argued, was also problematic, for it always 
blamed other external factors as reasons and exonerated oneself from responsibility. 
Therefore, the theory of evolution had attached itself to the captive material world; it 
obeyed illusory changes幻化 and dismissed the Tathātā [suchness, zhenru 真如].  
Third, the overall development of human society, Taixu stated, was not a 
linear movement towards a brighter future, but rather “neither progressive nor 
degenerate, neither karmic nor non-karmic.”731  As demonstrated in his article “Are 
 
730 In seeking to connect science and the Dharma, Taixu occasionally stretched his point, as in a 
discussion of evolution in which he appeared to conflate biological evolution with transmigration. 
[Principles 34]. 
731 Taixu, “Shijian wanyou wei Jinhua yi wei tuihua世間萬有為進化抑為退化,” TXQS, 336. 
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All Worldly Things Evolving or Regressing?” [Shijian wanyou wei jinhua yiwei tuihua 
世間萬有為進化抑為退化], Taixu divided the universe into three realms, following 
the framework Monk Fazang 法藏（643～712）had precisely parsed in his “Huayan 
wujiao zhang 華嚴五教章”: the mundane [laukika; shijian 世間], the supramundane 
of the three vehicles [Triyāna, sansheng 三乘], and the transcendent supramundane 
belonging to the one vehicle [ekayāna, dasheng 大乘].732 The mundane Dharma [shijian 
fa 世間法] applied to the world [bhājanaloka, qishijian 器世間] of ordinary sentient 
beings and the karmic changes in a cyclic movement733; the supramundane Dharma, 
which refers to enlightened practitioners such as bodhisattvas, demonstrated the 
path to the tranquil, changeless, and empty realm of Buddhahood. According to 
Taixu, the supramundane Dharma of the three vehicles is not progressive, but rather 
regressive, moving backwards from formation to dissolution and finally towards 
soteriological freedom, namely the moksha. The supramundane Dharma of the shared 
one vehicle [dasheng gongfa大乘共法], however, is progressive again (when judging 
from the perspective of the “practice-position [yinwei 因位]” in Taixu’s words), 
because the bodhisattvas must make progress to achieve the fruition of becoming 
Buddha. After entering into the stage of being Buddha, there will be no progress 
anymore but only “perfection and eternity [yuanchang 圓常].”734 Taixu’s attitude 
towards Evolutionism, therefore, had two points: firstly, things in the mundane world 
are in karmic movement; secondly, real ‘progress’ can only be observed and 
understood as one phase of the bodhisattva path, which is determined by “the 
 
732 According to Fazhang, of the ten stages [daśabhūmi] of the path leading to buddhahood, stages one 
through three belong to the mundane [laukika]; the fourth to the seventh stages are supramundane 
from the standpoint of the three vehicles [Triyāna 三乘] of śrāvaka [shengwen 聲聞], pratyekabuddha 
[yuanjue 緣覺], and bodhisattva [pusa 菩薩]; and the eighth to the tenth stages transcend even the 
supramundane and belong to the one vehicle [dasheng 大乘]. 
733 In Sanskrit, Qishi jian means literally “container world,” referring to the wider environment, or the 
physical or inanimate world, whose function is to serve merely as a “container” for the lives of 
ordinary sentient beings [sattva]. Its ancillary production and cessation as well as its overall physical 
qualities are considered to be by-products of the actions [Karman] of sentient beings. Qishi jian moves 
ceaselessly in the circle of ‘formation’ [vivartakalpa], ‘duration’ [vivartasthāyikalpa], ‘dissolution’ 
[saṃvartakalpa], and ‘nothingness’ [saṃvartasthāyikalpa]. 
734 Taixu, “Shijian wanyou wei Jinhua yi wei tuihua世間萬有為進化抑為退化,” TXQS, 336. 
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practice-position of the transcendent supramundane Dharma that belongs to the one 
vehicle 出世的一分大乘不共因位菩薩法.”735  
Based on this cosmological understanding, Taixu ‘invented’ his ‘Buddha-lized’ 
theory of evolution under the rubric of “evolutionism for the gradual teaching of the 
great vehicle” [Dasheng jianjiao jinhua lun 大乘漸教進化論]. In his eponymous 
lecture delivered in 1930, Taixu maintained his early division of the mundane and 
supramundane realms, but largely generalized the concepts of ‘progress’ and 
‘evolution’ as universal verdicts in Buddhist teaching. In detail, he argued that the 
evolutionism of the great vehicle had eight dimensions. It 1) was unlimited in time 
and space; 2) moved from bad interests [equ惡趣] to meritous interests [shanqu善
趣]; 3) moved from wrong views [xiejian 邪見] to right views [zhengjian 正見]; 4) 
moved from mundaneness [sushi 俗世] to true eternity[zhenchang 真常]; 5) moved 
from the lower vehicle [xiacheng 下乘] to the upper vehicle [shangcheng上乘]; 7) 
moved from understanding and practice 解行 to personal realization 親證; 7) moved 
from bodhisattva to Buddha; 8) moved from being Buddha to saving all sentient 
beings[du youqing 度有情]. As shown in this article, he accepted the notion of 
evolution but re-wove it into a Buddhist version of evolutionism. As shown here, 
Taixu, as a Buddhist modernist, embraced new concepts and values to reform 
Buddhism into the most ‘evolutionary’ religion, “a tolerant, receptive, universal faith 
which is essential to the realization of world unity,”736 and for propagandizing this 
modern image of Buddhism to the rest of the world.  
Partly out of pragmatic choice, Taixu considered ‘evolution’ as the key to the 
‘survival’ and ‘revival’ of Buddhism. The solution for the crisis Buddhism faced in 
such a secular, modern world would be linking the best part of the past with new 
 
735 “出世的一分大乘不共因位菩薩法 Ibid, 337. The unshared Dharma [Āvenika(buddha)dharma, 
bugongfa, 不共法, literally means the special qualities that are unique to the Buddha. They usually 
appear in a list of eighteen. For this unshared Dharma, see the entry of ‘Āvenika(buddha)dharma’ in the 
Princeton Dictionary of Buddhism, 85. Also Yinshun, Chenfo zhidao 成佛之道, Chapter 5. Taixu’s 
classification of the shared Dharma and the unshared Dharma has also been accepted by later 
Buddhists, such as Shengyan. See Shengyan, “Zhengxin de fojiao 正信的佛教.”  
736 “Urge Cultural tie with the Orient: Delegates Representing Eastern and Western Religions Unite in 
Movement to Promote World Peace,” New York Times, March 6, 1929. 
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concepts and interpretations appropriate to the future,737 that is, preserving an 
organic connection with the old Chinese Buddhism and at the same time freeing it 
from the entanglements of superstitions and obscure practices that had loaded it 
down and brought it under the scorn of so many educated people.738 To reach this 
goal, Taixu set a hierarchy between Buddhism and other religions and other forms of 
knowledge.739 He wrote that  
The scientific method in its study of the natural world organizes and classifies 
knowledge through careful analysis... but the things which have been analyzed are 
actually a complete whole, or a living organism. Science cannot analyze [the 
whole].”740 
Clearly, to Taixu, science, although not conflicting with Buddhism, was overconfident 
in its methods and myopically attempted to “improve [its] instruments rather than 
[its] inner vision.”741 Thus it consequently ignored the Dharma and could never 
achieve the direct insight necessary for seeing the entire universe as it really is, i.e. 
the suchness.742 Only Buddhism, which was based not upon an untenable belief in a 
creator god but upon the “eternal, unlimited, and absolute conception of the spiritual 
and material phenomena of the universe,”743 had the potential to remedy the lack of 
 
737 Pittman, Toward a Modern Chinese Buddhism: Taixu’s Reforms, 237.  
738 Karl L. Reichelt, “Trends in China’s non-Christian Religions,” Chinese Recorder 65 (March 1934): 763. 
739 Taixu classified what he saw as the primary forms of knowledge in a hierarchy ranging from merely 
animal awareness to the perfect awareness of an enlightened Buddha. Included in this scheme were 
“theoretical forms of knowledge” that Taixu tried to bring into harmony with the Dharma. These 
“theoretical forms of knowledge” came in four varieties: scientific, philosophical, religious, and moral. 
See Taixu, “Learning: Its Purpose and Method,” T'ai-hsü: His Life and Teachings, ed. Chou Hsiang-kuang 
(Allahabad: Indo-Chinese Literature Publications 1957], 63. For the summary and a very clear diagram 
of Taixu’s classification, see Justin Rizinger, Taixu: To Renew Buddhism and Save the Modern World, thesis, 
Lawrence University (1999): 23-24. 
740 Paul E. Callahan, “T’ai-hsü and the New Buddhist Movement.” Harvard University: Paper on China 6 
(1952): 163. 
741 Taixu, “Fojiao yu kexue 佛教與科學,” TXQS, 47. 
742 Ibid., 41. 
743 Taixu, “The History of Buddhism and Its Recent Tendencies,” T’ai-hsü: His Life and Teachings, ed. 
Chou Hsiang-kuang (Allahabad: Indo-Chinese Literature Publications, 1957), 22. 
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science. In this sense, Buddhism, alone among religions, “does not contradict 
scientific truth but rather confirms it.”744  
Taixu’s attitude towards Western philosophy, however, was somewhat less 
consistent. At times he gave it credit for its pursuit of truth, while at other times he 
treated it as little more than a two-thousand-year mistake. For instance, in a lecture 
given in France he described the entire history of Western philosophy as a sort of 
‘progressive’ descent towards error.745 According to him, Western philosophy, over 
centuries, had gradually digressed from its ancient Greek origin and its proper aim of 
investigating the noumenon and fallen into endless controversies, impeding real 
progress. This descent, he argued, originated from the methods that people used to 
penetrate the noumenon. Noumenon could not be known by analysis and 
observation, but through meditation and awakening.746  
Similar criticism has been observed in Taixu’s comments on modern 
historiography. Being unsatisfied with Wells’ Short History of the World and criticizing 
that Wells misunderstood Buddhism as a “progressive religion” and was “unable to 
fully understand the Buddha,”747 Taixu formulated his own general view of history, 
which he called “the dependently-originated conception of history [yuancheng 
shiguan 緣成史觀].” This view of history, as shown in a lecture he delivered in 1930, 
concentrated on the causal links between historical developments while he seemed 
ignore other factors, such as the diachronic changes in particular phenomena and the 
disruptions in history. Taixu suggested that history needs to focus on the universal, 
inescapable, and interdependent conditions [yuan 緣] among all sentient beings.748 He 
used the term yuancheng to take the place of historical continuity, relationship, and 
reason. For example, the life of the Buddha was narrated as a historical, provable 
 
744 Ibid, 30. For Taixu’s ideas on science, for example, Einstein’s theory of relativity, see Wing-tsit Chan, 
Religious Trends in Modern China (NY: Columbia University Press, 1953), 88-9. 
745 TXQS. 
746 Taixu, “Philosophy and Buddhism,” in Chou Hsiang-kuang ed., T’ai-hsü: His Life and Teachings, 
(Allahabad: Indo-Chinese Literature Publications, 1957), 48-57. 
747 TXQS, 164 
748 Ibid, 167, 169.  
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exemplar that demonstrated the interdependence between historical moments and 
the potentiality of the realization of Buddhahood, which could be actualized again in 
a ‘future’ time span. This idea, which linked the interdependence of historical actors 
with a promised ‘achievement’ [cheng 成], indicated a soteriological end in history 
that could be manifested by the fulfilment of every individual.749 In this sense, the 
historical thumbnail of Buddhism’s past that Taixu depicted here was, to a large 
extent, a referential image of his Buddhist revolution in the present.  
In creating a discourse that could harmonize Buddhism with modernity and 
justify Buddhism in the flow of time, Taixu indeed mediated his belief in Buddhism 
with the mainstream of modern ideologies—science, progressivism, and revolution—
by claiming that modern theories all approached the truth of Buddhism and that both 
these theories and Buddhism envisioned the future similarly. Therefore, Taixu 
believed that history, although it had had a long-term decline after the golden age of 
the Buddha, would be redirected in a progressive direction by the revival of 
Buddhism. This open-future view of history was an innate facet of the path of the 
bodhisattva and the faith of Maitreya, and had no contradictions with the modern 
discourses such as atheism and utopianism.750 He even wrote, articulating a Mahāyāna 
Buddhist argument with Marxist overtones, 
Progress in the realm of government is from the authority of tribal chieftains 
to a monarchy, and from a monarchy to a republic, and from a republic to [the ideal 
of] no-government at all. In religion, progress is from [the belief in] many gods to one 
 
749 In the original Indian tradition, though Maitreya arrives in a future golden age, he does not bring it 
about. However, by the seventh century, some Chinese Buddhists had developed a different view that 
considered Maitreya to be a power of salvation. This became a powerful idea for the rest of Chinese 
history, associated with rebellions and uprisings. See Jan Nattier, “The Meanings of the Maitreya Myth: 
A Typological Analysis,” in Alan Sponberg and Helen Hardacre ed., Maitreya, the Future Buddha 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 36.  
750 For Taixu’s position on anarchism and utopianism, see Ritzinger, “Anarchy in the Pure Land: 
Tradition, Modernity, and the Reinvention of the Cult of Maitreya in Republican China,” 28-98. 
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god, from one god to sages and worthies, and from sages and worthies to no religion 
at all.751 
In Taixu’s view, Mahāyāna Buddhism, which contains elements of atheism and 
anarchism, demonstrated the superior stage of the evolutionary process of all human 
civilizations. The religion-less future would come when the Buddhist Dharma had 
infiltrated the lives of all sentient beings. ‘Buddhism’ itself, as a formally structured 
religious tradition, would be forgotten,752 but the essence of Buddhism, Taixu 
asserted, would expand to every corner of the earth. Finally the universal, eternal 
truth of Buddhism [pubian hengchang de zhen 普遍恆常的真] would sweep out all 
the illusion of the past and erase the boundaries between new and old.753 
 
Revival or Decline? 
Let us return to the question that Liang Qichao asked in the 1920s: Is Buddhism 
progressive or regressive?754 This question, which should be one of the core issues of 
the history of Chinese Buddhism, had, however, seldom been directly addressed by 
historians or Buddhist scholars. Fundamentally, this predicament was just one 
‘historical mirror’ of the more general situation China was experiencing at that 
moment: the inescapable clash of traditions and external forces (here, modernity). Its 
crux, however, was neither how these modern figures thought about modernity nor 
whether they had correctly understood the theory of modernization, but instead was 
more teleological: namely, what they really needed from the modern theories, which 
questions they asked, and what kind of answers they were looking for.  
Liang Qichao’s and Taixu’s cases show that there was more divergence than 
accordance in their studies on the history of Buddhism, although both of them 
attempted to establish a paradigmatic narrative of the general history of Buddhism 
 
751 Taixu, “Wushen lun 無神論,” TXQS, 13, 41.27: 286 
752 Ibid, 295. 
753 Taixu, “Xin jiu wenti de genben jiejue 新舊問題的根本解決,” TXQS, vol.22, 33-40.  
754 Liang, fojiao jiaoli zai Zhongguo zhi fazhan 佛教教理在中國之發展, SBP, 137. 
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with some modern elements. For example, Liang and Taixu both intended to trace 
Chinese Buddhism back to its Indian origin. However, Liang’s purpose was to shed 
light on the particularity of Chinese Buddhism through historical comparison, while 
Taixu’s emphasis on Indian Buddhism was derived from his belief that the purest, 
ultimate form of the Dharma only existed in the age of the Buddha. These different 
opinions led to different patterns of periodization. Generally, Liang classified the 
history of Buddhism into two periods, i.e. pre-Sinicized Buddhism and post-Sinicized 
Buddhism (he also further applied a temporal framework of formation, development, 
and flourishing based on the thesis of ‘three ages,’ as mentioned before); Taixu, on 
the other hand, basically divided the history of Buddhism into two stages: the age of 
the Buddha and the age after the Buddha’s death.755 Clearly, Liang’s pattern used 
China/Chinese as the criteria of periodization while Taixu’s pattern centred on ‘the 
Buddha.’  
A more profound divergence between them lay in their views of history and 
their concepts of historical changes. To Liang Qichao, especially before 1928, 
progressivism was the universal principle of history and the ‘causality’ behind the 
complicated historical phenomena. Buddhist history, in his view, confirmed the 
theory of progressivism and could be explained and organized using the linear model 
of progress. Taixu, in contrast, moved in another direction. He showed less interest in 
providing historical interpretations of Buddhism in specific historical contexts; 
rather, he utilized Buddhist teachings to judge and explain progressivism and other 
prevailing modern thoughts. To him, the reason and purpose for history were truistic 
and unable to be obtained beyond the Dharma.  
However, somewhat ironically, Taixu’s conclusion suggested not the 
abandonment of the new Western thoughts that he criticized with such dedication, 
but the reformation of Buddhism itself—a Buddhist revolution, through which 
Buddhism could become more ethical, socially engaged, “humanist,” and modern. 
Liang Qichao, on contrary, showed clearly in his later works that Buddhism, as an 
essential element of Chinese tradition, should maintain its own character and be 
 
755 Taixu, “Fojiao shilue 佛教史略,” TXQS, vol.1, 895. 
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protected from succumbing to secular powers and modern values. He saw Buddhism 
itself as self-consistent, complete, and requiring no revision.  
It seems, at least from most of the contradictory opinions of Liang Qichao and 
Taixu, that there was a considerable gap between historians and religious figures, 
which was probably attributed to their identities, their beliefs as well as the class to 
which they belonged. This gap, which was always covered by the friendly and 
harmonious atmosphere in academia at that time, could be observed here and there 
in their debates and communications. One example might be the limited but cautious 
contact between Taixu and Hu Shih. In one letter Hu wrote to Taixu before Taixu’s 
trip to Europe, Hu carefully advised Taixu “to give up the self-insistence [wozhi 我執] 
on ‘the Oriental spirituality’ and to be a student, rather than a missionary or religious 
leader.”756 On the other side, Taixu, in his article “On Hu Shih’s Outline of the History 
of Chinese Philosophy” criticized straightforwardly that Hu Shih’s “concept of 
history” relied on Western progressivism and was fundamentally wrong. He argued 
that Hu prejudicially concentrated on the so-called “trend of time” [shidai chaoliu 時
代潮流] and devoted himself narrowly to the ‘reason’ and ‘effect’ of every single 
historical event, ignoring that ‘reason’ and ‘effect’ are not always correspondingly 
related and are not relevant to the ‘truth.’ As in the case of Buddhism, he bluntly 
commented that Hu was “judging something that he even did not understand.”757 In 
another article, Taixu criticized more directly that Hu hurt Chinese scholarship badly 
by applying Western theories indiscriminately; therefore, Taixu wrote, “he [Hu] 
would better not continue with writing the general history of Chinese philosophy.”758  
This situation was actually quite common in modern China. It was 
undoubtedly not the first time Hu Shih encountered this kind of censure—he had 
already known the responses from other Buddhist leaders, such as D.T Suzuki. 
However, did this scenario really only amount to a dialogue between the deaf? The 
real issue, or the foundation of the dialogue between historians like Hu Shih and 
 
756 Hu Shih 胡适, “Zhi Taixu致太虛.” Geng Yunzhi 耿雲志, Ouyang Zhesheng 歐陽哲生 ed., Hu Shih 
Shuxin ji胡適 書信集 (Beijing: Peking University Press, 1996), 401. 
757 TXQS, vol. 28, 276-77 
758 Taixu, “Ping Zhongguo xueshu shi gailun評中國學術史概論,” TXQS, vol 28, 247. 
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Buddhist reformers like Taixu, lay not in their concepts of history or Buddhism but in 
their understanding of modernity and the whole enterprise of China’s modernization.  
In much significant scholarship on Chinese religion, the dominant discourse 
was the “the pull of modernity.’759 According to this interpretation, the advent of 
modernity was a ‘challenge’ to which religion must ‘respond.’ Earlier studies of this 
model often presumed a “soft version of classical secularization theory,” in which 
modernity by its nature condemned religion to a shrinking sphere of social and 
cultural life. More recent works tended to see secularism as an ideological project 
rather than a law of social development. Either way, religion in China was considered 
forced into the modernization of some forms as the price of survival in the new age. 
Although some scholars also stressed that this was a ‘creative’ response, religion was 
nonetheless portrayed as fundamentally degenerate, reactive, and defensive.  The 
core narrative—Buddhism adapts to meet the challenge of the modern era—and 
conclusion—demythologization, rationalization, and social engagement—remained 
the same.760  
Regardless of its Euro-centric and Protestant implications761, this narrative 
model of ‘challenge and response’ did prepare the ground for discussion between 
intellectuals with ‘more secular’ and ‘more religious’ positions, as in the case of Liang 
Qichao and Taixu: they were both thinking about the future when they wrote their 
 
759 Ritzinger, “Anarchy in the Pure Land: Tradition, modernity, and the reinvention of the cult of 
Maitreya in Republican China,” 7-11. 
760 It was widely employed by the studies of Japanese Buddhism in the wake of the Meiji persecution. 
See for example, Orion Klautau, “Against the Ghosts of Recent Past: Meiji Scholarship and the 
Discourse on Edo-Period Buddhist Decadence,” in Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 35, no. 2 (2008): 
263-303. 
761 Protestantism, according to Weber, played an important role in the emergence of modernity; see 
Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (New York: Routledge Classics 2001); and Max 
Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press 1978), 10-12, 15. This view had 
been taken by several scholars as the archetype of the ‘modern religion’ and attempted to understand 
modern forms of Buddhism’s accommodation to modernity in term of a ‘Protestantization’. This is 
most explicit in Obeyesekere’s formulation of “Protestant Buddhism’. See Gananath Obeyesekere, 
“Religious Symbolism and Political Change in Ceylon,” Modern Ceylon Studies 1, 1 (1976): 43-63. Also, 
Richard Gombrich and Gananath Obeyesekere, Buddhism Transformed: Religious Change in Sri Lanka 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1988), 13-15 and chapter 6. 
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histories. This tendency also led to a prevailing, if not monopolistic, discourse: the 
Buddhist revival. It proposed that although Buddhism was forced to adapt to the 
modern era to avoid extinction, modernization was also good for Buddhism, since it 
would bring about its ‘revival’ and further promise a better Buddhism that would be 
more suitable for the future.  
This was, nevertheless, highly problematic and represented a situation that 
Gadamer has called the “hermeneutical circle”. This ‘revival’ discourse imposed its 
own ‘progressive’ expectations upon the historical investigations of Chinese 
Buddhism, interpreting the transformation (or revolution) of Buddhism as a 
teleological agenda. It was, fundamentally, not a description of what had happened, 
but an expression of the prejudice within this revival interpretation itself. Indeed, 
when scholars made judgments about the Buddhist revival, they already had their 
own understandings of modernity as well as a sort of ‘criterion’ [Maßstab], which, in 
Gadamer’s sense, was the twofold one of correspondence and coherence.762 In this 
sense, if we discuss people’s descriptions and reflections on the history of Buddhism 
at that time within the framework of the Buddhist ‘revival’, it is easy to conclude that 
the understanding of the history of Buddhism by Liang Qichao, Taixu, and others was 
always in the service of the reform and modernization of Buddhism. And Buddhism 
could gain its historical status by proving its ‘progressiveness’ in the historical 
experience of the past. 
Indeed, Taixu emphasized ‘newness’ in his Buddhist revolution, especially at 
the institutional level; however, we can gather from his historical writings a more 
conservative facet of him, which was highly skeptical about the faction of modernity 
and was attached to the perfect, superior Dharma essence. Liang Qichao, also, never 
used the word “revival,” and indicated several times that Buddhism itself need not be 
reformed. The historiography of Buddhism in modern China reveals precisely the 
ambiguous position among believers and researchers who reflected on the fate of 
 
762 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (London: Bloomsbury, 2004), 279. 
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Buddhism and China, showing us an attitude toward this religious heritage beyond 
the picture of ‘revival’. 
Maybe it is time to return to Welch, who, for the first time, explicitly posted 
the term ‘revival’ in his influential monograph The Buddhist Revival of Modern China. 
Based on his observation of Taixu’s failure of the Buddhist revolution, Welch 
portrayed Taixu as an intelligent but too idealist, or even ridiculous, figure in his 
book. This impression was more or less premature, for Taixu’s revolution continued 
and to a certain degree succeeded through the efforts of his disciples and other 
modern clerics after his death. However, Welch’s concern is crucial: the fruition of 
‘Buddhist revival’ could be bitter. As he warned, if the modernizing, secularizing 
reforms had been fully fulfilled, “most of the identifiably Buddhist, specifically 
religious institutions and practices would have faded away.”763 A ‘revival’ might have 
been, for Buddhism, suicide rather than survival, and it would not lead Buddhism to a 
better future but push it off the cliff. Insightful as Liang Qichao and Taixu were, they 
must have had a similar feeling. That is the reason why there were always paradoxes 
and hesitation in their writings of Buddhist history.  
 





Questioning Buddhist Canon 
 
 
Texts of Dazangjing 大藏經764, the canon of Buddhist scriptures written in literary 
form,765 have served as the foundation for the thought and practice of Chinese 
Buddhism from the medieval period onwards to the present. During the transmission 
of Buddhism in China, the canonical literature was traditionally conceived as the 
Chinese translation of original Buddhist texts in Sanskrit, or at least as conveying the 
true sayings and teachings of the Buddha.766 To the Chinese, among whom nobody 
had seen the Buddha or listened to his voice in person, Dazangjing consisted of the 
entity of the Dharma, both historically and doctrinally. However, this textual 
foundation was not stable. Once introduced to China by foreign monks, Buddhist 
texts experienced ceaseless translation, editing, modification, and misreading. The 
authorship, dates of creation, and the circulating information of some scriptures 
remain unclear. Adding the fact that Śākyamuni’s teachings were initially in oral 
form and the lack of historical records on the Dharma lineage in India, the 
 
764 For the definition of Dazangjing, Fang Guangchang 方廣錩, “Defining the Chinese Buddhist Canon: 
Its Origin, Periodization, and Future,” Journal of Chinese Buddhist Studies 28 (2015): 1-34. 
765 The word ‘canon’ is derived from the Greek word ‘kanon’, ‘can’, ‘ruler’, figurative: ‘rule’, ‘norm’, 
‘model’. For the etymology and historical development of the term, see Gerald T. Sheppard, “Canon,” 
Mircea Eliade ed., The Encyclopedia of Religion, vol. 3 (New York: Macmillan, 1987), 62-69. Jonathan Z. 
Smith has defined canon broadly as “the arbitrary fixing of a limited number of ‘texts’ as immutable 
and authoritative.” “Sacred Persistence: Toward a Redescription of Canon,” id., Imagining Religion: From 
Babylon to Jonestown (Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 36-52. Also, Paul Harrison, 
“Canon.” In Encyclopedia of Buddhism. Robert E. Buswell ed., 115 (New York: Macmillan Reference USA, 
2004), 111–115. 
766 The Pali canon was more or less fixed. We can be fully sure about its actual contents only from 
Buddhaghosa’s commentary in the 5th century onwards. Cf. K.R. Norman, “Buddhism and Canonicity,” 
id., A Philological Approach to Buddhism: The Bukkyo Dendo Kyokai Lectures 1994 (London: SOAS, 1997); cf. 
also Gregory Schopen, “Two Problems in the History of Indian Buddhism: The Layman/Monk 




authenticity of Buddhist scriptures and their Chinese translations had been 
questioned by Chinese Buddhists from the Tang dynasty onwards.767 The increasingly 
skeptical attitude to Chinese Buddhist texts propelled monk Xuanzang 玄奘 (600-664) 
to make his historical pilgrimage to India. However, in the centuries after Xuanzang, 
the passion for searching for original truth from scattered Buddhist texts gradually 
died out.768  
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the historical basis of Dazangjing 
was called into question again, especially for the texts that were highly related to the 
origin or nature of Chinese Buddhism, such as the Sūtra of Forty-Two Chapters [Sishier 
zhangjing 四十二章經], Treatise on Awakening Mahāyāna Faith [Dasheng qixinlun 大乘起
信論] and the Sūtra of Perfect Enlightenment[Yuanjue jing 圓覺經], the Platform Sūtra 
[Tanjing 壇經] and so on. This academic trend of re-examining Buddhist texts, which 
soon attracted attention from many leading intellectuals in the first half of the 
twentieth century in China, consequently resulted in two phenomena: the first one 
was that the Buddhist canon became involved in a process of “de-canonization” and 
became a neutral, objective source waiting to be examined and utilized. Its historical 
value as truth started to replace its religious function. The second one was an ‘anxiety 
about orthodoxy’—the prevailing suspicion concerning Buddhist texts shook up the 
basis of the structure of Chinese Buddhism. Hence, Chinese Buddhism, as a mixture of 
native ideologies and foreign thoughts, had to reclaim its particularity as a Chinese 
cultural tradition; meanwhile, after thousands of years of indigenization, it needed to 
re-identify its ‘real’ origin and clarify its kinship with Indian Buddhism.769 
 
 
767 For the process of the creation, categorization, and circulation of the Chinese Buddhist literature, 
see Jiang Wu and Lucille Chia, “Spreading Buddha’s Word in East Asia,” (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2015), 432. 
768 The reason why Chinese Buddhists after the Tang dynasty showed less interest in searching for 
original Dharma, according to some scholars, was the establishment the sanctity of Chinese Buddhism, 
especially the emergence of the Chan school.  
769 Most of these studies on Buddhist texts were collected and arranged by Zhang Mantao 張曼濤 into 
three volumes in his Xiandai fojiao xueshu congcan 現代佛教學術叢刊, see XFXC, vol. 2-4.  
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The Authenticity of Chinese Buddhist Texts 
Since Buddhism entered into the Middle Kingdom, the perplexity of ‘authentic 
Buddhism’ haunted Chinese Buddhists for centuries. The scarcity of authoritative 
Indian Buddhist masters coupled with the lack of accurate translations of Indian texts 
rendered a proper understanding of Buddhist canonical texts virtually impossible. 
Although the apologists of Buddhism, like the scholar-monks in the Wei and Jin eras, 
attempted to build reliable parallels between Indian Buddhism and its native 
variations (the hermeneutic strategy of ‘geyi’格義 [matching concepts/meanings] is 
one example)770, they failed to prevent Buddhism from being conflated with Chinese 
thought.  
When the essential ambiguity of Buddhist texts in the Sanskrit and Palī 
traditions is taken into account, as well as the general attitude of Buddhism towards 
‘words,’ which is linked profoundly with Buddhist cosmology, the issue of 
authenticity becomes even more complicated.771 In Early Buddhist scriptures, the 
universe is depicted as governed by impersonal laws, namely the Dharma—an idea 
whose the roots lie in the notion of ṛta [cosmic order] of the early Vedas. The Buddha, 
although believed to be a historical figure who lived in the history of India, is actually 
not a ‘human,’ but an embodiment of impersonal forces that ceaselessly move in 
accordance with the flow of the mahākalpa [cosmic cycles]. In this line of thought, the 
historical Buddha, Śakyamuni, is rendered into a symbolic term, not a transient body 
 
770 The issue of ‘matching concept’ [geyi], along with the related historiographical contexts in the 
modern scholarship are elucidated in the chapter 6 of this dissertation. In this chapter I will only focus 
on the historical critique of the Buddhist literature at the textual level.  
771 For the authenticity of Buddhist canons in general, see Lewis Lancaster, “Buddhist Literature: Its 
Canons, Scribes, and Editors,” in The Critical Study of Sacred Texts, ed. Wendy Doniger O’Flaherty 
(Berlekey: Berkeley Religious Studies Series, 1979). 215–29. See also Laurie Patton ed., Authority, Anxiety, 
and Canon: Essays in Vedic Interpretation (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994). 
 249 
 
with flesh and blood but rather a figure represented by his eternal teachings, the 
dharmakāya [body of the dharma, fashen 法身].772  
Because of the impersonality of the Buddha,773 there is a common statement in 
Buddhism that the Buddha himself never uttered a single word. One may understand 
this notion merely as a metaphor for the ineffability of the absolute, as demonstrated 
in Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 中論; however, it indeed intensifies the transcendental, 
quiescent image of the Buddha. The logical outcome of this silent Buddha is the 
superficiality and limitation of information in any textual form. Since the Buddha 
conveys his teaching without language, the complete and perfect Dharma cannot be 
written down. In this sense, the literal truth of Buddhist scriptures should not even 
be a problem, because it is nevertheless far away from the Dharmic truth. Especially 
in the Mahāyāna tradition, sūtras with the opening words “thus have I heard [rushi 
wowen 如是我聞]” present themselves not as real historical ‘records’, but as the 
‘sayings of the Buddha’ that disciples had heard.774  
In China, the authenticity of Buddhist doctrine was largely equated with the 
quality of the translation, because the reception of Buddhism by the local audience 
relied on the translated literature. This process demonstrated a switch in the 
religious ‘paradigm’: the truth of a Buddhist text lay no longer in its immediate link 
with the Buddha’s real sayings, but in the literal accuracy of the translation from 
Sanskrit to Chinese.775 Early Buddhist translators like Zhi Qian 支謙 (fl. 224) and 
 
772 For the relationship between the body of the Buddha and Buddhist writing, see Robert H. Sharf, 
Coming to Terms with Chinese Buddhism: A Reading of the Treasure Store Treaties (Honolulu: University of 
Hawai’i Press, 2009), 100-10. 
773 For example, the first fascicle of the Samādhirāja-sūtra [月燈三昧經] declares that there are one 
thousand billion buddhas, all with the same name, with sons and disciples of the same name, all born 
in Kapilavastu. 
774 Gethin, The Foundations of Buddhism, 56.  
775 Some scholars of earlier generations believed that the only appropriate way of examining Buddhism 
was to turn to its most ancient texts while neglecting later, allegedly degenerate, developments. 
However, current scholarship rightly opposes this implicit canonization, agreeing that there should be 
no restriction whatsoever as to which texts or religious expressions are selected for research. See the 
articles in Curators of the Buddha: The Study of Buddhism under Colonialism, edited by Donald S. Lopez, Jr. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995). 
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Kumārajīva had realized the difficulties of conveying meanings through translation;776 
the learned monk Dao’an, although knowing no Sanskrit, concluded that there were 
five kinds of distortion [wushiben 五失本] in the translation process of Buddhist 
scriptures, emphasizing the momentousness of the translation quality.777  
The request for the accuracy of scriptural translation reached its peak in the 
Tang dynasty and encouraged two eminent monks, Xuanzang and Yijing 義凈(635-
713), to travel to Southern and Central Asia. With sufficient knowledge of Sanskrit, 
both of them, compared to their contemporaries, were more capable of identifying 
the original version of Sanskrit texts and avoid fallacies in translation. As shown by 
the record of Fozu tongji 佛祖統紀 written by Zhipan 志磐, a highly institutionalized 
or even bureaucratic system of scriptural translation was established by Xuanzang, 
with an ‘assembly line’ of nine segments.778 Through such a meticulous process, the 
problem of the translation was largely avoided.   
After the Tang era, Chinese Buddhism came to adopt an exclusively 
Mahayanist outlook in a way that it never did in India and embarked on its 
independent development. The issue of ‘authenticity’ was more or less ignored, and a 
 
776 Zhi Qian and Kumārajīva emphasized literalness 直 (concentrating on the wording) and the 
transmission of the substances 質 with refined style 文 and elegance 雅. For example, Kumārajīva had 
commented that “when converting the Sanskrit into Chinese, the literary embellishments lost. even 
when it has the basic thought, it is far from the substance of the text.” [改梵為秦，失其藻蔚，雖得大
意，殊隔文體]. See Hui Jiao 慧皎, Gaoseng zhuan 高僧傳, CBETA, T, 2059. 50, 332b. 
777 The wu shiben are: 1. The barbarian speech may be turned completely upside down in order to follow 
Chinese syntax; 2. The barbarian classics prize substance, whereas the Chinese people prize elegance so 
that the transmitted text may please the heart of the masses where, without literary polish, it would 
not fit; the third to the fifth types of shiben involve the practices of blindly deleting repeated sentences 
and aphorisms from the original Buddhist texts, or summarizing them in one’s own words. See Lü 
Cheng, Zhongguo foxue sixiang gailun中國佛學思想概論 (Taipei: Tianhua chuban gongsi, 1982), 65.  
778 The nine segments include: 1. yizhu 義主 (the master of translation who reads the Sanskrit texts); 2. 
zhengyi  證義 (the philological assistant who reviews the texts); 3. zhengwen 證文 (the text appraiser 
who checks for errors); 4. Shu zi fanxueseng書字梵學僧 (transliterator who written down the Sanskrit 
pronunciation with Chinese characters); 5. bishou 筆受 (the translator- scribe who renders the Sanskrit 
sounds into Chinese words); 6. zhuiwen 綴文 (the text editor who reverses the words into meaningful 
sentences); 7. canyi 參譯 (the proofreader who compares both texts and corrects faults); 8. kanding 刊
定(the subeditor who deletes the unnecessarily long expressions and balances the phrasing); 9. runwen 
潤文 (the stylist who adds the finishing touches). See: fozu tongji, vol. 43.  CBETA, T49n 2035 43 0398a23.  
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new legitimacy merely based on the translated Chinese Buddhist canon gradually 
formed.779 Through a largescale hermeneutic movement conducted by native Chinese 
Buddhist schools, an indigenized system of Buddhist discourses and terminology was 
eventually established. Buddhists, normally without Sanskrit training, suspended the 
further pursuit of the ‘original’ truth of Buddhist doctrines or the ‘genuine 
Buddhism.’ Instead, they placed their attention on the exegetic and hermeneutic 
issues in texts. Some sects of Chinese Buddhism, such as the Chan school, even 
fundamentally dispelled the meaning of Buddhist doctrinal texts.780  
  This position invokes a potentially misleading tendency of setting literary 
sources of Buddhism aside. Moreover, the appearance of a plethora of native 
‘apocryphal’ scriptures exacerbated the deviation of Buddhism from its Indian 
origin.781 Essentially, this situation was not only caused by the limitations of 
translation techniques or the lack of knowledge about Buddhist doctrines, but was 
related to the logic that was deeply rooted in the epistemology of the Chinese people 
and their views of ‘truth’ in both historical and philosophical senses. In Chinese 
 
779 According to Tairyō Makita 牧田諦亮, the attitude toward sutra was “rather focusing on the 
thought and technology of excellent translation of the Chinese Buddhist texts than attaching 
importance to Sanskrit classics, Chinese translation of the Buddhist classics is Chinese Buddhism. For 
Chinese, Chinese translation is everything about Buddhism. This is the correct view.” Tairyō Makita, 
Yijing yanjiu – Zhongguo fojiao Zhong zhi zhenjing yu weijing疑經研究--中國佛教中之真經與疑經,” 
trans. Yang Baiyi, 楊白衣. Huagang foxue xuebao 華岡佛學學報 4 (1980): 286 
780 As indicated by the famous phrase “not establishing words or letters; transmitting outside 
teachings” [不立文字，教外別傳], in Puji 普濟, Wudeng Huiyuan 五燈會元第 1卷.CBETA, T. x80n1565 
1 0028b23.  
781 The most important studies on the Buddhist apocrypha including the works of  Japanese 
Buddhologists Yabuki Keiki 矢吹慶輝, Hayashiya Tomojirō 林屋友次郎, Mochizuki Shinkō 望月信亨 
and Tokiwa Daijō 常磐大定 in the early in middle part of the twentieth century, while more recently 
the topic has been treated in the works of such scholars as Mizuno Kōgen 水野弘元 and Makita Tairyō 
牧田諦亮. The most comprehensive of all works that treat apocrypha are Mochizuki's 
monumental Bukkyō kyōten seiritsushi ron [佛教經典成立史論] and the more recent Gikyō kenkyū (僞經
研究) by Makita Tairyō. Recently ‘apocryphal studies’ has become a prominent topic for Western 
scholars of East Asian Buddhism. In the English language, an extremely valuable volume, Chinese 
Buddhist Apocrypha, was published in 1990, edited by Robert Buswell. Important Chinese works on this 
topic include Wang Wenyan 王文顏 , Fojing yiweijing yanjiu yu kaoju佛教疑偽經研究與考錄 (Taipei: 
Wenjing chubanshe, 1997). 
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traditions, the practice of formulating one’s own theory under the name of ancient 
sages was quite common.782 Intentionally or unintentionally, peddling ideas with the 
label of ‘Classics’ or in the parlance of other traditions was believed to have the effect 
of facilitating understanding, increasing persuasiveness, and resisting attacks.783  
Due to the inherent difficulties of translation as well as the propensity to 
create new doctrines, Dazang jing became a multifold production, an unsolid, 
miscellaneous collection with questionable content. A major portion of the earlier 
apocryphal texts might have been compiled for the sake of overcoming the initial 
difficulties of making this Indian thought acceptable in its new home. In the later 
stages of Buddhism’s assimilation in China, new texts were composed for the purpose 
of clarifying certain doctrinal points that were thought to have been far from 
adequately treated or to reconcile philosophical and soteriological dilemmas that 
were not problematic in India. In a process of ‘canonization,’ some of these texts even 
became the pedestal for the presentation of the originality of East Asian Buddhism. As 
Robert Buswell noted, since most of the Chinese Buddhist apocrypha were indigenous 
compositions instead of translations of Indian texts, they actually addressed “their 
domestic authors’ own religious interests and social concerns.”784  
 
782 In China, there was a tradition of producing ‘apocrypha’ outside Buddhism. For example, in the Han 
dynasty, when Confucianists recovered the texts that the Qin had destroyed, they set about the 
embellishment of the texts by parallel compilation with their own. See Hans Van Ess, “The Apocryphal 
Texts of the Han Dynasty and the Old Text/New Text Controversy.” T’oung Pao, 85, no. 1-3 (1999), 29-64; 
also, Jack Dull, “A Historical Introduction to the Apocryphal (ch’an-wei) Texts of the Han Dynasty,” 
Ph.D. dissertation (University of Washington, 1966). 
783 In any case, East Asian writers of new Buddhist texts who wanted their particular piece to become 
canonical followed a strategy of attempting to write in a style and format as close to the Indian texts as 
possible. If style, format, and content, as well as other considerations, such as luck and timing, were 
sufficient, a text stood a good chance of making it into the Chinese canon. 
784 Robert E. Buswell, Jr., “Introduction: Prolegomenon to the Study of Buddhist Apocryphal 
Scriptures,” in Chinese Buddhist Apocrypha, ed. Robert E. Buswell, Jr. (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i 
Press, 1990), 1. See also Koichi Shinohara, “Rethinking the Category of Chinese Buddhist Apocrypha.” 
Studies in Chinese Religions 1, no. 1 (2015): 70–81. 
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The motivations behind these activities of forgery varied.785 Therefore, there 
were different types of apocrypha: for example, some apocrypha historicized the 
Buddha or Buddhist deities as a corporeal person who lived in history or had 
connections with Chinese figures;786 some were made to gain acceptance with the 
rulership or to endorse a particular political power; 787 there were also a large number 
of apocrypha aimed at mediating the conflict between Buddhism and local thoughts 
and catering to the taste of the Chinese audience or fulfilling the requirement of folk 
religious practice.788 Some very influential Chinese scriptures, in all three branches of 
sūtra, vinaya, and abhidharma, formulated sectarian thoughts and ideologies by 
creating new ‘canonical texts’ under the name of the Buddha or ancient eminent 
 
785 The reasons for producing apocryphal can be divided into different categories: for example, Shinkō 
Mochizuki lists five forms of apocryphal scriptures: 1. texts related to Taoism and folklore religions; 2. 
texts related to the Mahayana vow and Bodhisattva path; 3. texts related to tathagatagarbha doctrine 
and Tantric Buddhism; 4. Dasheng qixinlun [Treatise on the Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith]; 5. Chinese 
scriptures under the names of Aśvaghoṣa and Nāgārjuna. See Shinkō Mochizuki 望月信亨, “Fojiao 
chengli shilun 佛教經典成立史論,” trans. Shi Yinhai 釋印海, Zhongguo fojiao 中國佛教, 41, 7 (1997): 
42-46. In his “Yijing yanjiu 疑經研究,” Tairyō Makita listed six kinds of apocryphal scriptures: 1. 
political works that echo the intention of government power; 2. texts that criticize the political power; 
3. texts that compromise with or compare to other Chinese traditional thoughts; 4. texts that 
propagandize certain sectarian doctrines or beliefs; 5. works under the names of particular individuals; 
6. works related to superstitious activities, such as praying and curing. See Tairyō Makita, “Yijing 
yanjiu – Zhongguo fojiao Zhong zhi zhenjing yu weijing疑經研究--中國佛教中之真經與疑經,” 284-
306. 
786 For the relationship between Taoism and the Huahu jing, see Holmes Welch, Taoism: The Parting of the 
Way (Boston: Beacon Press. 1957), 152; some scholars believe that it is a forgery because there are no 
historical references to it until the early 4th century CE. It has been suggested that the Taoist Wang Fu 
[zh] 王浮 may have originally compiled the Huahujing circa 300 CE. See Louis Komjathy, Daoist Texts in 
Translation, 34.   
787 See also N. Harry Rothschild, Emperor Wu Zhao and Her Pantheon of Devils, Divinities, and Dynastic 
Mothers (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015). Rothschild has addressed how supporters forged 
connections between Emperor Wu Zetian and female deities of various origins including Confucian, 
Daoist, and Buddhist. 
788 Examples include the Foshuo fumu enzhong nanbao jing 佛說父母恩重難報經 (see Kenneth Ch'en, 
“Filial Piety in Chinese Buddhism.” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 28 (1968), 81-97); the GaoWang 
Guanshi Yin jing 高王觀世音經, see Yü Chun-fang 于君方, “Weijing yu Guanyin Xinyang偽經與觀音信
仰,” Chung-Hwa Buddhist Journal 中華佛學學報, 8, (1995): 97-135; also her Guanyin, The Chinese 
Transformation of Avalokiteśvara (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), and so on.  
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monks, for example, Yüan jue jing, Brahmajāla-sūtra 梵網經, Śūraṃgama-sūtra楞嚴經, 
Dasheng qixin lun, Treasure Store Treatise寶藏論, and so on.  
In the traditional Chinese context, the boundary between the ‘apocryphal’ and 
‘authentic’ texts was sometimes vague.789 Even within the framework of ‘apocrypha,’ 
texts could further be categorized into two types, ‘suspicious scriptures 疑經 and 
‘fake scriptures 偽經’. The latter referred to texts that were not only literally fake, 
but also could not fulfill the criteria for exemption from being doubted by the 
standard of doctrine itself. However, yijing was a more controversial phrase that often 
indicated some profound problem attributable to a lack of information about the 
translation or authorship of a text. Guardians of the Buddhist canon were aware, 
early on, of the profusion of non-authentic texts. They compiled bibliographical 
categories 經錄 to track the creation and distribution of Buddhist texts.790 From 
Dao’an, the author of the first Chinese Buddhist bibliography Zongli zhongjing mulu綜
理眾經目錄 to Zhisheng 智昇, who compiled the monumental work of the Buddhist 
bibliography, Kaiyuan shijiao lu 開元釋教錄, these Buddhists made efforts to list 
doubtful and spurious sūtras and to “identify the authentic and fake, clarifying the 
true and false.”791  
 
789 Other Chinese apocryphal scriptures may also including chaojing 抄經 or jingchao [經抄] (namely, 
coping some sentences from a sūtra and merging them into a new one. ), as well as the scriptures 
prohibited by political reasons, such as the classics of Sanjie jiao三階教 [the Three levels movement]. 
For the studies on sanjie jiao, see Yabuki Keiki 矢吹慶輝, Sangaikyō no kenkyū三階教の研究 [Studies 
on the Teaching of the Three Stages] (Tokyo, Iwanami shoten, 1927); also Jamie Hubbard, Absolute 
Delusionm, Perfect Buddhahood: The Rise and Fall of a Chinese Heresy (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 
2001).  
790 For the study of Buddhist bibliography, see articles in Wu, Jiang, and Lucille Chia ed., Spreading 
Buddha’s Word in East Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015). Also see Tanya Storch, The 
History of Chinese Buddhist Bibliography: Censorship and Transformation of the Tripitaka (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014); and Kyoko Tokuno, “The Evaluation of Indigenous Scriptures in 
Chinese Buddhist Bibliographical Catalogues,” in Chinese Buddhist Apocrypha, ed. Robert E Buswell 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990), 31-47. 
791 “別真偽明是非.” Zhisheng also divided the apocryphal texts into those of doubtful authenticity and 
those considered definitely spurious. See Tanya Storch, The History of Chinese Buddhist Bibliography: 
Censorship and Transformation of the Tripitaka, Chapter 5.  
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Based on this bibliographical labor, the Chinese Buddhist canon was formed 
and gradually established its ‘orthodoxy’ during the Song dynasty.792 However, the 
difficulty of authenticity, although largely overlooked afterwards, has never really 
been solved. In the Chinese context, this issue has not only been connected with the 
literal quality and narrative truth of texts, but has also been concerned with the 
survival and fortune of Chinese Buddhism. Ironically, textual fidelity sometimes was 
no guarantee of long-lasting canonicity. A certain number of the ‘doubtful’ works 
would later be accepted as authentic and canonical, either because their content was 
judged to be consistent with Buddhist teachings, or because there were appropriate 
circumstances at the time that allowed them to be incorporated. Those Buddhist texts 
that failed in adapting to the native religious, intellectual, or socio-political climate 
might disappear, even if they were totally authentic.793 Therefore, the phenomenon of 
apocryphal scriptures in the Chinese context is not simply related to ‘fidelity’ or the 
“dark side of Chinese monasticism”—the degenerate state of Chinese Buddhism, as 
claimed by Erik Zürcher794—but is a historical issue related to the formation and 
legitimization of Chinese Buddhism.  
 
Textual Orientation  
The formation of the canonicity of Dazang jing was a long journey full of debates, 
suspicions, and twists.795 The composition of Kaiyuan shijiao lu itemized the general 
 
792 Fang Guangchang divided the establishment of the Dazangjing into several stages, according to its 
form of production. See Fang, Guangchang, “Chinese Buddhist Canon: Approaches to Its Compilation,” 
Studies in Chinese Religions 2, no. 2 (2016): 1–18. 
793 For an excellent examination of the complexity of the factors involved in the attainment of 
canonicity by a text, see Barbara Herrstein Smith’s essay “Contingencies of Value” in von Hallberg’s 
volume entitled Canons (5-39). Smith in particular clarified the dynamics of the interplay among the 
extremely various types of “value judgments” involved in canon formation. 
794 Erik Zürcher, “Prince Moonlight: Messianism and Eschatology in Early Medieval Chinese Buddhism.” 
T’oung Pao 68, no. 1–3 (1982): 1–75. 
795 According to Aleida and Jan Assmann, there were three tasks within the process of the formation of 
the canons: censoring; maintaining the text; and maintaining its meaning (Zensur, Textpflege, and 
Sinnpflege). Aleida and Jan Assmann, “Kanon und Zensur,” in Kanon und Zensur: Beiträge zur Archäologie 
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corpus of the Chinese Buddhist canonical literature. Later, from the Late Ming to Qing 
dynasties, there was a Buddhist textual revival generated by the flourishing 
publishing industry. The distribution of Buddhist texts (especially the private 
publishing of the Jiaxing Canon 嘉興藏) and the expansion of readership spurred 
intensive reading and interpretation of Buddhist scriptures. This textual revival of 
Buddhism also led to the formation of a Buddhist-literati community and a syncretic 
Buddhist culture.796 A more profound change emerged after the mid-nineteenth 
century, when China gradually lost its monopoly on the Buddhist canon across East 
Asia because of the ‘posterior’ involvement of the West and Japan in Buddhist 
scholarship. The rapid developments in relevant disciplines outside China indicated a 
switch of methodological paradigm and a transfer of the power of authority from 
China to other places, even those unrecognizable to most Chinese Buddhists and 
scholars at that time.797 The ‘authenticity crisis’ and the consequent struggle to 
recapture China’s prior status in Buddhist scholarship incited the effort to seek and 
assemble Buddhist texts. In an effort conducted by Yang Wenhui and other Buddhists 
leaders, large-scale Buddhist texts were re-collated and re-published. The emergence 
of new resources also stimulated scholars outside the Buddhist circle to study 
Buddhist texts with new ideas and from new perspectives.  
 
Evidential Learning and Doubting Antiquity  
 
der literarischen Kommunikation II, ed. Aleida and Jan Assmann (München: Fink, 1987), 7-27. See also the 
articles in the same volume by Alois Hahn, “Kanonisierungsstile,” 28-37; and Carsten Colpe, 
“Sakralisierung von Texten und Filiationen von Kanons,” 80-92. 
796 Monks in the Late Ming dynasty, for example, the ‘Four eminent Monks,’ joined the literati circles 
and were highly trained in literary composition and art, such as calligraphy, music, and painting. For 
the literary outputs of the Buddhist clergy and the relationship between clergy and literati, see Liao 
Zhaoheng 廖肇亨’s articles, such as “Wanming sengren sanju shi lunxi: yi hanyue fazang wei zhongxin
晚明詩人山居詩論析：以漢月法藏為中心,” in Zhongbian, shichan, mengxi: mingmo qingchu fojiao 
wenhua lunshu de chenxian yu kaizhan 中邊·詩禪·夢戲--明末清初佛教文化論述的呈現與開展 
(Taipei, Yunchen Wenhua, 2008), 273-300. 
797 For the ‘crisis’ narrative, see Wu Jiang, Living for the Rising Sun: Chinese Zen Master Yinyuan & the 
Authenticity Crisis in Early Modern East China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).  
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The extensive re-examination of Buddhist texts that emerged at the beginning of the 
twentieth century was an inevitable outcome of the philological turn of the Qing 
scholarship, especially the influential Evidential Learning [kaozheng 考證]. As 
Benjamin Elman remarked, this philological grid represented a fundamental shift in 
the common codes of elite knowledge about the past, namely, “a shift from Song-
Ming rationalism, typified by the moral philosophy of Zhu Xi, to a more skeptical and 
secular classical empiricism.”798 Representative figures of this trend, from Gu Yanwu 
顧炎武 and Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲 to Hui Dong 惠棟, Dai Zhen 戴震, and so on, 
advocated for an empirically based scholarship grounded on concrete facts, verifiable 
institutions, historical truth, and literal evidence, instead of abstract ideas and 
principles [li 理].  
Fundamentally, the goal of kaozheng was to retrieve lost fragments of ancient 
books and identify their versions, authorships, and other publishing data, as well as 
judge the authenticity of their content. From the Han to Qing dynasties799, kaozheng 
had developed into a systematic field with concrete methods, including bibliography 
[jiaochou xue 校讎學]800, philology [xiaoxue 小學]801 and textual criticism [laozheng 
xue 考證學]802, with a set of approaches, such as cataloguing, collating, editing, 
 
798  Benjamin Elman, “Early Modern or Late Imperial Philology? The Crisis of Classical Learning in 
Eighteenth Century China,” Frontiers of History in China 6, no. 1 (2011): 6. 
799 The tradition of Kaozhenguxe can be traced back to Han scholar Liu Xiang 劉向 (79–8 BC) and his son 
Liu Xin 劉歆 (46 BC–AD23). They for the first time combined the term  ‘mu’ 目 (literally ‘subtitle’) with 
the term ‘lu’ 錄 (literally ‘record’, ‘report’) and composed the bibliographical work qilue 七略 , which 
marked the beginning of the Chinese bibliographic (mulu) tradition. See Yu Jiaxi 余嘉錫, Muluxue fawei 
目錄學發微 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2007), 23–26. 
800 Sub-branches include mulu xue目錄學 [studies on bibliographical catalogues], banben xue 版本學 
[studies on the version of books], and jiaokan xue校勘學 [collation] 
801 Xiaoxue include xunguxue訓詁學 [text-based semantics], wenzixue 文字學 [etymology], and 
yinyunxue 音韻學 [phonology]. 
802 These branches in classical Chinese are often mixed and therefore hardly to define, both historically 
and literally. In general, muluxue, banbenxue, and jiaokanxueindicate the studies on books can be 
brought into the domain of jiaochouxue 校讎學, in a generalized sense. The branch of textual criticism 
is closer to a method of exegesis and is basically equal with jiaochou. See Rudolf Blum, Bibliographia: An 
Inquiry into Its Definition and Designations, trans. Mathilde V. Rovelstad (Chicago: American Library 
Association, 1980); Luigi Balsamo, Bibliography: History of a Tradition, trans. William A. Pettas (Berkeley: 
B.M. Rosenthal, 1990). 
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summarizing, literature listing, and so on. As mentioned by Elman, kaozheng studies, 
although maybe not ‘scientific’ or ‘objective’ per se, represented an embryonic form 
of ‘science,’ replacing the moral discourses of lixue 理學, and shifted the goal of 
scholarship from the pursuit of perfect personality to the systematic study of 
empirical knowledge that could be deployed in secular life.803 To this degree, this 
philological turn of scholarship was an innovation of ‘technique’, within which more 
and more emphases were placed on methodology and materials.   
Along with methodological innovation, towards the end of the eighteenth 
century, the prestige of the Classics had diminished vis-à-vis historical studies. 
Scholars like Zhang Xuecheng 章學誠 began to “place the timeless Classics within the 
framework of the endless flux of history.”804 Admittedly, scholars like Zhang were still 
‘traditional’ literati who remained committed to the ideals of Confucianism and 
sought to restore the classical visions of state and society according to their 
Confucianist faith. In this sense, Evidential Learning was never really 
‘revolutionary.’805 Under the veil of Daoxue, the Late Qing literati returned to the past 
to root Chinese scholarship again by resuscitating the path of ‘Han Learning.’ The 
Late Han dynasty (as opposed to the Former Han, in which the New Text school was 
in vogue) was seen to represent the solemn force of the Old Text school, an ideal of 
Classical Learning, but also the latest period that the interpretations of the Confucian 
Classics had not been influenced by Taoist and Buddhist notions.806 Remarkably, this 
 
803 The evidential studies were related to natural studies such as mathematics and physics, as Elman 
has mentioned.    
804 Benjamin Elman, “Early Modern or Late Imperial Philology? The Crisis of Classical Learning in 
Eighteenth Century China,” 9.   
805 Although Elman has called Evidential Learning a scientific “revolution of discourse,” he has noted 
the difference between traditional kaozheng and the new scholarship that emerged in the twentieth 
century. Michael Quirin has made this point even clearer by claiming that kaozheng is “rather a further 
elaboration of the critical aspects of the special hermeneutics of the classics which became more and 
more elaborate from the Tang and Song dynasties onward.” See Michael Quirin, “Scholarship, Value, 
Method, and Hermeneutics in Kaozheng: Some Reflections on Cui Shu (1740-1816) and the Confucian 
Classics,” History and Theory 35, no. 4 (1996): 34-53. 
806 According to Chen Yinke, the ‘orthodoxy’ of Confucianism had been influenced by Buddhism in 
Tang dynasty. The foundation of Song learning, namely Neo-Confucianism, which was formed by Han 
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attitude led the late Qing literati to carefully examine the Buddhist element in 
Classical Learning and the impact of this foreign thought on native cultural heritage. 
Although maintaining a critical attitude towards ‘Buddhisized’ Classical Learning, 
they never fully banished Buddhism, from either their scholarship or their personal 
lives.807 For example, Qing classist Qian Daxin 錢大昕 deployed Buddhist scriptures 
and Buddhist phonetic books to discuss the alphabet and phonetic system of 
Chinese.808 Other scholars, such as Gong Zizhen, Weiyuan, and Yu Yue, wrote 
commentaries for Buddhist scriptures and drew on Buddhist ideas to elaborate on the 
Gongyang Learning.809  
The marginalization of the Classics as well as the alienation of ‘knowledge,’ 
‘application,’ ‘belief,’ and ‘practice’ led to a conceptual lag in the transformation of 
Chinese scholarship in late imperial China810 and influenced the new generations of 
scholars.811 During the early Republican era, the lasting influence of the kaozheng 
paradigm had persuaded historians, from Liang Qichao and Wang Guowei to younger 
scholars such as Gu Jiegang, to respect historical truth as the foundation of 
knowledge in the field of humanities. Some scholars, such as Liang Qichao, even used 
 
Yu, was inspired by the xinxing [心性] theory of Buddhism. See Chen Yinke, “Lun Han Yu 論韓愈,” in 
JMCB, 321-22.  
807 Private belief in and practice of Buddhism were very common among Late Qing literati. See chapter 
3 “Buddhism of the Late Qing Literati.” 
808 Qian Daxin used Xuanying玄應’s Yiqiejing yinyi 一切經音義 and Yuqie shi di lun瑜珈師地論 to 
demonstrate that the Chinese phonetic system of thirty-six letters originated from Mahāparinirvāṇa 
Sūtra, instead of Huayan Sūtra. See Qian Daxin, Shijiazhai yanxin lu 十駕齋養新錄. As Chen Yuan noted, 
in the Late Qing dynasty, studies on ‘yiqie yin [ 一切音] were very popular [顯學]. Chen Yuan, 
Zhongguo fojiao shiji gailun中國佛教史籍概論.  
809 See Ma Tianxiang 麻天祥, Wanqing foxue yu jindai shehui sichao 晚清佛學與近代社會思潮 (Taipei: 
Wenjin, 1992), vol.1, 22-37; vol.2, 33-95. 
810 Wang Fansen, “Introduction,” in Sixiang shi shenghuo de yizhong fangshi: Zhongguo jindai sixiang shi de 
zai sikao  思想是生活的一種方式—中國近代思想史的再思考 (Taipei: Linking, 2017). 
811 One of the intriguing questions of modern Chinese history is how the marginalization of Confucian 
doctrinal concerns relates to the development of the modern Chinese intelligentsia that grew out of 
the traditional intellectual elite. See Luo Zhitian, “The Marginalization of Classical Studies and the 
Rising Prominence of Historical Studies during the Late Qing and Early Republican: A Reappraisal,” in 
Transforming History: The Making of a Modern Academic Discipline in Twentieth Century China, 49-55; and 
Michael Quirin, “Die chinesische Intelligenz und die Macht,” Oriens Extremus, no.1-2 (1995), 239-258. 
 260 
 
kaozheng to refer to the whole of Qing scholarship and others, like Xiong Shili, tried to 
reveal its transcendental facet. In this sense, as Luo Zhitian and Chang So-an 
analyzed,812 the term (kaozheng or kaoju) was actually overused as an independent 
discipline, ignoring that it was originally, as Fu Sinian argued, “only method, not a 
goal.”813  
Around the 1890s, under multiple influences, including confrontation with 
Western imperialism and a rising Japan, the destructive impact of the Taiping 
Rebellion, and the revisionist developments within traditional scholarship,814 the 
kaozheng movement underwent its eventual denouement. Nevertheless, skepticism 
about traditional historical materials remained strong, especially under the influence 
of the New Culture and May Fourth movements.   
In the 1920s, the Doubting Antiquity School was officially formed with the 
propagation of historians such as Hu Shih and Gu Jiegang and his fellows. 815 Newly 
 
812 For relevant questions as to whether Evidential Learning can be considered as an independent 
discipline or not and the Qing scholars’ own discussions on this topic, see Luo Zhitian 羅志田, “Fangfa 
cheng le xueming: Qingdai kaojuxue heyi chengxue方法成了學名: 清代考據何以成學.” Wenyi yanjiu
文藝研究, 2010. And Chang Sho-an 張壽安  “Qingru de ‘zhishi fenhua’ yu ‘zhuanmen zhixue’ mengya: 
cong jichang bianlun tanqi 清儒的 ‘知識分化’ 與 ‘專門之學’ 萌芽: 從幾場論辯談起,” in Lingnan 
Journal of Chinese Studies 嶺南學報, 3 (2015): 59-94. 
813 Fu Sinian, “Taida ‘shehui kexue luncong’ fakan ci 臺大<社會科學論叢>發刊詞” [1950]. In Fu Sinian 
quanji 傅斯年全集 (Changsha, Hunan jiaoyu chubanshe, 2003) vol. 3, 367.  
814  See Elman, “From Philosophy to Philology,” 232-253. On the difficulties of the modern empirical 
disciplines in nineteenth-century China see for example Knight Biggerstaff, The Earliest Modern 
Government Schools in China (Port Washington, N.Y. and London, 1972). 
815 The Doubting Antiquity school was represented by Gushibian 古史辨 (Debates on Ancient History), 
a scholarly movement led by Gu Jiegang, centred on the magazine of the same name. Seven issues of 
the magazine, 1926-1941, contained about 350 essays. Most of their criticism concerned the 
authenticity of pre-Qin texts and dealt with questions put forward by past dynastic writers, as well as 
other subjects. Hu Shi initiated the critical movement, with his pupil Gu Jiegang and his friend Qian 
Xuantong continuing this school of thought. Their writings also had influence on many Western 
Sinologists, including Bernhard Karlgren and Samuel Griffith. For the studies on the Doubting 
Antiquity school, see Schneider, Ku Chieh-kang and China's New History: Nationalism and the Quest for 
Alternative Traditions.; Wang Fansen, Gushi bian yundong de xingqi 古史辨運動的興起 (Taipei: Yunchen, 
1987); Pung Mingfei 彭明輝, Yigu sixiang yu xiandai Zhongguo shixue de fazhan 疑古思想與現代中國史學
的發展 (Taipei: Shang wu yinshu guan, 1991).  
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discovered excavated materials, such as the oracle bone inscriptions, Han dynasty 
wooden slips from Guodian 郭店, Dunhuang manuscripts, and so on, revealed that 
the existing literature was full of dubious texts. From Zhang Xuecheng and Cui Shu to 
the New Text critics initiated by Kang Youwei,816 a revisionism of critiquing the 
inherited beliefs and the nature of antiquity emerged, laying the foundation for the 
new forms of disciplinary practice of history in a scientific, objective way.817  
To the Doubting Antiquity school, the Chinese textual tradition was always 
guilty of historicizing legends and myths through a kind of euhemerization. 
Therefore, in order to recover the “true face” [benlai mianmu 本來面目] (a term Gu 
Jiegang borrowed from Buddhism) of China’s past, historians needed to examine 
historical texts with “scientific methods 科學方法” and sift the authentic materials 
from the falsified ones. The general attitude and approach of the Doubting Antiquity 
school received approbation throughout modern academia. In one article published 
in 1924, Hu Shih endorsed the method of the Doubting Antiquity school for it 
followed the standard of “evidence.”818 Hu Shi affirmed this approach and argued that 
critiquing and questioning the credibility of antiquity would not cause the loss of 
faith or the “corruption of people’s minds [renxin bianhuai 人心變壞]”; rather, this 
 
816 According to the studies of some scholars, the intention of ‘doubting antiquity’ had long existed in 
the tradition of Classics learning. Scholars such as Zhang Xuecheng 章學誠 and Cui Shu 崔述 tried to 
return back to the origin of  the Sage’s Dao [shengren zhidao 聖人之道] and Six Classics, instead of 
relying on the Han scholars‘s commentaries. Cui’s ideas in his Kaoxinlu deeply influenced Gu; however, 
despite the ideological background of Zhang, Cui was fundamentally different from Gu Jiegang and 
Qian Xuantong. See Pung Mingfei, Yigu sixiang yu xiandai Zhongguo shixue de fazhan 疑古思想與現代中
國史學的發展, 17-32. 
817 As mentioned below, both Hu and Gu had advocated using a ‘scientific method’ to arrange the 
‘national essence.’ See Gu Jiegang, “Wo men duidai guogu caiqu de taidu我們對國故採取的態度”; and 
Hu, Zhixue de fangfa yu cailiao 治學的方法與材料.” Some scholars have thought that there is a direct 
relationship between the historiographies of Hu and Gu and Western scientific thought, especially the 
pragmaticism of Dewey. See Laurence A. Schneider, Ku Chieh-kang and China’s New History, 62-63. 
However, other scholars have argued that Hu and Gu’s understanding of science was very limited. For 
example, Lin Yusheng 林毓生 has pointed out that Hu’s ‘science’ was actually ‘scientism.’ See his The 
Crisis of Chinese Consciousness, Radical Antitraditionalism in the May Fourth Era (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press. 1979), 85,89, 91-92. Also, Daniel Kwork, Scienticism in Chinese Thought.   
818 Hu Shih, “Gushi taolun de duhougan 古史討論的讀後感,” in Gushibian, 1, 190. 
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scientific, objective historiography would contribute to the establishment of a “new 
system of history [xinde lishi xitong 新的歷史系統].”819  
By filtering out the forgery from the authentic, historians of the Doubting 
Antiquity school sought to place Chinese history on the basis of factual, provable 
‘truth’ through de-canonization and de-mythologization. To them, reading the 
ancient books with suspicion should be the first, if not the most important, step in 
restoring the past along empirical lines. This attitude, which combined kaozheng with 
a ‘pragmatist genetic’ method imported by Hu Shih, became an influential research 
paradigm and was widely practiced by historians.820 As a consequence, the common 
philosophical foundation of Chinese scholarship—Confucianism—was replaced by a 
shared, universal methodological tendency.821 The lively research activities of this 
school not only indicated that the value of the factual-evidential truth had surpassed 
the value of morals in historiography, but also embodied a further separation 
between historical materials and historical concepts. Historiography, then, became 
fundamentally a kind of ‘science’ with a consensus about its function: different 
historical writings might conflict with each other in certain stances on faiths or 
concepts; however, they had the same innate value as defending knowledge and 
truth. Because historiography had further escaped from the burden of philosophical 
commitments822, the Doubting Antiquity school argued that the mission of 
historiography was to overcome a distorted tendency of historicizing un-real 
 
819 Ibid. 
820 Surrounding Gu and the publications led by Gu, such as Gushi bian and Yugong 禹貢月刊, an 
academic community was formed. Besides, this method focused on historical materials was also 
endorsed by Fu Sinian and his colleagues in the History and Philology Department of the Academia 
Sinica中研院史語所.   
821 See Pung Mingfei, Yigu sixiang yu xiandai Zhongguo shixue de fazhan 疑古思想與現代中國史學的發展. 
822 Actually, historians like Gu Jiegang still could not cast off the influence of the Six Classics and relied 
too much on texts such as the Analects and Shijing. See Pung Mingfei, Yigu sixiang yu xiandai Zhongguo 
shixue de fazhan 疑古思想與現代中國史學的發展, 90. The paradox within Gu’s study has also been 
analysed by Laurence Schneider; see Schneider, Ku Chieh-kang and China's New History: Nationalism and 
the Quest for Alternative Traditions., 2. Ursula Richter also saw Gu as a “a traditional and yet modern 
scholar who was true to tradition also in that he ‘obeyed yet resisted’.” See Zweifel am Altertum.: Gu 
Jiegang und die Diskussion über Chinas Alte Geschichte als Konsequenz der ‘Neuen Kulturbewegung’ ca. 1915-1923 
(Frankfurt a. M: Steiner Franz Verlag, 1992), 288.   
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information into history and to reveal the mythical nature of the traditional 
narratives that had long been understood as historical and real.823  
The concept of myth and its related discourses emerged in the historiography 
of the Doubting Antiquity school and its neighboring fields, such as folklore studies.824 
This research trend echoed historians’ interests in popular literature, including 
Buddhist vernacular narratives such as the recorded sayings of Chan Buddhism, 
avadāna [piyu 譬喻], bianwen [transformation texts, 變文] and so on. Dividing myth 
from history was a rule that helped historians to draw boundaries around their 
writings,825 since the deployment of the term of ‘myth’ actually indicated a new sense 
of historicity, according to which some inherited knowledge was discarded, and some 
was recategorized.826 Through a similar process, the canonized corpus of Dazangjing 
was carefully divided into different sub-categories, such as Buddhist folk literature, 
Buddhist histories, Buddhist doctrines, Buddhist ritual texts, and so on. This 
classification, according to Brain Moloughney, followed the invisible track of the 
‘secularization’ of religious knowledge.827  
 
823 See G. Boltz William, “Kung Kung and the Flood: Reverse Euhemerism in the ‘Yao Tian’,” in T’oung 
Pao, 67 (1981): 141-53. 
824 Most of the studies were published in the nine issues of the Folksongs weekly. For the relationship 
between the folklore study of Gu and the May Fourth movement, see Haiyan Lee, “Mengjiang nü and 
the May Forth Folklore Movement,” Wilt L. Idema, trans. & ed., Meng Jiangnu Brings Down the Great Wall: 
Ten Versions of a Chinese Legend (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2008), 24–41.   
825 However, as pointed out by Brain Moloughney, there was a linguistic confusion between the terms 
‘myth’ and ‘legend’ that remained undiscussed in Gu’s work. See Brain. Moloughney, “Myth and the 
making of history: Gu Jiegang and the Gushi bian debates,” in Transforming history: The making of a 
modern academic discipline in twentieth-century China, 243. The term ‘shenhua’ 神話 was a modern 
neologism, coined in Japan by Takagi Toshio 高木敏雄(1876-1922) and soon deployed to advance the 
development of the modern discipline of folklore studies, especially through the work of Yanagita 
Kunio 柳田國男(1875-1862). See Mori Kōichi, “Yanagita Kunio: an interpretative study,” Japanese 
Journal of Religious Studies 7, no.2-3 (1980): 83-115.  
826 For the relationship between historical study and myth, see William H. McNeill, “Mythistory, or 
Truth, Myth, History, and Historians,” in The American Historical Review, 91, no. 1 (1986), 1-10. Also, 
Andrew von Hendy, The Modern Construction of Myth (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002).  
827 Brain Moloughney, “Myth and the making of history: Gu Jiegang and the Gushi bian debates,” in 
Transforming history: The making of a modern academic discipline in twentieth-century China,  
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Radically, the Doubting Antiquity school considered the traditions about early 
China as the outgrowth of deliberate fabrication. Hence, ‘ancient history’ was no 
longer a ‘credible history [xinshi 信史]’.828 Based on this knowledge, historians should 
not follow the common procedures of ‘questioning–investigating–proving’, but using 
the principle of ‘argument from silence [mozheng 默證]’,829 that is, systematically 
rejecting all the writings of ancient history from the very beginning.830 This attitude 
towards ancient Chinese Buddhist texts could be observed in Hu Shih’s critical 
interpretation of Chan Buddhism as well as Lü Cheng’s skepticism towards Chinese 
Buddhist literature.831  
In particular, Gu’s famous stratification thesis, or the theory of the “layered 
creation of ancient Chinese history [cenglei zaocheng de Zhongguo gushi 層累的造成
的中國古史]”832 formed a lucid picture of the formation of Chinese history. Although 
problematic to a certain extent833, the stratification thesis was adopted by many 
historians. For example, Tang Yongtong analyzed that the historical accounts of the 
White Lotus sects were shaped by the layered imaginations and associations of later 
 
828 The late Qing scholars tended to believe that more ancient a historical text was, more creditable it 
might be. ‘The adoration of ancientness’ was a mainstream concept in Qing scholarship. For example, 
the scholarship of Hui Dong as “anything if ancient then real.” For this tradition and the challenge of 
the New Textual School, see Wang, Fansen, Gushi bian yundong de xingqi 古史辨運動的興起, chapter 2.  
829 This method of mozheng 默證 was criticized by Zhang Yinlin 張蔭麟. Zhang cited the saying of 
Seignobos to point out that Gu ignored the nature and historical context of texts and the limits of the 
form of mozheng itself. Actually, the absence of a certain concept or term does not mean it did not 
exist. See Zhang Yinlin, “Ping jinren duiyu gushi zhi taolun (Gushi jueyilu zhiyi) 評近人對於古史之討
論(古史決疑錄之一).” Xueheng, 40 (1925).  
830 Pung Mingfei, Yigu sixiang yu xiandai Zhongguo shixue de fazhan 疑古思想與現代中國史學的發展, 62-
65. 
831 For further analysis, see the latter part of this chapter.   
832 Gu, Yu Qianxuantong xiansheng lun gushi shu與錢玄同先生論古史書,” in Gushi bian 古史辨 
(Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1982), vol.1, 59-66. For a contextual study of the Gushibian 
movement and Gu’s stratification thesis, see Wang Fansen, Gushi bian yundong de xingqi 古史辨運動的
興起.   
833 Gu’s approach to the textual evidence about early China, which Wang Fansen argued was that “of a 
conspiracy theorist” was critized by Wang Guowei, Liu Yizheng, Qianmu, Zhang Yinling 張蔭麟, and so 
on. See Brain. Moloughney, “Myth and the making of history: Gu Jiegang and the Gushi bian debates,” 
in Transforming history: The making of a modern academic discipline in twentieth-century China, 245-256. 
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believers.834 Historically, Buddhist texts were perfect examples of the process of 
‘stratification,’ for they combined authentic facts with fictional narratives in a 
layered way: miracle tales, oral accounts, prophecies, omens, and legends were 
utilized without division in order to strengthen the power of belief, establishing the 
religious authority, or serving sectarian purposes. Hu Shih’s study of Chan Buddhism, 
also followed the same pattern to reveal how Chan history was full of accumulated 
fabrications by depicting it as “clambering the dragon and phoenix [fanlong fufeng 攀
龍附鳳].” The story of Bodhidharma’s meeting with Emperor Wu of the Liang 
dynasty, which Hu analyzed as an example, went through this process of 
stratification, like “rolling a snowball that became bigger and bigger.”835 To Hu, the 
revised and enlarged versions of Chan scriptures, such as the creation of the Platform 
Sūtra, were the result of Chan monks’ intentional activities of “tampering with 
ancient books [wanggai gushu 妄改古書].”836 
The Doubting Antiquity movement, although not directly related to the 
development of Buddhist scholarship, drove the transformation of Buddhist textual 
tradition and further influenced the newly emerged historiography of Buddhism by 
emphasizing textual evidence as well as the less-religious features of Buddhism. In 
this modern period, this radical historiographical standpoint provoked the Buddhist 
‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ to think more seriously about what the ‘credible’ history of 
Buddhism should be; what was the relationship between true belief and the ‘truth’ 
that could be filtered by science and located in the framework of ‘knowledge’?  
  
New Materials and New Questions837 
As kaozheng and textual criticism began to perform as a shared methodology among 
scholars from the Late Qing dynasty, new materials became the crux of 
 
834 Tang, Hanwei, 575-77. 
835 Hu, “Puti damo kao菩提達摩考,” in HSWC, part 3, vol.4.  
836 Hu, “Tanjing kao zhier壇經考之二,” in HSWC, part 4, vol. 2. 
837 Chen Yinke 陳寅恪, Chen Yuan Dunhuang jieyu lu xu陳垣敦煌劫餘錄序, in JMEB, 266. 
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historiography.838 Newly discovered materials opened the door for scholars to enter 
into unexplored territory, stimulating them to organize these data into the existing 
literary corpus. The obsession with textual materials reached its peak in the Qing 
dynasty and eventually caused the ‘antiquarianization [gudonghua 古董化]’ of 
scholarship.839  Then the younger, Western-educated scholars such as Hu Shih, Fu 
Sinian, Gu Jiegang, and so on840 further advocated “an equal perspective [pingdeng de 
yanguang 平等的眼光]” towards materials.841 Against this background, Buddhist texts 
became extremely important ‘new material.’  
Remarkably, a large portion of the new sources discovered or regathered 
during the Republican era were Buddhist texts, including the Dunhuang manuscripts, 
the Jiaxing Canon, and the re-published Buddhist Tripiṭaka in Chinese (with a 
supplement from the Japanese Taisho), Tibetan, and Mongolian, as well as some 
Buddhist-related archives from the Grand Secretariat archives. The wealth of these 
materials attracted many scholars to devote themselves to the study of Buddhist 
texts. For example, Hu Shih’s groundbreaking study on Chan Buddhism was incited 
by his discovery of the Dunhuang collection. Chen Yuan’s study on Ming and Qing 
Buddhism, especially his two monographs A Study on Buddhism in Yunnan and Guizhou 
Provinces in Mid-Ming and Debates Between Monks in the Early Qing Dynasty, was based on 
 
838 For a modern reflection on the traditional concept of historical materials [shiliao 史料], see Wang 
Fansen 王汎森, “Shenme keyi chengwei lishi zhengju? Jindai Zhongguo xinjiu shiliao guandian de 
chongtu 什麼可以成為歷史證據? 近代中國新舊史料觀點的衝突,” in Zhongguo jindai sixiang yu xueshu 
de xipu中國近代思想與學術的系譜, 343-376. 
839 Zhang Xueshu 張學書, Xin faxian de Fu Sinian Shuzha jilu 新發現的傅斯年書札輯錄, unpublished, 
cf., Wang Fansen, Zhongguo jindai sixiang yu xueshu de xipu中國近代思想與學術的系譜, 346.  
840 Hu Shih elaborated his critique in the essays “Guogu jikan fakan ci” 國故季刊發刊詞 and “Zhixue de 
fangfa yu cailiao” 治學的方法與材料. In HSWJ, vol.4, 105-06.  
841 The equality of historical materials was stressed by many modern historians, such as Hu Shih, Gu 
Jiegang, Li Ji, and so on. See ibid; also Gu Chao, Gu Jiegang nianpu 顧頡剛年譜, 119; Li Ji, “Zhongguo 
zuixin faxian zhi xin shiliao 中國最新發現之新史料,” in Guoli zhongshan daxue yuyan lishi xue yanjiu suo 
zhoukan 國立中山大學語言歷史研究所週刊, 5, 57/58 (1928): 3. 
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the Yulu of Chan Monks in the Jiaxing Canon he discovered in the royal collections in 
the Imperial Palace.842 
 The development of the study of bronze and stone inscriptions [jinshixue 金
石學] and historical geography also provided more relevant data and a new 
perspective to this field. Scholars like Tang Yongtong, Chen Yuan, and Hu Shih placed 
great emphasis on epigraphical texts—inscriptions on tablet, tombstones, Buddhist 
statues, etc., as well as chorographical texts, such as temple gazetteers, local 
chronicles, and so on. Besides the collection of rare, unused primary sources, the 
scope of materials was largely expanded due to a more open attitude towards texts 
with different origins and fragmentary materials scattered in local archives, folk 
literature, images, and so on. For example, Tang Yongtong’s History demonstrated the 
highly synthetized utilization of different sources of materials from official histories 
to historical narratives written by Buddhist historians, such as the Gaoseng zhuan and 
Chusanzang jiji. He paid special attention to the modifications, overlaps, distinctions, 
and alterations between texts, both at literal and content levels. When investigating 
the life and lineage of Monk Fayao 法瑤, he not only cited the biographies of Fa Yao 
and other monks, such as Huijing 慧靜 and Daoping 道平 in Gaosengzhuan, but also 
referred to other Chinese Buddhist texts, such as Ke jingang pi xu科金剛錍序843, Fahua 
 
842 The Jiaxing zang, which Chen Yuan saw in the archive of the Grand Secretariat of Qing, was 
persevered in the collection of the Ming and Qing royal palace. It has 10,888 volumes with 2,141 kinds 
of scriptures, for a total of 2,453 volumes in 344 cases. This version of Dazangjing was printed between 
1579, the seventh year of the Wanli era of the Ming dynasty and 1707, the forty-seventh year of the 
Kangxi era of the Qing dynasty. During the Shunzhi, Kang xi, and Yongzheng eras, it was revised, 
enlarged, and copied, and stored in the Grand Secretariat in the Qiankong era. For a historical 
investigation of the Jiaxing zang, see Shi Fachuang 釋法幢, “Mingqing zhiji jiaxingzang diaoyin de 
shimo yinyuan明清之際嘉興藏雕印的始末因緣.” Zhongguo foxue 中國佛學 1 (2014): 23-40. For the 
scholarly significance of the Jiaxing Canon, seeLi Xueqing李學勤, “Jianxiangzang yu mingqing zhiji lishi 
yanjiu <嘉興藏>與明清之際歷史研究,” Gugong bowuyuan  yuankan故宮博物院院刊 105 (2003): 5; also 
Dai, Lianbin, “The Economics of the Jiaxing Edition of the Buddhist Tripitaka.” T'oung Pao 94 (2008): 
306-359. 
843 CBETA: T n1932, p. 781a06. 
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wenju法華文句, and Sanlun yizhang 三論義章, and records from official histories, 
such as the biography of Zhang Rong 張融.844  
This “equal sight” also directed historians to texts in different languages. Due 
to their Sino-Western hybrid educational background, many modern scholars became 
very sensitive to changes of meaning in translation. They also acquired the ability to 
read and compare multi-language texts. In one letter to his sister, Chen Yinke 
stressed this method of comparative linguistics:  
The Tibetan Buddhist canon has many materials written by Nāgārjuna, Aśvaghoṣa, 
which have not been translated into Chinese. Even for the translated ones, [the 
Tibetan Buddhist canon] can be used for comparative collation…… If [we] can use the 
Western method of linguistic science to do the comparative study between Chinese 
and Tibetan texts, [we] can reach a higher level than the Qianjia School 西藏文藏
經，多龍樹馬鳴著作而中國未譯者。即已譯者，亦可對勘異同……如以西洋語言
科學之法，為中藏文比較之學，則成效當較乾嘉諸老更上一層.845 
To Chen, using the approach of Western linguistic science that he had learned from 
Orientalists such as Lüders and Lanman was one potential path to making an 
outstanding contribution to the fields of philology and history.846 However, his 
research also differed from mainstream of Western Indology.847 He did not concern 
himself with Vedic studies, which were the most popular branch in Germany in his 
time, and he seldom dealt with the linguistic problems, such as vocabulary, grammar, 
etc., of Sanskrit and Pali. His study focused on the translation process of texts from 
 
844 According to the records in Songshu and Gaoseng Zhuan, Tang found that after the Xinan Temple was 
established by the Xiaowu Emperor, Fayao started to teach the meaning of ‘gradual enlightment’ there 
for 19 years, till his death.   
845 Chen Yinke, “Yu mei shu與妹書,” JMEB, 355-56. In a letter to Fu Sinian, Chen emphasized again this 
method. Chen Yinke ji· Suxin, 23-24. 
846 For the language knowledge of Chen Yinke, see Chen Huaiyu, Zai xifang faxian Chen Yinke: Zhongguo 
jindai renwenxue de dongfangxue yu xixue Beijing 在西方發現陳寅恪: 中國近代人文學的東方學與西學
背景, 100-122. 
847 For the history of Western Indology, see William Peiris, The Western Contribution to Buddhism (Delhi: 
Motilal Banarsidass, 1973), 81-161. For Indology in Germany, see Velentina Stache-Rosen, German 
Indologists: Biographies of Scholars in Indian Studies Writing in German: With a Summary on Indology in German 
Speaking Countries (New Delhi: Max Müller Bhavan, 1990).   
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Sanskrit into Chinese, namely, the changes in meaning, signifiers, and contexts 
between the different language systems. This research model was what he sometimes 
called Oriental studies but more often called comparative textual criticism.  
Other scholars, such as Lü Cheng, also valued this method.848 When compiling 
Zang yao, a bibliographical work of the Dazangjing, Lü summarized the method he used 
as:  
I oppose the practice of collating only based on Chinese Buddhist scriptures in the 
past, but using Sanskrit, Palī, Tibetan and other texts to conduct a comparative study 
with Chinese translated Buddhist scriptures. 我一反過去僅就漢譯佛典作校勘的做
法，而是利用梵、巴（巴利文）、藏等幾種文字與漢譯佛典進行對勘. 849 
Lü conducted this comparative research in a very meticulous way. He firstly 
translated each Buddhist scripture from Sanskrit, Tibetan, and Pali into Chinese, and 
then literally compared and collated these different translations with their original 
texts in Indian languages and their early Chinese translated versions. By doing so, he 
identified the latter sectarian commentaries, records, and teachings mixed into the 
 
848 One piece of evidence is that Chen, Hu, and Lü had learned from or cooperated with Alexander von 
Staël-Holstein剛和泰 (1877-1937). According to Chen Yinke’s daughter, Chen Liuqiu 陳流求, Chen 
visited Staël-Holstein every Saturday. See Jiang Tianshu 蔣天樞, Chen Yinke xiansheng biannian shiji 陳寅
恪先生編年事輯 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1997), 77. According to Hu’s diary, Hu had 
cooperated with Staël-Holstein for two years as the interpreter of Staël-Holstein’s course on the 
history of Ancient Indian religion at Peking University. Hu also learned Sanskrit from Staël-Holstein. 
See Hu Shih riji 胡適日記 [1937. 3. 16] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1985). 
849 see Gao Zhennong, “huai nianenshi Lü Cheng xiansheng 懷念恩師呂澂先生” in Wutaishan yanjiu 五
台山研究, 1 (1998): 33. 
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text, exploring their origins and historical strata.850 This approach was described by 
Lü Cheng as “smelting Sanskrit, Pali, Chinese and Tibetan in one furnace.”851  
In contrast to the traditional attitude towards Buddhist texts, new materials 
and questions in Buddhist scholarship reinforced the importance of textual 
resources, indicating a tendency which Philip Almond has called “textualism.”852 As 
unprecedent emphasis had been placed upon evidence written on paper, stone, and 
other artifacts, ‘truth’ then largely relied on the authenticity of text itself; the history 
of Buddhism, consequently, sometimes became a history of Buddhist literature. 
Behind this tendency was a profound shift in the ownership of primary materials. 
New materials—scriptures from the Dunhuang caves, the imperial treasury, and 
museums and libraries (some in Europe and Japan)—were firstly obtained by non-
Buddhist scholars from universities and research institutes instead of by monks and 
nuns. As more and more archaic languages became known to non-Buddhist scholars, 
and more and more venerable texts were amassed and cataloged in ‘secular’ 
institutes, the historiographical method acquired a burgeoning authority over the 
monastic institution of knowledge. When the historians read Buddhist texts, the 
imaginary enemy in their minds was also no longer learned monks and religious 
authorities, but rather Western Sinologists853, such as Alexander Staël von Holstein 
 
850 For example, in the collation notes of the Mahā-prajñāpāramitā Sūtra [Da borejing 大般若經], Lü 
clarified that: “the collation of this volume went through three rounds. The first one is the 
‘translation-collation’ [yijiao 譯校] that using the Mahā-Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra translated by Kumārajīva 
and the Pañcavimśatisāhasrikā- Prajñāpāramitā [般若二萬五千頌 Tib. ཤེས་རབ་'ི་ཕ་རོལ་,་-ིན་པ་སོང་1ག་3ི་4་5་པ།, 
No.3790] compiled by 師子賢[Skt. Haribhadra/ Tib.སེང་གེ་བཟང་པོ།, fl. 720-795] to collate the texts 
comparatively. The second one is the ‘apology-collation’ [leijiao 類校] that using the Mahā-
Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra translated by Xuanzang and the Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra translated by 
Kumārajīva; The third one is edition-collation [kejiao 刻校] that using the different block-printing 
versions to collated with each other.” Lü Cheng, “Da borejing dierfen jiaokan shuoming 大般若經第二
分校勘說明,” in Zangyao 藏要, Ouyang Jingwu 歐陽竟無 ed., (Shanghai: Shanghai shudian, 1991), 3-4.  
851 “冶梵、巴、漢、藏於一爐.” Gao Zhennong, “Huai nianenshi Lü Cheng xiansheng 懷念恩師呂澂先
生,” 34.  
852 Philip C. Almond, The British Discovery of Buddhism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 3, 
24, 27.  
853 Hu Shih, for example, was amazed to read Staël von Holstein’s work on Chinese ancient phonetics 
using Buddhist Dhāraṇīs. See Hu Shih Riji quanbian 胡適日記全編, Cao Boyan 曹伯言 ed. (Hefei: Anhui 
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and K. Klas Benhard 高本漢, and ‘the seniors of the Qian-jia school [qianjia zhulao 乾
嘉諸老]’.854 
Despite their varied perspectives, different methods, and often contradictory 
conclusions, modern scholars focused their studies on several common issues, some 
of which were not totally out of the vision of the pre-modern Buddhist scholars but 
were addressed with new perspectives. First was the bibliographical information of 
Buddhist scriptures and treatises. Traditionally, the authenticity and fidelity of 
Buddhist texts, though noted by many scholarly monks, such as Xuanzang, was not 
considered a critical issue. The doubts surrounding scriptures centered on whether 
the texts accurately conveyed the Buddha’s intentions in the translation process, 
although the bibliographical facts of certain texts, such as the identity of the author, 
the date of its compilation, and information about its versions had also been recorded 
and examined. In modern China, however, clarifying the origin of texts and their 
bibliographical background became the primary task of historians and the 
prerequisite for all their follow-up studies. This tendency, of course, emerged under 
the influence of both Qing Learning and the development of Western bibliographical 
scholarship.855 Text was seen a self-supporting system and, as Hu Shih noted, “can 
only be addressed by ‘paperwork [zhishang de gongzuo 紙上的工作]’, such as 
collation and exegesis; going beyond this scope would make stupid mistakes.” This 
 
jiaoyu chubanshe, 2001), vol.3, 605. He was also surprised that Sinologists like Benhard had surpassed 
the Qing scholars.  Hu Shih wencun, vol.3, 120-121. See also Wang Fanseng, “Shenme keyi chengwei lishi 
zhengju 什麼可以成為歷史證據,” in Zhongguo jindai sixiang yu xueshu de xipu 中國近代思想與學術的
系譜, 348. Chen Yinke also influenced by K. Klas Benhard. See Yu Dawei, “Huainian Chen Yinke 
xiansheng 懷念陳寅恪先生,” Lishi yuyan yanjiusuo jikan 歷史語言研究所集刊, 41, 1 (1969). 
854 Chen Yinke, “Yu mei shu與妹書,” JMEB, 355-56. 
855 In the early decades of the twentieth century, large numbers of bibliographies on Sinology and 
Oriental studies were published in Europe, such as the Orientalische Bibliographie published in Germany 
and the Bibliotheca Sinica published in France. See Chen Huaiyu, Zai xifang faxian Chen Yinke: Zhongguo 
jindai renwenxue de dongfangxue yu xixue Beijing 在西方發現陳寅恪: 中國近代人文學的東方學與西學
背景, 165-97. Japanese scholars, such as Naitō Torajirō, 島内翰 highly stressed bibliographical studies. 
See Qian Wanyue, “Cisheng chengjiu mingshan ye, buyan chongyang shi wanghuan: Neiteng Hunan 
Zhongguo fangshu jiqi xueshushi yiyi shulun 此生成就名山業, 不厭重洋十往還 —內藤湖南中國訪書




kind of work, namely collecting, identifying, and arranging lost, fragmentary 
materials, was named by Chen Yuan ‘the study of historical origins [shiyuan xue 史源
學]’, the very basic “insight and method of reading all history books.”856 As indicated 
in his book An Overview of the Historical Texts of Chinese Buddhism [Zhongguo fojiao shiji 
gailun 中國佛教史籍概論], the accuracy of the title [mingmu 名目], abbreviated title 
[lüemu 略目], volume number, and version information of every book, as well as the 
background of the author,857 although they might not be directly related to the 
content of the book, were the prerequisite for its historical legitimacy and further 
philosophical validity. Every historiographical statement needed to have its root 
solidly in primary textual records. This was considered not only a practical technique 
of historians but also their essential expertise and responsibility. 
The second issue was the historical context of Buddhist texts. Traditionally, 
Buddhist texts, no matter whether doctrinal or ritual, were read as purveyors of the 
Dharma. However, in modern times, as ‘secular’ historians entered this area, Buddhist 
texts were no longer the expression of concepts but a response to historical 
circumstances. Therefore, historians were asking question about why these texts 
were produced and how they were read under certain historical condition. Through a 
‘contextual reading’ of Buddhist texts as historical materials, these historians tried to 
reveal the conceptual inadequacy of purely scriptural studies and their relevant 
exegetical problems, and further avoided anachronistic misunderstandings and 
ignorance of the changing phenomena behind texts. In particular from the 1930s to 
1940s, many historians began to write the history of Buddhism as a kind of political or 
social history. For example, Chen Yinke had commented on Chen Yuan’s works on 
Ming-Qing Buddhism as “participating in the trend” of modern scholarship, for they 
explored new ways of writing religious history as “political history.”858 Liang Qichao’s 
critique of Chinese Buddhist treatises, Chen Yinke’s reading of translated Buddhist 
 
856 Chen Yuan, Shiyuan xue xuexi ji qingdai kaozheng fa 史源學學習及清代考證法 (Beijing: Shangwu 
yinshuguan, 2014), 1. For Chen’s methodology of ‘historical origins’, see Shi Lijun, Chen Yuan de shiyuan 
xue lilun yu shijian 陳垣的史源學理論與實踐 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2016). 
857 CYQJ, vol. 17, 496. 
858 Chen Yinke, 敦煌劫餘錄序. JMCB. 
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literature, Tang Yongtong’s study of Wei-Jin monks, Hu Shih’s discovery of the 
recorded sayings of Shenhui, and Chen Yuan’s reading of the Ming-Qing Buddhist 
texts all led towards the ‘contextualization’ of Buddhism. Remarkably, none these 
studies went as far as historical determinism or emphasized too much the socio-
economical elements in history; they still adhered to texts and focused on the 
dynamic interplay between different cultural forces. It was true that this 
methodology was consciously resisted, in particular by Buddhists, who insisted on the 
autonomy of scriptural studies. However, even the most Dharmic interpretations of 
Buddhist canons written by the Buddhists during this period of time included both 
some concession to knowing something of social and political conditions, and some 
gesture toward paying ‘due regard’ to the historical context that had produced the 
texts themselves, as we can see in the works of Ouyang Jingwu and Lü Cheng.  
 
Apocryphal Canon? Debates on the Chinese Texts of Mahāyāna 
Buddhism 
Most of the ‘dubious’ Buddhist texts were early Chinese compositions of Mahāyāna 
Buddhism written in the guise of original Indian works. Some of them were ‘sūtras,’ 
namely scriptures setting the doctrinal foundation of Buddhist thought, such as The 
Sūtra of Forty-Two Sections 四十二章經 and Yuanjue jing 圓覺經. Others used the term 
‘treatise’ [lun 論] (in Sanskrit śastra), the exegetic or doctrinal works that normally 
contained teachings on the same level as sūtras and conveyed the Buddha’s 
meaning,859 for example, “Treatise on Awakening Mahāyāna Faith.” All these Buddhist 
 
859 As Francesca Tarocco has pointed out, the title of many East Asian sūtras begins with the words fa 
shuo [佛說] or ‘the Buddha says.’ The widespread use of this formula highlights the importance placed 
on direct oral transmission to authenticate Buddhist writings. “Lost in Translation? The ‘Treatise on 
the Mahāyāna Awakening of Faith (Dasheng qixin lun)’ and Its Modern Readings.” Bulletin of the School 
of Oriental and African Studies, University of London 71, no.2 Scripture and Modernity: A Tribute to 
Professor John Wansbrough (2008): 323-343. On issues of translation and Buddhist language see, for 
example, see Jan Nattier, “Church language and vernacular language in Central Asian Buddhism.” 
Numen 37 no.2 (1990): 195-219; For some interesting comments on the use and reception of sacred texts 
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texts were highly influential in the history of Chinese or even East Asian Buddhism.860 
However, the popularity of these texts could not be attributed simply to their 
doctrinal content (some of them were quite rough and slipshod), but rather to what 
could be described as ‘spiritual capital’—an accumulated power of belief.861 Although 
the authorship, version, and bibliographical nature of these texts remained 
questionable, they were historically read and worshipped as the original works of 
Indian Buddhist masters, until the modern age.   
 
Debates on The Sūtra of Forty-Two Sections四十二章經 
The history of the Sūtra of Forty-Two Sections [Sishi’er zhang jing 四十二章經, below: the 
Sūtra] is linked to the earliest stage of the legendary mission of Buddhism from India 
to China in the Eastern Han dynasty. According to the traditional narrative, this Sūtra 
was firstly introduced into China by two Indian monks, whose names have been 
rendered variously as Kasyapa Matanga迦葉摩騰 and Gobharana or Dhamaratna 竺
法蘭. As pointed out by Usr App, this text and its tale of the introduction of Buddhism 
from India to China played an extraordinary role both in East Asia and later in the 
Western discovery of Buddhism.862 The popularity of the Sūtra cannot merely be 
attributed to the early date of its translation but also to its doctrinal content and its 
compilation style, which facilitated its transmission. It is not a complete, systematic 
 
within Buddhist traditions see Miriam Levering, Rethinking Scripture: Essays from a Comparative 
Perspective (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 13-14; 58-101.  
860 With regard to the use here of the term ‘East Asian Buddhism,’ it should be noted that the Buddhist 
source texts used in China, Korea, Japan, and even Vietnam are identical and that together they form 
the tradition that gave rise to what is commonly referred to now in Chinese as dazangjing or the canon 
of Buddhist scriptures written in literary Chinese. 
861 In her article on the modern reading of the Treatise on the Mahāyāna Awakening of Faith, Francesca 
Tarocco has used this term by referring Bradford Verter, “Spiritual capital: theorizing religion with 
Bourdieu against Bourdieu,” Sociological Theory 21 no. 2 (2003): 150-74.  
862 The Sūtra was not only the first complete Indian scripture to be translated into Chinese, but also the 
first Buddhist scripture to have been translated into a Western language. See Urs App, The Birth of 
Orientalism (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania University Press, 2010). 
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work, but rather a short collection of “aphorisms and pithy moralistic parables.”863 
Meanwhile, because of this unique form, its purported Indian origin is questionable: 
it may have been compiled in Central Asia or even China. All versions of this Sūtra 
only demonstrate signs that every revision of this text has been based on its earlier 
versions, and that it was in circulation during the earliest period of Buddhism in 
China.864 
 The suppositions on this Sūtra cannot undermine its importance in the history 
of East Asian Buddhism.865 It attracted attention from Western and Japanese Buddhist 
scholarship as early as in the eighteenth century866, and also triggered heated debates 
in China during the 1920s and 1930s. The most important studies on this text 
included867: 1) Liang Qichao’s “The Sūtra of Forty-Two Chapters as Falsehood” 
[“Sishier zhangjing bianwei” 四十二章經辨偽]; 2) Hu Shih’s “The Investigation of the 
Sūtra of Forty-two Chapters” [“Sishier zhangjing kao” 四十二章經考] and the 
commentary from Chen Yuan; 3) Tang Yongtong’s “Evidential Studies on the Sūtra of 
Forty-two Chapters” [“Sishier zhangjing kaozheng” 四十二章經考證]; 4) Lü Cheng’s 
 
863 Robert H. Sharf, “The Scripture in Forty-two Sections,” in Religions of China in Practice, ed. Donald S. 
Lopez, Jr. (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1996), 360-71. 
864 Ibid.  
865 For instance, App has examined how one particular Ch’an-influenced edition of the Sutra (the 守遂
註本) had a profound influence on the understanding of Buddhism at the time in Europe, a time in 
which Buddhist Sanskrit texts were unknown. This influenced philosophers such as Diderot and 
Schopenhauer. 
866 From the 1750s to 1800s, scholars like De Guignes and Klaproth had paid attention to this text. The 
work of De Guignes displayed an anthropological–historical interest in the subject—after all, the sutra 
was included as an appendix to the history of the Huns. However, it was couched in religio-centric 
terms: Buddhism was seen as being derived from early Christian heresies. Fifty years on, Klaproth, on 
the other hand, flatly contradicted de Guignes on the question of origins: he claimed instead that 
Christianity was derived from Buddhism. It may well be the case that he sought to cover up his 
plagiarism by introducing a rival, conflicting interpretation, but it is tempting to see in this a product 
of the times: post-Revolutionary religious studies were often characterized by a rationalist, 
politicized—if not outright anti-clerical—tone. Examples see Charles-François Dupuis, The Origins of All 
Religious Worship (New Orleans: C.C. W Müller, 1872). 
867 The most influential works on this topic in Chinese have been collected by Zhang Mantao ed., 
Xinadai fojiao xueshu congkan 現代佛教學術叢刊. Articles not mentioned here also include:   Related 
to the research on this sūtra, the textual studies of the mouzi liluo lun are also very important. Articles 
on Mouzi include:  
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“The Transcription Time of the Sūtra of Forty-two Chapters [“Sishier zhangjing chaochu 
de niandai” 四十二章經抄出的年代]. These articles mainly focused on three issues: 
first, its date of creation (when the Sūtra appeared for the first time in China; was it 
written or compiled as early as in the Eastern Han, as it claimed, or created later?); 
second, the nature of this text (Is the Sūtra a translated work based on an original 
Indian scripture in Palī or Sanskrit, or is it a native composition of Chinese 
Buddhists?); and third, the changes in the versions of this sūtra (namely, during the 
distribution of this text, was there only one version or two different versions?). 
Furthermore, discussions surrounding the Sūtra also touched upon other relevant 
issues in Buddhist history, for example, the early acceptance of Buddhism in 
Northern and Southern China, the path of the transmission of Buddhism, the 
formation of early Buddhist terminology, and so on.868  
Partly under the influence of Japanese scholarship, Liang Qichao firstly called 
the authenticity of this sūtra into question. The title of his article makes Liang’s 
conclusion obvious: the sūtra was an ‘apocryphal’ Chinese composition that was 
produced in a comparatively late age.869 It was not translated from any Indian text, 
but rather was a collection that merged different and even contradictory content into 
a single text by adopting the form of Xiaojing孝經 and Laozi 老子. Liang argued this 
for two reasons: first, according to the content of the Sūtra and its writing style, he 
believed that the author should be someone who was very familiar with the prevalent 
metaphysics of Lao-Zhuang Learning and lived in a time when Mahāyāna Buddhism 
had already been distributed throughout China. Second, the Sūtra had not been 
recorded in the Dao An 道安’s Bibliography [anlu 安錄], but appeared only in later 
bibliographies, such as Seng You僧祐’s Chusanzangjiji出三藏記集. Therefore, Liang 
believed that this Sūtra was created in the Eastern Jin dynasty, instead of the Wu 
 
868 For detailed study, see Tsintsin Peng, “Jindai fojiao shixue de beijing he jiaodian: yi weirao ‘sishier 
zhangjing’ de lunzheng weili 近代佛教史學研究的背景和焦點: 以圍繞《四十二章經》的論爭為例.” 
Huaren zongjiao yanjiu 華人宗教研究, 5 (Taipei: Xinwen feng, 2015). 




Kingdom 吳.870 Although Liang did not develop his argument into much detail,871 his 
conclusion raised wide attention concerning the Sūtra and the issue of the 
authenticity of early Chinese Buddhist texts.  
Soon, Liang’s assertion was opposed by Zhou Shujia 周叔迦, Tang Yongtong, 
and Hu Shih. One of the pieces of evidence presented by Tang and Hu was two 
idiomatic expressions—the “leather bag with blood” [genang chengxue革囊盛血]872	
and “sleeping one night under a tree” [shuxia yisu樹下一宿],873 which could be 
found in the biography of Xiang Kai 襄楷 in the Houhan shu後漢書. They used this 
record—which was in use by Xiang Kai 襄楷 in 166 CE (the ninth year of Yanxi period 
of the Huan Emporor in the Eastern Han)—to demonstrate that the Sūtra had been 
introduced into China in the Late Han. Tang also tried to find an explanation for 
Liang’s query that the Sūtra was not recorded in Daoan’s categories. He claimed 
(although without concrete evidence) that there would be two versions of the Sūtra; 
the older, less polished one had been replaced by this existing version, which was 
more literate. However, there were also difficulties with these arguments. Neither 
Tang nor Hu could clarify the doubt about why there were so many Taoist teachings 
in this Sūtra if it was a translation based on Indian texts. They were also unable to 
provide conclusive proofs to solve the question about its over-ornate style, which 
seemed incompatible with other translated Buddhist texts before the Eastern Jin era.  
The historian Chen Yuan came to a similar conclusion to Liang’s, expounding 
that the Sūtra was translated in a comparative later period (or at least after the Late 
 
870 Ibid. 30-32 
871 Liang’s conclusion was based on several hypotheses and ‘unsolid’ arguments. For example, he 
argued that the sutra was created in a later period because of its ornate and polished style. He also 
quickly moved to other issues, such as the mode of xuefen nanbei 學分南北 of Chinese Scholarship. In 
the later part of this section, I will further discuss Liang’s study. 
872 The original text in the Sūtra is: “天神遺以好女, 浮屠曰: ‘此但革囊盛血.’ 遂不眄之.” In Hou 
Hanshu 後漢書, vol.3, Xiang Kai zhuan襄楷. However, this phrase could also literally be found in some 
earlier texts, such as Shiji 史記 (Yin Benji 殷本紀). For a detailed study on the word nang 囊 in Qin and 
Han texts, see Hu Bo 胡波, Xianqin lianghan ‘tuo’, ‘nang’ yanbiankao – jiyu chuanshi yu chutu wenxian 
de zonghe kaocha 先秦兩漢 ‘橐’、‘囊’演變考—基於傳世與出土文獻的綜合考察.” Liyun yuyan xuekan 
勵耘語言學刊 2 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2018). 
873 The original text in the sutra is: “日中一食，樹下一宿，慎勿再矣。使人愚蔽者，愛與欲也.” 
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Han dynasty). Chen Yuan’s discussion, in his commentary on Hu’s study of the Taoist 
work Zhengao 真誥,874 adopted a different perspective, focusing on the usage of the 
term ‘fo’ 佛 in the Sūtra. He cited several non-Buddhist writings as evidence to show 
that the term ‘fo,’ which was used to translate the Sanskrit word “Buddha,” only 
appeared after the time of the Three Kingdom (before, ‘Buddha’ had been translated 
as ‘futu’ 浮屠). This terminological change from fo to futu, according to Chen, showed 
that the Sūtra must be written after the Late Han.875  
Relying on a literal comparison between the Sūtra and the Sanskrit scripture 
of the Dharmmapada 法句經876, Lü Cheng reached a final verdict that was close to the 
conclusion of Liang Qichao and Chen Yuan while opposing Tang Yongtong’s opinion 
in almost every aspect. Unlike Tang, who believed that there existed at least two 
versions of the Sūtra, Lü believed that there was only one version of the Sūtra before 
the Liang梁 dynasty, which had been produced no earlier than the period of 
Emperor Hui of the Jin 晉惠帝 (fl.306) and was recorded by Sengyou僧祐 in his 
Chusanzang jiji. Moreover, Tang suggested that the Sūtra was directly translated from 
the Palī canon; Lü, instead, thought that the Sūtra was a collected work of transcribed 
and copied sentences from the Chinese translation of the Dharmmapada.877 According 
 
874 Hu’s discussion on the sūtra came from his studies of the Taoist literature. He found that in Tao 
Hongjing 陶宏景’s Zhengao 真誥, more than twenty volumes of the contents were copied from the 
Sūtra. This discovery, which Hu considered his original idea, had actually already been discussed by 
Zhu Xi 朱熹, Huang Bosi黃伯思, and Sikutiyao 四庫提要. 
875 The letters between Hu and Chen were collected in both Hu and Chen’s complete collection of 
works. See Hu Shih, Hu Shih wenji p 184; Chen Zhichao, Chen Yuan wanglai shuxin ji, pp. 179-183. 
Their discussion on the Sutra and its broad scholarly context has been discussed by Ge Zhaohuang, 
“ ‘Liaowei youyi de bisai’ – Cong Chen Yuan yu Hu Shih de zhenglun shuo dao zaoqi Zhongguo fojiao 
shi yanjiu de xiandai dianfan 聊為友誼的比賽’——從陳垣與胡適的爭論說到早期中國佛教史研究的
現代典範,” in Lishi yanjiu 歷史研究 1 (2013): 132-46; Also, Chen Yiai陳以愛, “30 niandai Hu Shih yu 
Chen Yuan de jici xueshu jiaoshe 30年代胡適與陳垣的幾次學術交涉,” in Jiewang Erbian 結網二編, 
ed., Zhou Liangkai (Taipei: Dongda tushu gongsi, 2003), 341-408. 
876 Some current scholars, for example, Robert Sharf, did the similar work to Lü, comparing the Sūtra 
with the Dharmmapada. See Robert H. Sharf, “The Scripture in Forty-two Sections,” in Religions of China 
In Practice, ed. Donald S. Lopez, Jr., (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1996). 
877 In the appendix to his article, Lü provided a detailed table of comparison at the sentence level 
between the Sūtra and the Dharmmapada. 
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to Lü, the Dhammapada, as a canonical text of the Dharmaguptaka School 法藏部, was 
translated from Sanskrit into Chinese by Tanguo 曇果 at the end of the East Han 
dynasty (no earlier than the late years of Emperor Ling漢靈帝), based on a revised 
version created by Dharmatāta [Fajiu法救], a Indian monk who had lived in the era 
of Emperor Kanishka of the Kushan dynasty. When the Dhammapada arrived China, it 
had been formed into a style of ‘metaphor’ [piyu 譬喻], with new content, entries, 
and commentaries. This piyu style, as well as its loose structure and the traces of the 
teaching of the Dharmaguptaka school in the Sūtra, confirmed its link with the 
Dhammapada. Adding the records in Buddhist bibliographies, such as the Chusanzang 
jiji and the Jinglun doulu 經論都錄 compiled by Zhi Mindu 支愍度 (fl. 290–326), Lü 
concluded that the Sūtra was composed by Chinese Buddhists at the transition time 
between the Western and Eastern Jin dynasties.878 Against the most persuasive 
evidence provided by Tang Yongtong and Hu Shih, namely the idioms cited by Xiang 
Kai, Lü put forward a quite convincing explanation that these two stories might not 
directly be cited from the Sūtra, for both of the phrases had already existed in the 
Ekottaragama [Zengyi ahan增一阿含], which had been translated into Chinese as early 
as in the period of An Shigao 安世高 (c. 140-180 CE).879 
Although these discussions did not reach a consistent conclusion, these 
debates were significant for the writing of Chinese Buddhist history since they 
covered a wide range of issues that were relevant to the early encounter between 
China and Buddhism, such as the translation and interpretation of the terms fo and 
futu and the route of the transmission of Buddhism from India to China,880 as well as 
 
878 Here Lü also provided proof that, in the prologue of the Sūtra, there is the sentence “the former 
Emperor Xiaoming of Han [Xi Han Xiaoming di 昔漢孝明帝]”; the words “xi” and “Han” implied that 
the Sūtra was created after the (Eastern) Han dynasty 東漢. 
879 The early Chinese translated version of the Ekottaragama Sūtra was called Ekottaragama Sūtra of One 
Hundred and Sixty Chapters [Zeng yi ahan bai liushi zhang增一阿含百六十章], according to Lü’s 
arguments.   
880 There are different opinions about the route of the transmission of Buddhism. In his article “Meou-
Tseu ou les’doutes Leves,” Paul Pelliot has pointed out that, besides the route of central Asia, there 
could be other routes, including a land route between Yunan and Burma as well as a sea route via the 
South Sea and Guangdong; see Paul Pelliot伯希和, “Meou-Tseu ou les’ doutes Leves,” T’oung Pao, 
SerieⅡ, vol. ⅪⅩ (1920). This article was translated into Chinese by Feng Chengjun 馮承鈞 and 
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the more general principle of evaluating ancient Buddhist texts. Most of these issues 
touched upon fundamental questions about Chinese Buddhism, including its origin 
and early development. At the same time, these debates suspended or evaded the 
potential ambiguities and conflicts at the doctrinal level. As historical material, the 
Sūtra was noteworthy to these historians because of its historicity, instead of for its 
religiosity as the foundation of religious wisdom and faith. It was its historiographical 
value, instead of its preaching power or doctrinal construction, that attracted these 
scholars. As Hu Shih pointed out, “discussions (on the Sūtra), although minor, is very 
crucial in matters of methodological questions.”881  
As shown in these debates on the Sūtra, Buddhist and non-Buddhist texts, 
regardless of their origin or background, have been equally unfolded in front of 
readers and historians.882 However, in practice, there are always tensions and 
controversies between historians. For instance, in their research on the Sūtra, both 
Hu Shih and Chen Yuan seemed to have dissent concerning the way the other 
handled the materials. Hu criticized that Chen “had too much conviction in the 
writings of non-Buddhist historians” and “unfairly ignored all the existent Buddhist 
 
published in Mouzi congcan xinbian牟子叢殘新編 (Beijing: Zhongguo shudian, 2001): 91-114. Liang 
Qichao also agreed with the sea-route hypothesis. In his “Fo jiaozhi chu shuru: Appendix 2” 佛教之初
輸入: 附錄二, he claimed that “the import of Buddhism did not follow the overland route, but the 
marine route. It was firstly located in Jiangnan, instead of Luoyang [佛教之來，非由陸而由海，其最
初之根據地，不在京洛而在江淮].” See SBP. Hu Shih’s opinion was the same. He repeatedly 
elaborated this opinion when discussing relevant Buddhist issues with Chen Yuan, Zhou Yiliang 周一
良, and Yang Liansheng 楊聯陞. He also asked Yang to forward his opinion to Paul Demiéville to see if 
Demiéville could find any evidence in Vietnam. See Hu Shih, Zhi Zhou Yiliang致週一良 (1948. 08. 07); 
There were different versions of this letter, see Geng Yunzhi ed., Hu Shih shuxin ji 胡適書信集, vol. 2 
(Beijing: Peking University Press, 1996), 1150; Also, Lunxue tanshi ershi nian—Hu Shih Yang Liansheng 
wanglai shuzha 論學談詩二十年—胡適楊聯陞往來書札 (Taipei: Lingking, 1998), 92, 134.     
881 The original text is: “此次所論，問題雖小，而牽涉的方法問題頗關重要.” See Ge, Zhaoguang. 
“‘Liao wei youyi de bisai’ – cong Chen Yuan yu Hu Shih de zhenglun shuodao zaoqi Zhongguo fojiaoshi 
yanjiu de xiandai dianfan ‘聊為友誼的比賽’—從陳垣與胡適的爭論說到早期中國佛教史研究的現代
典範,” 135. 
882 Admittedly, the use of the ‘inner’ or ‘outer’ materials in traditional writings had basically not been 
sealed off. There was always mutual utilization between them. See John Kieschnick, The Eminent Monk: 
Buddhist Ideals in Medieval Chinese Hagiography (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997), 10-11. 
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historical sūtras and treatises, like Mouzi.”883 Chen, in contrast, rejected Hu’s 
conclusion and commented that “evidential study of history must be meticulous; any 
flaws would make research become a joke.”884 Chen explained, “I think it is better to 
believe in evidence than in confessions, so I always look for evidence outside the 
history written by the believers. ...... To study doctrine, one should naturally look into 
the scriptures, and to study the history, one should look for evidence outside 
scriptures.”885 As historian Ge Zhaoguang concluded, their conflicting opinions 
showed the complexity of the historiography of Buddhism; it was not only a conflict 
of conclusions, but also a theoretical divergency, as represented by the issues they 
discussed: the attitude towards primary materials, the understanding of particular 
terms or concepts, and the principle of approaching and judging evidence.886 
 
Debates on the Treatise on Awakening Mahāyāna Faith 大乘起信論 
A more profound ‘crisis of faith’ for Chinese Buddhism emerged when the Treatise on  
Awakening Mahāyāna Faith [Dasheng Qixin lun大乘起信論; below: Treatise], which was 
believed to be the philosophical foundation of Chinese Mahāyāna Buddhism, was also 
called into question.887  
 
883 “過信此等教外史家，而抹殺教中一切現存後漢譯經及 《牟子》等， 似乎未為平允.” See Hu 
Shih, Sishier zhangjing kao 四十二章經考, in HSWJ, vol.5, 143-57.  
884 The original text is: “考證史事，不能不縝密。稍一疏忽，即易成笑柄,” in Chenyuan laiwang 
shuxin ji 陳垣來往書信集 (1933. 4. 1; 3; 5; 8), 179-188. 
885  The original text is: 竊以為信供不如信證，故每在教史以外求證……研求教義，自當尋之內
典，研求教史，不能不證之外典也,” ibid.  
886 Ge Zhaohuang, “‘Liaowei youyi de bisai’ – Cong Chen Yuan yu Hu Shih de zhenglun shuo dao zaoqi 
Zhongguo fojiao shi yanjiu de xiandai dianfan 聊為友誼的比賽’——從陳垣與胡適的爭論說到早期中
國佛教史研究的現代典範,” 136.  
887 For example, some of the major contributions to the question of the authorship of the Treatise on the 
Mahāyāna Awakening of Faith are the studies by Paul Demieville, “Sur l’authenticite du Ta tch’eng k’i sin 
louen,” Bulletin de la Maison franco-japonaise, 2, no. 2. (1929): 1-78; Walter Liebenthal, “New light on the 
Mahāyāna-śraddhotpada śastra.” T’oung Pao 46 (1958): 155-216; and William H. Grosnick, “The 
Categories of T’u Hsiang, and Yung: Evidence that Paramartha Composed the Awakening of Faith.” 
Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 12 no.1 (1989): 66-92. Grosnick has suggested 
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In the Taishō edition of the East Asian Buddhist canon, there are two versions 
of the Treatise (T.1666 and T. 1667). As stated in its preface,888 this Treatise is attributed 
to the Indian patriarch Aśvaghosa, a figure to whom medieval Chinese Buddhists 
granted high significance in the transmission of the Buddha Dharma. Although the 
authenticity of this Treatise received suspicion from some Buddhists in medieval 
times, eventually, the highly authoritative catalogue Kaiyuan shijiao lu composed by 
Zhisheng declared it as a legitimate translation of an original Indian text, 
guaranteeing its canonicity.  
The Treatise’s key concern is the discussion of ultimate reality, referred to as 
‘suchness’ or ‘thusness’ [zhenru 真如] and another essential concept, ‘the buddha 
body’ [foshen 佛身]. It also elaborates upon earlier Indian Buddhist notions of 
tathdgatagarba [‘embryo’, foxing 佛性].889 These concepts, as the hub of Buddhist 
spirits, at least in most Chinese believers’ view, had initiated new discourses on the 
intrinsic possibility for enlightenment, which had enormous consequences for the 
development of East Asian Buddhist soteriology.890 After its canonization, the 
widespread fortune of the Treatise was witnessed, above all, by the wealth of 
commentarial literature composed by eminent scholar-monks in the pre-modern 
period.891 As one of a finite number of canonized texts that had been reprinted, 
commented upon, and worshiped by believers throughout history, the popularity and 
significance of this text is beyond doubtful. However, its canonical status is not only 
 
that Paramartha may be the real author of the text. For a critique of Grosnick’s methodological 
assumptions, see Sharf, Coming to Terms with Chinese Buddhism: A Reading of the Treasure Store Treatise, 104 
888 The preface to T. 1666, however, is almost certainly spurious. It is inaccurate with reference to 
Paramartha and contains several other anachronisms. See Paul Demieville, “Sur l’authenticite du Ta 
tch’eng k’i sin louen,” Bulletin de la Maison franco-japonaise, 2 no.2 (1929 [reprinted]): 11-19.  
889 About the issue of foxing, see for example the study on doctrinal transformation in twentieth-
century Chinese Buddhism in Scott Hurley, “The Doctrinal Transformation of Twentieth‐Century 
Chinese Buddhism: Master Yinshun's Interpretation of the Tathāgatagarbha Doctrine,” Contemporary 
Buddhism 5, no. 1 (2004): 29-46. 
890 Francesca Tarocco, “Lost in translation? The Treatise on the Mahāyāna Awakening of Faith 
[Dasheng qixin lun] and its modern readings.”  
891 According to a Japanese survey from the 1920s, there are about 173 surviving commentaries on the 
Treatise. See Hakeda Yoshito, The Awakening of Faith (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 
1967 [Reprinted in 2006 with a preface by Ryuichi Abe]), 5. 
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due to its hermeneutical value for the exegetical project of Buddhist thinkers, but 
also to its association with the legendary Buddhist patriarch Aśvaghosa, which could 
bring mystical power similar to his own to its practitioners.  
The intensive attention on the Treatise in modern China892 was catalyzed by 
Yang Wenhui.893 Just like his life-long friend, the Japanese scholarly-monk Nanjō 
Bunyū, Yang kept an active bibliographical interest in searching for ‘lost texts.’894  
Both Yang and Benyū tried in vain to discover the lost original Sanskrit version of the 
Treatise, in order to confirm the text as a legitimate source for the doctrinal authority 
of Buddhism. Probably because of their influence, the Treatise, both in content and 
‘spirit,’ soon became the ‘favorite’ of both Buddhists and laymen in Japan and China 
during the first decades of the twentieth century.895  
Along with the increasing attention to the Treatise, suspicion about its 
authenticity had also been incited. As early as 1906, Japanese scholar Suisai Funahashi 
舟橋水哉 had put forward his doubt about the authorship of the treatise. Following 
him, famous Buddhologist Mochizuki Shinkō望月信亨 reposted a similar opinion 
that the Treatise was an indigenous Chinese composition instead of a translation from 
 
892 Because the debates over the Treatise, compared to those about the Sūtra of the Forty-Two Chapters, 
were more complex and important, current scholars have had more discussion on this topic. See 
Huang Xianian 黃夏年, “Dasheng qixinlun yanjiu bainian zhilu 大乘起信論研究百年之路,” in Pumen 
xuebao 普門學報, 6 (2001): 1-21; Also, Binbin Yao, “Xiandai foxue sixiang xipu zhi fenye - yi ‘Dasheng 
Qixinlun’ zhenwei zhizheng wei qiji現代佛學思想系譜之分野 ─以《大乘起信論》真偽之爭為契
機,” Chung-Hwa Buddhist Studies 中華佛學研究, no. 12 (2011), 85-114. 
893 According to some sources, Yang’s conversion to Buddhism was indeed sparked by reading the 
Qixinlun. One source for this statement is the biography written by Yang Wenhui’s granddaughter Yang 
Buwei Chao. Yang Buwei Chao, Autobiography of a Chinese Woman, Buwei Yang Chao. (Westport: 
Greenwood Press, 1970 [1948]): 82. 
894 On the exchanges between Yang Wenhui and Nanjo Bun’yu see Goldfuss, Vers un bouddhisme du XXe 
siecle. Yang Wenhui (1837-1911), reformateur laique et imprimeur, 68-78. Yang’s letters to the Japanese 
Buddhologists are published in volume 10 of his Collected Writings, see Yang Wenhui, Yang Renshan 
jushi yizhu 楊仁山居士遺著 (Nanjing: Jinling kejingchu, 1998). For a study of the intellectual context 
surrounding Nanjo Bun’yu and other Asian scholars at Oxford see N. J. Girardot, “Max Muller’s ‘Sacred 
Books’ and the nineteenth-century production of the comparative science of religions,” History of 
Religions 41, no. 3 (2002): 213-50. 
895 See Goldfuss, Vers un bouddhisme du XXe siecle. Yang Wenhui (1837-1911), reformateur laique et imprimeur, 
203 and Lewis Hodous, Buddhism and Buddhists in China (New York: Macmillan Company, 1924), 67. 
 284 
 
Indian scripture. Other Japanese scholars, such as Ryōtai Hadani羽溪了諦, Senjō 
Murakami村上專精, Daijō Tokiwa常盤大定, Bunzaburō Matsumoto松本文三郎, 
Hayashiya Tomojirō林屋友次郎, and so on, also joined the debates that lasted from 
the 1900s to the 1920s.896  
Under the Japanese influence, Zhang Taiyan published an essay in 1908 that 
claimed that the Treatise was an authentic canonical text written by Aśvaghosa, based 
on a bibliographical investigation of Fei Changfang’s lidai sanbao ji.897 Later, a wide-
spread discussion was instigated in 1922 by Ouyang Jingwu.898 Opposing his mentor 
Yang Wenhui, Ouyang for the first time publicly questioned the authority of the 
Treatise.899 After him, Liang Qichao published an article titled “Textual Criticism on 
the Treatise on Awakening Mahāyāna Buddhism” [Dasheng qixinlun kaozheng 大乘
起信論考證], claiming that the text was composed in China by Chinese Buddhist[s].900 
 
896 The debates over the Qixinlun began in 1902 and reached their peak in 1919, when Mochizuki 
published several essays on the treatise (collected essays published in 1922, titled 大乘起信論研究, 
Tokyo: 金尾文淵堂). For an investigation of the overall picture of the Japanese studies on the Qixinlun, 
see Kosei Ishii石井公成, “近代アシア゙諸国における『大乘起信論』の研究動向 ”) (2005) and his 
talk “近代日本における『大乘起信論』の受容,” (2012).  
897 Zhang Taiyan, “Dasheng qixinlun bian 大乘起信論辨,” Mingbao 民報 vol. 19 (1908). Reprinted in 
XFXC, vol. 35. 
898 Most important articles (in total 15) on Qixinlun in modern China have been collected in Zhang 
Mantao ed., Dasheng Qixinlun yu Lengyan jing kaobian, XFXC, vol. 35.  
899 In his lectures “Weishi jueze tan 唯識抉擇談” (1922), Ouyang had criticized the teaching of a “mind 
of suchness” in the Treatise as confusing ‘suchness’ (tathatā, 真如) and ‘correct knowledge’ 
[samyagjñāna, zhengzhi 正智]. See Ouyaung Jingwu, “jueze wufa tan zhengzhi 抉擇五法談正智.” See 
also Cheng Gongrang 程恭讓, Jueze yu zhenwei zhijian – Ouyang Jingwu foxue sixiang tanwei抉擇於真偽之
間—歐陽竟無佛學思想探微 (Shanghai: Huadong shifan daxue chubanshe, 2000): 112-135. For 
Ouyang’s attitude towards Chinese Buddhism in the later phase of his life, see Eyal Aviv, “Ouyang 
Jingwu: From Yogācāra Scholasticism to Soteriology,” in Transforming Consciousness: Yogacara Thought in 
Modern China, 303-306. 
900 Liang Qichao’s study was based on the wealth of scholarship on this text that had already appeared 
in Japan since the late nineteenth century, especially the study of Mochizuki. He also was influenced 
by Ouyang Jingwu, although he was not officially a disciple of Ouyang like Lü. In one letter Liang wrote 
to his daughter, he wrote that: “Every week, on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays from 7:30 to 9:30 am 
I go to the Institute of Inner Learning to listen to Mr. Ouyang Jingwu’s lecture on Buddhism.” See: Xu 
Qingxiang 徐清翔, Ouyang Jingwu pingzhuan 歐陽竟無評傳 (Changsha: Baihua wenyi chubanshe, 2010), 
78. Liang also wrote that: “It is only after having heard the teachings by Master Ouyang Jingwu on the 
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Aiming at a larger community of intellectual elite, 901 again, Liang’s article soon 
gathered attention within academia and Buddhist circles.902  
Following Ouyang and Liang, some historians and Buddhist scholars	began to 
question the doctrinal authority as well as the theoretical value of the Treatise. In 
1923, Wang Enyang 王恩洋 (1897-1964), a scholar of the Neixueyuan, published his 
article “Selection and Measurement of the Treatise on Awakening Mahāyāna Buddhism” 
[Dasheng qixin lun liaojian 大乘起信論料簡], in which he claimed that the Treatise 
had not only been falsified by Chinese Buddhists but was also a propagated heresy.903 
His radical conclusion received strong repercussions within Buddhist monastic 
circles, especially from Taixu and his disciples in the Wuchang Buddhist Institute. 
Before the emergence of Wang’s article, Taixu had already written an essay titled 
“Comments on [Liang Qichao’s] Textual Criticism on the Treatise of the Awakening of 
the Mahāyāna Buddhism” under the pseudonym of ‘Feixin’ 非心 to refute Liang 
Qichao’s  argument. Soon, debates surrounding this Treatise were heating up; scholars 
like Chen Weidong 陳維東, Tang Dayuan 唐大圓(1885-1941), and Chang Xing 常惺 
(1896-1938) followed Taixu to criticized Wang for making damaging statements on 
the Dharma and judging the Mahāyāna wisdom through blinded evidential study and 
the narrowed prejudices of the Yagācarā school. Their works were later collected and 
published with a preface written by Taixu by the Wuchang Sutra Press 武昌印經處, 
under the title of Dasheng Qixinlun Yanjiu 大乘起信論研究.  
Discussions surrounding the Treatise continued for years in the early 
twentieth century and caused a so-called ‘sectarian conflict’ [fanan 法難] between 
the Wuchang Buddhist Institute and the China Institute of Inner Learning, and 
 
thought of the Yogacara school that I knew there exists a Genuine Buddhism.” See Liang Qichao Quanji 
梁啟超全集, vol. 8, Band 20 (Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 1999), 6041.  
901 Liang’s article was published by the Commercial Press in Shanghai, which, according to Francesca 
Tarocco, was well known for its new-style textbooks and periodical publications aimed at newly 
educated young people. See Francesca Tarocco, “Lost in Translation? The ‘Treatise on the Mahāyāna 
Awakening of Faith (Dasheng qixin lun)’ and Its Modern Readings,” 333. 
902 See Wang Enyang, XFXC, vol.35, 83-121.  
903 In this article, Wang claimed that “斯論之作，固出於梁陳小兒” almost negated the legitimacy of 
the Treatise. Ibid.. 
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further led to a confrontation between Neo-Confucianism and Buddhism.904 Debates 
and controversies went far beyond the scope of textual criticism and bibliographical 
investigation to develop into an enduring retort to the fundamental philosophical 
questions and the legitimacy of the whole system of the Chinese Buddhist tradition. 
In some cases, the debate was so intensified that it turned into a kind of “action on 
impulse without consideration” [yiqi zhizheng 意氣之爭], as Ge Zhaoguang 
commented.905  
The context and background of this ‘sectarian conflict’ are complicated, 
entangled in the philosophical dilemma of the text itself, its version divergence, and 
of course the contradictory academic pursuits of every scholar who participated in 
this debate. One of the hidden reasons why scholars of the camp of the Wuchang 
Buddhist Institute had to raise this scholarly discussion into fanan might be their lack 
of ‘textual evidence.’ Failing to solve the puzzle of this text with concrete facts, they 
argued that Wang Enyang’s textual criticism “was just the old habit of Evidential 
Learning among the classicists,” and claimed that “everyone who had basis 
knowledge of Buddha’s teaching will dismiss such views with a laugh.”906 This empty 
refutation actually avoided the real issues that scholars like Wang Enyang were 
concerned about.  
 
904 For a summary of the general situation of the debates over the Qixinlun in modern China, see Xiao 
Jiefu 蕭箑父 “Guanyu Dasheng Qixinlun de lishi dingwei 關於大乘起信論的歷史定位,” Xiao Jiefu 
Wenxuan 蕭箑父文選, (Wuhan, Wuhan University Press), 177. Huang Xianian, Dasheng qixinlun yanjiu 
bainian zhilu 大乘起信論研究百年之路,” 1-21. Gao Zhennong 高振農, “Dasheng qixinlun jianlun zhi 
si大乘起信論簡論之四,” in Jinxiandai Zhongguo fojiao lun: Gao Zhennong wenji 近現代中國佛教論: 高振
農文集 (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2002), 120-136. Yao Binbin, “Xiandai foxue sixiang 
xipu zhi fenye - yi ‘Dasheng Qixinlun’ zhenwei zhizheng wei qiji現代佛學思想系譜之分野 ─以《大
乘起信論》真偽之爭為契機,” 85-114. In my dissertation, I will focus my research on the textual study 
of this text.  
905 Ge Zhaoguang, “Shinian Haichaoyin – 20 niandai Zhongguo fojiao xin yundong de neizai lilu yu 
waizai zouxiang 十年海潮音—20年代中國佛教新運動的內在里路與外在走向,” in Ge Zhaoguang 
zixuanji 葛兆光自選集 (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 1997), 168. 
906 Orig. text: “考證只就歷史說馬鳴無其人與《起信》偽作，不過經生考據習氣，如往日張五民等
疑《法華》已亡之說，稍解佛理者，一笑置之而已.” See Tang Dayuan 唐大圓, “Qixinlun jiehuo起
信論解惑,” XFXC, vol. 35, 133-150 
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In the 1950s907, Lü Cheng, the leading scholar of the China Institute of Inner 
Learning, devoted several essays to claiming again that the Treatise and some other 
texts, such as the Lañkāvatāra-sūtra [Lengqie jing 楞伽經] were all pseudepigraphic 
creations pretending to be original texts.908 Continually utilizing the approach of 
inter-textual criticism that he had used in the case of the Sūtra of the Forty-Two 
Chapters, he listed seven pieces of evidence to prove that the Treatise was a spurious 
text based on erroneously translated vocabulary stolen from the Wei version of the 
Lañkāvatāra. It was not an authentic translation, but rather something refashioned in 
a muddled manner, with terms and concepts from certain error-riddled 
predecessors.909 Lü’s argument, although not widely accepted by the Chinese Buddhist 
community, was clear and credible, and has also been further confirmed by more 
recent studies aided by computer technology.910  
 Most current scholars who have tried to picture the panorama of modern 
Chinese Buddhology have categorized the tangled debates on the Treatise into two or 
three camps with different positions.911 However, few studies have noted the voices 
 
907 Although these essays were published in the 1950s, Lü’s main opinion on the Qixinlun was formed as 
early as in the 1920s, as shown in his letters to Xiong Shili.  
908 Before comparing the Qixinlun with Lañkāvatāra, Lü discussed the versions of Lañkāvatāra. He 
pointed out that long before the Qixinlun circulated in China, there were already two versions of the 
Lañkāvatāra. The first one was the translation by Guṇabhadra 求那跋陀羅 in the Liu-Song (420-479) 
dynasty (楞伽阿跋多羅寶經 T.16.670); the second one was the translation by Bodhiruci 菩提流支 in 
the Wei dynasty (入楞伽經, T. 16.671). When examining these two texts in comparision with the texts 
in Sanskrit and Tibetan, we find that the early version, namely the Guṇabhadra’s translation, matched 
more closely, while the Wei translation is filled with errors and deviations. See Lü, LFLX, vol.1, 293.    
909 Ibid.  
910 See Takemura Makio 竹村牧男, “Kishiron to Jūjikyōron起信論と十地経論 [The Awakening of 
Faith and the Daśabhūmi-sūtra-bhāṣya],” in Tōhōgaku, no. 72 (1986): 1-15. And Frédéric Girard, Traité 
sur l'acte de foi dans le Grand Véhicule (Tokyo: Keio University Press, 2004), xxxi-xxxii. See also Dan 
Lusthaus, “Lü Cheng, Epistemology, and Genuine Buddhism,” in Transforming Consciousness: Yogacara 
Thought in Modern China, 340-342.  
911 For example, Du Jiwen and Huang Xianian categorized the scholars who participated in the debates 
into two groups: the Buddhist monastic community 僧界 and the lay Buddhist community 居士界. See 
Du Jiwen 杜繼文, “Dasheng qixinlun shuping 大乘起信論述評,” in Zhongguo fojiao yu Zhongguo wenhua 
中國佛教與中國文化 (Beijing: Zongjiao wenhua chubanshe, 2003) 299-336; Yao Binbin divided them 
into three camps of researchers: 1. lay Buddhists linked to the China Inner Studies Institute; 2. Taixu, 
Yinshun, and other Buddhists who believed in the doctrinal value of the Treatise; 3. Xiong Shili, Mou 
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from real ‘outsiders.’ For example, Chen Yinke published an article in 1948 titled 
“True Materials in Zhikai’ Preface of the translated Treatise of the Awakening of the 
Mahāyāna Buddhism in the Liang dynasty” [Liangyi dasheng qixin lun wei Zhikai xu 
zhong zhi zhen shiliao 梁譯大乘起信論偽智愷序中之真史料]. In this short essay, he 
commented on the previous studies of the Treatise in the 1920s but stressed that, 
despite the disputation on the Treatise’s content and doctrine, there were ‘facts’ in 
this ‘forged text’: that is, the real historical phenomenon of the textual insufficiency 
of Chinese Buddhism and the propensity to subjective conjecture covered by the 
divergence of faith positions.   
 
Rewriting the History of Chan Buddhism  
As the most influential native Buddhist tradition, the heritage of the Chan/Zen school 
was deeply interwoven with the fabric of Chinese culture. It was considered by 
modern scholarship to be the pinnacle of Eastern transcendental spiritualism and was 
marketed from the late nineteenth century as an antidote to Western rationalism and 
materialism by some Chan apologists influenced by Orientalism and other modern 
ideological agendas.912 However, the historical legitimacy of Chan Buddhism began to 
receive criticism at the turn of the twentieth century with important discoveries of 
numerous documents in the Dunhuang Caves. The origin of Chan tradition and the 
transmission pedigree of the Chan lineage were also called into question. 
  
The Discovery of Shenhui  
 
Zongshan, and other Neo-Confucian scholars. See Yao, “Xiandai foxue sixiang xipu zhi fenye — yi 
‘Dasheng Qixinlun’ zhenwei zhizheng wei qiji現代佛學思想系譜之分野 -- 以《大乘起信論》真偽之
爭為契機,” 85-114. 
912 One of the most successful examples is the popularization of D.T. Suzuki and his audience in the 
West. See  Robert H Sharf, “Whose Zen?  Zen Nationalism Revisited,” in Rude Awakenings: Zen, the Kyoto 
School, and the Question of Nationalism, edited by James W. Heisig and John Maraldo (Honolulu: University 
of Hawai'i Press, 1995), 44-46.  
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In the traditional historical narrative of Chan Buddhism, Monk Shenhui had long 
been marginalized.913 Even in the early years of the twentieth century, this figure was 
still ignored in the comprehensive histories of the Chan tradition written by Chisa 
Kohō and Nukariya Kaiten and was not even mentioned by D.T. Suzuki in his famous 
Essays in Zen Buddhism.914 Although the study on Chan/Zen Buddhism had undergone 
several epochal shifts over the course of the nineteenth century,915 the traditional 
narrative of Chan history was deeply challenged by Hu Shih’s study on Shenhui.  
In the preface to his Collection of the Lost Works of Monk Shenhui [Shenhui heshang 
yiji 神會和尚遺集], Hu described that: 
In 1924, when I was trying to write the draft of a history of Chinese Chan, I developed 
extreme doubts when I came to Huineng; when I reached Shenhui, then I had to stop 
writing.916  
Realizing that the materials after the Song dynasty were untrustworthy, Hu decided 
to seek historical data related to Shenhui among the manuscripts from Dunhuang. 
Two years later, in 1926, he took the opportunity of visiting Europe to examine the 
 
913 In the traditional annals of the Chinese Chan school, the name of Shen Hui appears only as a minor 
figure in the Platform Sūtra; he is left unmentioned in any famous “public cases” and in texts such as 
Dunwu yaomen 頓悟要門 or Linji lu 臨濟錄.  
914 Nukariya’s work is titled Zengaku shisōshi 禪學思想史, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Genkōsha, 1923). Suzuki’s Essays 
was first published in London by Rider in 1949, but it includes a 1923 preface written by the author.  
915 The representative scholars at the time of Hu include Paul Pelliot (1878–1945), Paul Demiville (1894–
1979), Jacques Gernet, Iriya Yoshitaka 入矢義高 (1910–1999), and Yanagida Seizan 柳田聖山 (1921–
2006). Their works include: Paul Pelliot, “Notes sur quelques artistes des Six Dynasties et des T’ang,” 
T’oung Pao, 22 (1923): 215–91; Paul Demiéville, “Le miroir spirituel,” Sinologica 1.2 (1947): 112–37; Paul 
Demiéville, Le concile de Lhasa: Une controverse sur le quiétisme entres les bouddhistes de l’Inde et de la Chine 
au VIIIe siècle de l’ère chrétienne (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1952); Jacques Gernet, Entretiens 
du Maître de Dhyāna Chen-houei du Ho-tsö (Paris: Publications de l’École française d’Extrême-Orient, 
1949); Yanagida Seizan, Shoki zenshū shisho no kenkyū 初期禅宗史書の研究 (Kyoto: Hōzōkan, 1967). For 
a more complete bibliography on Western scholarship see Bernard Faure, “Chan and Zen Studies: The 
State of the Field(s),” in Chan Buddhism in Ritual Context, ed. Bernard Faure (London: Routledge Curzon, 
2003), 1–35. 
916 Hu Shih, Shenhui heshang yiji 神會和尚遺集 (1968 [1930]), 1-3.  
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Dunhuang collections in London and Paris.917 Hu soon discovered three versions of 
Shenhui’s recorded sayings in Paris and Hui’s Xianzong ji 顯宗記 in London. These 
materials affirmed Hu’s working hypothesis.918 Based on those newly discovered 
historical materials, Hu published subsequent works on Shenhui’s biography and the 
history of early Chan Buddhism. These works stimulated the emergence of 
international debates in Buddhist studies.919 
The discovery of new Chan texts from the Dunhuang collections, which was 
considered by Hu Shih as one of the most significant achievements of his own 
scholarship, encouraged him to “rewrite the whole history of Chan Buddhism” [jiang 
yizhengbu chanzong de lishi chongxin xieguo 將一整部禪宗的歷史重新寫過]. Based 
on the recorded sayings of Shenhui, Hu claimed that the Platform Sūtra was composed 
by Shen Hui and his followers. In order to rehabilitate his teacher Huimeng’s 慧能 
(638-713) status and build up the legitimacy of the Southern School, Shenhui had 
altered the transmission pedigree of the Chan tradition by diminishing the influence 
of the Northern school and the teaching of gradual enlightenment [jianwu 漸悟]. 
Shenhui’s campaign and its eventual victory represented a fundamental 
transformation in the Chan history.920 In his radical interpretation of the “battle” 
 
917 Some Chinese Chan texts from Dunhuang had been displayed in public in Japan by Yabuki Keiki 矢
吹慶輝. After he left Europe, Hu met Yabuki in Japan and heard that Yabuki had discovered the 
ancient version of the Tanjing in the Dunhuang collection. Ibid.  
918 Although Hu did not mention the reason why he had such suspicion about the history of Chan 
Buddhism in the first place, according to Jiang Canteng, he might have been influenced by Meng 
Wentong 蒙文通, the author of Zhongguo chanxue shi 中國禪學史 which was published in and by 
Nukariya Kaiten忽滑骨快天’s Zengaku shisōshi禪學思想史 (Tokyo: Genkosha, 1925). See Jiang Canteng 
江燦騰, “Hu Shih chanxuean zai Zhongguo xuejie de fazhan yu zhengbian 胡適禪學研究在中國學界
的發展與爭辯,” in Xiandai Zhongguo fojiaoshi xinlun 現代中國佛教史新論, (Kaohsiung: Jingxin wenjiao 
jijinhui, 1994). This opinion also was proved by Yanagida Seizan. See Jiang Canteng, “Hu Shih yu 
Huhuagu kuai tian: zaitan Hu Shih zaoqi chanxue yanjiu wenti 胡適與忽滑谷快天：再探胡適早期禪
學研究問題,” Hanxue yanjiu tongxun 漢學研究通訊, 30, no.4 (2011): 14-15. 
919 Yanagida Seizan 柳田聖山, “Goroku no rekishi — Zen bunken no seiritsu-teki Kenkyū  語錄の歷史
—禪文獻の成立的研究, Tōhō gakubō 東方學報 57 (1985): 365.  
920 Most of the conclusions of Hu have been contested by recent scholarship. See Faure, Bernard. The 
Rhetoric of Immediacy (Princeton University Press, 1994). John R. McRae. “Shen-Hui and the Teaching of 
Sudden Enlightenment in Early Ch’an Buddhism,” in Sudden and Gradual: Approaches to Enlightenment in 
Chinese Thought, ed. Peter N. Gregory (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), 227-275. 
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between the Southern and Northern Schools, Hu boldly re-depicted the minor figure 
Shenhui as a “militant, even rabidly aggressive, innovator and exponent of a new and 
widely influential teaching.”921 This new image of Shenhui profoundly influenced the 
entire enterprise of Chan/Zen studies in both China and Japan after 1935, as Yanagida 
Seizan pointed out.922 Hu Shih’s discovery of the historical materials of Chan 
Buddhism also encouraged scholars to further reflect on other historical literature of 
Chan Buddhism, including biographies, Records of Lamp, and other comprehensive 
sectarian historical writing.923 
 
Hu Shih’s Chan Buddhist Historiography 
Hu Shih’s initial interest in Chan Buddhism originated from his project of writing a 
comprehensive history of Chinese philosophy done according to strictly modern 
methodological standards. He undertook this project beginning in 1917 after he 
finished his dissertation The Development of the Logical Method in Ancient China at 
Colombia University,924 and he developed it during his teaching career at Peking 
University. Hu’s analysis of classical Chinese philosophy was groundbreaking for his 
 
921 John R McRae, “Religion as Revolution in Chinese Historiography: Hu Shih (1891-1962) on Shen-Hui 
(684-758),” Cahiers d’Extrême-Asie 12, no. 1 (2001): 63. 
922 Yanagida Seizan 柳田聖山, “Hu Shih boshi yu Zhongguo chuqi chanzong shi zhi yanjiu胡適博士與
中國初期禪宗史之研究,” in Hu Shih Chanxue an胡適禪學案 (Taipei: Zhongzheng shuju, 1975); 17–18. 
According to Seizan, Ui Hakuju’s Zenshū shi kenkyū 禪宗史研究(1939), D.T. Suzuki’s Zen shisōshi kenkyū 
daini: daruma kara enō ni禅思想史研究第二:達摩から慧能に至る (1952) and Shindai Sekiguchi關口
真大’s Daruma daishi no kenkyū達摩大師の研究 (1958) all “covered by the shadow of Hu Shih’s 
‘Lengqie zong kao楞伽宗考’.  
923 For more recent developments in the field of Chan/Zen studies, see: John R. McRae, “Buddhism,” in 
John R. McRae and Daniel L. Overmyer, “Living Religious Traditions: Taoism, Confucianism, Buddhism, 
Islam and Popular Religon,” in JAS 54.2 (1995): 354–71; and Bernard Faure, “Chan and Zen Studies: The 
State of the Field(s),” in Chan Buddhism in Ritual Context, ed. Bernard Faure (London: Routledge Curzon, 
2005), 1-35. See also essays by this cohort of scholars in Cahiers d’Extreme-Asie 7 (1993–1994), a special 
issue dedicated to the work of Yanagida Seizan. 
924 Jin Yuelin 金岳霖, The Development of the Logical Method in Ancient China (Shanghai: Oriental Book Co., 
1922; rpt. New York: Paragon Book Reprint Corp., 1963). This appeared in expanded form in Chinese in 
1921 as the first volume of a projected multi-volume work called Zhongguo Zhexueshi dagang 中國哲學
史大綱 (Shanghai: The Commercial Press, 1921). 
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rigorous approach of penetrating into the subject matter without any transcendental 
concerns. From a methodological perspective, his undertaking was largely 
unprecedented within Chinese intellectual tradition.925 
a. The Discovery of Chan Materials 
One of Hu’s main contributions to Chan studies, and also the less controversial one, 
was his discovery and organization of the lost textual materials of the Chan school. At 
that time, more Buddhist texts, for example, the Dunhuang documents, were 
preserved and controlled outside the Buddhist community.  Scholars like Hu Shih 
then were able to address those materials from a broader perspective and refrained 
from the dominant narrative of the Chan school as a succession of individual 
patriarchs and their teachings. As an outsider to any religious community, Hu placed 
much more emphasis on the ‘hard facts’ in the historical narrative and focused his 
studies on the textual and historical authenticity within materials. He was extremely 
skeptical of traditional legends and nourished an extraordinary sensitivity toward 
minor or unorthodox texts.  
In 1930, the materials Hu Shih discovered in Europe and the Dunhuang 
version of the Platform Sūtra that he had obtained from Japan were arranged and 
published by Hu Shih under the title The Posthumous Collection of Ven. Shenhui [Shenhui 
heshang yij 神會和尚遺集]. In the first period of Hu’s work on Chan Buddhism during 
the 1920s to 1930s, Hu’s study did not receive many direct responses within Chinese 
academia.926 However, the materials he discovered, for example, the Lengqie Shizi ji, 
were cited and used by scholars such as Tang Yongtong and Chen Yinke.927 Outside 
China, the Lengqie shizi ji he found was published between 1931 and 1933 by the 
 
925 For a summary of Hu Shih’s contribution to Chan studies, see Lou Yulie 樓宇烈, “Hu Shih Chanzong 
shi yanjiu pingyi 胡適禪宗史研究評議,” in Beijing daxue xuebao 北京大學學報, 3 (1987). In this paper, 
Lou provided many observations based on Hu’s diaries and his marginal comments on Buddhist texts.   
926 Hu complained of this to D.T. Suzuki when Suzuki visited him in 1933. Suzuki recorded Hu’s 
complaint in his paper published in Bungeishunjū, volume 26, no.7 in 1948. See Yanagida Seizan 柳田聖
山, “Hu Shih boshi yu Zhongguo chuqi chanzong shi zhi yanjiu胡適博士與中國初期禪宗史之研究,” 
11-12.  
927 Chen referred to the Lengqie shiziji in his essay 禪宗六祖傳法偈之分析, but Chen did not mentioned 
Hu’s name; see JMEB, 187-191 
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Korean scholar Kim Ku- kyŏng 金九經. During this period, Hu also collected several 
textual materials of Chan Buddhism in Japan to supplement his study, including the 
Caoxi dashi biezhuan 曹溪大師別傳, and the Platform Sūtra found in the Kōshō Ji 
Temple in Kyoto.928 Hu’s discoveries of the Chan Buddhist materials were informative 
and controversial. In one article Hu published in the newspaper “The Times,” he 
commented on D.T. Suzuki’s study that “did not refer to the Dunhuang manuscript.” 
His critique inspired Suzuki to further investigate materials in the Dunhuang 
collection.929 During the latter phase of his life, although experiencing several 
disruptions, Hu continued collecting, arranging, and collating the textual materials of 
Chan Buddhism. It is fair to conclude that Hu’s discovery and publication was a major 
stimulus to the emergence of the field of Chan/Zen study.930 His editions of Shenhui’s 
texts later appeared in the 85th volume of the Taisho shinshū daizōkyō 大正新脩大藏經, 
complete with Hu Shih’s emendations in red and green ink.    
b. The Narrative of The Transformation of the Early Chan Tradition 
Hu Shih’s reevaluation of Shenhui also shook the prevailing worship of the traditional 
pedigree of Chan Buddhism and established a new narrative about the relationship 
between the Northern and Southern School and their teachings.  
Hu Shih’s understanding of Shenhui’s role in the formation of Chan Buddhism 
and the development of the Chan school before the Song dynasty was based on a 
scrutiny of Shenhui’s own writings, the Platform Sutra, and the Lengqie shizi ji. In 1935, 
 
928 Based on these two texts, Hu wrote his articles “Tanjing kao zhiyi 壇經考之一” and “Tan jing kao 
zhier 壇經考之二,” in HSWJ, vol.5, 237-258.  
929 Lou Yulie, “Hu Shih Chanzong shi yanjiu pingyi 胡適禪宗史研究評議.” For the communication with 
Hu Shih and D.T. Suzuki, see Yanagida Seizan, ed., Ko Teki zengaku an 胡適禪學案 (Kyoto: Chūbun 
shuppansha 1975); Chinese edition: Hu Shih Chan xue an胡適禪學案 (Taipei: Zhongzheng shuju, 
1975). Also see Zhuang Meifang 莊美芳, “Hu Shih yu Linmu dazhuo lun Chan xuean – Cong Taiwan 
xuejie de huiying tanqi 胡適與鈴木論禪學案──從台灣學界的回應談起” (unpublished, 1998); Qiu 
Minjie邱敏捷, “Hu Shih yu Linmu dazhuo胡適與鈴木大拙,” in Liangan dangdai chanxue lunwen ji 
(shang) 兩岸當代禪學論文集(上), ed., Zheng Zhiming鄭志明 (Jiayi: Nanhua University, Religion 
centre南華大學宗教中心, 2000), 155-78. 
930 John R McRae, “Religion as Revolution in Chinese Historiography: Hu Shih (1891-1962) on Shen-Hui 
(684-758),” Cahiers d’Extrême-Asie 12, no. 1 (2001): 61-62. 
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he published “A Study on Lengqie School” [Lengqie zong kao 楞伽宗考],” the core essay 
of his Chan study.931 In this essay, Hu listed evidence in the Record Saying of Shenhui, 
arguing that the teaching of Lengqie jing was replaced by the teaching of the Diamond 
Sūtra; he concluded that:  
From the Bodhidharma to Shenxiu, they all belong to the orthodox Lengqie school…… 
[However] Shenhui boldly replaced the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra [Lengqie jing] with the 
Diamond Sūtra. The legal orthodoxy system of the Lengqie school was overthrown, 
and its ‘heart’ also fell. Therefore, the revolution of Huineng and Shenhui is not that 
the Southern school reform the Northern school [of Chan], but the Bore school 




In this passage, Hu used a word to sum up the development of Chan in the sixth 
century: “revolution” [geming 革命]. Hu’s basic view on the history of Chan remained 
unaltered throughout his entire career, from the 1920s to the 1960s. His 
groundbreaking view on the orthodoxy of Chan Buddhism, although problematic or 
even unacceptable to some scholars, influenced the writing of the history of Chan 
afterward. His narrative of the Chan revolution was partly accepted by Tang 
Yongtong but with a milder tone: “restoration” [zhongxin 中興]. Impressed by Hu’s 
fresh view on Chan history, Tang Yongtong wrote a letter to Hu asking his general 
opinion on the history of Chan in 1928 after reading Hu’s “A Study on Bodhidharma” 
[Puti damo kao 菩提達摩考].933 In his response to Tang, Hu mentioned the newly 
discovered materials he had used and shared with Tang his whole proposal of writing 
the Chan history. In Tang’s History published in 1938, Tang agreed with Hu’s idea that 
 
931 According to Seizan, Hu Shih’s “Lengqie zong kao楞伽宗考” was the most important work of Hu’s 
early studies of Chan history. He was very confident about his claims in this paper. This study brought 
modern Chan study into a new stage.  Yanagida Seizan 柳田聖山, “Hu Shih boshi yu Zhongguo chuqi 
chanzong shi zhi yanjiu胡適博士與中國初期禪宗史之研究,” 18. 
932 In HSWJ, vol.5, 191; see also Yin Shun’s analysis in Zhongguo Chanzong shi中國禪宗史 (Taipei: 
Zhengwen Chubanshe 1971). 
933 In a remark Hu wrote in 1935, he cited Tang Yongtong’s analysis in Hanwei as the evidence of his 
discussion. Ibid. Hu said: “He [Tang] discussed this issue, which I raised, at great length.” 
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the old tradition of Lengqie from the first patriarch Bodhidharma to the fourth 
patriarch Hongren 弘忍 had been seviously modified with an emphasis on Huineng’s 
teaching of Prajña.934 Lü Cheng, as well, also followed the line of Hu Shih and thought 
that the teaching of the Diamond Sūtra had replaced the prior Lengqie tradition.935  
c. Methods and Purpose  
Based on a historical reading of the primary texts of Shenhui, Hu provided a modern 
interpretation of the formation of Chan orthodoxy. He approached materials and his 
research questions with syncretic analytical methods, combining traditional 
Evidential Learning with modern scientific procedures. Among modern Chinese 
scholars, Hu had a comparatively stronger consciousness of the importance of 
methodology. With a tendency toward ‘reductionism,’ he considered all scholarship 
and philosophical traditions, including Chan Buddhism, to be expressions of 
methods.936 As Hu said,  
All the ‘-ism’, all the scholarship, are all the tools for us to study questions [一
切主義，一切學理，都只是我們研究問題的工具].937. 
As well, Chan Buddhism, as a method, was the tool that Buddhists like Shenhui used 
to reform the tradition of Buddhism. Chan’s assertion, narrative and theorical 
framework were all questionable in his problem-oriented historiography. As Hu 
himself described, Thomas H. Huxley’s agnosticism and John Dewey’s pragmaticism 
 
934 According to Tang, Bodhidharma taught the four-volume version Lengqie [Lankāvatāra-sūtra] to his 
followers while Huneng stressed Jinggang bore 金剛般若 [vájra-cchedikā-prajñā-pāramitā-sūtra]. After 
Hongren, the Chan school placed more and more emphasis on Jingang bore; one reason for this change, 
Tang noted, was the influence of the trend in the South [南方風氣]. Tang considered this 
transformation to be “restoration” [zhongxing 中興]. See Tang Yongtong, Suitang fojiao shigao 隋唐佛教
史稿, chapter “Chan School.” In this chapter, Tang did not use the materials Hu discovered in Europe. 
In a later work, Tang labelled this work as “an old text” [舊文].  
935  Lü Cheng 呂澂, Zhongguo foxue yuanliu luejiang 中國佛學源流略講 (Taipei: Liren shuju, 1985), 
223. 
936 Yu Ying-shih, “Zhongguo jindai sixiangshi shang de Hu Shih – “Hu Shizhi xiansheng nianpu 
changbian xu”中國近代思想史上的胡適--《胡適之先生年譜長編初稿》序,” in Chongxun Hu Shih 
licheng重尋胡適歷程 (Taipei: Linking, 2004), 215-216. 
937 Hu Shih, “Sanlun wenti yu zhuyi三論問題與主義,” in HSWJ, vol.2, 249-52.  
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had taught him to regard every existing theory and idea with suspicion. Before being 
influenced by these Western philosophers, Hu had already developed a skeptical 
attitude toward ancient books, especially old historical narratives under the influence 
of the Song philosophers of lixue 理學, such as Zhuxi and Zhang Zai張載.938 
Meanwhile, this was also the lessons he had learned from Evidential Learning: a deep-
rooted concept of ‘truth’ and an appreciation of the importance of “carefully seeking 
verification” [xiaoxin de qiuzheng 小心的求證] to uncover the truth.939   
Hu’s rigorous textual studies and his critical suspicion were the core elements 
of his “historical view” [lishi de yanguang歷史的眼光] of the world, knowledge, and 
values.940 However, this scientific method was still hardly able to overcome the 
inherent limits of his “suspension of judgement” and excessive deconstructive force, 
as Yü Ying-shih discussed.941 His studies on Chan Buddhism, as well, had this pitfall: 
although he claimed to adopt scientific, objective approaches toward the subject with 
critical doubts, there were still some things he did not or could not doubt. His study 
of Chan Buddhism, which attributed the historical transformation of the Southern 
and Northern School entirely to Shenhui, for example, relied too much on the records 
in the Platform Sūtra and the narrative of the orthodox Southern School. However, as 
some critiques demonstrated, the two teachings of the sudden and the gradual, which 
represented a fundamental difference in Hu Shih’s opinion, would be better 
considered as dialectically inseparable motifs within the context of Buddhist spiritual 
training and doctrinal discourses.942 To Hu, the battle between the sudden and the 
 
938 For the intellectual background of Hu’s thingking, see Yu Ying-shih, “Zhongguo jindai sixiangshi 
shang de Hu Shih – “Hu Shizhi xiansheng nianpu changbian xu”中國近代思想史上的胡適 -- 《胡適之
先生年譜長編初稿》序,” 210-227.  
939 Hu Shih, “Zhixue de fangfa yu cailiao 治學的方法與材料,” in HSWJ, vol.4, 105.   
940 Hu listed three keys of the “method of researching, observation and governing [求學論事觀物經國
之術]”: inductive theory, historical view and evolutionary concept [歸納的理論，歷史的眼光和進化
的觀念].” See Hu Shih, Hu Shih liuxue riji 胡適留學日記 (Shanghai: sanlian shudian, 2014), vol.3, part 
1, 167.  
941 Yu Ying-shih, “Zhongguo jindai sixiangshi shang de Hu Shih – “Hu Shizhi xiansheng nianpu 
changbian xu”中國近代思想史上的胡適 -- <胡適之先生年譜長編初稿>序,” 228-240.  
942 Bernard Faure. The Rhetoric of Immediacy: A Cultural Critique of Chan/Zen Buddhism (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1991), 32-52. 
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gradual teachings and the inexorable victory of the sudden campaign were 
uncontestable historical “facts.” However, more and more evidence had shown that 
although the dichotomy of sudden/gradual was important in the early Chan 
tradition, it did not circumscribe the most basic transformation in Chan.943 Hu’s re-
depiction of the formation of the Chan orthodoxy, although he questioned the 
legitimacy of Huineng’s teaching, still kept the prerequisite that there was an 
“orthodoxy” of Chan Buddhism as an uncontested truism. It was, as Bernard Faure 
discussed, “a will of orthodoxy.”944 
Furthermore, Hu’s instrumental rationalism, which questioned and even 
expelled the vast majority of traditional Chinese philosophical expressions and 
ideological standpoints, led him to a complete rejection of the religious background 
of the Chan texts. As a consequence, Hu basically considered the history of Chinese 
Buddhism, which is composed of scriptures as well as traditional Buddhist historical 
writings such as the Lamp records, biographies of monks, etc., to be a narrative of 
legends filled with supernatural power, mysterious experiences, and apparitions. 
Similar to the Doubting Antiquity School, Hu also believed that, although many of the 
fabricated details in those narratives might seem slight and insignificant, the flaws 
mounted as more and spurious things accumulated until their sheer number 
eventually made the case compelling and decisive. Therefore, the main mission of 
historiography was to unravel the multiplicity and complexity within texts, and to 
expose how distortions and fallacies were accumulated in ancient history layer by 
layer. This historiographical standpoint actually denied the religious nature of the 
Chan Buddhist texts, which subjected Hu to the critique of having an “inability to 
understand the nature of Buddhist spiritual training.”945 In some scholars’ view, Hu, 
 
943 See John R McRae, “Religion as Revolution in Chinese Historiography: Hu Shih (1891-1962) on Shen-
Hui (684-758),” 82-83. Also, his “The Ox-School of Chinese Buddhism: From early Chan to the Golden 
Age,” in Studies in Chan and Hua-yen, Studies in East Asian Buddhism, ed. R. M. Gimello and P. N. Gregory 
(Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1983), 169-253.  
944 Bernard Faure, The Will to Orthodoxy: A Critical Genealogy of Northern Chan Buddhism, trans. Phyllis 
Brooks (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 4-5. 
945 John R McRae, “Religion as Revolution in Chinese Historiography: Hu Shih (1891-1962) on Shen-Hui 
(684-758),” 83.  
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as a historian, seems not to have recognized that Chan/Zen had its own life 
independent of history.946  
Hu’s dedication to history caused him to ignore the historical context those 
medieval monastics actually lived in. He kept cynical about the educational level of 
the Chinese Buddhist clergy and accused them of lacking historical consciousness and 
knowledge of Sanskrit.947 Hu complimented the Lengqie shizi ji for some critical 
viewpoints that could only be found by a modern scholar while failing to realize that 
the text was written in a traditional, sectarian context of historiography.948 Because of 
his distaste for historical inaccuracy, most of the Chan texts were unable to pass Hu’s 
lie detector or matched his restrict criteria of authenticity—in Hu’s own words, the 
entire of body of Chan literature of Recorded Sayings was “ninety-nine percent 
false.”949 Hu’s prejudice against religion, therefore, brought an imaginative facet into 
his arguments and eventually led to some distorted historical judgements.    
Besides his repulsion from religion in general, there was also an injection of 
personal belief in Hu Shih’s objective research means. His contemporary scholars, like 
Chen Yinke and Jin Yuelin 金岳霖, had commented on Hu’s work in their reviews of 
Feng Youlan’s 馮友蘭 Zhongguo zhexueshi 中國哲學史 [The history of Chinese 
philosophy], published in 1931. Chen suggested that, although Hu’s subject was 
ostensibly ancient Chinese philosophy, he was actually discussing his own ideas; Jin, 
as well, remarked that Hu had unconsciously adopted optimistic American attitudes 
toward progress and results, thereby revealing his own discomfort with the ancient 
 
946 Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki, “Zen: A Reply to Hu Shih,” Philosophy East and West 3, no. 1 (1953), 26 
947 Hu Shih, Shenhui heshang yiji 神會和尚遺集, 27 
948 See John R. McRae, The Northern School and the Formation of Early Ch’an Buddhism (Honolulu: University 
of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1986), 91. McRae thought that the error of Hu Shih committed here was the 
“historians’ fallacy,” referring to David Fischer’s description that “the error of assuming that a man 
who has a given historical experience knows it, when he has it, to be all that a historian would know it 
to be, with the advantage of historical perspective.” See David Hackett Fischer, Historians’ Fallacies: 
Towards a Logic of Historical Thought (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1970), 209. 




world.950 Therefore, Hu’s methodological construction only served the purpose of 
expressing his philosophical commitments.951 
 
New Paradigm of the Historiography of Buddhism  
Hu’s rewriting of Chan history, although it had its limits, was a pivotal event that 
quite literally made possible the enterprise of Chan studies.952 Despite the 
controversial nature of his works,953 it should be admitted that Hu’s work explored 
and established the ‘paradigm’ [典範] for the modern historiographical revolution, 
which also further propelled the transformation of Chinese scholarship. According to 
Yü Ying-shih, the reason why Hu’s studies were revolutionary is that, as a follower of 
the tradition of Evidential Learning, he was able to combine the old mode of 
scholarship with a new framework of conceptual categories and methodological 
system. His work not only covered the “entire constellation of beliefs, values and 
techniques” in a broad sense but also offered “shared examples” in studies on specific 
issues.954 Although new research tendencies could be observed in many contemporary 
scholars, such as Liang Qichao, Chen Yinke, Chen Yuan, and Tang Yongtong, Hu might 
be the one who most clearly and plainly formulated a methodology in words and 
openly propagandized his scientific settings (he also went further, even to extremes 
 
950 Feng Youlan 馮友蘭, Sansongtang zixu 三松堂自序 (Beijing: sanlian shudian, 1984), 226-228. 
951 For a further discussion of Hu’s historiographical agenda and his viewpoints on the role Buddhism 
played in Chinese history, see the Chapter 7 of this dissertation.  
952 For an overall description of Chan/Zen Studies, see Faure, Bernard: Chan and Zen studies: the state 
of the field (s). In this article, Hu Shih was also considered as the one who brought the attention of the 
Sinological world to Chan Buddhism. See Bernard Faure ed., Chan Buddhism in Ritual Context, 1. 
953 Not only limited to Hu’s study on Chan Buddhism, his historical studies on Chinese literature and 
pre-Qin philosophies also opened a new ethos in modern Chinese academia.  
954 See Yu Ying-shih, “Zhongguo jindai sixiangshi shang de Hu Shih – “Hu Shizhi xiansheng nianpu 
changbian xu”中國近代思想史上的胡適 -- <胡適之先生年譜長編初稿>序,” 188. Also, “Zhongguo 
zhexue shi dagang yu shixue geming中國哲學史大綱與史學革命,” ibid., 241. Here Yü refers to 
Thomas S. Kuhn’s term “paradigm.” See Thomas Kuhn, “Second thoughts on Paradigm,” in The Essential 




towards system and order).	The “paradigm” set by Hu955 , which was presented in but 
not limited to his study of the history of Chan Buddhism, contained three dimensions: 	
Firstly, as a non-Buddhist historian, Hu wrote a history of one Buddhist sect 
without any sectarian dedication and re-assigned the task of recovering the past of 
Buddhism to history, instead of religious utterance. He broke the shackles of the 
traditional Buddhist narrative and introduced a secularized, chronological system of 
historiography based on modern discourses into the field of Buddhist studies. A 
structured scheme of “arranging the national essence” and a clear understanding of 
value, method, and belief, which were presented in his Outline of the History of Chinese 
Philosophy, could always be observed behind his concrete investigations.956 In a 
sophisticated way, he replaced the religious ends in Buddhist texts with an inquiry 
into historical facts and reconstruction of the historical thread of the transmission of 
Chan and the Sinicization of Buddhism.   
Secondly, he expanded the scope of Chan studies by introducing new 
materials into this field. Through his collection, organization, and examination, more 
primary materials were brought to the table. He completely abandoned the 
monogenic preconception of the traditional narrative and applied an “equal view” 
[pingdeng de yanguang 平等的眼光]957 toward all materials. To Hu Shih, the history 
of Chan Buddhism needed to be rewritten outside the old genealogy fabricated by 
believers. To do so, a full utilization of non-Buddhist materials, including inscriptions, 
collected works, local records, and so on, was crucial. He examined and arranged the 
bibliographical catalogue of the Buddhist and Taoism inscriptions according to the 
records in Quan Tangwen 全唐文; in his later career, he carefully identified and 
collated some inscription materials with recourses to epigraphy.958 His utilization of 
 
955 Ge Zhaoguang, Ren zai Hu Shih de yanchang xianshang: youguan Zhongguo xuejie zhonggu chanshi 
yanjiou zhi fansi 仍在胡適的延長線上: 有關中國學界中古禪史研究之反思,” in Lingnan xuebao fukan 
嶺南學報復刊, vol.7 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2017), 16.  
956 Yu Ying-shih, “Zhongguo zhexue shi dagang yu shixue geming中國哲學史大綱與史學革命,” 251-
253. 
957 Cai Yuanpei, “Zhongguo zhexue shi dagang xu中國哲學史大綱序.” 
958 Hu Shih, “Quantangwen li de Chanzong jia shiliao全唐文裡的禪宗假史料,” HSWJ, vol.9, 441-444. 
Also, “Jinshilu li de Chanzong chuanfa shiliao金石錄裡的禪宗傳法史料,” ibid., 539-541. See Ge 
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Dunhuang manuscripts and ancient Japanese scriptures as well as Buddhist and non-
Buddhist texts demonstrated a broadening of the horizons of Buddhist scholarship, 
which encouraged scholars to examine the origins and early development of Chinese 
Buddhism in a manner never before possible.   
Thirdly, Hu established a historiographical paradigm of religious study 
pivoting on kaozheng. The legitimacy of Hu’s own scholarship, as mentioned by Cai 
Yuanpei in his preface to Hu’s Outline, was derived from the tradition of Han Learning. 
Hu considered that the logical character of the Qing scholars (beginning with Gu 
Yanwu 顧炎武 and culminating with Qian Daxin 錢大昕, according to Hu) composed 
the basis of the modern method and the spirit of science. The foci of the Qing 
scholarship—historical perspective; the discovery of [historiographical] tools; 
inductive research; and prioritizing evidence—had also been maintained as 
principles in his studies.959 This kaozheng inclination, which differed from the 
metaphysical tendency of Japanese Zen/Chan studies as well as the 
linguistic/archaeological path of Western scholarship, was the most distinctive 
characteristic of the Chinese scholarship of Buddhist history.960 
What needs to be noticed here is that these dimensions mentioned above were 
not Hu Shih’s invention. Similar tendencies could be observed in many contemporary 
scholars, such as Liang Qichao, Chen Yinke, Chen Yuan, and Tang Yongtong. Although 
Hu might be the one who most clearly and plainly formulated a methodology in 
words and openly propagandized his scientific settings (he also went further, even to 
extremes towards system and order), his pursuit of establishing a modern paradigm 
 
Zhaoguang, Ren zai Hu Shih de yanchang xianshang: youguan Zhongguo xuejie zhonggu chanshi 
yanjiou zhi fansi 仍在胡適的延長線上: 有關中國學界中古禪史研究之反思,” 18-19. 
959 The original words Hu used are: “歷史的眼光;工具的發明;歸納的研究;證據的注重.” In “Dai 
Dongyuan de zhexue 戴東原的哲學.”  
960 Ge Zhaoguang, Ren zai Hu Shih de yanchang xianshang: youguan Zhongguo xuejie zhonggu chanshi 
yanjiou zhi fansi 仍在胡適的延長線上: 有關中國學界中古禪史研究之反思,” 19-26. Ge has 
investigated the main tendencies within the field of Chan/Zen studies in Japan and the West. He has 
suggested that the Japanese scholars emphasized more the “modern interpretation of traditional Chan 








In 1944, Tang Yongtong’s monograph Hanwei won the “Prizes for the Writing,  
Invention and Art” awarded by the Ministry of Education of Republican China 
[Minguo jiaoyu bu zhuzuo faming jiangli民國教育部著作發明美術獎勵].961 Almost 
sixty years later, a recently discovered document has revealed that Lü Cheng and Liu 
Yizheng, as the reviewers of Tang’s work, had completely opposite opinions.962 
In his review963, Liu, the leading scholar of the Xueheng school 學衡派, highly 
praised Tang’s History as “peeling the banana and reeling off raw silk from cocoons, 
making cutting and satisfactory reasoning” [bojiao choujian, qieli yanxin 剝蕉抽繭，
切理厭心]; he commented that Tang’s work “not only clarified the complex social-
political phenomenon logically but also analyzed the doctrines of different sects 
concisely and thoroughly.” In particular, on some crucial issues, Tang’s exposition 
was “extremely subtle” [youji jingwei 尤極精微] and “with extraordinary insights” 
[youjian teshi 尤見特識]. Thus, Liu concluded that, according to the selection 
standards, the History of Tang should undisputedly be awarded the first Prize.  
Lü Cheng, on the contrary, classified Tang’s History into the “third level.” He 
listed several fallacies in the History in detail, such as Tang’s investigation of the Sūtra 
of the Forty-Two Chapters, and complained that Tang misunderstood many essential 
 
961 Tang applied (probably through the others’ recommendation) for these prizes in 1943. Therefore, he 
won the prizes of the “sanshisan niandu” 三十二年度 . For a detailed investigation on these prizes and 
the process of Tang’s application, see Lai Yueshan 賴岳山, “Kaolun: Mingguo jiaoyubu ‘zhuzuo faming 
ji meishu jiangli (1941-1949) yu Lu Cheng Liu Yizheng ‘Tang Yongtong Han wei liangjin nanbeichao fojiao 
shi shencha shu’ 考論: 民國教育部 ‘著作發明與藝術獎勵’ (1941-1949)” 與呂澂柳詒徵‘湯用彤<漢魏兩
晉南北朝佛教史>審查書’,” in Hanyu foxue Pinglun 漢語佛學評論 3 (2013): 11-121. 
962 For a copy of these two documents, see Hanyu foxue Pinglun 漢語佛學評論, Vol. 3, 2013. 
963 “全屬同一面貌，復何有於歷史之說歟.” Both the original versions of Lü’s and Liu’s reviews were 
discovered in the archive of the preparatory office of the museum of Tsinghua University, Taiwan. See 
Yao Zhihua 姚治華, ibid. 8.  
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Buddhist concepts, such as Buddha nature [Buddha-dhātu; 佛性], Prajñā, nirvāṇa, and 
dhyāna. As well, Tang’s description of the relationship between Buddhism and the 
xuanxue, according to Lü, “failed to distinguish China and India, ancient and current” 
[wuhua wufan, wugu wujin 無華無梵，無古無今]. He lamented that Tang’s History 
“mixed all the things up, [so] how could it be called as history”? In the end, Lü 
concluded that: 
 The materials used in this book are wide-ranging, but not precise enough. His 
descriptions and explanations are vague and inappropriate; only the narrative 
structure is relatively clearly organized, so this book can be used for reference. 是著
取材博而不精，論斷泛而寡當，僅敘次有序，可資參考而已.964	
Considering the good personal relationship between Tang and Lü, it is a little 
bit surprising to see such severe criticism. This document unveiled the huge gap 
between individuals within the same circle, which had always been concealed by the 
friendly atmosphere during that time.965 It is noteworthy that the discussions over 
the historical materials and phenomenon of Chinese Buddhism have often exceeded 
the literal domain and tangled with different academic and religious standpoints. To 
Tang, as well as the historians Chen Yinke and Chen Yuan, Buddhism was more a 
‘relic’ that has been preserved in books and artifacts than a living life form. This 
‘isolated’ standpoint, however, was rejected by Lü Cheng and other Buddhist scholars. 
Behind his critical comment, Lü posted a question to all the professional historians 
without Buddhist faith: could someone really obtain the true knowledge of Buddhism 
without any relevant religious experience? This question not only exposed the 
tension between truth and faith but also led to more divergences on the ‘teleological’ 
level of history.  
 
 
964 Ibid. 7-8. According to the editor, Yao Zhihua, Lü’s student Zhang Chunbo 張春波 probably has seen 
a copy of this document (or its copy); however, Zhang thought that it was “not suitable for publishing.”  
965 Ge, “ ‘Liaowei youyi de bisai’ – Cong Chen Yuan yu Hu Shih de zhenglun shuo dao zaoqi Zhongguo 




“The Scholarship of Truth” 真實之學 and “The Scholarship of Life” 為人
之學  
Reading religious texts from a historical perspective was not only aimed at 
reconstructing and expounding knowledge about the past of a certain religion, but 
rather was a project tangled with belief, doctrine, values, and science. To a certain 
extent, the textual studies of Buddhism against a modern academic background 
degraded the canonical Buddhist literature into a collection of written information 
waiting to be explained, verified, and deciphered. Texts, then, became sources from 
which those who were seeking historical knowledge obtained evidence. 
Fundamentally, the modern reading of Buddhist texts was a hermeneutical practice 
with different angles, from the historiographical interpretations based on knowledge 
and materials, to a teleological ascending path of thinking.966 Although scholars 
narrowed their studies to very grounded facts in Buddhist texts, the innate tension 
between ‘faith’ and ‘truth’ was intensified, combining their personal choice and tastes 
with the irreconcilable conflict between science and religion.967  
Although the ghost of the apocrypha always haunted the Chinese Buddhist 
canon, it was only in the modern period that those textual controversies exceeded 
the bibliographical and doctrinal level and went beyond the monastic circle. This 
process led to a further de-canonization of Buddhist literature and a deeper 
separation between knowledge and religious value. Realizing this separation, in one 
talk on the main missions of the China Institute of Inner Learning, Lü Cheng stressed 
the re-unification of “the learning of truth” and “the learning of life.” He elaborated: 
The establishment of the institute was to study the development of Buddhist culture 
from an academic perspective. At that time, such a goal was proposed to be achieved 
at least through both the learning of truth and the learning of life……Because 
Buddhism spread in China comes from translation, the texts and understandings all 
 
966 See Ricoeur, Paul, The Conflict of Interpretations, trans. Evanston (The North-western University Press. 
1974).  
967 This conflict, as mentioned in Chapter 2, was rooted in the nature of modernity. For the relationship 
between science and Chinese traditional culture, see David W. Y. Kowk, Scientism in Chinese Thought 
(New Heaven, CT: Yale University Press, 1965).  
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contain various barriers and have always distorted. Only via a thorough organization 
of the research materials and the acquisition of the truth can the real face of 
Buddhism then be observed. Secondly, the practice of Mahāyāna Buddhism actively 
benefits the world; but when it came to China, it went through a transcendental path. 
To rectify it, we must re-execute the Mahāyāna spirit of serving sentient beings. Our 







This tendency, which combined the instrumental and spiritual functions of 
scholarship together, was echoed by Taixu and later Yinshun 印順. Taixu’s belief in 
the authenticity of Chinese Buddhist texts, from his standpoint as an apologist of 
Buddhism, derived from his tacit consent to the missionary utilization of these 
canons for the sake of safeguarding Buddhist faith. To him, all the textual deviations 
were just strategies of interpretation, behind which the Dharma remained unaltered. 
With a similar position that the ‘truth’ of Buddhism had never been challenged by 
apocrypha, scholastic monk Yinshun, although he admitted the questionable status of 
some Chinese Buddhist texts and supported the Evidential methodology, believed 
that the alterations of the original Indian texts would be better understood as 
innovative developments of Buddhism or an effort of its indigenization, which had 
never harmed the Dharma.969  
Compared to these scholars, Hu Shih and Lü Cheng were less positive. As more 
iconoclasts than guardians of tradition, Hu and Lü’s skepticism led them to very 
 
968 Lü Cheng 呂澂, “Neixueyuan yanjiu gongzuo de zongjie he jihua 內學院研究工作的總結和計畫,” in 
Jinxiandai zhuming xuezhe foxue wenji 近現代著名學者佛學文集, ed., Huang Xianian 黃夏年, Beijing: 
Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1995), 301. 
969 See Yinshun, Dasheng qixinlun jiangji 大乘起信論講記 (Taipei: Zhengwen chubanshe, 1991), Xuanlun 
懸論; Original texts based on the notes of Yinshun’s serial lectures in Hong Kong in 1950. The 
representive work of Yinshun’s Buddhist history is his “Zhongguo zanzongshi” 中國禪宗史 published 
in 1971.  
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radical conclusions. Both of them criticized that Chinese Buddhism was full of 
fallacies, intentional distortion, mythical narratives, and even lies. Lü considered 
Chinese Buddhist texts as ‘heresy’, therefore, he was aiming to veer Chinese 
Buddhism back to its origin and to recover the “credible history of Buddhism”[xinshi 
信史].970 To Hu, who claimed a standpoint of positivism, Chinese Buddhist texts were 
basically narratives of legends and myths that had deceived Chinese people for 
centuries. In his view, by exposing the tricks of “those counterfeiting monks” [zuojia 
de heshang daoshi 作假的和尚道士], the real ‘national essence’ would be freed from 
the negative effects of ‘Indianization’ [yinduhua 印度化].   
Chen Yinke, Chen Yuan, and Tang Yongtong chose carefully a balanced 
position between faith-oriented judgment and purely scientific analysis. They did not 
simply categorize certain Buddhist texts as unauthentic or forgeries but rather 
accepted them as undoubtedly existing primary sources for historiography. To them, 
the behavior of falsification and its historical, political, and intellectual background 
were what they, as historians, should pay attention to. Therefore, the authenticity of 
texts was not the end of their textual criticism. What they preferred was 
historiography with an explanatory power, which could identify, criticize, and 
interpret the particular historical phenomena behind the changes in the texts. 
However, could these non-religious, historicized discourses guarantee a ‘truer truth’? 
To these ‘secular’ historians, this question, which put forward by Lü Cheng and his 
Japanese counterparts, such as D.T. Suzuki, was hard (or not necessary) to answer.  
  
Text without History 
The encounter of the Buddhist textual tradition with the modern construction of 
world religion largely complicated the issue of authenticity surrounding Buddhist 
texts. When some of the Buddhist texts had been read and presented to the modern 
audience, they had been transformed into a discursive composition; they might be 
apocryphal or even heretical, but they could be popularized as a representative 
 
970 Lü Cheng, Fojiao yanjiufa 佛教研究法. XFXC, vol. 41, 243. 
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articulation of Buddhism itself. For example, the Treatise was translated and 
published in 1900 by D. T. Suzuki and again by Briton Timothy Richard soon after 
(1845-1919).971 Soon, this text became part of what has been described as the 
“occidentalist strategies” of Japanese Buddhists, whereby they discovered the role 
Western studies of Buddhism could play in legitimizing their tradition in the eyes of 
their local critics. In particular, to those Japanese Buddhist clerics and laypeople 
interested in what James Ketelaar has called “the construction of Eastern Buddhism,” 
the Treatise, although it might be a counterfeited production, was one of the texts 
that could be used to manufacture a Buddhism beyond sectarian boundaries -- a 
united, trans-historical, essential Buddhism.  
Even in D. T. Suzuki’s translation of the Treatise, the “Chineseness” of the text 
had been smoothed down. Suzuki worked hard both to re-define the Western views of 
Mahāyāna Buddhism and to help convince people at home that Buddhism was useful 
to the modern Japanese nation. By emphasizing the ‘Japanese spirit’ in Zen, he and 
some other Japanese scholars overcame suspicion about the authenticity of the 
Buddhist canon and gained “approval of Buddhism as the most appropriate religion 
for the modern, scientific world” by utilizing sophisticated philosophical idioms and 
appropriating many of the philological and historicist tools of Western Buddhology.  
Recently, more and more scholars have criticized that, behind the modern 
construction of the ‘objective,’ ‘absolute’ textual tradition of Buddhism, there was 
always a socio-political inquiry that was deeply rooted in this-worldly and particular 
historical contexts.972 As described by Ishii Kosei石井公成, Japanese academia in the 
late nineteenth century used the teachings of the Huayan school to rationalize the 
ideology of Japanese nationalism; while in China, intellectuals like Kang Youwei, Tan 
 
971 Timothy Richard carried out the second but completed translation of the Qixinlun, which published 
in 1907. As a Baptist missionary, one of Richard’s key proselytizing strategies was to open a dialogue 
with Chinese political and cultural elites and to seek to influence them. He also put forward the theory 
that the so-called Buddhism of the “Great Vehicle” [Mahāyāna] was not Buddhism at all, but rather a 
form of Christianity. See Mitchell, Dumoulin, and Peachey, “A History of Zen Buddhism.”  
972 Representative works include Victoria Brian, Zen at War (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers. 1997). 1997; Robert H Sharf, “The Zen of Japanese Nationalism,” History of Religions 33, no. 1 
(1993): 1-43; Faure, Chan Insight and Oversight. 
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Sitong, and Zhang Taiyan deployed the same teachings to support their revolutionary 
or even anarchist ideas.973 In the unique context of modern China, Buddhist texts, to 
some Chinese intellectuals, were not the real subject of Evidential Studies or the 
science of religion, but philosophical resources for their critiques and reflections on 
other ideologies. For example, in Xiong Shili’s “agonizing questing for authentic 
existence,”974 he borrowed from Buddhist ideas to establish a dynamic ontology in 
which reality [ti 體] gained its normativity through ceaseless movement of creation 
and transformation.975 In one letters to Lü Cheng, Xiong argued that the question of 
whether Buddhist scriptures such as Lengyan jing 楞嚴經, Yuanjue Jing 圓覺經 and the 
Qixin lun were Chinese apocrypha or not was less relevant to doctrinal reflection, 
because the main ideas in those texts did “not inevitably obey the Dharma.”976 
However, although he criticized Buddhism harshly, Xiong, as well as other Neo-
Confucian philosophers, drew substantial (albeit largely unacknowledged) 
philosophical inspiration from the concepts of emptiness, transformation, and nature 
origination977 in Buddhist heritage. Buddhist texts, even questionable ones, served as 
valuable intellectual resources for their constructive philosophies.   
 
973 Kosei Ishii 石井公成, “Kindainihon ni okeru daijōkishinron no juyō” 近代日本における大乗起信論
の受容,” Ryūkokudaigaku Ajia bukkyō bunka kenkyū senta 2012 Nendo dai 10 kai zentai kenkyūkai 龍
谷大学アジア仏教文化研究センタ 2012年度第 10回全体研究会, Kindainihon bukkyō kenkyū dai 
2-kai 近代日本仏教研究第 2回. 
974 Tu Weiming, Neo-Confucian Thought in Action: Wang Yang-Ming’s Youth (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1976), 254. 
975 Xiong’s religio-philosophical conversion from Buddhism to Confucianism happened after 1923. 
From 1920 to 1922, he studied Buddhism, especially the Consciousness-Only school with Ouyang 
Jingwu in Nanjing, and his doctrinal position was rather faithful to the Yogacara tradition. See Lin 
Chen-kuo, “Hsiung Shih-Li’s Hermeneutics of Self: Making a Confucian Identity in Buddhist Words.” 
NCCU Philosophical Journal 8 (2002): 69-90. 
976 Xiong Shili, Xiong Shili quanji 熊十力全集, vol.8, 436.  
977 Xiong’s theory of Buddhism’s nature origination [xingqi 性起] was influenced by Huayan tradition. It 
indicated that all phenomenal appearances are nothing but manifestations of nature (reality). 
According to Peter N. Gregory, this goes beyond conditioned arising in locating an ultimate ontological 
basis for the phenomenal world. See Peter Gregory, Inquiry into the Origin of Humanity: An Annotated 
Translation of Tsung-mi’s Yüan jen lun with a Modern Commentary (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 
1950), 18. Also, see Makeham, John. “Xiong Shili’s Critique of Yogācāra Thought in the Context of His 









The formation of Chinese Buddhism, which has been depicted as a scene of 
‘Sinicization,’ has captured the attention of generations of scholars in both Asia and 
the West. One of the essential pieces of the puzzle of Buddhist Sinicization is 
translating, rendering, interpreting, and deciphering the concepts of Indian 
Buddhism into the Chinese language, a process that usually has been labeled with the 
term geyi [matching concepts or matching meanings] in Buddhist historiography.978 
 Commonly, the practice of geyi has been historically considered by the current 
Buddhist scholarship as an inevitable stage of reception; though it ‘failed,’ it played a 
decisive role in the early transmission and indigenization of Buddhism in China. 
Indeed, how could foreign thought be understood without any existing conceptual 
background or any ‘Vorurteile’ [prejudgment 前見]? As the scholar Whalen Lai said: 
“Perhaps all human understanding is ko-i [geyi], that is, an endless appropriation of 
new ideas relying on the flexibility of the old.”979 He then argued that, rather than 
criticizing geyi for its incorrectness and indiscrimination, it would be more proper “to 
see why and how ko-i [geyi] failed.”980 Since Buddhism is an imported religion after all, 
the term ‘geyi’ sounds quite proper and natural, for it highlights the transcultural 
implantation of concepts and ideas. Therefore, geyi and its derivative term ‘ko-i’ [geyi] 
Buddhism’ thus have been widely employed and became the main target of the so-
 
978 Most Western scholarship on early Chinese Buddhism has touched on geyi [ko-i]. See Eric Zürcher, 
The Buddhist Conquest of China (Leiden, Brill, 1959); see also the bibliography in Arthur Wright, Buddhism 
in Chinese History (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1959): 131-32, also 38-39.  
979 Lai Whalen. “Limits and Failure of ‘Ko-I’ (Concept-Matching) Buddhism,” in History of Religions 18, no. 
3 (1979): 239. 
980 Ibid., 239.  
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called ‘critical Buddhism’ prevailing in Japan throughout the twentieth century.981 
However, describing the character of Chinese Buddhism as ‘matching concepts’ is 
highly problematic and oversimplified, as it presumes the ‘impurity’ of Chinese 
Buddhism and an unsuccessful indigenization. Some scholars have pointed out that 
geyi, though enshrined as a cardinal principle of the early encounter between Indian 
Buddhism and China, was historically a brief, unimportant episode. Its historical 
significance emerged actually as a matter of modern scholarship.982  
 
‘Geyi’ Revisited 
As Victor H. Mair analyzed, geyi was one product of the modern scholarship on 
Chinese Buddhism. Although this notion transpired in history, geyi, as one facet of 
Chinese Buddhism, was invented rather than discovered. Although current 
discussions on geyi have addressed the complicated historical context of this term, 
they have left some crucial questions unanswered: why did the discourse of geyi gain 
attention during the early twentieth century and why it was selected and used to 
describe one essential facet of Chinese Buddhism? How was this discourse formed and 
emphasized by modern Buddhology through historiography? How did historians in 
modern China, such as Chen Yinke and Tang Yongtong, understand this phenomenon 
from the perspective of the entire process of Chinese history, and what kind of 
historiographical concept and cultural viewpoint can be observed from their 
interpretation of geyi?  
 
Geyi in Historical Context    
 
981 For the important works of Critical Buddhism see esp. Matsumoto, Shirō, Enji to kū: Nyuraizō shisō 
hihan (Tokyo: Daizō Shuppan, 1989), 1993; and Noriaki Hikamaya, Hongaku shisō hihan 本覺思想批判 
(Tokyo: Daizō Shuppan, 1989) and Hihan bukkyō (Tokyo: Daizō Shuppan, 1990); see also the English 
accounts in Jamie Hubbard and Paul. L. Swanson, eds., Pruning the Bodhi Tree: The Storm Over Critical 
Buddhism (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997); and James Mark Shields, Critical Buddhism: 
Engaging with Modern Japanese Buddhist Thought (Burlington: Ashgate, 2011). 
982 See Victor H. Mair, “What Is Geyi, After All?” in China Report 48, no. 1 (July 23, 2012): 29–59.  
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In common usage, geyi is usually rendered in English as “matching 
concepts/meanings” or “measuring concepts/meanings” and is explained as a 
‘translation technique’ serving to pair Sanskrit Buddhist terms with Sinitic Daoist 
terms “when the Chinese neo-Taoist intellectuals were drawn to the emptiness 
philosophy of Prajñā-Pāramitā-sūtras.”983  
In the massive Chinese historical texts, geyi, in its textual form, was limited 
used, in either Buddhist literature or in other religious and secular contexts. 
According to Victor H. Mair’s investigation, no single example of geyi can be found in 
Taoist canons or in the whole collection of the twenty-four official histories.  
Similarly, no occurrence of geyi can be observed in Zizhi tongjian資治通鑑 or Xu Zizhi 
tongjian 續資治通鑑. Neither is there an independent instance of geyi in the entirety 
of the enormous Gujin tushu jicheng 古今圖書集成 nor in the mega collection of Siku 
quanshu 四庫全書.984 Only in Buddhist texts does the term geyi appear several times: 
it is mentioned four times in Gaoseng zhuan, and two times in Chu sanzang ji ji. It is also 
scattered in several other Buddhist scriptures and categories, such as Fayuan zhulin 法
苑珠林, Xu gaoseng zhuan續高僧傳, Kaiyuan shijiao lu 開元釋教錄, and so on. Most of 
these texts are biographies of Buddhist figures or bibliographical records of 
scriptures.985   
The primary and most important document for the history of geyi is the 
biographical account of Zhu Faya 竺法雅 (who lived between the late Western Jin 
[265–316] and the early Eastern Jin [317–420]) in the Gaoseng zhuan:  
[Zhu] Faya was a man of Hejian. He was of a staid, tolerant disposition. As a youth, he 
excelled at non-Buddhist studies, and when he grew up, he became proficient in 
Buddhist doctrine…… Consequently, [Zhu Fa] ya, with Kang Falang and others, 
 
983 See Lai, Whalen. “Limits and Failure of ‘Ko-I’ (Concept-Matching) Buddhism,” 239.  And Mair, Victor 
H. “What Is Geyi, After All?” 30. 
984 Mair, Victor H. “What Is Geyi, After All?” 32. He also has mentioned in the same article that there is 
no occurrence of geyi in Shishuo xinyu, which would be significantly abnormal if geyi were a dominant 
or famous concept among the intellectuals in the Wei, Jin, and Southern-Northern dynasties.  
985 The only exception was Zhongguan lunshu 中觀論疏 written by master Jizang 吉藏(549-623), which 
was an exposition on the doctrine of Madhyamakaśāstra.  
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correlated the enumerations of items [shishu] in the sūtras with non-Buddhist 
writings as instances to engender understanding986; this was called ‘matching 
concepts’ [geyi]. 法雅，河間人。凝正有器度。少善外學，長通佛義……雅乃與康法
朗等，以經中事數擬配外書，為生解之例，謂之格義.987 
This passage has been invariably cited several times in Chinese Buddhist texts; 
however, until Chen Yinke’s article on the theory of Zhi Mindu 支愍度, it did not 
draw much attention among scholars or Buddhists.988 After Chen, however, this 
passage was much discussed while still poorly understood. One of the problems was 
the implication and meaning of the expression ‘shishu’ 事數, which literally means 
‘enumeration of items.’ Many scholars believed that the term  shishu could be to a 
large extent equated with ‘fashu’ 法數 [numerical Dharma] or ‘mingshu’ 名數 
[numerical terms], which in Sanskrit is linked to “dharma-paryāya” [formulaic terms 
of the dharma] and signifies “Buddhist terms that begin with a number.”989 Therefore, 
shishu may be appropriately translated as ‘numerical categories’ and denotes the 
categorized groups of terms in Buddhist doctrines, such as four truths [sidi 四諦], five 
sense-organs [wugen 五根], six paths [liudao 六道], twelve links of dependent 
origination [shier yinyuan 十二因緣], etc.990  
 
986 The meaning and proper translation of the phrase “shengjie” 生解 was controversial. There has been 
no satisfactory translation until now. A possible alternative could be “lively understanding,” which 
considers “sheng” 生 to be an adjective.  
987 CBETA. T50, no.2059, 4, p.347a20. Translated cited from Mair, Victor H. “What Is Geyi, After All?” 
(2012): 32. 
988 Chen Yinke 陳寅恪, “Zhi Mindu xueshuo kao 支愍度學說考,” in JMCB, 167-180. 
989 For example, this definition of shishu was adopted by Buddhologist Erik Zücher in his famous book 
The Buddhist Conquest of China: The Spread and Adaptation of Buddhism in Early Medieval China, 184. 
990 One convincible example supporting this explanation can be found in Shishuo xinyu 世說新語 [A 
new account of tales of the world] with the commentary of Liu Xiaobiao 劉孝標 (462-521): Shishu 
means, for example, the Five Personality components/aggregates (pañcaskandha), the Twelve 
Entrances (dvādaśāyatanāni), the Four Truths (catvāri ārya-satyāni), the Twelve Links of Dependent 
Origination (dvādaśanga pratītyasamutpāda), the Five Sense-organs (pañcendriyāni), the Five Powers 




 However, in actual practice, the utilization of shishu was variable and flexible 
and did not have to mean ‘numerical categories.’991 Basically, the term shishu had an 
indigenous root. The single character shu, which was used to translate “Sāmkhya” (an 
Indian philosophical tradition whose name was normally defined as ‘enumeration’, 
‘investigation,’ or ‘categorization’ of the phenomenal world), can be found in dozens 
of early Chinese philosophical and historical texts, such as Yijing 易經. The 
combination of ‘shi’ and ‘shu,’ which appears only two times in the translated 
Buddhist scriptures in Chinese, did not signify “numerical categories.”992 As Chen 
Yinke noted, ‘shishu’ as a term was continually used by Buddhists and scholars in later 
times, but the signification of this term was wide-ranging.993 Even in the Southern and 
Northern dynasties, the implications of ‘shishu’ had been generalized and were not 
limited to‘fashu’ 法數 [numerical categories].994 It usually denoted ‘discourse and 
 
991 Shishu, as a term, had been actually used for centuries before Buddhism was imported from India 
into China. It was related to an augury based on Zhouyi and meant a kind of mathematic technique 
that was applied to predict the destiny and future of certain people and events. Examples of such a 
usage can be find in the commentary of Zhouyi, xici 繫辭: “極數知來之謂占，通變之謂事，陰陽不
測之謂神”; also “極其數，遂定天下之象.” Here shu [numbers] were considered the cipher of the 
changes and images of heaven. By ‘exhausting numbers’ one could capture the changing phenomenon 
of the universe. This idea of “jishu” 極數 [exhausting numbers] also had a pronounced influence on 
Chinese Buddhists; for example, Sengzhao 僧肇 used the phrase “qiongling jishu” 窮靈極數’ [exhaustly 
penetrating the spirits and numbers] in his Bore ushi lun般若無知論. Taishō 45: 155a ff.  
992 The first example is in Sifenglü四分律 [Dharmagupta-vinaya], volume 52. The original text is: “爾時
世尊在王舍城。時優波離與諸比丘共論法律，……新學年少比丘不解事數相涉，聽用算子記數.” 
See CBETA, T22, no.1428, p.956b3. The second example is in Dafangguangfo huayan jing 大方廣佛華嚴
經 [The Great Vaipulya Buddha Flower Ornament Scripture; Sank. Buddhāvatamsaka-mahāvaipulya-
sūtra], translated by佛馱跋陀羅譯 in 420, volume 36. The original text is: “佛子！譬如字章，悉入一
切字數、一切事數、一切語言數、一切算數、一切世間、出世間而無所住.” See CBETA, T9, no.278, 
33, p.627c15. In both examples, the meaning of ‘shishu’ was not only “numerical categories.”  
993 For example, in weimojiejing xuanshu <維摩詰經>玄疏 [ Commentary on Vimalakīrti-Nirdeśa-Sūtra] , 
Zhiyi 智顗, wrote that: “此經理致深遠言旨淵玄。若但依文帖釋恐止事數而已。一教宗極終自難
量。猶須略忖幽微，顯不思議旨趣.” See CBETA, T38, no. 1777, p521a5; In his “Miaofalianhua jing 
xuanyi 妙法蓮華經玄義,” CBETA, T.33, no.  1716, he used shishu as: “既知 ‘化成’一事是佛權施，則遍
達恆沙佛法，遠通久劫方便。故《華嚴》中明，為阿鞞跋致多明事數，即其義也.” 
994 There are two examples in Chu sanzang ji ji compiled by Sengyou 僧祐. The first one is in  <Dapinjing> 





concepts of dharma’ in a broad sense and approximately equated with the Buddhist 
term ‘mingxiang’ 名相 [names and appearances].995  
 Geyi, as an approach to dealing with the issues of shishu, thus cannot simply be 
understood as a technique of translation or a method of categorizing Buddhist terms. 
Also, it means not merely matching the Buddhist concepts with China’s indigenous 
thoughts (especially Daoism). Considering the variable and obscure meanings of 
shishu and geyi, historians like Chen Yinke observed and interpreted geyi as a 
historical phenomenon that had existed in the early stage of the transmission of 
Buddhism in China, rather than as a systematized method of translation. They also 
noticed that geyi was continuously criticized as early as when it had just emerged 
because it abruptly and problematically fashioned a synthesis bridging two 
intellectual systems. One of the most famous examples was Dao’an’s rejection of geyi 
by the middle of the fourth century in his conversation with Monk Sengxian 僧先 (?) 
as “The old ‘matching concepts’ [geyi] of the past was often at odds with Buddhist 
principles.”996 Another example was Sengrui’s 僧叡 (352-436) repudiation of geyi in 
his “Pimoluojietijing yishu xu” 毘摩羅詰堤經義疏序 that “the matching of concepts 
[employed in them] was pedantic and at odds with the original [sense of the Indian 
texts being discussed]; the Six Schools [of Prajñāpāramitā] were biased and did not 
touch [the truth].”997 Apparently, approximately one hundred years after its rise, geyi 
had long ceased to be applied as a functioning device. The opposition against it had 
been cemented by Buddhist exponents; the limitation and defect of geyi had also 
 
See CBETA: T55, no.2145, 8, p.52c28. The second example is in DaXiaopin duibi yaochao xu 大小品對比要
抄序 written by Zhi Daolin 支道林: “是故出小品者。參引王統。簡領群目。筌域事數。摽判由宗。
以為小品。而辭喻清約，運旨亹亹。⋯⋯又大品事數甚眾而辭曠浩，衍本欲推求本宗明驗事旨，
而用思甚多勞審功又寡，且稽驗廢事不覆速急.” See CBETA: T55, no.2145, 8, p.55a14. In both 
examples, the term ‘shishu’ refers to theoretical principles and terms of Buddhism in general.   
995 Even modern Buddhist scholars have maintain this usage of ‘shishu’ in their arguments on Buddhist 
doctrines, for example, Lü Cheng has mentioned that “the teaching of prajñā only talks about 
‘emptiness’ [xingkong 性空, sunyata] vaguely and generally; if we want understand this term, we must 
figure out the ‘shishu’ (namely, names and appearances [mingxiang, 名相]).” In Zhongguo fojiao yuanliu 
lüejiang 中國佛教源流略講, 45. 
996 CBETA: T50, no.2059,50, 5, p.355a25. 
997 CBETA: T55, n2145, p.58c13.  
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become fully exposed. Buddhist historian Sengyou 僧祐 (445-518) concluded in his 
biography of Kumārajīva that:  
Since the Great Law covered the east, beginning in [the time] of Emperor Ming (58–
75) of the [Later] Han and passing through the Wei (220–265) and the Jin (265–420), 
the (translated) sūtras [scriptures] and Śāstras [treatises] that were produced 
gradually became numerous. Yet the [translations] produced by Zhi [Qian] and Zhu 
[Fahu]998 mostly [were plagued by] stagnant wording999 and concepts matching. 自大
法東被，始於漢明，歷涉魏晉，經論漸多，而支、竺所出，多滯文格義.1000 
In this passage, ‘ge’ 格 is used in parallel with ‘zhi’ 滯 and was probably intended to 
mean ‘obstruct, stagnant, stiff, confine’, and so on. Sengyou here chastised the early 
translators like Zhi Qian and Zhu Fahu because their interpretations of Buddhist 
doctrines were laborious, superficial, and based too much on the literal meaning of 
the texts. Even the term geyi may be an extension of the basic meaning of 
‘compartment(alize)’; it is palpable that Sengyou’s understanding of geyi did not 
equate with its primary meaning—which was a method of exegesis, rather than a 
technique of translation. 1001 Some scholars, such as Erik Zürcher, believe that, to the 
 
998 One of the explanations of the word ‘zhizhu’ is to treat it as an abbreviation referring to Rouzhi 月支
and Tianzhu 天竺; here ‘zhizhu’ would more likely designate Zhi Qian (fl. 220-252) and Zhu Fahu (i.e. 
Dharmaraksa), according to Sengzhao 僧肇 in his preface to the Vimalakīrti-sūtra (CBETA: T55, no. 
2145 p.58b9).  See Robert Shih, trans. and annot. Biographies des moines éminents (Kao seng tchouan) de 
Houei-kiao. Bibliothèque du Muséon, vol. 54 (Louvain: Institut Orientaliste, 1968). In a detailed study of 
the translation techniques of this period, Boucher has pointed out that by zhiwen geyi, Sengzhao 
criticized overly Sinicized or indigenised translations that came at the expense of faithfulness to the 
Indic originals. Zhiwen geyi is a pejorative stigmatisation of the translation style of Zhi Qian and Zhu 
Fahu. See Daniel J. Boucher, Buddhist Translation Procedures in Third Century China: A Study of Dharmaraksa 
and His Translation Idiom (University of Pennsylvania, Diss., 1996), 8 
999 For a note on the origin and significance of this expression, see Shih (1968: 74, n. 57), who pointed 
out that it may ultimately derive from Dao’an’s preface to the Extracts from the Mahāprajñapāramitā-
sūtra, in which Dao’an stated: “Whenever I come to a stagnant sentence [滯句] or a passage where the 
beginning and the ending are obscured, I set the scroll aside and think deeply, regretting that I never 
met such men as Dharmarakṣa and Mokṣala’ (CSJ 8; T.55 [2145] 52b.p.11–13). 
1000 From Chuzanzang ji ji, CBETA: T55, n2145, p.101b13. Copied with a couple of minor variants in 
Gaoseng zhuan, CBETA: T50, n2059, 2, p.332a28.  
1001 It can be, furthermore, restricted to the explication of numbered lists, as some of the scholars have 
insisted. See Mair, Victor H. “What Is Geyi, After All?” 29–59.  
 316 
 
generation of Buddhists like Sengyou, the meaning of geyi had already become very 
vague.1002  
Influenced by Sengyou, Buddhist exponents in the Sui and Tang dynasties 
continued to use the phrase “stagnant wording and matching concepts” [zhiwen geyi 
滯文格義] verbatim when discussed the early translation of Buddhist doctrines.1003 
Jizang 吉藏 (549–623), for example, repeated the identical set of paired clauses: 
“matching concepts were pedantic and went against the fundament; the Six [Prajñā] 
Schools were biased and off the mark.”1004 Commenting on this sentence, he criticized 
geyi as distorting the original meaning of the Buddha’s teaching. He mentioned that 
geyi had its practical function before the advent of Kumārajīva but did not refer to 
how it actually worked. None of these Buddhists provided any concrete definition of 
geyi or recorded any further development or extension of this method in the 
following centuries after Dao’an’s time.  
After all these reproaches, geyi seems to have been ostracized by the Buddhist 
circle. It disappeared from the history of Chinese Buddhism, at least literally, and was 
seldom discussed or mentioned again. More precisely, as some scholars have pointed 
out, geyi did not disappear overnight, but when the Buddhist concepts like prajñā and 
śūnyatā were more appropriately rendered and digested by the Chinese, the demise of 
geyi was inevitable.1005 
In sum, geyi was neither a vital technique of translation nor an essential 
philosophical principle; rather, it was a hermeneutic strategy to cope with the 
concepts and ideas in the Buddhist canon. It was a method of exegesis with a very 
pragmatic intent, controversial, ephemeral, and abortive to a certain extent, which 
 
1002  See Erik Zürcher, The Buddhist Conquest of China, 184; also see Leon Hurvitz, tr., Zenryū Tsukamoto, A 
History of Early Chinese Buddhism Vol. 1 (Tokyo: Kodansha International Ltd., 1985), 294.  
1003 For example, Sengyou’s censure of the translations of Zhi Qian and Dharmaraks as  zhiwen geyi was 
repeated verbatim by Daolang 道朗 (T55, no.2145, p.101b13–1542), Huixiang 慧祥 (T51, no.2067, 15b9–
10), Daoshi 道世 (T53, no.2122, p.474b16–17), Zhisheng 智昇(T55 [2154] 514c13–15), Yuanzhao 圓照 
(Eastern Jin) (T55, no.2157, p.811c3–4)  
1004格義迂而乖本，六家偏而未即. T42, no.1824, p.4c11, 29a7–8; T42, no.1825, p.174a12–13, 183a2. 
1005 See Lai Whalen. “Limits and Failure of ‘Ko-I’ (Concept-Matching) Buddhism,” 238. 
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was applied by a limited group of Buddhist advocates to make Buddhist teaching 
accessible and acceptable for more people. It is not necessary to limit geyi to 
categorizing ‘shishu’ with a numerical framework, as Zürcher did; however, it was, 
without doubt, a short-lived stage of the Sinicization of Buddhism and quietly 
changed its meaning during the development of Chinese Buddhism. The main reason 
geyi was known as a critical feature of Chinese Buddhism was the re-examination of 
modern Buddhist scholarship and historiography. There was no significant mention 
of geyi until the twentieth century, when it was miraculously revisited by modern 
historians such as Chen Yinke and Tang Yongtong and was re-interpreted as a key 
factor in the early development of Chinese Buddhism.  
 
The Modern Interpretations of Geyi   
As discussed before, geyi was a temporary solution for early Chinese Buddhists to 
overcome the daunting obstacles they faced. Because of the scarcity of accurate 
knowledge in both language and philosophy, as well as “a plethora of ‘apocryphal’ 
scriptures,”1006 the propensity to confuse or conflate Buddhism with native Chinese 
thought was ignited. Geyi was one conspicuous example. It lasted for around two 
centuries, and then, as a hermeneutic strategy, it was criticized and rejected, and 
disappeared from the historical context. Then, how did such a transient, pragmatic 
(or maybe insignificant, as some scholars have claimed)1007 strategy became one of the 
cardinal features of Chinese Buddhism? To answer this question, we need to trace the 
discovery of geyi in modern scholarship that occurred in the 1920s and illustrate the 
discursive transformation of geyi from an exegetical technique of limited, 
circumscribed application into a key label of Chinese Buddhism as well as a vital 
element of its historiography. 
 
1006 The ‘apocryphal scriptures’ here mean the indigenous Chinese texts written so as to resemble 
translations of Indic originals, which had emerged on large scale since the Eastern Jin dynasty.  
1007 See Victor H. Mair, “What Is Geyi, After All?” 59. 
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The issue of geyi is believed to have been raised by Chen Yinke for the first 
time.1008 He resurrected the obscure notion of geyi and brought it back into the vision 
of scholarship. Moreover, he established the prototype of the discourse of geyi that 
was followed by almost all the scholars after him.1009 As mentioned before, Chen’s 
pioneering study of geyi was a part of his inquiry into a marginal Buddhist figure in 
the Eastern Jin dynasty, Zhi Mindu (who also served as the starting point for his 
boarder investigation of medieval Chinese Buddhist literature) and his teaching of 
xinwu 心無 [the nonexistence of the mind]. With regard to the interpretation of the 
term of geyi, he quoted Zhu Faya’s biography in the Gaoseng Zhuan as well as Liu 
Xiaobiao’s commentary on shishu and explained: 
During the Jin era, the scholars who engaged in Pure Conversation [qingtan 清談] 
mostly favored strained comparisons [bifu 比附] between Buddhist texts and non-
Buddhist writings. What is more, among the monks, there was a concrete method 
called geyi. Although the term geyi is seldom seen in written records, it was prevalent 
for a period, and its influence on contemporary thought was profound; therefore, the 
issue of geyi should be elaborated 蓋晉世清談之士，多喜以內典與外書互相比附。
僧徒之間復有一種具體之方法，名曰“格義”。“格義”之名，雖罕見載記，然
曾盛行一時，影響於當日之思想者甚深，固不可以不論也.1010 
Chen accepted Liu’s interpretation of shishu and provided some examples. However, 
he suggested that it was not necessary to limit shishu and geyi only to the numerical 
Buddhist concepts. Instead, Chen interpreted geyi in a general sense, referring to 
Huiyuan 慧遠 (334-416) and Sun Chuo 孫綽 (ca. 311-368) as two representative 
examples of the practice of geyi: Huiyuan recounted the meaning of shixiang 實相 
[reality] by using the sources in Zhuangzi 莊子; Sun Chuo connected the legend of 
‘seven worthies of the bamboo groves’ [ zhulin qixian 竹林七賢] with seven monks 
from India. In Chen’s opinion, geyi was not only a natural outgrowth of the early 
encounter between Buddhism and Chinese culture but also a common conduct 
 
1008 At least Chen was the most influential scholar who discussed this issue.  
1009 See Victor H. Mair, “What Is Geyi, After All?” 47; Takatoshi, Itō. ‘The Formation of Chinese Buddhism 
and “matching the meaning” [geyi], trans. Rolf W. Giebel, Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo 
Bunko (The Oriental Library), no. 54 (1996): 69.  
1010 Chen Yinke 陳寅恪, Zhi Mindu xueshuo kao 支愍度學說考, in JMCB, 141-67. 
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related to the prevalent trend of qingtan among the literati. The propensity to discuss 
metaphysical issues during that time led to the practice of matching concepts. The 
reason why xinwu, a misconception derived from the literal misunderstanding of the 
Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā道行般若經1011 could be developed by Zhi Mindu into a 
popular thought, according to Chen, could also be attributed to this “scholarly trend” 
[xueshu fengqi學術風氣]. Chen noted that, just as its vanguards—xingkong 性空 and 
benwu 本無, invented by Dao’an 道安 and Fatai 法汰1012—the teaching of xinwu was 
also consistent with the purport of Laozi 老子 and Xici 繫辭 (the commentary of 
Yijing) and did not conform with the original meaning of emptiness in 
Prajñāpānamitā scriptures.  
In one lecture, Chen further critically investigated the historical appearance 
of geyi by using ‘zhulin qixian’ as an example.1013 According to Chen’s investigation, 
zhulin was the Chinese translation of the celebrate Venuvana or Karandāvenuvana;1014 
qixian 七賢, as a shishu, originated from the mysterious zuozhe qiren 作者七人 [the 
seven men who acted] of the Analects. Driven by the scholarly mechanism of geyi, 
these two unconnected terms combined into the notion of zhulin qixian, referring to a 
group of bohemian, nonconformist intellectuals, poets, musicians, and tipplers in 
 
1011 In his article Zhimindu xueshu kao, Chen expounded that the teaching of xinwu was based on three 
Buddhist sūtra: Fangguang bore jing放光般若經，Daoxing borejing道行般若經, and Chitian fantian 
suowen jing 持心梵天所問經, in which the expression xinwu could be observed frequently in the form 
of the phrase ‘youxinwuxin’ 有心無心.  Chen compared the Chinese translation of these three sūtras 
with the original manuscripts in Sanskrit, and showed that xinwu 心無 was an equivalent of cittam 
acittam in Sanskrit; cittam meant xin, and acittam meant wuxin. Therefore, xinwu was not a proper word 
and actually should be wuxin. Chen also mentioned that in most of the early translated Buddhist sūtras, 
xinwu was translated as feiyi 非意 or feixin 非心’.  
1012 See Chen Yinke 陳寅恪, Zhi Mindu xueshuo kao 支愍度學說考, in JMCB, 160. 
1013 His lecture was titled “Qingtan wuguo” 清談誤國 and was delivered at Sun Yet-sen University in 
1947. See Wan Shengnan 萬繩楠 (ed.), Chen Yinke Wei Jin Nanbeichao shi jiangyan lu 陳寅恪魏晉南北朝
史講演錄 (Hefei: Huangshan Shushe, 2007), 45-64. 
1014 Venuvana or Karandāvenuvana [Zhulin] is a monastery park near the city of Rājagṛha that was 
donated to Śkyamuni by King Bimbisāra (or, according to another account, by the elder Karanda). 
However, in Wei and Jin, the real meaning of ‘zhulin’ was already unreachable.  
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Luoyang 洛陽.1015 Later, Confucianist Sun Chuo further compared the legendary 
Tianzhu Qi Seng 天竺七僧 [the seven monks of India] to this Chinese zhulin qixian.1016 
Through this example, Chen demonstrated how geyi cumulatively affected the 
transformation and implantation of concepts between cultural parallels.  
For Chen, the utilization of geyi was not restricted to the earliest phase of 
Buddhist Sinicization during the Wei-Jin period, or specifically before Kumārajīva . He 
extended the scope of geyi onwards to the Northern Song dynasty. Historically, as 
Chen noted, geyi, although it had been rejected by the Buddhist community, 
performed as a subterranean flow in medieval Chinese cultural history.1017 It was the 
hidden logic behind the formation of many new theories—borrowing concepts and 
ideas with different origins to form something fresh and compatible. For example, 
according to Chen, Zhu Xi 朱熹’s Neo-Confucianism, was influenced essentially by 
Buddhist thought and therefore a tangible form of geyi. The amalgamation of the 
three religions [sanjiao 三教]—Buddhism, Confucianism, and Daoism—was a 
variation of geyi as well. Other forms of syncretism followed the spirit of geyi 
 
1015 The ‘Zhulin qixian’ includes: Ji Kang嵇康, Ruan Ji阮籍, Shan Tao山濤, Xiang Xiu向秀, Liu Ling劉
伶, Wang Rong王戎, Ruan Xian阮咸.  
1016 Chen quoted Sun Chuo’s Dao Xian zhuan道賢傳 [Biographies of the Sages] to explain how people at 
the time paired the Zhulin qixian with seven Indian eminent monks. For example, 法護 was paired with 
Shan Tao  (高僧傳一•曇摩羅叉傳)，Bai Fazu 白法祖 was paired with Ji Kang (高僧傳一•帛遠傳), Fa 
Cheng 法乘 was paired with Wang Rong (高僧傳四•法乘傳), Zhu Daoqian 竺道潛 was paired with Liu 
Ling (高僧傳四•竺道潛傳), Zhi Dun was paired with Xiangxiu (高僧傳四•支遁傳), Yu Falan 於法蘭 
was paired with Ruan Ji (高僧傳四•於法蘭傳), Yu Daosui 於道邃 was paired with Ruan Xian (高僧傳
四•於道邃傳). See Wan Shengnan 萬繩楠 (ed.), Chen Yinke Wei Jin Nanbeichao shi jiangyan lu 陳寅恪魏晉
南北朝史講演錄, 45-64. 
1017 Chen did notice that, after the Jin Dynasty, the term geyi was seldom discussed by Buddhists and 
intellectuals, with the result that the tree significance of geyi was also unreachable. In his example of 
‘Zhulin qixian,’, he pointed out that in the Northern dynasty, people such as Li Daoyuan 酈道元, the 
author of the Shuijing Zhu 水經註, had already missed the meaning and origin of ‘zhulin’ 竹林 and tried 
to find sights of bamboo groves near Ji Kang’s living places. See ibid.  
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dispersed in Chinese intellectual history, such as the thought of Zongmi 宗密 (780-
841).1018  
Following Chen, many scholars joined the discussion. One of the most 
important articles was written by Tang Yongtong. In this article, Tang defined geyi as: 
‘Ko’ [Ge], in this context, has the meaning of ‘to match’ or ‘to measure’; ‘yi’ means 
‘name’, ‘term’ or ‘concept’; ‘Ko-yi’ [Geyi] is (the method or scheme of) ‘matching ideas’ 
(or terms), or ‘the equation of ideas. 1019  
Tang’s explanation, due to its wide reception in the English-speaking world, 
determined the standard translation of geyi as ‘matching concepts.’1020 In the chapter 
“The study of prajñā at the time of Shi Daoan” [Shi Daoan shidai zhi bore xue 釋道安
時代之般若學] in his History, he wrote: 
What is geyi? ‘Ge’ 格 means ‘measure’, to estimate, evaluate [liang 量]. It is a method of 
facilitating people’s understanding of Buddhist writings by combining and matching 
them with Chinese thought.1021 
Tang’s explanation here was in very general terms. He illustrated that geyi was a 
convenient way for understanding Buddhism and that this method had only been 
practiced before Dao’an’s and Kumārajīva’s times. He attached the examples of Dao’an 
[his conversation with Sengxian] and Sengrui僧叡 to emphasize the fact that Dao’an 
had already realized the pitfall of geyi and considered geyi to be circuitous and to run 
counter the principles of Buddhism. The aim of geyi, Tang further argued, was to 
 
1018 Some of the scholars then questioned whether Chen had the proper understanding of geyi, because 
he extensively applied geyi to a larger spectrum. However, this opinion ignored the background of 
Chen’s own historiographical position. 
1019 Tang Yongtong, Lun geyi—zui zao yi zhong ronghe Yindu Fojiao he Zhongguo sixiang de fangfa 論
「格義」—最早一種融合印度佛教與中國思想的方法. The English Translation by M.C. Rogers was 
published in 1950. Translated from  English to Chinese by Shi Jun石峻, in Lixue, Foxue, Xuanxue 理學•佛
學•玄學  (Beijing: Beijing daxue, 1991), 282–94. This has also been collected in TYQJ, vol. 5, 231–42. The 
original Chinese draft on which Rogers based his English translation has not been found.  
1020 Some scholars, such as Mair, have contested the accuracy of the rendered English term ‘matching 
concepts.’ However, due to the absence of Tang’s original text in Chinese, it is not easy to see if Tang’s 
understanding of geyi was vague or not.  
1021 Tang Yongtong, Han Wei liang Jin Nanbeichao Fojiao shi 漢魏兩晉南北朝佛教史(Beijing: Zhonghua 
shuju 中華書局, 1983) 168, Or geliang, 格量 as on page 170.  
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blend Chinese thought with foreign ideas about Buddhism. It was an effective and 
pragmatic means; therefore, even Dao’an, who opposed the problematic geyi, also 
fused Taoist Lao-Zhuang thought into his writings on Buddhism.   
As the harbingers of discussion on the issue of geyi, both Chen Yinke and Tang 
Yongtong presented the intention of considering geyi to be one of the most 
representative and fundamental methods of the integration of different traditions. 
Moreover, these two historians shared the hypothesis that the Chinese Buddhism, or 
even the entire landscape of Chinese culture, was the outcome of geyi; based on the 
logic of geyi, China went through several external cultural impacts and eventually 
formed its own cultural peculiarities.1022 
The discourse of geyi was elaborated by Japanese specialists into the term 
‘kakugi Bukkyō’ 格義仏教 [‘geyi Buddhism’] and was promulgated as an equivalent to 
or synonym for Chinese Buddhism, with countless disquisitions being written on its 
nature and impact.1023 The Japanese researcher Ui Hakuju 宇井伯壽 discussed geyi by 
quoting Zhu Faya’s biography from the Gaoseng Zhuan and explained it as one 
“practice of comparing and matching the principles expounded in the sūtras with 
non-Buddhist works,” which he identified exactly with Taoist texts. Another Japanese 
scholar, Tokiwa Daijō 常盤大定, also asserted that “geyi means to employ Lao-
Zhuang [thought] to interpret Buddhism.” The opinions of both Japanese scholars 
indicated the influence from Chen Yinke and Tang Yongtong, but remarkably 
narrowed the scope of geyi and limited the non-Buddhist teaching that participated in 
the process of geyi to Daoism.1024  
The expression ‘geyi Buddhism’ [kakugi Bukkyō] was used for the first time by 
Japanese scholar Tsukamoto Zenryū 塚本善隆. The chapter “The unfolding of geyi 
 
1022 Other Chinese scholars who discussed geyi included  Hu Shi 胡適, Feng Youlan 馮友蘭 and Ren Jiyu 
任繼愈.  
1023 For example, Kobayashi Masayoshi 小林正美(1997). Also see Hayashima Kyōshō and Takasaki 
Jikidō, eds, Bukkyō-Indo shisq jiten 仏教インド思想辞典 (Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1987), 54b-55b. 
1024 For a detailed examination of the Japanese scholarship on ‘geyi Buddhism’ or ‘kakugi Bukkyō,’ see 
Takatoshi, Itō. “The Formation of Chinese Buddhism and ‘Matching the Meaning’ [geyi]’, trans. Rolf W. 
Giebel, Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko (The Oriental Library), 54 (1996): 71-73. 
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Buddhism towards a society of pure conversation during the Eastern Jin” [Kakugi 
Bukkyō no Tō Shin seidan shakai he no tenkai 格義仏教の東晉清談社会への展開] 
in his Shina Bukkyō shi kenkyū 支那仏教史研究 [A study on the history of Chinese 
Buddhism] also indicated influence from Chen Yinke.1025 After the previous section of 
‘Daoist Buddhism’ [Dōkyōteki Bukkyō] (which offered an even more dubious 
proposition),1026 he followed Ui and Tokiwa to emphasize the significance of Daoism in 
the Eastern Jin period and advocated geyi as a vital factor in the early development of 
Chinese Buddhism that connected the ‘Dark/Abstruse/ Metaphysical Learning’ 
[xuanxue 玄學] of the Wei-Jin period with prajñā studies. Tsukamoto’s notions of 
‘Dōkyōteki Bukkyō’ and ‘kakugi Bukkyō’ were adopted and used, for they described one 
staple of the thought of the Wei-Jin literati and a form of faith that was promoted in 
parallel among the ordinary people. 
From the second half of the twentieth century, the discourse of geyi was 
widely established in Western academia. It became a constant theme presented in 
nearly all introductory and general expositions of Chinese Buddhist history.  
The Western reception of the discourse of geyi can be dated back to the 
enormously influential A History of Chinese Philosophy [Zhongguo zhexue shi 中國哲學史] 
written by Feng Youlan 馮友蘭. Under the influence of Feng, as well as Chen Yinke 
and Tang Yongtong, scholars such Arthur Link, Arthur Wright, Wing-tsit Chan, 
Kenneth Chen, Robert Shih, etc., gradually settled on the rendering of ‘matching 
concepts’ or ‘matching meanings’ as the most crucial and representative feature of 
Chinese Buddhism and defined geyi as a method of translation that connected the 
prajñā-sūtra with Sinitic Lao-Zhuang thought.1027 Even the primary meaning and scope 
 
1025 Tsukamoto, Zenryū 塚本善隆, Shina Bukkyō shi kenkyū 支那仏教史研究 (Tokyo: Kōbundō shobō, 
1924), 25-34. 
1026 It is problematic because Daoist religion was hardly well enough established before the Eastern Jin 
(the period to which Tsukamoto is here referring) to have subsumed or significantly coloured 
Buddhism. 
1027 Arthur Link, from 1957, began a long series of articles in which he focused on the problem of geyi. 
Influenced by Tang Yongtong, he defined geyi initially as “matching meanings,” a method in which 
Chinese terms and concepts (chiefly Taoist) were paired with analogous Indian terms and ideas. Arthur 
Wright, in his Buddhism in Chinese History, rendered geyi as ‘matching concepts’ and stated that “[t]his 
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of geyi was vague; it was enshrined as a cardinal principle and an unavoidable process 
in the transmission of Buddhism from India to China. In modern scholarship, geyi has 
been conceptualized not as a technical term but as an abstract sketch of the general 
identity of Chinese Buddhism, without any sectarian biases. To this extent, geyi is a 
discourse that has been uprooted from its historical context. Its intended meaning 
was simplified, generalized, extensively interpreted, and mixed up with 
interpretations and even imagination. Fundamentally, geyi and its extended 
variations in modern scholarly writing are conceptual and ‘less-historical.’      
 
The Discourse of Geyi: Chen Yinke’s Reflections 
Although geyi was ‘re-invented’ by modern scholarship and became a discursive 
narrative of Chinese Buddhism, current studies of this issue began to focus on the 
essence of this term itself by examining its historical existence and further revealing 
how geyi has been constantly distorted and misunderstood. Chen and Tang, then, 
have been criticized as missing the real historical function of geyi or misevaluating its 
long-term significance. Such comments rightly suggest the nature of geyi and its 
historical limitations, but meanwhile leave out questions such as why scholars in 
modern China ‘occasionally’ noticed geyi and purposely promoted it into a core 
feature of Chinese Buddhism, or why geyi was chosen and established as a discourse 
in the writing of Buddhist history. To answer these questions, it becomes necessary to 
trace the fundamental historiographical concepts of Chen and Tang and reveal their 
contemplations on the history, tradition, religion, and culture of China.  
 
device was prevalent in the second and third centuries.” Wing-tsit Chan in his A Source Book in Chinese 
Philosophy defined geyi as “the practice of matching concepts of Buddhism with Daoism, in which one 
Buddhist concept is matched one in Chinese thought.” Based heavily on Tang Yongtong, Kenneth Chen 
described geyi as “the method of matching the meaning. This method was used especially by the 
translators of the Prajñā sūtras for the purpose of making Buddhist thought more easily understood by 
the Chinese.” Most of the representative ideas of geyi in modern Western scholarship were influenced 
by Chen and Tang, at least to ca ertain extent. For the detailed investigation on geyi in the modern 
Western scholarship, see Mair, Victor H. “What Is Geyi, After All?” 49-52. 
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The innate similarities and the complementary character between Chinese 
and Indian civilization, as the initial point of interpenetration, drove the early 
Buddhist apologists, such as Dao’an and Huiyuan, to find parallels between Buddhism 
and Chinese native thought. To Chen and Tang, this activity of bridging indigenous 
and foreign thought, which happen naturally, demonstrated a vital facet of both 
Chinese culture and Buddhist tradition. Historically, geyi, as one significant method of 
interpretation, was not required by the ‘authentic’ Dharma, but rather, presented 
how Chinese civilization responded to external impacts in a particular way. 
Therefore, instead of delimiting geyi or evaluating the pros and cons of practicing 
geyi,1028 Chen and Tang’s studies immediately focused on the intellectual background 
and socio-political perquisite for geyi, namely, the motivation and means of the 
Chinese to adapt to and domesticate foreign thought, intellectually and practically.  
 
Buddhism and Chen Yinke’s Historiography  
For the scholars who try to rebuild the past of Chinese Buddhism, ‘Sinicization’ was 
an inescapable issue. Chen Yinke was perhaps the first scholar who coped with this 
issue in Chinese academia. Realizing the historicity of geyi as well as its reference in a 
specific time, Chen partly admitted that geyi was firstly an instrumental way to make 
an alien faith palpable to local people. Indeed, how could Buddhism be understood 
without some recourse to the familiar? Although, as Zürcher suggested years ago,1029 
this term must have referred to something more specific, such as the pairing of 
Buddhist numerical categories found in the older dhyanā and Abhidharma literature 
with superficially similar Chinese numerical lists,1030 in Chen’s view, geyi was not 
something ephemeral. He considered it to be one step in the broader historical 
process of the Sinicization of foreign thoughts, and understood it as a cultural pattern 
 
1028 As cited before, Chen and Tang both only provided a brief description of geyi. Some scholars, like 
Mair, have then questioned whether Chen and Tang had sufficient knowledge of this term.  
1029 Erik Zürich, The Buddhist Conquest of China: The Spread and Adaptation of Buddhism in Early Medieval 
China, 184. 
1030 Zürich’s discussion was somewhat ignored by some later scholars, for example, Walen Lai.  
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that presented the basic scenario of the encounter between ‘the others’ and ‘the 
self’.1031 As such, Chen upgraded this hermeneutic strategy into a historical stereotype 
of the formation of Chinese cultural identity.  
Chen Yinke’s two most cited texts on geyi, mentioned before, echoed the 
central theme of his “national cultural history” [minzu wenhua zhishi民族文化之
史].1032 As early as 1919, Chen mentioned in a conversation with Wu Mi吳宓 that the 
transmission of Buddhism was particularly worth investigating,1033 since, compared 
with Confucianism, which had a deep influence on social regulation and moral 
principles, Buddhism had more profoundly changed the intellectual sphere of the 
Chinese.1034 As a silent power, this religious belief had sometimes propelled but 
sometimes obstructed changes in other domains, such as politics, economy, 
literature, and art. Therefore, Chen stressed that understanding the issue of “belief” 
[xinyang 信仰] was the “prerequisite” [xianjue tiaojian 先決條件] for establishing the 
past of China.1035 To him, political elements, especially the behavior and activities of 
the emperors and courts, were only one facet of the whole picture. He contended that 
the inheritance and discontinuity of religious tradition within or between clans, 
literati, gentry communities, and so on, were another thread of Chinese intellectual 
history. In particular, the dis-synchronic tempos of religious and political changes, 
following crisscrossing conflicts both inside and outside China, profoundly influenced 
or even determined many historical scenarios. Accentuating the term ‘religious 
belief,’ Chen declared that only with the knowledge of mutual-utilization between 
religion and other socio-political powers and the realization of the conflicts between 
individual beliefs and the larger atmosphere of faith in a particular era—which is the 
 
1031 Here I oppose Mair’s claim that Chen did not understand that geyi is a historical product.   
1032 Chen, Yinke, “Chen Yuan ‘Yuan xiyuren huahua kao’ xu 陳垣元西域人華化考序,” JMEB, 270. 
1033 “佛教流布，實為世界文明史上，大可研究者.” See Wu Mi, Wu Mi Riji吳宓日記,  
1034 Chen, “Feng Youlan Zhongguo zhexue shi (xia ce) shencha baogao 馮友蘭中國哲學史下冊審查報告,” 
JMCB, 283. 
1035 Chen, Tao Yuanming sixiang yu xingtan zhi guanxi 陶淵明思想與清談之關係. JMCB, 224, 227-228. As 
Chen implied here, Liang Qichao’s study might be unqualified, because Liang’s studies on Tao 




“convention” [guanli 慣例] of Chinese history1036“can [the historians] talk about the 
cultural history of medieval China.”1037 
 
‘Theoretical Geyi’ and the Innovation of Old Meaning  
Chen Yinke’s interpretation of geyi firstly appeared in his works during the 1930s as 
one part of his construction of Chinese national cultural history. To Chen, Buddhism 
was always linked with a first-person possessive, such as ‘our nation’ [wuguo 吾國]. 
Buddhism, definitely, is not Chinese; however, in Chen’s observation, the significance 
of Buddhism in Chinese history transformed this quintessential (in Chen’s sense) 
external tradition in a departure from its Indian roots that caused it to gain a certain 
‘Chinese-ness.’   
 After 1932, Chen’s studies on Buddhism experienced a transition from 
comparative textual analyses on Buddhist scriptures to thematic investigations of the 
cultural and ethnic manifestations of Buddhism in medieval Chinese history.1038 In 
1935, he published an article entitled “Empress Wu Zhao and Buddhism” [Wuzhao yu 
fojiao武曌與佛教], in which he fabulously expounded on how religion (here 
Buddhism) as a discursive mechanism functioned in historical processes and engaged 
in socio-political changes from the Sui to the Tang dynasty. He started his argument 
by investigating the belief tradition of Empress Wu’s maternal clan and the historical 
origins of this belief within the royal court of the Sui, linking it with the broader 
 
1036 For example, in his article “Tianshidao yu binghai diyu zhi guanxi” 天師道與濱海地域之關係, he 
pointed out that “in Chinese history, political reforms always presented certain kinds of ‘religiosity’ or 
‘mysticism’. Even today, this ‘historical convention’ continues,” in JMCB, 45. 
1037 “始可與言吾國中古文化史也.” Ibid, 38. Chen also discussed the issue of religion in his “Wozhao yu 
fojiao 武曌與佛教” (JMEB, 153-74) and “Tao Yuanming zhi sixiang yu weijin qingtan zhi guanxi陶淵明
之思想與魏晉清談之關係” (JMCB, 201-39). Both of these articles demonstrated how the family 
religious tradition was ‘deep and strong’ [深且固]. One example Chen provided here was Shen Yue. 
Although Shen believed in Buddhism and wrote dozens of articles to defend and advocate for 
Buddhism, he still followed the Daoist ritual of “shangzhang shouguo” 上章首過 when he was dying. 
1038 As investigated in Chapter 3, at this stage of Chen’s career (from 1927-1937), religion remained the 
core theme of his studies. However, after he moved to Yunman and taught at Xinan lianda 西南聯大, 
he switched his interests from religious history to the history of politics and literature in medieval 
China, partly due to limited access to research sources.  
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context of the rise and fall of Buddhism from the Northern Zhou era to the early 
Tang. As Chen demonstrated, the attitude of Empress Wu towards Buddhism was not 
only related to her practical quest for consolidating political power but also rooted in 
her faith background and religious experience of her childhood. From Wu!s 
promotion of the Mahāmeghasūtra [Dayun jing 大雲經],1039 Chen suggested the multi-
layers of the mutual exploitation between religion and politics: a dynastic change in 
secular power could not immediately shake the faith foundation of society; rather, 
religion was always utilized in political turmoil as an apparatus for enhancing certain 
political powers or sustaining social status. Therefore, he concluded, “the historical 
materials always reveal that religion and politics depend on each other.”1040  
 This article not only clarified the role religion played in political changes but 
also covered some other essential issues closely related to the transformation of 
Chinese Buddhism. The first one was the fundamental contradiction between the 
Buddhist and Confucianist concepts of ethics. Citing a passage from Fozu tongji 佛祖統
紀 written by Zhipan 志磐, Chen brought to light how a monk of the Tiantai school 
depicted the Emperor Yang of the Sui dynasty, a brutal despot, as a savior, labeling 
him “the king Ajātasattu.”1041 Secondly, Chen, in his conclusion, touched upon the 
critical issue of ‘dissimilarity between China and the Western regions’ [huayi zhibie 
華夷之別] by referring to Xie Lingyun’s 謝靈運 (385-433) Bianzong lun 辨宗論. 
Furthermore, he also discussed the encounter between different religious and 
cultural traditions. The Buddhist scripture Dayunjing, he analyzed, was not an 
 
1039 According to Chen’s argument, Wu Zhao was influenced by Buddhism through her mother at a very 
young age. Based on the records in the Dunhuang scripture of Dayun Jingshu大雲經疏 [Commentary 
on the Mahāmeghasūtra] in the British Museum in London, Chen argued that Wu even ordained as a 
nun before she entered the palace. However, her promotion of Buddhism also had a political intention. 
Because her ascendence to the throne could not be supported by the Confucian classics, she had to 
turn to Buddhism to get legitimacy. In the Mahāyāna classics, there was the narrative of ‘being 
recorded to be Chakravartin as woman’ [nüsheng shouji wei zhuanlunshengwang chengfo 女身受記為
轉輪聖王成佛]. Wu then made use of this story to justify her position as Empress. See part “bing 丙.” 
See Chen, “Wozhao yu fojiao武曌與佛教” , in JMEB, 153-74. 
1040 “自來史實所昭示，宗教與政治終不能無所關涉.” See Chen Yuan mingji dianqian fojiao kao xu 陳
垣明季滇黔佛教考序, in JMEB, 272.  
1041 Ibid. 159-160 
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apocryphal scripture created in the Middle Kingdom but originated from a district 
near Khotan Kingdom 于闐. However, the term “female king” [nüshen weiwang 女身
為王] in this scripture, which Empress Wu made use of, was initially created by Han 
immigrants living in the Western Region, instead of the Indians or Khotanese 
themselves. Therefore, the formulation of Dayunjing could not be solely assigned to 
the Empress but instead resulted from unavoidable cultural contacts. The historical 
process is complex, containing coincidence, backward flow, and political intentions, 
as well as conceptual exchanges. Therefore, the case of Dayu jing was not only 
concerned with the ‘legitimacy’ of ‘power’ but rather demonstrated a special model of 
‘dialogue’ between cultures: one tradition borrows and imports its own concepts 
through the others.  
 The issues discussed in this essay reflected the central concerns of Chen 
Yinke‘s historiography, which included: firstly, the relationship between religions 
(especially Buddhism) and other socio-political powers in the Chinese historical 
context; secondly, the contradiction and compromise between external and domestic 
traditions; thirdly, the formation of the particularity of the Chinese nation and 
culture, especially the role Buddhism had played in this process. Therefore, the key 
point of Chen’s studies was not the static state of so-called “historical truth” but 
rather “relationships” (alteration, discontinuity, and convergence), which gradually 
impelled the Chinese to establish their own historical path and conceptual system.  
From the 1930s to the 1940s, Chen published several articles about geyi and 
some relevant issues, such as qingtan. The most important ones are “A study of Zhi 
Mindu’s teaching” [Zhi Mindu xueshuo kao 支愍度學說考] (1932), “ An investigation 
of Xiang Xiu and Guo Xiangs’ interpretation of ‘Xiaoyao You’” [Xiaoyaoyou Xiang Guo 
yi ji Zhi Dun yi tanyuan 逍遙遊向郭義及支遁義探源] (1937), and “The Relationship 
Between Tao Yuanming’s idea and pure conversation” [Tao Yuanming zhi sixiang yu 
qingtan zhi guanxi 陶淵明之思想與清談之關係].1042 Without providing any direct 
 
1042 In current scholarship, most of studies on geyi have paid attention to the first article because it was 
the initial investigation of this term. However, the other two articles should not be ignored since they 
provide indispensable information on Chen’s meaning. Axel,  
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clarification of the term geyi, all these articles addressed one question: what is the 
relationship between qingtan and geyi? — namely, is geyi a result of pure conversation, 
or vice versa? Indeed, as some scholars have pointed out, connecting Buddhism with 
qingtan, a trend of xuanxue 玄學, revealed Chen’s deviation from the original meaning 
of geyi. However, this judgment is somewhat of a detour and misreading of the real 
intention behind Chen’s discussion.1043 To Chen, the relationship between geyi and 
qingtan was not only about a special historical phenomenon, but touched upon issues 
that he concerns: how Chinese cultural tradition dealt with influences from the 
outside and how cross-cultural exchanges had taken place throughout China’s 
history. His reflections echoed his historical interpretation of the cultural 
universality and integrity in China’s past as well as in its present and future.    
 Never formulating a definition for geyi, however, Chen realized that geyi was a 
method or strategy applied in a limited situation and properly noticed the 
relationship between geyi and shishu. Although Chen quickly moved to a generalized 
historical context, this did not mean that Chen had only a vague understanding of 
this term. In the article on Zhi Mindu’s teaching, he provided a very innovative yet 
convincing elucidation for the term ‘shengjie’ 生解,1044 an expression that had an 
equivalent meaning to geyi, and clearly pointed out the limitation of geyi in a 
methodological sense.  
 In his article on Guoxiang and Xiang Xiu’s comments on “Xiaoyaoyou,” Chen 
investigated the commentary of Monk Zhidun on the Taoist classics Zhuangzi as a 
representative instance that showed how Buddhism had impacted native Chinese 
thought and what kind of social and ideological transformation had supported the 
popularity of Buddhism among the Chinese literati. According to Chen, Guo and 
 
1043 For example, Victor H. Mair wrote that: Chen’s discussion of geyi is filled with this sort [like Chen’s 
investigation of Zhulin Qixian 竹林七賢] of unbridled attribution of practically any syncretic 
tendencies to this eclusive snark” and made “bold assertion.” See Victor H. Mair, “What is Geyi, After 
All?,” China Report 48, no. 1-2 (2012). 
1044 In Chen’s opinion, ‘shengjie’ 生解 was related to the term ‘zizhu’ 子注 . There is a intertextuality 
between ‘sheng’ 生’ and ‘zi’ 子, ‘jie’ 解, and ‘zhu’ 注. Chen criticized the method of ‘shengjie’ and 
advocated for the method of ‘zizhu.’ See Chen “Zhi Mindu xueshuo kao 支愍度學說考,” in JMCB, 181-85. 
This issue will be further discussed in the next part of this chapter.     
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Xiang’s commentaries on “Xiaoyuao you” from Zhuangzi, one of the most important 
and profound texts of the Daoist philosophy, were based on ‘the theory of talent and 
personality’ [caixing lun 才性論], which originated from the system of ‘pure 
judgment’ [qingyi 清議], a method for selecting talented people by judging their 
personalities. However, after the Eastern Jin dynasty, with the disintegration of the 
influential-family system [menfa zhidu 門閥制度], qingyi gradually transformed into 
a trend of qingtan—‘pure conversations’ on abstract and philosophical topics. Against 
this background, Zhi Dun 支遁, an eminent monk living in the Jiangdong 江東 area, 
used the doctrine of the Aṣṭasāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra [Daoxing jing道行經] to 
comment on “Xiaoyao you,” matching the concepts of prajñā to the Taoist idea of 
‘nature’ [ziran 自然] and ‘non-doing’ [wuwei 無為]. This kind of geyi, in particular 
using Buddhist doctrines to interpret Taoist classics, Chen argued, emerged as early 
as in the period of Dao’an and Huiyuan and continually developed into a main trend 
of qingtan.1045 In this sense, it was the shift from the dying political system of qingyi to 
a scholastic, theoretically vibrant trend of qingtan that encouraged the prevalence of 
discussing metaphysical questions by matching, pairing, and comparing concepts 
within and across different systems of thought. Even as Dao’an harshly criticized the 
method of geyi as “deviating from reason” [yuli duowei 於理多違], he was 
comfortable with his own practice of mixing the theories of Daoxing jing and “Xiaoyao 
you” together. Clearly, under an atmosphere of qingtan, Dao’an himself was also 
actually “bearing geyi in mind.”1046 Therefore, the term geyi, which fundamentally 
meant a specific technique for comparing numerical categories, had been understood 
 
1045 Actually, as Chen noticed, using Buddhist terms and concepts to comment on “Xiaoyao you” was an 
admired, popular intellectual activity in the Wei and Jin dynasties that could demonstrate the 
commentator’s intelligence and talent. Here Chen gave a very interesting explanation of Senxian’s 
saying of “qie rong fenxi xiaoyao” 且容分析逍遙. In his article “Zhimindu xueshuo kao,” Chen did not 
explain the meaning of xiaoyao; some of the scholars have translated this sentence as “analysing 
carefreely” and have treated the xiaoyao here as an adverb word (see Mair, "What is Geyi, After All?." 
41). However, Chen changed his opinion in this article and thought xiaoyao in this context specifically 
referred to Zhuangzi’s “Xiaoyao you” 逍遙遊. See Chen, “Xiaoyaoyou Xiang Guo yi ji Zhi Dun yi 
tanyuan 逍遙遊向郭義及支遁義探源,” in JMCB, 96. 
1046 “道安心中有此格義.” Ibid.  
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and deployed by early Buddhist apologists like Dao’an and Huiyuan1047 as a more 
general hermeneutic strategy for matching Buddhist concepts with indigenous terms 
or using them to interpret local teachings. This kind of conceptual shift, although it 
seems misleading when referring to the criteria of modern scholarship (both 
Buddhology and historiography), breathed new air into the scholarship and 
intellectual life at that very moment in history.  
 Chen continued his discussion on geyi in the article “The Relationship between 
Tao Yuanming’s Idea and the Pure Conversation” with a question from another angle: 
why are there no Buddhist elements in Tao Yuanming’s poems, given Tao’s close 
personal association with Buddhist figures such as Huiyuan? The previous articles 
discussed how the trend of qingtan had supported people’s understanding of 
Buddhism. Here, using Tao Yuanming as an example, Chen hoped to explain the 
overall cultural climate in the Wei-Jin dynasties and to discuss the extent to which 
Buddhism, in turn, had been resisted, covered, or rejected in the spiritual life of the 
Chinese literati. To Chen, Tao’s case was representative and special, for it involved 
two crucial issues: the relationship between philosophical qingtan and religious belief, 
and the Daoist tradition of Tao’s clan.1048 Chen argued, the collapse of the system of 
‘the nine-ranking system [jiupin zhongzhengzhi 九品中正制] and caixing lun, 
although accelerated by political forces, was fundamentally an outgrowth of the 
built-in tension between two contradictory concepts or standpoints: ‘nature’ [ziran 
自然] and the ‘doctrine of names’ [mingjiao 名教].1049 In the Wei era, this implacable 
collision could cause tragedy on some extreme occasions, such as the dramatic death 
 
1047 For the Huiyuan case, Chen cited Huiyuan’s biography in the Gaoseng Zhuan (“遠乃引莊子義為連
類。於是惑者曉然,是後安公特聽慧遠不廢俗書”), which also demonstrated that, in the time of 
Huiyuan, it was very common to make an analogy between Zhuangzi and prajña doctrines. See ibid., 96. 
1048 In his lecture “Qingtan wuguo” 清談誤國 delivered at Sun Yat-sen University in 1947, Chen 
repeated the same issue as the one expressed in this article. See Wan Shengnan 萬繩楠 ed., Chen Yinke 
Wei Jin Nanbeichao shi jiangyan lu 陳寅恪魏晉南北朝史講演錄, 45-64.  
1049 There are different explanations of the term ‘mingjiao.’ Basically, mingjiao means the “teachings of 
social stations, the crux of Confucian social ethics,” which can also be called ‘lijiao’ 禮教. See Kai-wing 
Chow, The Rise of Confucian Ritualism in Late Imperial China: Ethics, Classics, and Lineage Discourse (Stanford 
University Press, 1996), 10. 
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of Ji Kang 嵇康 (223-263), the icon of Daoist naturalism. However, as Chen argued, by 
abstracting this collision into a philosophical conversation and keeping far away from 
politics, intellectuals after Ji Kang were able to reach a balance by creating a parallel 
state between these two standpoints: namely, “following the principle of 
Confucianism on the outside, while maintaining the beliefs of Buddhism or Daoism in 
the heart” [waifu rufeng, neizong fan(dao)xing 外服儒風，內宗梵(道)行].”1050 Qingtan 
thus became a highly intellectualized activity, cutting its links with political attitude 
or goals, and becoming a pure ‘decoration’ or ‘ornament’ without any practical 
function. It was empty, impractical, and tedious and, hence, faced inevitable decline. 
However, this unrealistic or even pretentious trend broke into new territory after the 
Eastern Jin dynasty, as Chen noted, since Buddhism provided enormous numbers of 
new ideas and perspectives to this more and more lifeless qingtan system.   
  To Chen, theoretical innovation through absorbing new concepts and ideas 
was an indispensable condition for the existence and growth of a certain system of 
thought. Tianshidao 天師道 (also known as Wudoumi 五斗米 [five pecks of rice]), for 
example, could survive only by absorbing external learnings, such as Buddhism, or 
through personal innovations from excellent believers, such as Tao Yuanming. The 
encounter between Buddhism and domestic Daoism in the time of Tao, according to 
Chen, could be divided into three types: first, believers maintained their previous 
belief in Daoism but realized that their own faith needed to be reformed; second, the 
former belief was abandoned and replaced by the new faith of Buddhism; third, the 
belief in Daoism partially lost its status but survived by becoming mixed up with 
Buddhist doctrines. Tao’s Daoism belongs to the first type. Under the inspiration and 
pressure from Buddhism, non-Buddhist Tao Yuanming became aware of the 
limitations and crisis his own beliefs faced. Tianshidao had to be changed through 
 
1050 Namely, following the principle of Confucianism in appearance, while maintaining their beliefs in 
Buddhism or Daoism in their hearts. Throughout the intellectual history of pre-modern China, this 
strategy had been employed with variations very often. This trend, in some sense, was an ideal for 
Chinese intellectuals. According to Chen’s explanation, since Confucianism was not a real religion, 
there should not any antagonistic contradiction between Confucianism and Buddhism. See Chen, “Tao 
Yuanming zhi sixiang yu qingtan zhi guanxi 陶淵明之思想與清談之關係,” in JMCB, 219.  
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doctrinal innovation. Tao’s contribution, Chen concluded, was reinterpreting ziran as 
a natural process of ‘conforming to the changes and destinies’ [weiyun shunhua 委運
順化], a seemingly passive but ingenious way to reconcile individuals with the times, 
especially a time that was full of violent political and social unrest. By doing so, he 
contributed to the subsequent development of Daoist naturalism.1051 
The newness Buddhism brought into the Chinese cultural landscape, Chen 
summarized, “opened a magnificent scenario in Chinese intellectual history.”1052 To 
the Wei and Jin literati, Buddhism not only matched their ‘metaphysical’ taste but 
also became a respected new theory that could “guide the chaotic world and all the 
unhappy minds away from confusion and suffering.”1053 Due to this ‘Buddhist turn’ 
among the literati, the core of qingtan and its philosophical format was eventually 
maintained; moreover, geyi, a ‘Buddhisized qingtan,’ breathed fresh air into the 
stagnation of old scholarship and ideology, replacing the empty quarrels on 
philosophical notions, terms, and concepts with vital theoretical innovations. This 
phenomenon was called and emphasized by Chen as an “innovation of the old 
meanings” [jiuyi gexin 舊義革新].1054 
 For Chen, “innovation of the old meanings” was a glimmer of hope that could 
save a tradition or spiritual heritage from elimination; it might be the most effective, 
if not the only, way of intellectual ‘renaissance.’ Through the study of Buddhism, 
Daoism, and other traditions, he enumerated examples of this kind of renaissance or, 
in his words, the “groundbreaking elucidation of unique ideas” [guming xianfa 孤明
先發]: the utilization of Chan Buddhism by the Daoists in the Song dynasty; the 
formation and development of lixue by employing Buddhism to discuss the theory of 
xinxing 心性 [luminous mind]; the Tiantai Master Zongmi’s commentary on the 
Ullambana Sūtra [Yulanpen Sūtra 盂蘭盆經] and so on. All those phenomena and 
 
1051 According to Chen, this was because Tao was able to innovate the idea of Tianshi dao. See “Tao 
Yuanming zhi sixiang yu qingtan zhi guanxi 陶淵明之思想與清談之關係,” in JMCB, 219.   
1052 “開震旦思想史從來未有之勝境.” Ibid. 
1053 “實於紛亂之世界，煩悶之心情具指迷救苦之功用.” Ibid. 
1054 Chen, “Tao Yuanming zhi sixiang yu qingtan zhi guanxi 陶淵明之思想與清談之關係,” in JMCB, 229.  
 335 
 
practices of “innovating the old meanings,” according to Chen, represented geyi in its 
variations.1055  
 In his analysis of Zhi Mindu’s theory of xinwu 心無 [the nonexistence of the 
mind], Chen revealed Zhi’s misunderstanding of this term by referring to its original 
meaning in Sanskrit. As a typical scenario of geyi, Zhi’s new meaning of xinwu had 
been colored by Chinese thought. However, instead of criticizing the deviation of 
Zhi’s understanding, Chen stressed the popularity of the xinwu theory among the 
Chinese, which, as Chen believed, mainly resulted from its ‘Sinicized’ feature. The 
emergence and prevalence of xinwu should not be attributed to the limitation of 
translation technique or the lack of ‘authentic’ Buddhist knowledge, but were 
triggered by social conduct, scholastic atmosphere, and the taste of the literati and 
educated gentry at that time. Geyi, although inevitably containing 
misunderstandings, was the result of cultural choice, which sometimes might be 
passive or unconscious but at least was vigorous enough.1056 Therefore, geyi was a 
conceptual displacement rather than merely incompetence or fallacy. As Chen 
further clarified:  
[I] once have said that the idea that there is one kind of theory when judging by 
historical linguistics, is totally fallacy; however, when judging from the perspective of 
philosophy, it has no reason not to be progressive. For example, Yijing [The book of 
change] originally was a book of prophecy and divining. The commentaries of Wang 
Fusi and Cheng Yichuan as philosophical works, although were different from the 
 
1055 See Chen, “Zhi Mindu xueshuo kao 支愍度學說考,” in JMCB, 173. Using native concepts to match 
the imported ones was also a kind of geyi, which Chen called reversed geyi, namely, “fanxiang geyi.” 
Scholars have had some discussions on this term. See, Liu Xiaogan, 劉笑敢, Quanshi yu dingxiang – 
Zhongguo zhexue yanjiu fangfa zhi tanjiu 詮釋與定向 —中國哲學研究方法之探究 (Beijing: Shangwu 
yinshuguan 商務印書館, 2009), 441; Zhang Rulun 張汝倫, “Handan xuebu, shiqi gubu – yetan 
Zhongguo zhexue yanjiu zhong de ‘fanxiang geyi’ wenti 邯鄲學步,失其故步—也談中國哲學研究中的 
‘反向格義’問題,” in Nanjing daxue xuebao 南京大學學報,” 4 (2007): 60-76.  
1056 As Chen cited in “Zhi Mindu xueshuo kao” 支愍度學說考, Hui Yuan’s “引莊子義為連類” and 
Dao’an’s “不廢俗書’ are all illustrations of geyi. The examples of geyi mentioned by Chen also including 
Yan zhitui’s analogy between “wujin” 五禁” in the “neidian” 內典 and “wuchang” 五常 in the “waidian” 
外典；Tiantai master Zhiyi智顗’s teaching in his mohe zhiguan 摩訶止觀 and renwang huguo bore 
jing shu 仁王護國般若經疏; and so on. “Zhi Mindu xueshuo kao 支愍度學說考,” in JMCB, 173 
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This passage was said by Chan in response to the studies of the Orientalists in 
Western academic circles. Here, he contended in this passage that the ‘inconsistency’ 
of meaning at a literal level does not amount to a misunderstanding at the theoretical 
level; on the contrary, it might be even a dynamic and positive factor. For example, 
Han Yu韓愈 (768-824), despite his rejection of Buddhism, was influenced by Chan 
thought. His harmonization of the mind/nature theory and the Confucianist political 
ideal was not a negative aberration from the original teaching of Confucius, but an 
innovative geyi that deployed “the Indian learning as the foundation and the Chinese 
learning as practical application” [Tianzhu weiti, huaxia weiyong 天竺為體，華夏為
用].1058 In another example of Cui Hao 崔浩 (381-450), Chen clarified that although 
Daoism was a local production, it had developed into a profound intellectual system 
by absorbing diverse thoughts, especially Buddhism. Therefore, geyi was historically a 
valid path that encouraged bold innovation by modifying and mixing new theories 
into the old, native ideological system. It might be ‘wrong’ or contain fallacies; 
however, it could be beneficial and necessary when judged from a historical 
perspective. As Chen argued, as an alien system, Buddhism included elements 
inappropriate to China’s ideals and values, such as its rejection of dyadic ties between 
the ruler and the ministers [junchen 君臣] and its abandonment of filial piety. If 
Buddhism stubbornly persisted with its “real face” [benlai mianmu 本來面目], just as 
 
1057 Chen, “Dasheng yizhang shuhou 大乘義章書後,” in JMEB, 185. 
1058 See Chen, “Lun Han Yu 論韓愈,” in JMCB, 322. Chen thought that Han Yu’s combination of 
Buddhism and Confucianism established the base for the Neo-Confucianism in the Song dynasty [退之
於此奠定後來宋代新儒學的基礎]. In this article, Chen also analyzed that Han Yu’s assertion on “直指
人倫，掃除章句之繁瑣” was deeply influenced by the idea of “直指人心，不立文字” of Chan 
Buddhism; his tendency towards “restoring the ancient style of literature” [文體復古] and “以文為詩” 
also was inspired by “Chang hang” 長行, a Buddhist literary style. Accoding to Chen, his rejection of 
Buddhism originated from his political concerns caused by 安史之亂 (as shown in his claims of 




Xuanzang’s Yogācāra did, it might “shock the people in a short time, but finally go to 
depression and disappearance.”1059 Therefore, the historical continuity of Buddhism 
lay upon “the process by which Buddhism was modified and absorbed by the 
Chinese.”1060 This process, which Chen named “guantong 貫通” [thoroughly and 
continuously linking things up], marks one particular characteristic of Chinese 
culture. Chen suggested, the intellectual development in the West was normally 
driven by questioning, critique, and negation, while the development of Chinese 
thought originated from integration, synthesis, and reconciliation.1061  
By means of depicting the historical process of guantong, Chen indicated that 
there was no ontological hierarchy between different thoughts, including 
Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism; instead, when these traditions transformed 
from universalistic ideals into historical structures, their own ideals and values all 
facilitated the changes in China’s past and the formation of China’s cultural 
particularity. This dynamic mechanism provided China its historical cohesion and 
created its culture system—which should be distinguished from the political entity of 
the nation state. Noticeably, the cultural system in Chinese history was also 
relativized in Chen’s writing and therefore became historicized. His own academic 
practices also adopted a relativistic standpoint and followed the path of guantong. As 
he once stated in a report on Feng Youlan’s monograph The History of Chinese 
Philosophy [Zhongguo zhexueshi 中國哲學史], his historiographical studies, 
rhetorically, were meant to make fresh the “old wine” by pouring it into a “new 
bottle.”1062 Instead of simply throwing the ‘old’ things—the traditions—away, he was 
pursuing a “neither-old-nor-new” [bugu bujin zhixue 不古不今之學] scholarship, 
which was aimed at maintaining the traditions in the container of modern 
 
1059 “雖震動一時之人心，而卒歸與消沈歇絕.” Chen Yinke, “Feng Youlan Zhongguo zhexue shi (xia ce) 
shencha baogao 馮友蘭中國哲學史下冊審查報告,” JMEB, 283. 
1060 “經國人吸收改造之過程.” Ibid. 
1061 Chen Yinke, “Chen Yuan ‘Yuan Xiyu Ren Huahua Kao’ Xu 陳垣《元西域人華化考》序,” in JMEB, 
238-39.    
1062 Che Yinke, “Fengyoulan Zhongguo zhexue shi (xia ce) shencha baogao 馮友蘭中國哲學史下冊審查報
告,” JMEB, 283. 
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scholarship and re-evaluating or reinterpreting them with new perspectives and 
methodologies in order to make them acceptable again.1063  
This reinterpretation of the past was entirely congruent with Chen’s 
awareness of contemporary issues. His claims for the veracity of history and empathy 
towards tradition opened his horizon to the future. Through reading and writing 
histories, Chen believed, the historical experience of ‘innovating the old meanings’ 
and ‘guantong’ would be recalled and activated. This was the heritage the Chinese 
learned from the Buddhist geyi, and it could help to prevent cultural disintegration, 
counter the ills introduced by the Western hegemony, and overcome the decay and 
alienation of the ‘past’. Chen’s studies of culture, religion, and nation were all heading 
in this direction.  
 
‘Methodological Geyi’ and National Identity  
When Chen Yinke discovered geyi from Chinese Buddhist texts and reintroduced it as 
a vital factor in Chinese scholarship and culture, he was experiencing the dramatic 
contradiction of views within modern Chinese academia, especially in the domain of 
historiography. The divergence between radical iconoclasts and the protectors of 
tradition was intense, and both camps failed to eclipse the other. In this fractious 
 
1063 About [不古不今], there are some different opinions. Some scholars, such as Wang Rongzu 汪榮祖, 
have argued that the ‘bugu bujin’ refers to the medieval period in Chinese history; therefore, 
scholarship neither old or new means the study of the history of the Wei and Jin to the Tang and Song 
dynasties [中古史]. This opinion, however, might be problematic, because before this phrase of 
‘bugubujin,’ Chen used a word meaning ‘in the whole life’ [pingsheng 平生], which indicated that this 
scholarship was Chen’s lifelong pursuit. However, his studies of medieval Chinese history began after 
1933. Lu Yaodong逯耀東 and Sang Bin 桑兵 have thought that the phrase ‘bugu bujin’ refers to the 
contentions between the Old Text school and the New Text School and [gu古] may specifically mean 
Tang Youwei’s 康有為 ‘tuogu ‘ 托古 and Gu Jiegang顧頡剛’s ‘yigu’ 疑古, while the ‘new’ means the 
movement of ‘arranging the national essence’ [zhengli guogu yundong 整理國故運動]advocated by 
Hu Shi胡適; Chen Qianfan程千帆 has noticed that this phrase originated from the Taixuan Jing 太玄經 
and was related to another phase, ‘tongniu jiaoma’ 童牛角馬,’ which literal means a cross-bred animal. 
From this point, it is reasonable to deduct that, to Chen, ‘bugu bujin’ referred to a mixed, hybrid, and 
thorough intention of scholarship. This opinion has also been supported by historians Huang Qinglian 
黃清漣 and Luo Zhitian 羅志田.  
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terrain, Chen Yinke carefully stood on the middle ground. He conceived his own 
method through deliberations on the national and cultural identity of China, 
profoundly interweaving his historiographical concept, value standard, and concerns 
for the past and future of Chinese individuals and society. Being pulled out from the 
past and placed in front of the future, geyi, in Chen’s view, became one fulcrum of the 
overall project of the China-West encounter: it might be a potential way to secure the 
status of the Chinese tradition and its external appearances, forms, and normative 
patterns, and meanwhile it also needed play its role in the transformation of Chinese 
national identity.  
This dual expectation in Chen’s historiography was present in his seemingly 
paradoxical narrative of geyi. Although the complexity and even paradoxical nature 
of Chen’s account of geyi has been noticed and discussed later schorlars, the inner 
tension within his narrative has been largely ignored. Chen’s attitude towards geyi 
hence has been oversimplified as dualist and self-contradictory.1064 To Chen, geyi as a 
discourse had multiple implications: from a theoretical aspect, geyi embodied the 
characteristic of Chinese culture, revealing the deep logic behind the changes in 
Chinese culture on an intellectual level—namely, through absorbing different 
intellectual resources to reach the goal of ‘the innovation of old meaning’; 
meanwhile, it was also an encumbrance for scholarship and academic exploration 
from a methodological perspective that contained limitations and pitfalls. Chen’s 
discussions on geyi, which are scattered in his works here and there, clearly but 
indirectly indicated that he drew a distinct boundary between theoretical geyi as a 
historical characteristic and methodological geyi as a strategy for introducing new 
theories. He criticized that the latter, which came into fashion in modern China, 
should be avoided due to its danger of uncritically merging heterogeneous things 
together while ignoring the essential incompatibility between them.  
 
1064 For example, historian Sang Bing has claimed that Chen’s attitude towards geyi is rejection and 




It is necessary to clarify the background of the methodological geyi and its 
very meaning in Chen’s thought. Clearly, his critique of geyi as a method was a 
response to the spreading of Western Learnings [xixue 西學]. Compared to his peers, 
Chen’s observations of the West were more direct and thorough, on account of his 
long experience of living and studying in Europe and North America.1065 Throughout 
his entire career, his understanding of the Western world not only stimulated his 
academic interests but also established a frame of reference for his transcultural 
comparison and evaluation.1066As early as when he was in Europe, some of his daring 
theses on the advantages and shortcomings of Chinese civilization based on an 
East/West comparison had surprised his contemporaries and been considered 
“exceptional opinions that man never heard about.”1067 Because of his knowledge of 
Western philosophy, literature, and art, as well as theories such as the psychoanalysis 
of Sigmund Freud and Marxism1068, Chen was considered the most representative and 
excellent figure of ‘Western Learning,’ instead of an expert on ‘Chinese studies,’ and 
was respected for his achievements in Oriental studies.1069   
 
1065 See Bian Senghu 卞僧慧, Chen Yinke xiansheng nianpu changbian 陳寅恪先生年譜長編.  
1066 About Chen’s “free and thorough discussion on the Chinese and foreign cultures” [縱談中外文化],” 
see Wu Mi, “12.14.1919,” in Wu Mi riji 吳宓日記, vol.2, 90. In his diary, Wu also recalled that Chen had 
talked about the relationship between Indian philosophy and China as well as Greece. Wu believed that 
the Chen’s extensive knowledge stemmed from his wide reading of Western books. Cf. also Wu Mi riji, 
28, 55. 
1067 “聞所未聞的奇論.” See Xiying 西瀅, “Xianhua閒話.” Xiandai Pinglun 現代評論 3, no. 65 (1926). 
1068 Chen commented that the theories of Freud and Marx’s discussion went no further than the old 
Confucian. Bian Senghu 卞僧慧, Chen Yinke xiansheng nianpu changbian 陳寅恪先生年譜長編.  
1069 When he returned to China,1069 his academic success encouraged other scholars, such as Fu Simian, 
to believe that Chinese scholarship would surpass its Western competitors, and eventually “the 
orthodoxy of the scientific Oriental Studies will be established in China” 要科學的東方學之正統在中
國. See Fu Sinian, “Lishi yunyan yuanjiu suo gongzuo zhi zhiqu 歷史語言研究所工作之旨趣,” in Lishi 
yuyan yanjiusuo jikan 歷史語言研究所集刊 1, no.1, (1928). Fu was not good at Oriental studies; 
however, Chen’s capability made him believe that China’s achievement in Oriental Studies would 
surpass that of the West. After he helped to establish the Department of History and Philology in 
Academia Sinica, he then immediately hired Chen as a researcher. However, it is worth noting that 
Chen’s and Fu's research positions were very different. See Sang Bing桑兵, “Minguo xueren de 
songdai yanjiu jiqi jiujie民國學人的宋代研究及其糾結,” in Xueshu jianghu: wanqing minguo de xueren 




However, unlike many scholars who stayed abroad, such as Liang Qichao, Hu 
Shih, and Fu Sinian, Chen intentionally distanced himself from the trend of 
interpreting Chinese heritage through Western studies. Within his numerous 
writings, he hardly ever discussed or even mentioned any Western theories or 
concepts directly, or, at least, he never officially demonstrated any preference for 
certain Western thoughts. On the contrary, Western learning was disassembled, 
examined, and re-packed by Chen in a subtle and critical way. Interestingly enough, 
despite his iconic image as a scholar ‘with a thorough understanding of China and the 
West’ [xueguan zhongxi 學貫中西], he always presented himself as a ‘conservative’ 
figure, whose “ideas of scholarship and politics were in opposition to the current 
trend” [lunxue lunzhi, jiongyi shiliu 論學論治，迥異時流].1070  
Chen’s historiographical methodology contained two aspects: first, textual 
comparison and second, historical interpretation. In one letter to Liu Shuya on the 
questions for the Chinese examinations and his preface to Chen Yuan’s religious 
history, he affirmed the method of comparative study based on textual criticism, 
which originated in the historiographical tradition of the Song dynasty; in his reports 
on Feng Youlan’s history of Chinese philosophy, he emphasized more strongly the 
hermeneutic approach and its function of complementing textual criticism with 
historical interpretation of the motives of the historical protagonists. Both sides, with 
respective scholarly implications, were succinctly reflected in his rejection of the 
methodological geyi.  
Three points were crucial to Chen’s rejection of geyi: first, the method of geyi 
to a large extent involves blind comparison between objects that do have something 
in common but are fundamentally different. In a very important letter, Chen 
discussed the pitfall of the geyi method: 
Today’s grammar system based on Indo-European language, namely, the geyi 
grammar in the Ma Shi Wentong, cannot be applied to Chinese; …… Only a small part of 
one language’s grammar rules is consistent with the general principles of language in 
 
1070 Chen Yinke, “Du Wu Qichang zhuan Liang Qichao zhuan shuhou 讀吳其昌撰梁啟超傳書後,” in 
HLTJ, 168.  
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a universal sense. In most cases, the grammar of one language comes from 
summarizing the particular usages of this language into several more general rules 
and then developing them into a unique, systematic thesis, so can this thesis be 
named as the law of one language. It is impossible to generalize the grammar law of a 






As suggested in this passage, the ‘geyi’ Chen discussed here was not a historical 
phenomenon but a research method. He demanded here that the particular aspects of 
a language (implicitly also of a culture) that deviates from the “universal laws” should 
be investigated inductively; then, some “general rules” [tongze 通則] within 
particularity could be established. Only by this means could a comparative method be 
applied. In another letter, he further explained the foundation of this comparative 
method:  
Such a comparative research method must have at its disposal the notion of historical 
change and systematic concepts of similarity and difference. Otherwise, one could 
compare past and present, China and abroad, people and heaven, dragons and spirits. 
蓋此種比較研究方法，必須具有歷史演變及系統異同之觀念，否則古今中外，人
天龍鬼，無一不可取以相與比較.1072 
Here, by stressing both changes—a diachronic aspect [貫]—and system—a 
synchronic [tong通] aspect—he related the method of historiographical comparison 
to his theoretical view of guantong. The diachronic investigation aimed to find out the 
historical origins of phenomena, whereas the synchronous investigation required a 
systematic comparison of the respective differences between phenomena. Otherwise, 
Chen criticized, oversimplified conceptual comparison or ‘matching’ that ignored the 
prerequisite of analogies and glosses over the fundamental difference between two 
 




things would create a “hybrid monster” [hundun guaiwu 混沌怪物].1073 Observing 
this danger of “incoherence” [butong 不通] 1074 caused by the strategy of geyi that had 
been hastily practiced as an approach to ‘Westernization’ by the so-called ‘reformers’ 
of Chinese scholarship, Chen warned of the zany and catastrophic result of geyi: 
“implausible pairing, grotesque distortion ominously.”1075 
After his critique on blind comparison, he moved to the second dimension of 
his methodology, interpretation (or “understanding” [liaojie 了解], to use his own 
word). The example of Tao Yuanming, as mentioned before, indicated his disapproval 
of a ‘geyi with hindsight’: namely, applying the experience and knowledge of current 
people to their ancestors. This ‘ahistorical’ geyi, Chen argued, was a common mistake 
prevailing among the ‘new’ scholars (he was talking about Liang Qichao, in 
particular)1076, who were infatuated with fashionable ideas and new techniques and 
believed that the new perspectives and methodological tools would help them to 
better reach the ‘real’ truth of history than their predecessors who were confined 
either to Han Learning or Song Learning. However, pitfalls might emerge, as Chen 
observed, when they exerted their own suppositions on the behavior of ancient 
people. In the example of Han Yu and Kou Qianzhi, Chen argued, if we understood 
Han Yu and Kou Qianzhi according to our own thinking, it would be impossible to 
explain why these figures, who had expressed hostility and antipathy towards 
Buddhism, also at the same time utilized the intellectual resources of Buddhism to 
change their own beliefs—Confucianism or Daoism. Based on these examples, Chen 
emphasized that textual criticism, which went hand in hand with the demand to deal 
 
1073 Chen Yinke, “Yu Liu Shuya lun guowen shiti shu 與劉叔雅論國文試題書,” in JMEB, 251. 
1074 Ibid. 
1075 “穿鑿附會，怪誕百出，莫可追詰.” Ibid., 252. 
1076 In his article on Tao Yuanming, Chen criticized Liang Qichao’s explanation of the reason why Tao 
Yuanming chose a life of seclusion. In Liang’s opinion, the incorporation of Tao with the court of the 
Eastern Jin and his retreat could be attributed to Tao’s psychological status caused by his feelings of 
exhaustion and disgust when faced with the corruption, deception, and fraud in officialdom. However, 
Chen argued, Liang’s opinion was just a superficial hypothesis based on Liang’s own experience; the 
deeper reason behind Tao’s political choice was his religious belief, which was related to his ethnic 
background and the tradition of his clan. 
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with extensive historical material with reference to “general historical knowledge,” 
should be combined with historical hermeneutics. This point of view, as summarized 
in his comments on Feng Youlan’s book, called upon historians to put themselves in 
their subject matter and to understand their research objects empathetically.  
To Chen, it was impossible to gain an ‘absolute’ truth from history because 
‘absolute’ means ‘ahistorical.’ Therefore, he carefully identified a ‘relative’ historical 
truth in his writings—,	its tasks and limits, and the intellectual presuppositions and 
political implications of such truth that could only be understood historically. The 
essential characteristic of this truth, therefore, was both complete and limited: the 
historical materials could be proved sufficient and credible, at least to a certain 
degree; however, the reading of these materials could not and should not be 
conducted in an objective and impartial way. From such reflection, Chen emphasized 
that an “sympathy with understanding” rested in the comprehensive historical 
knowledge of the multiple facets of certain traditions as well as the ‘family 
resemblance’ between cultures. He portrayed this empathy as “the artist’s 
perspective and attitude when viewing old paintings and carvings.”1077 He expounded:  
This so-called real understanding requires spiritual journeys and deep meditation …… 
so that we can evaluate the gain and loss of their teachings without any prejudices. 
Otherwise, all the ancient teachings, which were produced in a fundamentally 
different circumstance, seem to be ridiculous and hilarious. 所謂真瞭解者，必神遊
冥想……始能批評其學說之是非得失，而無隔閡膚廓之論。否則數千年前之陳言
舊說，與今日之情勢迥殊，何一不可以可笑可怪目之乎？1078 
Chen indicated that historical interpretations need to approach ancient people’s 
intentions and motives with respect, instead of making judgements according to the 
historians’ own criteria. Being aware of the problem of the hermeneutical circle, 
Chen posited a more prudent, meticulous approach towards particular historical 
 
1077 “藝術家欣賞古代繪畫雕刻之眼光及精神.” Che Yinke, “Fengyoulan Zhongguo zhexue shi (xia ce) 
shencha baogao 馮友蘭中國哲學史下冊審查報告,” JMEB, 282-85. Here Chen was criticizing the debate 
on Mozi. Zhang Taiyan, Hu Shih, and other ‘doubting antiquity’ scholars had participated in this 
debate.   
1078 Ibid., 285. 
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circumstances in order to prevent misunderstandings, or in his words, “a bad habit of 
making strained interpretations and drawing farfetched analogies.”1079  
Possibly with Hu Shih in mind, Chen questioned the ‘geyi’ of formulating 
historical interpretation and organizing historical sources according to a preset 
philosophy. To Chen, a prerequisite for historical study was that the historian must 
be able to examine the fragments of historical materials first and then reframe them 
with a kind of constructed totality. There might be imaginative or subjective 
elements involved in this process, which Chen did not deny, but he believed that the 
destination of this kind of ‘spiritual journey’ was not offering evidence for a certain 
presupposed theory but understanding the life and recent experiences of the 
ancients. Therefore, this totality differed from a ‘systematic organization’ [xitong 
zhengli 系統整理] of traditions, for the latter, which always contained a 
preconceived system, was ‘far away from the truth of the ancient doctrines’ and was 
just “repeating the historian’s own theory.”1080  
Following the two methodological steps of comparison and interpretation, 
Chen also mentioned the third dimension of his methodology: critique—critical 
commentaries on the ‘correctness and merits’ [shifei deshi 是非得失] of historical 
phenomena, which referred to political implications and moral statements that 
historians might convey tacitly or explicitly.1081 This dimension of critique is 
indispensable for understanding and assessing the theoretical and ideological views 
of Chen’s historiography. For him, describing and representing the “national spirit” 
and its manifestations were not the end; it was also the task of historians or the 
consequence of their practice to protect the status of tradition and further provide 
guidance for the present and the future.  
Chen implicitly discussed the proper position of historians and their task in 
his study of the Neo-Confucianist Han Yu and the Daoist priest Kou Qianzhi. Using 
 
1079 “穿鑿附會之惡習.” Che Yinke, “Fengyoulan Zhongguo zhexue shi (shang ce) shencha baogao 馮友
蘭中國哲學史上冊審查報告, in JMEB, 279-81.  
1080 “去古人學說之真相愈遠.” Ibid. 
1081 Ibid.  
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these two, and especially their attitudes towards Buddhism, as examples, he clarified 
‘the defense zone between Yi (barbarian) and Xia (China)” [yixia defang 夷夏大防], 
namely the salient hierarchy between native traditions and external influences.1082 
This hierarchy had also been proved by the experience of Xuanzang’ Yogācāra 
Buddhism: the ignorance of the prior position of ‘national spirit’ would not only lead 
to the failure of acclimatization1083 but also injure the self-identity of individuals. 
Especially in an era subjected to repeated foreign invasions, it was immoral and even 
brutal to tout new theories mindlessly or impose any imported theories on native 
traditions blindly. To Chen, the real ‘great achievement’ [dacheng 大成] of 
historiographical methods relied on an attitude that combined modesty and 
conservatism.1084 Therefore, absorbing foreign teachings, while also keeping in mind 
the standing of one’s own nation was the bottom line.1085 This delicate and middle-
ground stand, which Chen summarized as “the real spirit of Daoism and the old path 
of the Neo-Confucianism,” was the historical experience Chen read from the 
communications between China and other traditions throughout the past two 
millennia.1086  
To Chinese intellectuals, finding a balance between the appealing, advanced 
‘others’ and a crisis-ridden ‘self’ was not just a historical issue but also a realistic 
predicament. Even Chen himself sometimes faced a similar dilemma in cases when his 
 
1082 As a foreign religion, Buddhism became Han’s main target.  
1083 Chen noted that if we import an external thought without “defining the position of our own nation’ 
[本民族之地位],” the result would be as failed as Xuanzang’ Yogācāra teaching. In Che Yinke, 
“Fengyoulan Zhongguo zhexue shi (xia ce) shencha baogao 馮友蘭中國哲學史下冊審查報告,” JMEB, 284-
85. 
1084 Chen used Daoism as an example and pointed out that Daoism had absorbed external thoughts, 
such as Buddhism and Manichaeism, as much as possible, but still did not forget the original status of 
the nation. After these theories had merged into Daoism, Daoism then insisted on the division between 
Yi [barbarian] and Xia [middle kingdom] to exclude foreign teachings. This ideological attitude has 
continued since the Six Dynasties. Although it seems paradoxical, its components are able to 
complement each other. Neo-Confucianism was an example that inherited this heritage and 
succeeded. See Chen, “Lun Han Yu 論韓愈,” JMCB, 319-32.  
1085 Original text: “一方面吸收輸入外來之學說，一方面不忘本民族之地位.” Che Yinke, “Fengyoulan 
Zhongguo zhexue shi (xia ce) shencha baogao 馮友蘭中國哲學史下冊審查報告,” JMEB, 282-85. 
1086 “道教之真精神，新儒家之舊途徑.” Ibid. 
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research path led towards certain truths that might shake the foundation of Chinese 
national spirit and glory.1087 Sometimes, the revolution of knowledge, if not handled 
with caution, would end in the ‘vacuum of comparison’ or the dissipation of meaning. 
Being aware of the dramatic impact of new approaches and ideas, Chen remained 
vigilant against an ‘instrumental objectivity’ in historical studies. Although Chen 
partially accepted the genetic method as propagated by Hu Shih, which had been 
used by Hu as an iconoclastic power against the authority of tradition, the anti-
traditional undertone that Hu associated with this approach at the time of the May 
Fourth movement was completely absent from Chen’s writing. Criticizing a formulaic, 
unsympathetic geyi, Chen opposed an ‘empty’ historiography without value concerns 
and moral responsibility. Also, at this point, he separated himself from Ranke’s 
Historicism, which claimed a disinterested construction of hard factual truth by 
recording every event ‘wie es engentlich gewesen.’1088 Never abandoning his pursuit 
of the meaning in history, Chen kept away from the ‘neutral’ zones of scientism and 
avoided going into a ‘historical nihilism’ that stripped away any ‘ultimate’ meaning or 
universal matters from historiography. Overall, he never blurred the internal 
standard of ethics and the venerable features of nationality in his historical writings.  
This is the political mission for historians as well as for a historiography with 
meaning. As shown in his preface to Wang Guowei’s collection and some other texts, 
Chen’s view of history and his political attitude combined with his judgment of 
historical legality. He doubted the existence of causal relations; rather, he assumed 
“mutual relations” between historical events and concluded that change in “human 
affairs” [renshi 人事] is therefore not accidental but follows principles that can be 
recognized in advance [qianzhi zhili 前知之理]. In this sense, he defined the tasks of 
 
1087 Examples included Chen’s studies on the royal family of the Tang dynasty and his investigation on 
the family background of the poet Li Bai. See Chen, “Litang shizu zhi tuice 李唐氏族之推測,” JMEB, 
320-32. 
1088 Although he has been called “the Chinese Ranke” [中國的蘭克], Chen never mentioned Ranke’s 
name in his works. Some scholars believe that Chen was deeply influenced by Ranke. See Wang Rongzu 
汪榮祖, Shijia Chen Yinke zhuan 史家陳寅恪傳 (Taipei: Linking, 1988), 53-57. For further discuss on this 
issue, see Axel Schneider, “Reconciling History With The Nation? Historicity, National Particularity, 
And The Question Of Universals” (2003). 
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historians as continuing the achievements of their predecessors to criticize, explain, 
and influence their society, and to shed light upon some basic principles that could 
offer guidance for the future.1089 He suggested that these principles are neither 
exclusively immanent to history nor universal, but can only be observed from the 
particular historical experience of the realization of the “national spirit.”  
Drawing parallels was ubiquitous; seeking for the more sophisticated, if not 
more correct, methods was also necessary for scholarship. As an open-minded 
scholar, Chen did not reject methodological innovation. His critique, however, was 
aimed at some popular trends in the domain of historiography: the movement of 
organizing national heritage [zhengli guogu 整理國故] and the Doubting Antiquity 
school.1090 In Chen’s opinion, neither of these two camps could escape from the hazard 
of methodological geyi: improper comparison, spurious interpretation, and suspended 
critique. To avoid these shortcomings, Chen tried to conceptualize a view of history 
capable of accommodating change without, however, necessarily leading to a breach 
of continuity and identity.1091 He achieved this by means of a methodology that took 
historicity and culture seriously—a hermeneutic method that combined textual 
criticism with cultural-national concerns. 
Based on the above reflections, Chen proposed one possible alternative to 
overcome the methodological difficulty of geyi: a comparative method based on 
“composite texts and interlinear notes” [heben zizhu 合本子注]. This specific 
method, which Chen formulated during his historical investigation into the history of 
Buddhism, combined trans-language and trans-textual comparison with historical 
hermeneutics. Chen understood heben zizhu as an exegetic approach created by early 
Buddhist apologists for the sake of understanding Buddhist scriptures. It shared 
common ground with geyi in terms of comparing, pairing, and categorizing terms and 
 
1089 Chen, “Wang Jingan yishu xu 王靜安遺書序.”  
1090 For a detailed analysis of Chen Yinke’s approach in comparison with other historiographical trends 
of the 1920s and 1930s, see Axel Schneider, Wahrheit und Geschichte: Zwei chinesische Historiker anf der 
Suche nach einer modernen Identität für China (1997), 126-146. 
1091 Axel Schneider, “Reconciling History With The Nation? Historicity, National Particularity, And The 
Question Of Universals.” 
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concepts, at least at first glance; however, it was essentially different from geyi, for 
heben focused on the textual transformation between different translations rather 
than conceptual matching.1092 In his article “Zhi Mindu Xueshuo kao,” Chen cited 
examples in the Chu sanzang jiji to define ‘heben’ and sketched its development during 
the Wei and Jin Dynasties:  
In the Middle Land of China, a large number of Buddhist canons were translated and 
always preserved with different versions of translation. Hence the “combined 
version” was compiled to assist comparison.  Both ‘heben’ and geyi are methods 
monks and their disciples applied in the Six Dynasties to study Buddhist doctrines. 
From the perspective of form, they all emphasized comparing and pairing sentences 
and texts. Although these two methods look similar, however, they were 
fundamentally different and need to be separated. …The comparison of geyi is based 
on the comparison between Buddhist texts and non-Buddhist texts, while the 
comparison of ‘heben’ is a comparison between the different translations of one text. 
The methods seem to be similar, but the results are the opposite. One is a far-fetched 
analogy between Chinese and foreign learnings, just like the example of ‘xinwu.’ The 
later implantations of Buddhism, Confucianism, and Daoism were all developed from 
this method. The other one corresponds to the current comparative methodology of 
linguistics. For example, the Lengqiejing huiyi written by Yuanke in the Ming dynasty, 








1092 According to Chen’s investigation, Monk Zhi Mindu, who use geyi to create the teaching of xinwu心
無, was very familiar with the technique of ‘heben’ as well. In Chu Sanzang jiji, there are several prefaces 
tp the combined version of Buddhist scriptures written by Zhi Mindu. In those prefaces, Mindu 
described this approach as “合令相附,” “使事類相從.” However, later in the Northern dynasty (the 
period of Luoyang jialan ji 洛陽伽藍記) this method disappeared, or to say it better, was replaced by the 
generalized geyi; the real meaning of ‘heben’ was also incomprehensible. See Chen Yinke, “Du Luoyang 





This approach, in Chen’s view, was the ancient version of historical-comparative 
linguistics, and it echoed what Chen had learned from his teachers of Oriental Studies 
in Europe.1094 Specifically, this methodology required historians to identify the origins 
of texts through a comparative investigation of all the textual changes in a broad 
historical context. He emphasized that language nuances, rhetorical strategies, and 
tones of expressions in historical materials needed to be carefully examined. To Chen, 
the comparison of heben had its literal ground and well maintained the diverse 
textual manifestations of concepts and ideas. By presenting all the interpretations of 
the same text equally in front of readers, the changes behind the text would be 
adequately displayed and further “the universality of abstract ideals” [chouxiang 
lixiang zhi tongxing 抽象理想之通性], which would be admitted and stressed 
through particular textual phenomena.1095 Therefore, the difference between heben 
and geyi was that heben respected the particularity of every cultural element while 
geyi erased differences and inevitably led to an uncritical mixture of old and new, self 
and other. Through the method of heben, namely demonstrating historical changes, 
divergences, and discontinuities comparatively and equally, the real thread of 
historical development would become evident. By this means, the historian could re-
construct universality from particular historical experience and further reach the 
unity of subject and object.  
 
1093 Chen Yinke, “Zhi Mindu xueshuo kao 支愍度學說考,” in JMCB, 185. 
1094 See Chen Huaiyu, Chen, Zai xifang faxian Chen Yinke: Zhongguo jindai renwenxue de dongfangxue yu xixue 
Beijing 在西方發現陳寅恪: 中國近代人文學的東方學與西學背景., chapter 3 and chapter 7. Although 
he adopted the methodology of the European Oriental Studies, the main focus of his research was on a 
very important historical process—the sinicization of Buddhism 佛教中國化. He was not interested in 
Vadas [吠陀], one of most important topics of German Indology; for the other popular topics in 
Buddhology, such as the stone inscription of Aśoka, he also showed little interest. Although he was 
good at Sanskrit and other ancient languages in the Central Asian area, he paid little attention to 
linguistic issues of grammar, words, and so on.  
1095 Chen, Wang Jingan yishu xu 王靜安遺書序. 
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This particularism indicated that every culture was unique. Moreover, this 
uniqueness was universal and waiting to be revealed through historical comparison, 
interpretation, and critique. In this sense, the universality of abstract ideals was not 
only inherent in the Chinese national spirit, but also present in the equivalence of 
different cultures. Referring to it, Chen recovered the lost universal ground not by 
proclaiming a humanistic Chinese civilization superior to the West (as e.g., Zhang 
Junmai), or by referring to universal science (as e.g. Fu Sinian), but by assuming the 
formal universality of humans, who do vary from culture to culture and change in the 
course of history, but have to be protected in order to safeguard the identity of their 
respective culture. As Chen showed in China’s case, abstract ideals, although they had 
been concretized in particular social institutions, economic conditions, and cultural 
contexts, had not perished but were anchored in the Chinese cultural identity and 
orientation. In Chen’s later works, this unity of particularity and universality 
responded to impulses from current questions and problems, on the one hand, as the 
immanent form of the ‘national spirit’ that connected past and present, and, on the 
other hand, as the result of interpretation and criticism.  
Partly attributable to the socio-political turmoil surrounding him,1096 Chen’s 
reflection on cultural particularity and the responsibility of the historian to protect 
this particularity became an intensive ‘implication’ [jituo 寄託] in his writings.1097 
Switching between different issues, he always returned to one theme: the mutual 
contact between Han China and foreign forces in history, which was closely linked to 
the issue of geyi. To Chen, geyi was a phenomenon that had emerged from the import 
of Buddhism to aid the formation of Chinese cultural entity; it also contained pitfalls 
on the level of methodology that should be carefully avoid. The heritage of geyi would 
help the Chinese to understand the fundamental elements of Chinese culture more 
 
1096 As some scholars have pointed out, the lack of research sources was one main reason for the switch 
in Chen’s studies. After the 7.7 issue, it was impossible for Chen to access to the Beijing libraries 
anymore; he also lost his personal collection of books. His wartime correspondence recorded his 
hardship on the road as he moved to China’s southwest. See Yeh Wen-hsin, “Historian and Courtesan: 
Chen Yinke and the Writing of Liu Rushi Biezhuan,” East Asian History, no. 27 (2004).  
1097 Yü Ying-shih 余英時, “Chen Yinke shixue sanbian陳寅恪史學三變,” in Chen Yinke wannian 
shiwen shizheng 陳寅恪晚年詩文釋證 (Taipei: Dongda chuban gongsi, 1998).  
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profoundly; they were synthetic, pluralistic, and multi-ethnic, as demonstrated 
repeatedly in Chen’s discussion of the religious heritage and family tradition of the 
Chinese literati, geographic and racial elements of different social groups, and so on. 
Also, geyi was also a perpetual problem China had had and would face. Chen’s 
reflection on both theoretical and methodological geyi, in general, was what he 
learned from China’s past and what he wished to convey through his historical 
writings.  
 
The Lesson of Geyi  
When the new generation of historians, like Chen Yinke and Tang Yongtong, started 
to write the history of Buddhism, the storm of new ideology, especially the ‘spirit of 
the May Fourth movement’ [wusi jingshen 五四精神], had swept through the entire 
Chinese intelligentsia. In modern China, Western Learning was appealing, just like 
Buddhism had been during the Wei and Jin dynasties. It not only directly brought in 
new theories and information but also had proved its effectiveness through the 
successful modernization of Japan and other countries. To survive and further 
compete with nations like Japan, Chinese people needed to learn more than simple 
technical knowledge; they needed to transform, root and branch, their entire society, 
government, military, and even ideology. This transformation was impeded by long-
standing Chinese chauvinism against foreigners, who were always denigrated as 
‘barbarian’ [yi 夷]. However, Late Qing intellectuals, such as Yan Fu and Zhang 
Zhidong, although they still used this term, had realized that the new yi—the 
‘West’—was utterly unlike anything China had encountered before. Facing this 
situation, Buddhism became almost the only experience that those modern Chinese 
could glean from their history. It signified particular forms of cultural production 
that associated exemplary historical precedents with new intellectual dispositions, 
maintaining self-cultivation and also securing broader socio-cosmic order. Neither 
conquering the ‘foreigners’ nor submitting to their influence, the success of Chinese 
Buddhism had resulted from a self-transformation, which had often been described 
under the rubric of ‘Sinicization’—a process of making Chinese-ness, which was 
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based on the re-interpretation of different cultural elements (language, belief, rituals, 
and so on) rather than on brutally replacing the existing faith background and ethnic 
identification of individuals.   
To some historians, the discourse of ‘Sinicization’ exhibited a normative 
effect: namely, the process of Sinicization proved China’s capability of establishing 
standards, setting frameworks, utilizing foreign resources actively, and finally 
establishing the triumph of its native culture over them.1098 Behind this standpoint 
was, fundamentally, the popular logic of ‘Chinese Learning as substance, Western 
Learning for application’ [zhongti xiyong中體西用], which was closely tied to a view 
that knowledge, including historical knowledge, is neutral, functional, and can be 
used both to destroy traditions or to protect them. As some of the modern Chinese 
intellectuals believed, knowledge and social practices are not law-like, or value-
suspended, nor do they manifest themselves in certain ‘superior’ civilizations. Rather, 
they are determined and formed by what people think, say, and believe in specific 
historical contexts.  
Confronting the West, historiography bore a new responsibility—to establish 
a ‘new national history’ in which China could be properly located in the new global 
world. To fulfill this responsibility, modern Chinese historians varied—as shown by 
the example of Liang Qichao and Zhang Taiyan—between universalistic and 
particularistic conceptions. Chen Yinke and Tang Yongtong leaned to the side of 
particularity but kept a relative cultural continuity at the core of their writings. In 
such a particularistic view, historical knowledge was constructed through cultural 
relationships.1099 Perhaps inspired by the role Buddhism had played in Chinese 
history, both Liang and Zhang had noted the way in which historiography is indebted 
 
1098 One example is Liang Qichao’s nationalist narrative of Buddhism. For the issue of national identity, 
see also Frank Dikötter’s analysis of Chinese racial theories in The Discourse of Race in Modern China 
(London: C. Hurst & Co., 2015).  
1099 This view can also be found in the West from the twentieth century. One of the advocates of the 
particularistic view of knowledge is Charles Taylor. See Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” 
in Multiculturalism and “The Politics of Recognition” (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992); also, 
Source of the Self: The Making of the Moswen Identity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989). 
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to particular pasts and concrete intellectual contexts. Only by affirming the 
particularity of each utterance and situation in history could they avoid assimilating 
history into the historian’s own terms and thereby distorting its meaning. 
The writings of Chen and Tang presented their construction of a narrative 
that revolved around the historical process of cross-cultural engagement. That is, 
when they wrote history, they also “had a geyi in mind,” just like Dao’an. This idea of 
geyi was not simply comparison or a trans-conceptual loan, but rather a Gadamerian 
‘fusion of horizon.’ Such a fusion—the “empathy with understanding” in Chen’s 
words and “silent response with empathy” in Tang’s words—as explained by 
Roxanne Euben and others, “attempts to cross divides of meaning by acknowledging 
and appropriating their own prejudices within a language that evolves to 
accommodate and ultimately transform disparate understandings into mutually 
intelligible meanings.”1100 Realizing the very ground of geyi, an intellectual similarity 
between the ‘abstract ideals’ of human beings, they were able to avoid the trap of 
relativism and to get rid of the ‘hermeneutical circle.’ This ‘culturalist alternative’ or 
‘conservativism’1101, as some scholars have called it, in a way combined universalism 
and particularism together for it assumed the general applicability of particular 
cultural norms. Such a historical attitude is actually the lesson to be obtained from 
geyi; it lies behind the historical observation that the ‘other’ can become Chinese.     
The universality Chen and Tang found was the Chinese tradition as cultural 
entity. It was by no means universal law-like principles of historical change but 
instead was the “personality and thinking of the ancient sages” [gu xianxian zhi 
renge sixiang 古先賢之人格思想] (Tang) or “the national spirit” (Chen). Neither 
endorsing any Western model nor subjectively twisting the history of China to 
support any other worldview, they understood this universality as a ‘formal’ 
attachment that varies from culture to culture, and changes in the course of 
 
1100 Euben, Enemy in the Mirror, 37.  
1101 The most paradigmatic study on conservativism is Karl Mannheim, “Conservative Thought.” For 
studies of modern Chinese conservatism, see Charlotte Furth, ed., The Limits of Change: Essays on 




history.1102 This view, which differs from the philosophical standpoint of ‘classicist 
conservativism’—namely, advocating for an absolute and universal moral order—
can be categorized as ‘historicist conservativism,’ which means that the universality 
is dependent, historicized, and only exists in histories.1103  
Compared to Chen’s obscure and abstruse language style, Tang often made 
straightforward responses against universalists and particularists. As a scholar 
belonging to the Xueheng school, he intended to express his academic position in a 
more clear-cut way. He had once frankly declared that he “was unwilling to say that 
all the good things come from foreign countries.”1104 In another essay, he criticized 
that neither the reformers who treated the West as spiritual mentor nor the ‘fogeys’ 
[shoujiu zhe 守舊者] who utilized foreign thoughts to prove or protect their own 
views could grasp ‘the truth’ that was rooted in cultural traditions.1105 This anti-
culture/anti-tradition tendency, he wrote, embodied “the decaying phenomenon of 
the collapse of the Chinese spirit” [固有之精神湮滅之衰相].1106  
The past of China, for Tang, played a dual role: it was respected antiquity and 
also a dynamic, flowing voice that people should still listen to. Therefore, Tang 
advocated a historiography with explanatory power. Issues such as the differences 
between sects, the reformation of Buddhist communities, and the relationship 
between different thoughts and discourses, were waiting to be read and interpreted 
reasonably and contextually. This ability of explanation, according to Tang, was 
guaranteed neither by any positivistic ‘trueness’ nor by methodological ‘newness’, 
but rather by a kind of philosophical comprehension. He argued:  
 
1102 Chen, “Wang Guantang xiansheng wanci bingxu 王觀堂先生輓詞並序.”  
1103 I borrowed the categories of ‘classicist conservatism’ and ‘historicist conservatism’ from Axel 
Schneider. According to Schneider, Strauss, Voegelin, and Babbitt belong to the former group. See Axel 
Schneider, “The One and the Many,” unpublished Paper for AAS, 2005. 
1104 “頗有一個私見，就是不願意說什麼好東西都是外國來的.” See Hu Shi riji quanji 胡適日記全集, 
7.373.  
1105Tang Yongtong, “Wenhua sixiang zhi chongtu yu tiaohe 文化思想之衝突與調和,” in TYQJ, vol.5, 
273. 
1106 “固有之精神湮滅之衰相.” ibid. 
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Religious sentiment exists deeply in people’s minds but is often displayed as 
suspicious historical records or symbols or legends. Therefore, searching the traces in 
the past but without a tacit response with empathy it is hard to attain the truth. 
Philosophy is very subtle; the essence of the world can only be obtained by 
Enlightenment. The ancient wisdom is innocent and unaffected, but also full of 
prudent discernment. Its expression is condensed into a few words, but the meaning 
is far-reaching. Therefore, the evidential study of text that lacks comprehension from 




In this important passage, Tang emphasized a philosophical concern of 
historiography—a ‘truth’ that is derived from but goes beyond historical evidence. 
The mission of history is “attaining the truth” [deqizhen 得其真]: not only to 
discover facts, but rather, “to explore ‘truth’” [zhenli zhi tantao 真理之探討].1108  
To both Chen and Tang, the term ‘empathy’ implied that historiography 
should find a balance between evidential research and hermeneutics, and should be 
concerned with religion, culture, and worldview. Tang’s attitude, as described by his 
friend the philosopher He Lin賀麟 (1902-1992), was close to that advocated by Qian 
Mu—“warmth and respect for the history of the nation’s past.”1109 As Qian 
commented on Tang’s studies:    
[Tang] puts himself in their position, tries to understand them sympathetically and 
never treats them unjustly. He neither criticizes the ancients, nor distorts them to 
support his own sayings.  設身處地，同情瞭解古哲，決不枉屈古人。既不抨擊異
己之古人，亦不曲解古人以伸己說.1110 
 
1107 Tang Yongtong, “Han Liangjin nanbeichao fojiaoshi ba 漢兩晉南北朝南北朝佛教史跋,” in TYQJ, 
vol.1, 655.  
1108 Tang Yongtong, “Ping jinren zhi wenhua yanjiu 評近人之文化研究,” TYQJ, vol.5, 274. 
1109 “對其本國已往歷史之溫情與敬意,” in Qian Mu, “fan du benshu qing qianju xialie zhu xinnian 凡讀本
書請先具下列諸信念,” Guoshi dagang 國史大綱 (Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan, 2010), 1. 
1110  He Lin 賀麟, Dangdai Zhongguo zhexue 當代中國哲學 (Shanghai: Shanghai shudian, 1945), 25. 
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This attitude, obviously, echoed Chen’s expression of “the artist’s perspective.”1111 It 
was summarized by Tang with a sentence cited from Shiji: “living in this world, 
following the old way, reading history as a mirror of one’s self. The past and the 
present are not the same.”1112 
In this sense, Tang defined himself also ‘neither-old-nor-new.”1113 Or, he had 
noticed and acknowledged that there was always a tension between the new and the 
old, in the form of geyi. His own historiography of Buddhism also presented itself as a 
dialogue bridging the old and the new, facts and concepts, phenomena and structure, 
particularism and universalism. On the one hand, he critically inherited the tradition 
of Han Learning, emphasizing textual organization, collation, and perusal, for he 
noticed that the scarcity and limitation of ancient sources would hinder 
interpretation. Only through “widely collecting and searching both Chinese and 
foreign materials”1114 would the textual evidence be justified and properly utilized. On 
the other hand, Tang had the feeling (although maybe not consciously) that 
positivism, although claimed to be unprejudiced and impartial, had intentionally 
restricted philosophy to be the guardian of the ‘proper’ methods of scientific 
enterprises. Therefore, textual criticism needed to be practiced followed by a 
systematic, constructive understanding at a macroscopic level.1115 Different from 
Chen, who discussed Buddhism from “the periphery” and focused on Buddhism’s 
impact on other political and cultural elements, Tang started his observation from 
 
1111 See the former section in this chapter: “Methodological geyi and National Identity.” 
1112 “居今之世，志古之道，所以自鏡，未必盡同.” Tang Yongtong, “Wenhua sixiang zhi chongtu yu 
tiaohe 文化思想之衝突與調和,” in TYQJ, vol.5, 281. The original text in Sima Qian, “Gaozu gongchen 
hou zhe nianbiao xu高祖功臣侯者年表序,” in Shiji. 
1113 For further discussion on Tang’s writing of the history of Chinese Buddhism, see: Chapter 6. Here 
only issues related to “geyi,” for example, Tang’s attitude toward the Western theories and the 
concrete application of the new methodologies, are discussed.  
1114 “中外文化之材料，廣搜精求.” Tang, “Ping jinren zhi wenhua yanjiu 評近人之文化研究,” TYQJ, 
vol. 5, 276. 
1115 This was different from Chen’s path of “seeing the whole world from a grain of sand” 以小見大. 
Yan Gengwang had summarized that Chen’s historiography “gathers many seemingly irrelevant trivial 
materials and trivial cases, collects them, organizes them, makes them systematic, and tells a big 
problem, big conclusion.” Yan Gengwang 嚴耕望, Zhi shi jingyan tan治史經驗談 (Taipei: Shangwu 
yinshuguan, 1997): 94. 
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the ‘inside’: the transformation of Buddhism itself, or systems, threads, and layers 
behind particular phenomena of Buddhist development. In his own words, he was 
seeking to “explore and organize the thread of ancient thought and the changes of 
sects.”1116 
This systematic framework in Tang’s historiography, obscure and well 
covered, was not based on any existing, imported, or universal system, but still was 
an outcome of “glaring at the Western books” [kui xiji 窺西籍].1117 Given the training 
in philosophy and history he had received during his student period,1118 it is not 
surprising to see Western-originated paradigms behind Tang’s elaboration. According 
to He Lin, the translator of the book Grundriss der Geschichte der Griechischen Philosophie 
[Outlines of the history of Greek philosophy 古希臘哲學史綱] written by Eduard 
Zeller, Tang’s Buddhist history referred to Zeller’s structure, although he never 
professed this openly. At times, Tang also mentioned Wilhelm Windelband as a 
paradigm for writing a “problem-centric history.”1119 Similar to Zeller and 
Windelband, ‘system’ [tixi 體系] was very significant in Tang’s work. To Tang, history 
needed to “manage the overall situation” [tongji quanju 統計全局] and to be 
conducted in a systematic way by linking the particular with the general and the 
holistic with the local, as he modestly concluded his Hanwei that:  
It [the book Fojiao shi] provides some credible materials for the history of Chinese 
Buddhism; it constructs the general thread of the changing of Chinese Buddhism; and 
it reveals some important phenomena in the history of Chinese Buddhism. 它供給了
 
1116 “疏尋往古思想之脈絡、宗派之變遷.” Tang Yongtong, “Han Liangjin nanbeichao fojiaoshi ba 漢兩
晉南北朝南北朝佛教史跋,” in TYQJ, vol.1, 655 
1117 Qi Mu錢穆, Bsshi yi shuangqin shiyou zanyi hekan八十憶雙親師友雜憶合刊, in Qian Bingsi 
xiansheng quanji錢賓四先生全集, vol. 51 (Taipei: Lianjing, 1998): 204. 
1118 For Tang’s academic background, see Zhao Jianyong 趙建永, “Tang Yongtong liuxue hanmulin 
daxue shiqi zhexue wengao tanwei湯用彤留學漢姆林大學時期哲學文稿探微.” Shijie zhexue 世界哲
學 3 (2008): 105-112; Also, Zhao, “Tang Yongtong hafo daxue shiqi zhexue wengao bianxi 湯用彤哈佛
大學時期哲學文稿辨析,” Zhexue dongtai哲學動態, 4 (2006): 33-39.  





Admittedly, the specter of relativism that haunted Windelband pestered Tang 
Yongtong as well. His studies on Buddhism, following a similar track, sometimes also 
slip into ‘historicization,’ just as historicism reduced philosophy to the history of 
philosophy. To avoid this situation, when Tang rebuilt the past of Chinese Buddhism, 
he tried to re-find a structure of axiology or typology in order to have the possibility 
of arriving at binding truth. For example, the dichotomy between ‘body’ [ti 體] and 
‘function’ [yong用] was one yardstick in his writings; a three-stage framework was 
also implied in his narrative of Buddhist history and the general progress of cultural 
assimilation.1121 Throughout his voluminous works, category, periodization, and 
causality are always relevant.  
When comparing Tang and Chen, it might be proper to conclude that the 
object of Chen Yinke’s study was the political or intellectual history of China, while 
Tang’s object was Buddhism itself as one branch of philosophy. Chen’s study rested 
on the ‘essence’ of the historical thinking and faith background of the Chinese, 
touching upon abstract cosmological concepts and ethical principles behind the 
traditional historical narratives. Chen discussed Buddhism as a key factor (along with 
other factors such economy, politics, and race) that profoundly influenced Chinese 
history. On the other hand, Tang focused his study on the changes within and 
between Buddhist sects and the communication of Buddhism and other thoughts, 
such as the Dark Learning, Daoism, and Confucianism. He considered Buddhism to be 
a complex structure consisting of various sects or schools, divergent monastic 
organizations, and intricate lineages and networks.  
 
1120 Tang Yijie 湯一介, Women sandairen 我們三代人 (Hongkong: Sanlian shudian, 2016), 173. 
1121 Tang divided Buddhist history into three stages: the period of Fo-Dao, the period of Fo-Xuan, and 
the period of independence. For the first stage, see Tang, “Han Wei foxue de liangda xitong 漢魏佛學
的兩大系統,” in TYQJ, vol.5, 177; for the second stage, see Hanwei, in TYQJ, vol.1, 89-99; for the third 
stage, see “Sui Tang foxue zhi tedian 隋唐佛學之特點,” in TYQJ, vol.2, 325-331. Also, see Zhao 
Jianyong, Tang Yongtong yu xiandai zhonggu xueshu 湯用彤與現代中國學術 (Beijing: Remmin 
chubanshe, 2015), 171-174. 
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Aside from their differences, both Chen and Tang learned from the lesson of 
geyi. Their conservative approaches, although seemingly rejected to modern 
standards and defending the value of tradition, was actually also a product of the 
Enlightenment and modernity. Meanwhile, in modern China, even the May Fourth 
radicalism, which targeted the symbols and practices of China’s traditional order, also 
expressed particularistic beliefs in the significance of a given past. Inevitably, China’s 
historical continuity and cultural particularity within its past always contained 
heterogeneous elements that were not in line with the ‘ideal China.’ As Michel de 
Certeau has described: 
The ambiguity proper to the exchange between cultures, or related to their 
succession, does not nullify the reality of the connections, but rather specifies their 
nature. Ambiguity of communication is related to an ‘anxiety’ that intertwines the 
continuity of history and the discontinuity of its system: difference.1122 
In this sense, when the modern Chinese intellectuals tried to create a narrative for 
China as a nation and as a cultural entity, they were also exposed to an impression 
that China was not, in fact, homogeneous or unique. On the one hand, the history 
they wrote suggested that China was developed under ceaseless influences from the 
outside; on the other hand, China needs to become more and more like the West. Not 
only was China acquiring all the accoutrements of modernity, but it was also 
discovering and experiencing its ills. This ambiguity and the feel of difference, which 




1122 Michel de. Certeau, Heterologies: Discourse on the Other. Translated by Michael Massumi (Minneapolis: 









The story of Chinese Buddhism begins with an ‘encounter’: Buddhism drifted into 
China in the Eastern Han dynasty (A.D. 25–220) via trade routes linking China to 
Central and South Asia. Historically, most of the early Buddhist missions might have 
been spontaneous activities conducted by monks, businessmen, and immigrants who 
had no official background. However, in the traditional narratives, the Chinese 
encounter with Buddhism was initiated through the dream of one emperor: Emperor 
Ming of the Later Han dynasty dreamt of a huge golden God coming from the West. 
The emperor then signed an edict to dispatch a group of envoys to ancient India and 
bring back a foreign teaching, which is Buddhism.1123 The thorny route between India 
and the Middle Kingdom, as well as the scarcity of authoritative Indian Buddhist 
knowledge coupled with the lack of accurate translations of Indian texts, rendered a 
proper understanding of Buddhism almost impossible. Therefore, transformation and 
assimilation seemed unavoidable. This process took place in two dimensions at once: 
textual and practical. Therefore, Buddhism in China’s past actually has two histories: 
one was the ‘encounter’ between Buddhism and Chinese civilization at political, 
social, and cultural levels, which was filled with conciliations and conflicts; the other 
one was the reception history of Buddhist canons, referring to the well-organized and 
 
1123 Detailed records of the legend can be found in Mouzi Lihuolun as: “In olden days Emperor Ming saw 
in a dream a god whose body had the brilliance of the sun and who flew before his palace; and he 
rejoiced exceedingly at this. The next day he asked his officials: ‘What god is this?’ The scholar Fu Yi 
said: ‘Your subject has heard it said that in India there is somebody who has attained the Dao and who 
is called Buddha; he flies in the air, his body had the brilliance of the sun; this must be that god’. The 
emperor then sent an envoy to Tian Zhu (India). Translated into French by Henri Maspero. English 
edition: Henri Maspero, Taoism and Chinese Religion, tr. by Frank A. Kierman Jr., (Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1981), 402. In modern China, it was called into question by Liang Qichao. 
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long-term translation project of turning Buddhist writings from Indian languages 
into Chinese.  
As described in the modern narrative about the history of Buddhism, in the 
late Han dynasty, an age when Confucianism fell into disrepute, the initial utilization 
of Buddhism by the Chinese was grounded in their pragmatic needs and superficial 
impression of the similarity between Buddhism and other local traditions. Through a 
hermeneutic strategy known as “matching concepts” [geyi 格義]1124, Chinese people 
gradually conflated Buddhism, especially the Mahāyāna tradition, with native 
Chinese thoughts. The core concepts of Buddhism, such as celibacy, mendicancy, and 
other forms of social renunciation, although they were ultimately antithetical in 
many respects to the local Confucian and Daoist conventions, were accepted and 
acclaimed as dynamic elements for Chinese civilization. This process has been 
described in the modern scholarship of Buddhism as the ‘Sinicization/Sinification’ of 
Buddhism1125 or the ‘Indianization of China’.1126   
Admittedly, although widely used, neither the discourses of ‘Sinicization’ nor 
‘Indianization’ can been considered to capture the irrefutable character of Chinese 
and East Asian Buddhism in the scholarly circles of both Buddhology and Sinology. 
Current scholarship has realized that the situation of the Indo-Chinese encounter was 
much more complex; the examples of the Sinicization of Buddhism are also 
 
1124 For a detailed the investigation of geyi and the modern interpretation of this term, see chapter 6.  
1125 In most cases, the two word ‘Sinicization’ and ‘Sinification’ are used without distinction. However, 
some scholars intend ‘Sinicization’ to refer to religious and ethical assimilation, while they use 
‘Sinification’ to refer to the political and military expansion of China. See Michel Strickmann, “The Tao 
Among the Yao: Taoism and the Sinification of South China,” in Rekishi ni okeru minshū to bunka—Sakai 
Tadao Sensei koki shukuga kinen ronshū 歷史における民眾と文化─酒井忠夫先生古稀祝賀紀念論集 
[Peoples and Cultures in Asiatic History: Collected Essays in Honour of Professor Sakai Tadao on his 
Seventieth Birthday] (Tokyo: Kokusho Kankokai, 1982), 23–30. Also, John R. McRae, “State Formation, 
Indigenization, and Buddhism in East Asian History: The Theoretical Foundation,” in Indo tetsugaku 
bukkyōgaku kenkyūインド哲学仏教学研究, no.13 (2006): 45-73. 
1126 The most influential expression of this discourse was Hu Shih’s lecture “The Indianization of China: 
A Case Study of Cultural Borrowing” in Independence, Convergence and Borrowing in Institutions, Thought 
and Art, Harvard Tercentenary Publications (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1937), 219-247. 
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questionable.1127 It is, fundamentally, not a real existant historical fact, but rather a 
modern-made narrative—a story that was first formulated and recounted by modern 
historians.1128  
 
The Anxiety of Origins 
In modern China, issues like the origin of Chinese Buddhism became so important 
because they were directly linked with the historical formation and continuity of 
Chinese culture. To modern Chinese historians, the social change they faced and their 
confrontation with the West urged them to reflect on and describe the historical 
processes in the past that had seen intellectual and socio-political conflicts but 
eventually formed something that could be called tradition—something with 
‘coherence,’ ‘unity,’ or ‘uniqueness.’ As the ‘Sinicization’ of Buddhism might embody 
such a process and the strategies the ancient Chinese used to address similar 
conflicts, modern Chinese intellectuals, therefore, became sensitive to this issue and 
the origins of Buddhism.  
 
1127 Several articles and books have discussed the inadequacy and misleading of the ‘Sinicization’ 
discourse. For example, Gregory Schopen has contested that filial piety [xiaodao 孝道] was the 
outgrowth of the Sinicization of Buddhism, but has claimed it rather to be an innate idea of Indian 
Buddhism itself as shown by several pieces of archaeological evidence. See Gregory Schopen, “Filial 
Piety and the Monk in the Practice of Indian Buddhism: A Question of ‘Sinicization’ Viewed from the 
Other Side,” T’oung Pao 70, no. 1/3 (1984): 110–26. Other scholars, such as Tansen Sen, Stanley Abe, Yü 
Chunfang, John Kieschnick, Robert Sharf, and so on, have criticized the discourse of Sinicization from 
the aspects of Chinese religious, cultural, artistic, and material life. For a summarized investigation on 
current reflections on ‘Sinicization’, see John Kieschnick, “Guanyu Fojiao hanhua de xingsi 關於佛教漢
化的省思,” in Zhongguoshi xinlun: zongjiaoshi fence 中國史新論: 宗教史分冊, ed., Lin Fu-shih 林富士
(Taipei, Lingking, 2011), 259-273. Also Teng, Wei-jen 鄧偉仁, “Jige pipan ‘gojiao Zhongguohua’ lilun de 
zai shenshi 幾個批判 ‘佛教中國化’ 理論的再審視,” in Qiufa yu Hongfa求法與弘法, ed., Shi Guojing 釋
果鏡, Liao Zhaoheng 廖肇亨 ed., (Teipei: Fagu Wenhua, 2015), 79-104. 
1128 In this chapter, I will not repeat the attempts of the scholars mentioned above to discuss the 
content, meaning, and applicability of the “Sinicization of Buddhism”; instead, I will investigate why 
and how this narrative about Chinese Buddhism was formed and developed in the modern Chinese 
context. Besides, the term ‘Sinicization’ has recently experienced a remarkable change. The political 
leader of China, Xi Jingping, uses this term to describe the current basic religious policy of China.  
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An origin is normally considered to be a historically determined, 
unchangeable point. In the case of Chinese Buddhism, the identification of origin is 
complicated, for Buddhism is not a native tradition to China. Thus, historians in 
modern China needed to create an understanding of how to define the authenticity 
and continuity of Chinese Buddhism with its Indian origin; meanwhile, they had to 
distinguish Chinese Buddhism from Indian Buddhism by reasserting its ‘Chinese-
ness.’ In this sense, they needed to confirm something of their ‘own’ in the other. 
Foucault has noted this kind of ‘anxiety of origin’:  
It is no longer origin that gives rise to historicity; it is historicity that, in its very 
fabric, makes the necessity of an origin which must be both internal and foreign to it: 
like the virtual tip of a cone in which all differences, all dispersions, all 
discontinuities would be knitted together so as to form no more than a single point of 
identity, the impalpable figure of the Same, yet possessing the power, nevertheless, 
to burst open upon itself and become Other.”1129  
With a strong willingness to build ‘self,’ origin thus became ‘foreign’; it marked a 
moment when tradition was born from something alien. Because of this dilemma, 
searching for the origin of Chinese Buddhism was full of tensions. Furthermore, the 
pious wish for preserving tradition in a time of transition, to be sure, was not merely 
an academic issue, but also a political attitude of idealizing certain aspects of China’s 
past in order to arrest the disintegration of society. This tendency indicated that, 
historically, tradition is a product of ‘traditionization.’ Tradition, in reaction to new 
threats, is unstable, generative, and constantly changing, and thus points to a greater 
cohesion, which is in itself a goal and value.1130 All the manifestations of tradition, 
then, are historically oriented toward the interior and require retrospection. Against 
this background, in modern China, not only the so-called conservatives but also the 
modern politicians, reformist religious figures, and Western-style industrialists all 
more or less participated in this turn to the past and to origins.  
 
1129 Michel, Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Science, trans. Alan Sheridan (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1973), 329-39. 
1130 For an informative analysis on tradition, see Abdallah Laroui, The Crisis of the Arab Intellectual: 




The Puzzle of Route  
Various legends had described the presence of ancient Buddhism on Chinese soil. 
According to the scholarly consensus, Buddhism came to China in the first century 
through missionaries from India. The term ‘Buddhism’ was for the first time 
mentioned in an edict in 65 AD, which was quoted by the compiler of the Book of the 
Later Han.1131 Buddhist scriptures were believed to be imported on the backs of white 
horses; the transmission of Buddhism started with two Indian monks, Dharmaratna 
and Kaśyapa Mātaṅga, who arrived in China along with the envoy of Emperor Ming 
and began their preaching in Luoyang. Historical events related to the early 
encounter between China and Buddhism were recorded in Buddhist sūtras, 
biographies of monks, and several official histories, including the Houhan shu and the 
Weishu.1132Those widespread legends as well as convincing records about the historical 
relationship between China and the Western Land [xiyu 西域]1133  largely fixed the 
image of Chinese Buddhism in its early stage. Those traditional accounts, although 
ceaselessly narrated, polished and refined, had never been publicly challenged.1134 
Only during the modern era did the vague details and contradictory narratives catch 
 
1131 The earliest record of Buddhism can be found in Houhan shu 後漢書. 
1132 Most of the later versions of this story in the Buddhist literature had an obvious propaganda 
function: they served to enhance the prestige of the Buddhist Church either by telling tales of its 
triumphant entrance at the imperial court and the immediate conversion of the Chinese emperor, or 
by demonstrating the early existence of Buddhism on Chinese soil. See Zürcher, The Buddhist Conquest 
of China, 19. 
1133 Military, commercial, and diplomatic activities between Middle Kingdom and the Western Land can 
be found as early as in Shiji, Han Shu and Hou Hanshu. For example, in “Xiyu zhuan” in Houhanshu, it is 
recorded that, in 74 A.D., the Emperor Ming sent troops to fight against the Huns and occupied several 
countries in the Western Regions. This activity built up a direct connection between China and the 
Western Land. 
1134 Some of the late Qing scholars, such as Shen Zengzhi, had already noticed cultural communication 
between China and India through the sea route. See Ge Zhaoguang, “From the Western Regions to the 
Eastern Sea: Formations, Methods and Problems in a New Historical World,” in Here in ‘China’ I Dwell: 
Reconstructing Historical Discourses of China for Our Time (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 172-86. 
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the attention of scholars who tried to study Chinese Buddhism from a historical 
perspective.1135  
The biggest difficulty modern historians faced was the scarcity of reliable 
materials, not only because of their limited quantity, but also because of the sectarian 
implications behind those early texts. For example, many early historical sources 
(from before the Sui era) that have survived until today were written by Confucian 
historians who showed less interest in Buddhism. They only recorded Buddhist 
events when they were directly related to political affairs or the activities of 
governors or the royal family.1136 Their descriptions of Buddhist figures also 
presented a strong legendary tone, which indicated their suspicious or even rejection 
of Buddhism.  
The first missing piece of the puzzle is the route via which Buddhism entered 
China. Liang Qichao was one of the most influential figures who supported the 
maritime route hypothesis. In his article “The Early Transmission of Buddhism in 
China,” he claimed that before Dharmaratna and Kaśyapa Mātaṅga, Buddhism firstly 
arrived at the Yangzi-Huai 江淮 river region via the sea route.1137 He cited the 
biography of King Ying of Chu (present-day Jiangsu) in Hou hanshu and the record of 
Ying’s joint worship with the Yellow Emperor, Laozi, and the Buddha to show that in 
a very early time Buddhism had been prevailing in Southern China. Liang believed 
that the detailed record that King Ying “observed fasting and performed sacrifices to 
 
1135 For the beginning of the incubation of Buddhism in Chinese soil, there are several opinions. 
However, most of them are legends. For an enumeration of the legends, see Tang, Yongtong, History; 
also, Zürcher, The Buddhist Conquest of China, 20-22.  
1136 Some historians, like Shen Yue 沈約, were committed Buddhists; however, they carefully kept a 
distance from their personal faith to fulfill their responsibilities as professional historians [shijia 史家]. 
For example, in his Book of Song, Shen Yue only wrote biographies for two Buddhists, Huilin 慧琳 and 
Daosheng 道生. For analysis on this issue, See Zürcher, The Buddhist Conquest of China., 19. According to 
Zürcher, the materials in the secular historical literature should not be overestimated, for “they 
certainly do not indicate the beginning of Buddhism in China, nor are they in any way representative 
of the spread of Buddhism at the time they were written down. They are important as symptoms of 
conditions which, by a fortuitous combination of external circumstances, happen to have been 
recorded.” 
1137 Liang, SBP, 32.  
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the Buddha”1138 demonstrated not only the formation of the Buddhist communities in 
the Jiangnan area but also the popularity of Buddhist ritual practices within the 
upper class living in the South.1139 He further suggested in a long footnote that, based 
on the record in Houhan shu, there had already been an advanced commercial 
connection between China and the South Asian subcontinent as early as in the later 
Han period, which began from Guangzhang and had its final destination in Huangzhi 
黃支, a kingdom in present-day India.1140  
Similar opinions have been put forward by the Sinologist Pelliot, who believes 
that, in the first century B.C., a Chinese mission, by order of the court, traversed the 
India Ocean “on ships of the barbarians.” 1141 Through the same path, Buddhism was 
introduced into China. According to Liang and Pelliot’s analyses, the sea route to and 
from the West had been built up at that time, and the Chinese from that time 
onwards participated in the economic, diplomatic, and missionary activity of India 
via this maritime route.1142   
This bold hypothesis, in Liang’s interpretation, might provide a persuasive 
explanation for the phenomenon that most activities related to Buddhism, such as 
the translation and composition of the Chinese Buddhist canon, happened in 
Southern China instead of in regions along the line of the overland Silk Road. By 
referring to the biographies of An Shigao 安世高 (?-168) in Chusanzang jiji and 
Gaosengzhuan, Liang pointed out that the locations of An’s early peregrination, from 
Guangzhou, Kuaiji 會稽, and Yuzhang 豫章 to Jingzhou 荊州 and Danyang 丹陽, 
 
1138 “為浮屠齋戒祭祀,” in Houhanshu, 72.4b 
1139 Such detailed records about Buddhist rituals, according to Liang’s investigation, could not be 
observed in any historical texts written about Northern China 
1140 Before Liang, French sinologist Ferrand G. identified that the Kingdom of Huangzhi (Huang Chih) 
was Kanchipuram (i.e. Conjevaram, forty-six miles south-west of Madras, the then capital of the 
Pallava dynasty). See Gabriel Ferrand, “Le K’ouen Louen et les anciennes navigations,” extrait du Journal 
Asiatique (1919): 196, 203. Japanese scholar Fujita Toyohachi also held the same opinion. See Fujita 
Toyohachi藤田丰八, Zhongguo nanhai gudai jiaotong congkao 中國南海古代交通叢考, trans. He Jianmin 
何健民 (Shanghai : Shangwu yinshuguan, 1936).  
1141 Paul Pelliot, “Autour d’une traduction sanscrite du tao tö king,” T’oung Pao 13, no.2 (1912): 460.  
1142 J. J. L. Duyvendak, China's Discovery of Africa: Lectures Given at the University of London on January 22 and 
23, 1947 (London: Arthur Probsthain, 1949), 12. 
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sketched the earliest centers of the transmission of Buddhism: the region near 
Cangwu  蒼梧 and Jiaozhou 交州1143, which are both in the South. In another 
paragraph, Liang cited from Sanguo zhi to describe a splendid rite called “bathing the 
Buddha,” which was organized by the local warlord Ze Rong 笮融 in Guangling 廣陵, 
Xiapei 下邳, and Pengcheng 彭城 (all in present-day Jiangsu). This record, to Liang, 
was more evidence that proved his thesis.1144  
Radical enough, this hypothesis soon attracted wide attention in academia. Hu 
Shih, for example, responded to this issue when he discussed the authenticity of the 
Sūtra of the Forty-Two Sections with Chen Yuan in 1933. In a 1948 letter Hu wrote to 
Zhou Yiliang 周一良, he claimed that “there should be a large group of Indian and 
Southern-Sea Buddhists who reached Jiaozhou via a sea route and permanently 
resided there for commercial (or maybe missionary) purposes.”1145 Repeating the 
evidence Liang had shown, Hu held the idea that Buddhism had arrived in China via 
the maritime route much earlier than Emperor Ming’s dream and the composition of 
the Mouzi Lihuo hun, one of the earliest Chinese Buddhist texts. Although failing to 
gather any direct evidence, his confidence in this view never changed. After Hu 
moved to Taiwan, he still wrote to Yang Liansheng 楊聯陞 and suggested Yang 
forward his letter to the French Sinologist Demiéville to see if Demiéville could find 
some materials in European libraries to support this hypothesis.1146  
The sea route hypothesis, however, always provoked disputes due to the 
paucity of evidence. Most scholars still maintained the theory of the overland 
 
1143 In the preface, it was written as Jiaozhi 交趾.  
1144 This hypothesis accords with the opinion of Paul Pelliot. In the introduction to his translation of 
Mouzi, Pelliot suggested that multiple routes of the early transmission of Buddhism might have existed 
in the first century, including an overland link between Yunan and Burma and a sea route from 
Jiaozhou to India. See Paul Pelliot, “Meou-tseu ou les doutes levés,” T'oung Pao, 19, no.5 (1919): 256. 
1145 Hu Shih 胡適, “Zhi Zhou Yiliang (1948.8.7).” This letter has different versions. This one is cited from 
Geng Yunzhi 耿雲志 ed., Hu Shih shuxin ji (zhong)胡適書信集(中) (revised version based on Hu Shih 
yigao ji micang shuxin 胡適遺稿及秘藏書信, vol.19), 1150. 
1146 Hu Shih, Lunxue tanshi ershinian – Hu Shih Yang Liansheng wanglai shuzha 論學談詩二十年—胡
適楊聯陞往來書札” (Taipei: Linking, 1998), 92, 103.  
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route.1147 One of the most representative voices came from Tang Yongtong. Following 
the traditional narrative, Tang believed that Buddhism first entered into the Western 
regions, including Greater Yuezhi 大月氏, Sogdiana 康居 and Parthia 安息, and then 
crossed the western boundary of the Han Empire before it finally arrived the ‘Middle 
Kingdom.’ He stated, “it seems beyond doubt that it [Buddhism] traveled primarily by 
the land road.”1148 Although Tang could not prove the authenticity of the story of 
Emperor Ming’s dream, he examined in detail the geographic dissemination of 
Buddhism in the Han dynasty and clarified the chronological sequence of the arrival 
of Buddhism in a broader historical context. In the fourth chapter of his Hanwei, “The 
Spread of Buddhism in the Han Dynasty,” he referred to several records in Chinese 
historical texts relevant to the overland route of Buddhist transmission, including 
those that had been cited by Liang. However, the most important evidence Tang 
posted was the story of the instruction of (a) Buddhist sūtra(s) by Yi Cun 伊存 [known 
as the story of ‘yicun shoujing’ 伊存授經].1149 This story directly led Tang to a different 
verdict. He considered the residents in the Western Region as the ‘intermediaries’ of 
Buddhism and believed that Luoyang was the first and major Buddhism center in 
China. Further, he credited the flourishing of Buddhism in the Qi-Chu and Yangzi-
Huai River area to the prevalence of esoteric arts [fangshu 方術] (especially the 
Huanglao practice 黃老之術)1150 in these regions. Such local atmosphere might 
 
1147 Some scholars outside China who have supported the overland hypothesis include Kurakichi 
Shiratori, Hakuju Ui, Arthur Wright, Kenneth Ch’en, Erik Zürcher, and so on. However, there are still 
some debates on the concrete date and route of the dissemination of Buddhism from India to China.  
1148 Tang, Hanwei, in TYQJ, vol.1, 63. 
1149 Other matertials deployed by Tang included the payment of homage to both the Buddha and Laozi 
by the Emperor Huan 桓帝 (147-167 A.D.), the translation of Buddhist sūtra by An Shigao and 
Lokakṣema 支婁迦讖 (147-? A.D.) in Luoyang, the practicing of Buddhism by Zhai Rong, and the 
composition of Mouzi. See Tang. According to Rong Xinjiang 榮新江, the “scope of the historical texts 
cited by Tang Yongtong remains undisputed to this day.” See Rong Xinjiang, “Land Route or Sea 
Route? Commentary on the Study of the Paths of Transmission and Areas in which Buddhism Was 
Disseminated during the Han Period,” Sino-platonic Papers, vol. 144 (2004): 3. 
1150 Maspero has pointed out that it is better to take the term Huanglao黃老, when it occurs in Han 
texts, as referring to Huanglao (jun) 黃老君, the main deity of the early Daoist pantheon who was 
especially venerated by the Yellow Turbans, and not as denoting two persons, the Yellow Emperor and 
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accelerate the distribution of Buddhism but did not guarantee that Buddhism had 
first landed there.  
The reason why Tang’s conclusion was different from those of Liang, Pelliot, 
and Hu lay in the so-called ‘calibration in historiography’ or, in Hu Shih’s words, “the 
marker stone on the route” [jili de shizhu 記里的石柱]—the solid, credible, ‘prior’ 
records that could be used to examine other historical materials while they 
themselves could not be questioned. To Tang, the story of Yicun was one calibration. 
Although, he argued, this story had slightly different details in different books [Pei 
Songzhi’s commentary on the Sanguo zhi, Liu Jun’s commentary on Shishuo xinyu, etc.], 
such as the location and also the participants in the event, the main narrative 
remained the same: a Chinese scholar [boshi 博士] studied Buddhist sūtras with a 
monk from the Greater Yuezhi.1151 This story, which marked the earliest contact 
between China and Buddhism, unquestionably proved the existence of the overland 
route of Buddhist transmission across Central Asia.   
Other scholars, such as Jiang Weiqiao and Huang Chanhua, also considered 
Yicun’s story to be a credible “historical record” [shilu 實錄]. In his History of Chinese 
Buddhism, Jiang reiterated the authenticity of Yicun’s story and basically accepted the 
traditional narrative.1152 Huang, following Hakuju Ui ideas, contested the traditional 
accounts of Emperor Ming but read the story of Yicun as the real beginning of 
Chinese Buddhism.1153  
Lü Cheng, on the contrary, might have had some reservations on this matter. 
In one of his lectures, he referred to the study of Japanese scholar Kurakichi Shiratori 
白鳥庫吉 (1865–1942) and argued that there had been no established Buddhist belief 
during the first two generations of the Kusha Dynasty in Bactria. Therefore, it was 
 
Laozi, which seems to be a later scholarly interpretation of the term. See Henri. Maspero, “Les origines 
de la communauté bouddhiste de Luoyang,” Journal Asiatique (1934), 90. 
1151 Tang, Hanwei, in TYQJ, vol.1, 36-38. 
1152 Jiang Weiqiao, Zhongguo fojiao shi 中國佛教史(1929).  
1153 According to Lü, Jiang Weiqiao’s Zhongguo fojiaoshi was translated from the History of Chinese 
Buddhism written by Sakaino Satoru; Huang’s history was based on Hakuju Ui’s Outline of the History of 
Chinese Buddhism, 1936. 
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highly doubtful that the Greater Yuezhi tribes, which were even earlier than the 
Kushanas, could have held Buddhism as a popular belief; the story of Yicun, therefore, 
was also dubious.1154 Lü also rejected the whole story of Emperor Ming as a myth. It 
was, Lü claimed, a propaganda story full of anachronisms that was fabricated based 
on an edict of Emperor Ming: Because, in the official history, there was a record that 
the Emperor sent back the silks that the King Ying of Chu had submitted for 
redemption in order to “encourage the rituals of upāsakas 伊蒲塞 and Śramaṇas 桑
門,” people then mistakenly connected the Emperor Ming with Buddhism.1155 
Despite their contradictory conclusions, narratives of ‘Sinicization’, or the 
origin of Chinese Buddhism, reached some consensus: the authenticity of the story of 
Yicun was largely acknowledged; also, it was agreed that Buddhism had slowly 
infiltrated from the North-West, via the two branches of the continental Silk Road to 
the North China plain, where in the Later Han times the capital Luoyang, was 
situated.1156 Also, the existence of Buddhism in the Late Han was attested.1157 The 
conclusion written in the textbooks nowadays is simple; however the hypothesis that 
Buddhism came from the Southern coast of China has never fully disappeared.1158 
 
 
1154 Lü Cheng, Zhongguo gojiao yuanliu luejiang 中國佛教源流略講, lecture one,  
1155 HHS 12.5a; Hou-Han ji 10.4b; see also Tang Yongtong, op. cit., pp. 53–55; For the studies on the 
ritual, see Fukui Kōjun 福井康順, Dōkyō no kisoteki kenkyū 道教の基礎的研究 (Tokyo: Risosha, 1952), 
99–106; Henri Maspero, Essay sur le Taoïsme, ch. III, “Le Taoïsme et les débuts du Bouddhisme en 
Chine,” in Mélanges posthumes vol. II (1950): 185. 
1156 This view had been presented in many introductory and general expositions of the history of 
Buddhism, both in classroom or in written works, and the date of the Yicun’s introduction, B.C.2, had 
also been officially designated as “the Arrival Year of Buddhism.” In 1998, under the lead of Zhao 
Puchu 趙樸初, 中國佛教協會 held a ceremony to celebrate the 2000th anniversary of the import of 
Buddhism.  
1157 See Zürcher, The Buddhist Conquest of China.23.  
1158 After the 1980s, newly discovered archaeological Buddhist iconographic materials expanded the 
early phase of Buddhism’s dissemination area to include present-day Sichuan and the coastal areas 
near Jiangsu. the view of Buddhism coming to China via the sea route has resurfaced and seems more 
closer to the final conclusion. See Rong Xinjiang, “Land Route or Sea Route? Commentary on the Study 




The Textual and Cultural Journey of Buddhism  
After Buddhism arrived in China, the attempt to translate and interpret Buddhist 
doctrines and regulations into indigenous expressions lasted for over two centuries. 
It was another important facet of the early encounter between China and Indian 
Buddhism; it was also the real ‘agent’ of Buddhist Sinicization, at least in the view of 
the modern historiography of Buddhism.  
Until the distinguished Kuchean Buddhist scholar, Kumārajīva’s 鳩摩羅什
(350–ca. 409)1159 sophisticated, if not “authentic,” translations of several essential 
Buddhist scriptures and commentaries arrived China, Chinese believers did not stop 
their pursuit for the real Buddha’s Dharma through their direct or indirect contacts 
with Indian Buddhist masters and their reading of Pali or Sanskrit texts. To that early 
generation of Chinese Buddhists, India, instead of China, was the center of the world; 
it was a sacred land where the Buddha had gained his perfection.1160 This imagination 
with aspiration and anxiety became a “broader complex,” which, as described by 
Tansen Sen, was a prevailing voice within the early dialogue between China and 
India.1161  
Later, the South Asian missionaries and translators who followed Kumārajīva, 
such as Bodhiruci 菩提流支 (?) and Paramārtha 真諦(499–569), facilitated the 
development of Chinese counterparts to the Indian exegetical systems, establishing 
the Chinese people’s own structures of Buddhist hermeneutics: Sanlun 三論 (based 
on Indian Mādhyamika treatises), Dilun 地論 (based on the Daśabhūmikasūtra-
śāstra), and Shelun 攝論 (based on the Mahāyānasamgraha). Generally, during the 
 
1159 For these dates, see Tsukamoto 塚本善隆: “The Dates of Kumārajīva and Seng-chao Reexamined,” 
in Zinbun Kagaku Kenkyūjo Silver Jubilee Volume, trans. Leon Hurvitz (Kyoto: Kyōto daigaku jinbun kagaku 
kenkyūjo), 568-584 
1160 In the seventh century, Monk Daoxuan, for instance, recorded in great detail his vision of a 
monastery in India. See Tan Zhihui, “Daoxuan’s Vision of Jetavana: Imaging a Utopian Monastery in 
Early Tang,” Ph.D dissertation, University of Arizona, 2002.  
1161 Tansen Sen, Buddhism, Diplomacy, and Trade: The Realignment of Sino-Indian Relations, 600-1400 
(Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2003). According to Sen, this concept was derived from 
Antonino Forte, “Hui-chih (fl. 676–703 a.d.), A Brahmin Born in China,” Estratto da Annali dell'Istituto 
Universitario Orientate 45 (1985): 106–134. 
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Southern and Northern Dynasties (ca. 317–589), the more ascetic, devotional, and 
thaumaturgic forms of Buddhism found their home in the “barbarian” kingdoms of 
the north, while the more metaphysical and philosophical facets of Buddhism proved 
attractive to segments of the displaced Han elite in the south.1162 
This indigenizing process reached its peak in the Sui and Tang dynasties, the 
so-called ‘golden age’ of Chinese Buddhism. Advances in trade and travel along the 
Silk Road and sea route via the Southeast Asian sea1163 encouraged Chinese monks 
such as Faxian, Xuanzang, and Yijing義淨 (635–713) to make pilgrimages to India and 
import the latest texts and teachings to China. Their writings and translations 
allowed the Chinese audience to perceive India from a more familiar angle.1164 
However, these practices, which were aimed at establishing ‘authentic’ Indian 
thought, ‘failed’: because of Xuanzang’s translation expertise and the importation of 
the Buddha’s relics, the “border complex” of Chinese Buddhists was largely replaced 
by local worship of the new sacred sites and canons in China, the ‘Middle Kingdom’ 
[zhongtu 中土].1165 At the same time, the favorable cultural and political climate, 
together with the patronage of a succession of Sui and Tang rulers, spurred the 
development of genuinely indigenous Chinese schools, including Tiantai, Huayan, 
Pure Land, and, most important of all, Chan.1166 Chinese Buddhism then had come of 
 
1162 Robert Sharf. Coming to Terms with Chinese Buddhism, 5 
1163 For Indian- Chinese trade, see Liu, Xinru, Ancient India and Ancient China: Trade and Religious Exchange 
AD 1-600 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).  
1164 The travel accounts of these Chinese pilgrims can be considered to provide only indirect access to 
India, as they are tied up with preconceptions of both the authors and what the authors assumed their 
Chinese readers wanted to know. See John Kieschnick and Meir Shahar, India in the Chinese 
Imagination (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 4; See also Timothy H. Barrett, “Did I-
Ching Go to India? Problems in Using I-ching as a Source for South Asian Buddhism,” in Buddhist Studies 
Review 15, no.2 (1998): 142–156. 
1165 See Sen, Tansen, Buddhism, Diplomacy, and Trade: The Realignment of Sino-Indian Relations, 600-1400 
(Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2003); Also, John Kieschnick and Meir Shahar, India in the Chinese 
Imagination, Myth, Religion, and Thought, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013).  
1166 The Buddhist traditions that were to emerge from the Tang relatively unscathed (Pure Land and 
Chan) survived precisely because they were less dependent on scriptural learning, monastic ritual, and 
clerical regulation, and thus were less susceptible to the vagaries of state and aristocratic patronage. 
Pure Land and Chan were oriented toward individual faith and salvation gained through meditative 
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age: it was ready and willing to distance itself from the authority of Indian Buddhism 
and to strike out in new directions. 
The emergence of those indigenous Buddhist schools and the formation of the 
body of Dazangjing marked the accomplishment of Buddhist Sinicization. Although, 
along with this process, there was a long and inexorable decline of Buddhism, 
especially at the philosophical and spiritual level1167, the encounter between China 
and India through the vehicle of Buddhism ‘invented’ the normativity and 
particularity of Chinese Buddhism.  
This narrative about Buddhism’s journey from India to China, as formalized by 
Arthur Wright over forty years ago, can be divided into four phases: “preparation” 
(Eastern Han and early Six Dynasties), “domestication” (Northern and Southern 
Dynasties), “independent growth” (Sui and Tang dynasties), and “appropriation” 
(Five Dynasties to 1900).1168 This paradigm was widely adopted throughout the 
modern academic circle because of its resilience.1169 Similar paradigms had already 
appeared in the writing of the history of Buddhism during the early twentieth 
century in China. Questions such as ‘Should the different Chinese interpretations of a 
Buddhist doctrine be understood as misunderstandings or creative appropriation?’ or 
‘Does India have the exclusive rights to the orthodoxy of Buddhism?’ were also under 
 
practice, rendering them accessible and appealing to the masses respectively. As such, these traditions, 
infused at times with popular forms of Tantra, came to dominate the Chinese Buddhist landscape down 
to the present day. 
1167 The notion that Buddhism went into a protracted decline following the watershed of the Tang is 
similarly based on longstanding but unwarranted historiographical biases; Buddhist institutions and 
intellectual traditions continued to flourish through the Sung dynasty (960–1279) and enjoyed periods 
of renewed vigor and growth in later periods as well. For the critique of the ‘decline’ narrative of post-
Tang Buddhism, see Griffith Foulk, “Myth, Ritual, and Monastic Practice in Sung Ch’an Buddhism,” in 
Religion and Society in T’ang and Sung China, edited by Patricia Buckley Ebrey and Peter N. Gregory 
(Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1993), 147–208.; and the collection of essays in Peter N. Gregory 
and Daniel A. Getz ed., Buddhism in the Sung (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1999). 
1168 Arthur Wright, Buddhism in Chinese History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959). 
1169 Currently, only two scholars, John McRae and Robert Sharf, have advocated completely abandoning 
the notion of “Sinicization.” Sharf has criticized that: “The Chinese encounter or dialogue with 
Buddhism took place almost exclusively among the Chinese themselves, on Chinese soil, in the Chinese 
language.” See Sharf, Coming to Terms With Chinese Buddhism: A Reading of the Treasure Store Treatise, 2.  
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discussion, although a consensus was still out of reach. In the modern Chinese 
context, the controversy within the studies of the history of Chinese Buddhism owed 
mainly to the dichotomy between ‘Chinese culture’ and ‘Indian Buddhism,’ which still 
was framed in terms of the interrelationship between discrete and autonomous 
historical entities. Scholars modeled the process of Sinicization in different ways, 
depending on their (sometimes hierarchical) understanding of the relationship 
between Indian tradition and Sinitic culture.  
 
The Contradiction of Explanations 
In practice, the deficiency of information might be helpful if we were trying to list all 
the proofs we actually have. However, to distinguish what we know from what we 
have conjectured or reconstructed or hypothesized is another thing.1170 As discussed 
before, the modern scholars should have known, at least to some extent, that the 
limited historical and Buddhist writings preserved in the ancient Chinese books were 
unreliable, since these texts were either written by secularized literati or translated 
by believers with patchy knowledge of foreign language and historiography. 
Therefore, all their writings on the history of Buddhism were ‘critical.’  
The mist surrounding the history of Chinese Buddhism and early Chinese 
Buddhist literature was mentioned in Liang Qichao’s article “Brief Remarks on the 
Development of Chinese Buddhist Dharma.” First, why could Buddhism prevail in 
China? Second, why was Mahāyāna Buddhism, instead of Hinayana Buddhism, able to 
be cultivated in Chinese soil?1171 Both of these questions had never been touched in 
the traditional historical narratives of Buddhism.  
 
1170 Gregory Schopen, “Two Problems in the History of Indian Buddhism: The Layman/Monk 
Distinction and the Doctrines of the Transference of Merit,” in Bones, Stones, and Buddhist Monks: 
Collected Papers on the Archaeology, Epigraphy and Texts of Monastic Buddhism in India (Honolulu: U of 
Hawai’I Press, 1997), 23-55.  
1171 Liang, “Zhongguo fofa xingshuai yange shuolue” 中國佛法興衰沿革說略,” SBP, 4 
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Chinese civilization has been preoccupied with record-keeping and history-
making since its very beginning.1172 This sustained dedication to the enterprise of 
writing down the main events of each dynasty and reign for posterity has transfixed 
China for more than two millennia. The Chinese have demonstrated an admiration 
for chronicles, annals, bibliographies, documents, and other written accounts of the 
enactment of rulers and government institutions on a day-to-day basis. This strong 
dominance of secular historiography, along with a legendary lineage of the 
transmission of the Buddha Dharma, determined the complexity and multivocality of 
the story of Chinese Buddhism. The mission of writing Chinese Buddhist history was 
not just patching up the fragments and missing parts with new materials, but also 
finding answers to questions similar to those Liang posed,1173 namely, providing 
explanation, judgment, and principles; the writing of Chinese Buddhist history was 
expected not only to tell stories but also to reveal the causality, order, and ideals 
behind them.  
Liang’s study, for example, focused on grasping the ‘continuity’ behind 
historical events while rejecting occasional factors. For example, he criticized the 
legend of Hanming qiufa as “a saying without any evidence; it began from the false 
accusation framed by bad Daoists and was narrated with the implausible fabrication 
of the silly monks.”1174 He also rejected the opinion that the flourishing of Buddhism 
in China could be attributed to the conflict between the faiths of Taoism and 
Confucianism within the Han court.1175 On the contrary, Liang summarized two 
reasons for the success of Buddhism in Later Han China, especially among the literati. 
One was the “intellectual undercurrent”[sixiang zhi fuliu 思想之伏流], namely the 
vacuum of faith left by the empty textualization of Classic Learnings and the esoteric 
 
1172 For a summary treatment of all the main facets of the historical tradition of Chinese civilization, see 
Endymion Wilkinson, Chinese History: A Manual, Harvard-Yenching Institute Monographs Series, 52 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2000). 
1173 Liang wrote: “The answer to this question is rooted only in history” [此答案非求根柢與歷史焉不
可也]. SBP, 48. 
1174 Liang, “Fojiao zhi chushuru 佛教之初輸入,” SBP, 29. 
1175 Liang claimed that this saying was derived from the record in Houhanshu: “聞宮中立黃老、浮屠
之祠.” However, Liang did not mention who had said this saying. Ibid., 23.  
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arts of ‘religious’ Taoism. The other reason was the “background of time” [shidai zhi 
Beijing 時代之背景]—a feeling of ‘impermanence [wuchang 無常] among people, 
which was stimulated by the socio-political turbulence from the end of the Han 
dynasty to the Sui dynasty.1176   
Hu Shih stressed more the Chinese cosmology and philosophical conceptions 
in pre-Qin and early Han eras. He repeatedly mentioned that Buddhism in ancient 
China had been imagined as a great religion, for it provided Chinese people a 
hierarchical, layered system of Heaven and Hell. This conception, which was in 
accordance with the natural element of shamanism in Chinese culture, Hu suggested, 
resulted in the Buddhist ‘conquest’ of China, or the ‘Indianization’ of China.1177 This 
historical process, he described rhetorically, was “a small witch meets a big witch” 
[xiaowu jian dawu 小巫見大巫].1178   
Rather than simply dismissing any single traditional account, Tang Yongtong 
used his own judgment of the textual and logical reliability of these accounts to 
enumerate all the prevailing legends and stories about the spread of early Buddhism. 
(In the first chapter of the History, he presented ten different accounts). After listing 
numerous events related to the indigenization of Buddhism—early translation 
activities, religious events, rituals, and ceremonies—he also took into account the 
current social, political, and economic conditions. Although he did not use the term 
“Sinicization,” Tang was one of the first to depict this historical process over a longer 
span of time. In the Hanwei, he divided the early reception of Buddhism into two 
stages. The first stage was the last Later Han era, during which Buddhism was 
considered a kind of esoteric art such as Huanglao (Daoism) and was practiced by the 
common people; the second stage was from the Wei to the Northern and Southern 
 
1176 Liang, “Zhongguo fofa xingshuai yange shuolue 中國佛法興衰沿革說略,” SBP, 5. 
1177 The term ‘conquest’ was not used for the first time by Erik Zürich, although it was he who made it 
famous. Hu used this metaphor in his 1945 lecture at Harvard, which was published in the same year in 
the Bulletin of the Divinity School, Harvard University under the title “The Conception of Immortality in 
Chinese Thought.” For a Chinese translation, see Wenji, vol.12, p 354. For a similar expression of Hu, see 
lecture “Chanzong shi de yige xin kanfa 禪宗史的一個新看法”  (1953), in HSWJ, 389.  
1178 Ibid.  
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dynasties, during which Buddhism became significant and prevalent among the elites 
with the help of xuanxue.1179 Examining the mutual relationship between Buddhism 
and local thoughts and emphasizing the esoteric and exotic facet of Buddhism,1180 
Tang linked the acceptance of Buddhism with three-fold influences consisting of the 
Daoist esoteric arts, the migration from Central Asia, and the Dark Learning that 
prevailed among the Late Han literati, rulers, and royal families.1181  
Although Tang was already aware of the unique form of faith of ordinary 
believers and the ‘popular accretion’1182 of Buddhist culture, he paid more attention to 
the religious life of the elite stratum. According to Tang, when the centralized 
organization of the Han empire started to collapse and Confucianism, as “veritable 
orgies of scholasticism”1183, lost much of its former prestige, disappointed literati 
started to look for other means to replace or modify their beliefs. Against this 
background, a new trend in Chinese philosophy, xuanxue, emerged. Xuanxue appears 
primarily to be the philosophy (and, in many cases, the intellectual pastime) of a 
refined and aristocratic leisure class whose interest had turned from the practical 
business of everyday life to gnostic and ontological problems such as the “original 
non-being” [benwu 本無], the presence or absence of emotions in the Sage, the 
 
1179 Tang, TYQJ, vol.1, 39-46; 89.  
1180 Tang referred the Mouzi and the Sutra of Forty-Two Sections to demonstrate that Buddhism in the Han 
dynasty was called “the Dao of Buddha” or “the Dao of Śakyamuni.” See Tang, TYQJ, vol.1, 65. 
1181 Ibid, 142-44. 
1182 The popular accretion included shamanism, ancestor worship, cults directed toward the veneration 
of 
aboriginal gods and local holy men, thaumaturgy, auguring and divination, appeasement of baleful 
spirits and wayward ghosts, ritual possession and exorcism, and any number of other indigenous 
practices. See Sharf, Coming to Terms With Chinese Buddhism: A Reading of the Treasure Store Treatise. 13-14. 
For the tantrism of Buddhism see Heinz Bechert ed., Buddhism in Ceylon and Studies on Religious 
Syncretism in Buddhist Countries (Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1978); Richard Gombrich, 
Theravåda Buddhism: A Social History from Ancient Benares to Modern Colombo (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1988); Ian Reader and George Tanabe,  Practically Religious: Worldly Benefits and the Common 
Religion of Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1998); Rolf A. Stein, Tibetan Civilization (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1972), 191– 247; as well as the extensive ethnographic studies by Melford 
Spiro, Gananath Obeyesekere, Sherry Ortner, Stanley Tambiah, and so on. 
1183 Zürcher, The Buddhist Conquest of China, 45.  
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extent to which words can express ideas, and other subjects of a highly speculative 
nature.1184 Tang had in his Hanwei convincingly demonstrated how this native cultural 
setting acted as a factor of the utmost importance in the development of early 
Chinese Buddhism, especially in the gentry circles in the Huabei plain and Jianghuai 
regions, the major locales of Buddhist distribution.1185 Comparatively, in his panorama 
of Chinese Buddhism, religious forms that were more closely linked with monastic 
clerics, such as Vinaya, ritual, and meditation, were less discussed.  
This approach to intellectual history has been criticized by several scholars, 
such as Erik Zürcher, Daniel Overmyer, Michel Strickmann, and Stephen Teiser. As 
Zürcher has noted, “as soon as we go below that top-level, quite another picture 
emerges, in which Buddhism loses much of its sharp contour, as it is absorbed into 
the surrounding mass of Chinese indigenous religion.”1186 Since Zürcher, scholars of 
the social history of Asian religion have increasingly focused on the faith situation of 
non-elites, opening up new horizons for the study of religion. At the same time, 
however, if we consider that Zürcher’s research was profoundly influenced by Tang 
Yongtong, it can be argued that it was Tang’s approach that triggered Zürcher’s 
reflections.1187 
In general, the interpretations of scholars showed differences in both 
premises and conclusions. Liang rejected the authenticity of the traditional 
narratives and formed an explanation for the Chinese embrace of Buddhism with the 
evidence he sifted through; Hu’s conclusion, which was more straightforward, 
 
1184 Tang, Hanwei, in TYQJ, vol.1 91-114. 
1185 Ibid., 115-140 
1186 Erik Zürcher, “Perspectives in the Study of Chinese Buddhism,” in Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 
(1982): 173; see also the discussions in Michel Strickmann, “The Tao among the Yao: Taoism and the 
Sinification of South China,” In Rekishi ni okeru minshū to bunka - Sakai Tadao Sensei koki shukuga kinen 
ronshū 歴史における民眾と文化—酒井忠夫先生古稀祝賀記念論集 (Tokyo: Kokusho Kankokai, 
1982), 23–30; and Daniel L. Overmyer “Buddhism in the Trenches: Attitudes toward Popular Religion in 
Chinese Scriptures Found at Tun-Huang,” in Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 50.1 (1990): 197-222. 
1187 Zürcher himself then used the term “gentry Buddhism” to label the Buddhist faith among the 
cultured upper class in medieval Chinese society. Zürcher, The Buddhist Conquest of China, 4-6; Cf. E. G. 
Pulleyblank, ‘“Gentry Society’: some remarks on recent work by W. Eberhard,” in Bulletin of the School of 
Oriental and African Studies (BSOAS), xv, (1953): 588. 
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critically read mysticism and esoterism as the main factors related to the prevalence 
of Buddhism in China. Tang wrote the past of Chinese Buddhism from a broad 
perspective of intellectual history but ignored the popular facet of Buddhism as a 
‘lower culture.’ Nevertheless, as was analyzed before, what is important is not 
whether these interpretations were right or wrong, but the position from which 
these scholars made their judgments. All these historians were not passively 
following Tang’s sources, but actively interpreting them. They inquired why the 
Chinese people were willing to embrace Buddhism and also how Buddhism was 
‘Sinicized’.   
 
The Formation of Chinese Buddhism 
The scholarly consensus indicated that the Sinicization of Buddhism was 
accomplished in the middle of the Tang dynasty, when the indigenous Buddhist 
schools, Tiantai, Huayan and Chan, had been completely established by Chinese 
Buddhist masters. However, before the modern era, Buddhism in China was normally 
called  ‘shijiao’ 釋教 or ‘shijia’ 釋家 in traditional texts; it was never called ‘Chinese 
Buddhism’ [Zhongguo fojiao/hanzhuan fojiao 中國佛教/漢傳佛教]. The appearance 
of the term ‘Chinese Buddhism’ was a modern product that was not only related to 
the invention of Buddhism as a ‘world religion’1188 but also the formation of China as a 
nation.  
 
Chinese Buddhism in the West 
The emergence of the independent field of Buddhist study with a focus on China was 
closely linked with how the Orientalists and Sinologists understood or imagined 
Chinese religions. During the last three centuries, the Western attitude towards 
 
1188 In the last twenty years, a diverse array of scholars from Talal Asad and Jacques Derrida to Daniel 
Dubuisson, Timothy Fitzgerald, Jonathan Z. Smith, and Tomoko Masuzawa have all repeatedly 
demonstrated that religion is not a universal entity but a culturally specific category that took shape 
among Christian-influenced intellectuals and missionaries.  
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Buddhism and China has gone through several ups and downs.  The earliest 
narratives about ‘China,’ which came from travelers like Marco Polo, John of 
Montecorvino, and so on, never mentioned Buddhism.1189 Only beginning with Matteo 
Ricci, the man whom Demiéville has called the “founding father of Western 
Sinology,”1190 did Buddhism enter into the vision of Westerners. To a certain extent, 
the Western attitudes toward Chinese Buddhism as well as other local religions were 
determined mainly by the descriptions given by the Christian missionaries. However, 
the outstanding achievement of those Christians had a high cost: because of their 
prejudices against Buddhism and Daoism, the entire branch of Chinese religion was 
always excluded from the field of Sinology.1191 Inherited from Ricci and other 
Christian missionaries, Buddhism and other Chinese religious traditions continued to 
be ignored in Western academic writings during this early stage.  
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however, many Western 
philosophers began to imagine China as a “paradisiacal universe,” a model of rational 
government, and a moral land in which native religious tradition was just a “heap of 
superstitions.”1192 In this view, Buddhism caught the attention of Western scholars 
and was portrayed as an expression of quietism and nihilism. Such interpretations 
paved the way for the Western characterization of Buddhism.1193 In the nineteenth 
century, Buddhism definitely constituted an object of scholarly discourse and was 
“rectified as a textual object.” This can be attributed to the ‘Oriental Renaissance,’1194 
 
1189  Paul Demiéville and Martin Faigel, “The First Philosophic Contacts Between Europe and China,” in 
Diogenes 15, no. 58 (1967), 75-103. 
1190 Paul Demiéville, “Aperçu historique des études sinologiques en France,” in Acta Asiatica: Bulletin of 
the Institute of Eastern Culture 11 (1966): 56-110. 
1191 On Ricci’s attitude towards Chinese religion, see also Paul A. Rule, “Jesuit and Confucian? Chinese 
Religion in the Journals of Matteo Ricci,” in Journal of Religious History 5 (1968). 105-24; Frederick P. 
Braudauer, “The Encounter between Christianity and Chinese Buddhism from the Fourteenth Century 
through the Seventeenth Century,” in Ching Feng 11, no. 3 (1968). 30-38; Iso Kern, “Matteo Riccis 
Verhältnis zum Buddhismus,” in Monumenta Serica 36 (1984): 65-126. 
1192 For the Western understanding of Chinese Buddhism, especially Chan, see Bernard, Chan Insight and 
Oversight. 19-45. 
1193 Bernard, Chan Insight and Oversight. 34 
1194 Almond, The British Discovery of Buddhism, 139. 
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which, in Raymond Schwab’s words, demonstrated a textualization that permitted a 
‘historicized’ Buddha and the convenient opposition between a pure, canonical, early 
Buddhism in India and the decadent Buddhist religion in later Asia. 1195 Accordingly, 
many Western scholars considered Chinese Buddhism an offspring of Indian 
mysticism that had modified, twisted, or wildly supposed the doctrines of Indian 
Buddhism.  
Around the middle of the nineteenth century, or particularly under the 
influence of Hegel, a variant of the evolutionist schema was applied. Buddhism was 
interpreted by Hegel as “a definite and necessary step of religious representation,”1196 
which would eventually be aufgehoben by Western thought.1197 Moreover, owing to the 
development of the “scientific study of Buddhism” established by Eugène Burnouf, 
Max Müller, and so on, the romantic search for the old Oriental wisdom gave way to 
the cultural versions of this Hegelian evolutionism in which Buddhism (as well as 
Hinduism, Confucianism, Daoism, etc.) was reduced to one early stage of mankind.1198  
As colonialism expanded over Asia, the image of China evolved from that of a 
model of enlightened government (as in Voltaire’s opinion1199), to that of a corrupted, 
apathetic, and radically inferior country. Under this circumstance, the ‘great 
tradition’ of Confucianism continued to consume most of the efforts of the 
 
1195 See Raymond Schwab, The Oriental Renaissance: Europe’s Rediscovery of India and the East, 1680-1880, 
trans. Gene Patterson-Black (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984).  
1196 Heinrich Dumoulin, “Buddhism and Nineteenth-Century German Philosophy,” Journal of the History 
of Ideas 42, no. 3 (1981): 462. 
1197 Hegel remained very dependent on Jesuit accounts, from which he inherited the conception of the 
Buddhist principle [li], “the matter of all things” [Grundstoff]. From this outset, he was convinced that 
“world history moves from East to West, Europe being the end of world history.” However, Hegel’s 
understanding of li was not correct. It was based on Longobado’s misinterpretation (1701) of Confucian 
li as being of a material nature.  
1198 For a summary of this issue, see Goethe, in a discussion with Eckermann about Hindu philosophy, in 
Gespräche mit Goethe (Berlin: Bong, 1949), 224. 
1199 For instance, Voltaire, Correspondence, 112, Letter of 28 November 1762.  
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Sinologists1200, while ‘sub-great traditions,’ here Daoism and Buddhism,1201 were 
largely overlooked or, as an afterthought, fitted into the preexisting scheme 
established for the ‘great’ tradition.1202 Moreover, because of the combination of a 
development of scholarly Orientalism, Christian intolerance, and colonialist self-
importance, the formulation of Buddhist degeneration reached its peak among 
Western scholars.1203 Most of the Western Buddologists at that time failed or refused 
to distinguish Chinese Buddhism from its Indian origin. For example, the Chan school, 
one of the most representative Chinese Buddhist traditions, was interpreted as a 
meditation form of quietism and a forerunner of annihilation. Carefully hiding their 
polemical tactics behind scholarly erudition, these nineteenth-century Orientalists 
believed themselves more sophisticated than their Christian predecessors in 
rediscovering the Indian origins of Mahāyāna Buddhism. However, even the most 
excellent scholars among them, such as Eugène Burnouf, dismissed the miracle told 
in the Lotūs Sūtra or simply labeled it as “incredible nonsense,” and were unable to 
completely free themselves from prejudice and condescension.1204 Based on this 
epistemological position, the ‘annihilation’ thesis spread and became the established 
 
1200 For instance, Marcel Granet downplayed the role of Taoism and Buddhism in his picture of Chinese 
religion (1927); Max Weber, although not a Sinologist, reflected the same premises in his work on 
China (The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism, 1951); Joseph Levenson’s influential work Modern 
China and its Modern Fate (1968) also demonstrated a special emphasis on Confucianism. 
1201 In addition to the sets of great “Western” and “Eastern” religions, in the early twentieth century, 
there was another category of religions that were perhaps not so great, or what were sometimes 
termed “little traditions,” which tended to go by certain generic, lower-case names (shamanism, 
animism, etc.) often with particular local markers attached. See Masuzawa, The Invention of World 
Religions: Or, How European Universalism was Preserved in the Language of Pluralism, 15. Here I use the ‘sub-
great tradition’ to mean the non-Confucian traditions that were not orthodox or dominant in the 
Chinese historical context but influential in the intellectual domain.  
1202 Norman J. Girardot, “Chinese Religion and Western Scholarship,” in China and Christianity: Historical 
and Future Encounters, ed. Yu-ming Shaw James D. Whitehead, Norman J, Girardot (Notre Dame: 
University of Nortre Dame Press, 1979). 64 
1203 Jules Barthélémy Sanit-Hilaire, for example, in his work entitled “The Buddha and His Religion,” 
considered Buddhism to be an ideological foil, a convenient way to extol the virtues of positivism and 
Western democracy. His reassertion of the intellectual superiority of the West had a great influence on 
Friedrich Max Müller and many other scholars of the second half of the nineteenth century.  
1204 Eugène Burnouf, Le Lotus de la bonne loi (Paris: 1973, Adrien Maisonneuve, 1973 [1852]) vol.1, 417. 
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view among Europeans. It was developed with nuance by Max Müller, who claimed 
that Chinese Buddhism was a deviation from the original teachings of the historical 
Buddha.  
Noticeably, it was only the mystical facet of Chinese Buddhism, especially the 
Chan ‘mysticism,’ that caught the eyes of European researchers, and they tried to 
define the Chan as Indian instead of Chinese.1205 For instance, the Chan school was 
depicted by some scholars as one of the two sides (the other is Christianity) of the 
essential religious phenomenon of “perennial mysticism.” By doing so, Chan 
Buddhism was considered fundamentally “non-Chinese”; it was seen as “profoundly 
Indian, even more so than Buddhism itself.”1206 Even, in some academic discourses, 
the origins of Chan were linked with various Indian teachings outside Buddhism, for 
example, Vedantism, Jainism, and so on. Therefore, Chan was defined at times by 
several Western scholars as neither Chinese nor Buddhism,1207 but Indian. The 
‘mysticity’ of Chan’s meditation techniques, transmission means, and its rhetoric 
form of expression—the ‘encounter dialogue’—were emphasized and even became a 
cliché in the characterization of the Chan tradition.   
Linking certain Chinese Buddhist sects back to India was one of the attempts 
to trace Chinese Buddhism back to its Indian origin.1208 Many other accounts and 
discourses, which were dominant in the field of comparative religious studies, relied 
too heavily on textual comparison and hence downplayed China’s novelty. Sinicized 
Buddhism, which later was transplanted to Japan as a kind of ‘Chinese wisdom,’ was 
 
1205 For example, scholars like James Livingstone Stewart, Karl Neumann, and so on.  
1206 Bernard, Chan Insight and Oversight. 41.  
1207 Léno, Wieger, for example, in his work entitled “A History of the Religious Beliefs and Philosophical 
Opinions in China” considered Chan a “Chinese paganism” that he associated with Vadantism. E. 
Lamariesse also interpreted the Linji school of Chan as an “esoteric school” against the ritualism of 
Chinese Buddhism and an interiorization of morality; he considered the Nirvāna not as a beatitude 
through science. (1893: 84, 68-69) Other scholars who had the similar opinion included Henri Doré, 
Henri Bernard and so on. Some other scholars, such as Edkin, believed Chan was a Jain outgrowth.  
1208 Taking the study of the Chan school as example, some scholars, such as James L. Stewart, have 




interpreted as a passive and distorted version of Indian metaphysics that was 
negatively contaminated with neo-Confucian morality. Not surprisingly, this Western 
interpretation of Buddhism was criticized in East Asia, especially in the Buddhist 
circle. After a long (but basically failed) ‘dialogue’ between the West and Buddhism in 
the pan-Asian circle, this situation was finally changed by the outstanding Japanese 
Buddhist scholar D.T. Suzuki. With his efforts and those of his followers of the Kyoto 
school, Japanese Buddhism, in particular the Zen tradition, acceded to full visibility. 
Suzuki not only provided a doctrinal basis for a unified and universal Buddhism 
through his translations and commentaries on a ‘minimalized’ or ‘selected’ Zen 
canon1209 but also interpreted the teachings of Zen1210 with modern discourses that 
matched the taste of the Western audience better than the former missionary-
influenced descriptions or the ‘great tradition’ offered by Sinologists.  
Japan’s experience gained tremendous responses in Western society as well as 
in China. Along with a stronger urgency for learning or even copying the Western 
model, a desire for self-portrait and a sense of self-identity disseminated among 
Chinese elites. The success of Suzuki encouraged the Buddhists in China to transform 
their native Buddhist tradition into something more unique, dynamic, and universal 
(even by misrepresenting some doctrines while consciously keeping silent about 
others) and interpret it as a supporting power of a modern nation or a core of the 
spirit of Chinese culture.1211 However, Buddhism in China largely failed to free itself 
from its cultural ties with any specific religious or philosophical traditions, as Zen 
did.1212 The path of Japan and the models borrowed from the West also could not 
 
1209 The canon included works such as the Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna, the Green Cliff Record 
[Hekiganroku; 碧巖錄], the Platform Sutra [dangyō; 壇經], the Song on the Realization of the Way [Shōdōka, 
証道歌], and Hakuin’s Orategama. Later, it came to include the works of Shenhui and the Japanese 
Master Bankei. See Ketelaar, Of Heretics and Martyrs in Meiji Japan: Buddhism and Its Persecution, 187-191. 
1210 Suzuki’s notion of Zen, as Faure noted, pointed to the Kamakura and Muromachi periods, the time 
Zen supposedly embodied the highest values of the rising warrior class. See Bernard, Chan Insight and 
Oversight. 57. 
1211 See ibid., 65-66, also, Sharf, “The Zen of Japanese Nationalism.” 
1212 For Suzuki’s “psychological antecedents,” see D.T. Suzuki, Essays in Zen Buddhism (London: Rider and 
Company, 1949-1953), vol.2, 28-34. 
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uncritically be applied to Chinese contexts. Modern Chinese scholars either needed to 
search through traditional sources to find something corresponding and reinterpret 
it by referring to new conceptual frameworks, or they could change the concepts 
themselves and use them under particular conditions. The titles of many scholarly 
works during the modern era, with the terms “Chinese religion,” “Chinese 
Buddhism,” “Chinese philosophy,” and so on, suggested their endeavor of 
‘announcing possession’ and setting a boundary. 
   
Defining Chinese Buddhism 
The Western narrative of Buddhism, which was based heavily on Christian-
missionary or Orientalist presuppositions, failed to capture its panorama due to the 
absence of the Chinese image. To many modern Chinese historians, it was misleading 
in a way that made Buddhism the substantive noun and the notion ‘Chinese’ merely 
as adjectival qualifier. On the contrary, these historians believed that being ‘Chinese,’ 
which could be interpreted as a cultural bricolage that historically formed the 
characteristic of Chinese Buddhism, had its fundamental value. Historians in China, 
from Liang Qichao to Hu Shih, demonstrated less interest in the soteriological 
doctrine of certain sects and the original, fundamental teachings of the Buddha in the 
canon. Palī and Sanskrit literature was emphasized, but mostly from a comparative 
perspective. To a certain degree, when these Chinese historians applied the notion of 
‘Chinese Buddhism,’ what they had in mind totally differed from their European and 
American counterparts. They were focused more on the word ‘Chinese’ instead of 
‘Buddhism.’ Therefore, the strategical usage of the term “Chinese Buddhism,” which 
has ‘Chinese’ as a genitive case to the nominative noun of Buddhism, actually 
inverted the relationship between China and Buddhism. In this sense, this was the 




The Problematic Concept of “China” 
The word ‘Chinese’, which indicated the geographical separation and ethnic 
uniqueness of China was vague and somewhat premature. One initial problem was 
the absence of the terminology, especially the ambiguity of the term ‘China’ 
[Zhongguo 中國] itself, in Chinese historical texts. In the chapter “The Denomination 
of Chinese History” [Zhongguo shi de mingming 中國史的命名] in his introductory 
work Zhongguo shi xulun published in 1921, Liang described this dilemma:  
Nothing is more shameful than the fact that our country has no name. It is commonly 
called Zhuxia [all the xia], or the Han people, or the Tang people, which are all names 
of dynasties. Foreigners call it Zhendan [Khitan] or Zhina [Japanese for China], which 
are names that were not named by us. If we use Xia, Han, or Tang to name our 
history, it will pervert the goal of respect for the guomin [citizens]. If we use Zhendan, 
Zhina, etc., it is to lose our name to follow the master’s universal law [gongli]. Calling 
it Zhongguo or Zhonghua is pretentious in its exaggerated self-esteem and self- 
importance…… We might as well use what has become customary. It may sound 
arrogant, but respect for one’s country is the way of the contemporary world. If our 
citizens could realize the difference between name and reality, this would be also a 






As shown in this passage, the word Zhongguo, according to Liang’s criterion, was not a 
‘perfect’ name for the historical existence of the ‘land of the Middle kingdom.’ Liang 
realized the perennial question of ‘zongguo’ in disciplinary practice and raised this 
issue in the writing of the new ‘comprehensive history’ as one definition that needed 
to be clarified from the beginning.  
The term ‘China’, from Liang onwards, gradually became fixed and was used 
by modern Chinese scholars uncritically. At times, the notion of China or Chinese was 
 
1213 Liang, “Zhongguo shi Xulun 中國史緒論,” 1-12, esp. 3. 
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indistinctly applied to the dynasties founded by non-Han ethnicities. However, 
historians in modern China realized that, mostly, it referred to extremely different 
territories in space and also covered various time spans. Chen Yinke and Chen Yuan, 
for example, had already realized that the complexity behind the name China was 
unavoidable.1214 Regardless of whether they were speaking about, for instance, the 
Tang, Ming, or Qing dynasties, the diversity within China was tremendous with regard 
to ethnicity, descent, clan, and religions.1215 The attempt to write Buddhism as one 
part of the national history of China represented this diversity. It demonstrated that 
the scholarly consensus that the Qing territorial bequest had laid the foundation for 
the modern Chinese state as a geographic and ethnic entity1216 was an oversimplified 
self-identification instead of an existant historical fact.1217  
 
1214 The Qing definition of China has been criticized by several New Qing scholars. They have pointed 
out that the concept of China as a multi-ethnic empire was defined by the Qing and continued 
throughout the modern period, while the name China referred only to the peoples of the Han group 
and the region of China proper. James A. Millward, Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing 
Central Asia, 1759-1864 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 9, 12-13, 201, 249; Pamela Kyle 
Crossley, A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Empire Ideology (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1999), 341. For a summarized investigation, see also Zhang Gang, “Reinventing China: 
Imperial Qing Ideology and the Rise of Modern Chinese National Identity in the Early Twentieth 
Century,” Modern China, Vol. 32, No. 1 (2006): 3-30  
1215 Sabine Dabringhaus has deepened this issue by investigating “the work between Sinology and 
Central Asian Studies”; she has named Owen Lattimore, Paul Pelliot, Herbert Franke, Joseph Fletcher, 
Morris Rossabi and Nicola Di Cosmo were the few scholars who were able to overcome these lines of 
division. See Sabine Dabringhaus, Geschichte Chinas von der Mongolenherrschaft bis zur Gründung der 
Volksrepublik (München: Oldenbourg Verlag 2006), 127.  
1216 Ho, Ping-ti, “The Significance of the Ch'ing Period in Chinese History.” The Journal of Asian Studies, 26 
no.2 (1967): 189–195. 
1217 China’s nationalism has recently been a hot topic among American scholars of Qing history, 
although they have not paid much attention to the change in the concept of China. There have been 
some studies that have explord the change in the concept of China; see, for example, Edward Rhoads’s 
book Manchus and Han: Ethnic Relations and Political Power in Late Qing and Early Republican China, 1861–1928, 
which focuseds on the Qing court’s construction of China as a multi-ethnic entity (Seattle: University 
of Washington, 2000). Many scholars have discussed the origin and evolution of China. See (Wang 
Ermin 王爾敏, “Zhongguo mingcheng suyuan jiqi jindai chanshi 中國名稱溯源及其現代闡釋” in 
Zhongguo jindai sixiang shilun 中國近代思想史論 (Taipei: Huashi chubanshe, 1977), 441-80; Ge 
Zhaoguang, Zhaizi Zhongguo: Chongjian youguan ‘Zhongguo’ de lishi lunshu 宅茲中國:重建關於 “中國”的
歷史論述 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2011), and Hewei Zhongguo: Jiangyu, minzu, wenhua yu lishi 何為 “中
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In history, religious diversity has always occurred against the background of 
trans-ethnic assimilation. Therefore, when it came to the issue of religion, the grand 
unification [dayitong 大一統] model needed to be challenged, as well as a simplified 
but long-lasting conflation of China and Han. Liang Qichao made clear that he only 
used China for convenience; however, as shown in the passage cited above, there was 
indeed a tendency towards nationalism in Liang’s understanding of China. Although 
realizing the dilemma behind the term China, most historians could and would not 
abandon this term. Instead of confirming the political model of a multiethnic empire 
of Qing, historians tended to redirect China towards Han China, which was designed 
not to integrate all the ethnic communities into a homogenous state in reality, but 
was a highly theoretical setting.1218 They tried to dissolve the terminological 
confusion of China by redefining it through a process of theoretical assimilation, 
which Levenson called a “culturalist approach,”1219 that re-integrated the non-Han 
culture and community into a cultural ‘China as nation-state.’1220 In both cases of 
nationalism and culturalism,1221 historians in modern China eventually were able to 
suspend the ambiguity of the concept of China and keep using it instrumentally.  
 
國”: 疆域,民族,文化與歷史 (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 2014); Kawashima Shin 川島真, 
“Tenchō kara Chūgoku he: Shinmatus gaikō bunsho ni miru ‘Chūgoku’ no shiyorei,” 天朝から中國へ:
清末外交文書にみられ「中國」の使用例, Chugoku: Shakai to bunka no.10 (1997): 41–54; Luo Zhitian, 
Minzu zhuyi yu Zhongguo jindai sixiang 民族主義與中國近代思想 (Taipei: Dongda Tushu, 1998), 1-9; Hu 
Axiang 胡阿祥, “Weizai siming: ‘ Zhongguo’ gujin chengwei yanjiu 偉哉斯名: ‘中國’ 古今稱謂研究 
(Wuhan: Hubei jiaoyu chubanshe, 2000); Lydia Liu, The Clash of Empires: The Invention of China in Modern 
World Making (Cambridge, MA., Harvard University Press, 2004).  
1218 John Fairbank, ed., The Cambridge History of China: Volume 10: Late Ch'ing 1800–1911, vol. 10, The 
Cambridge History of China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 3-5. 
1219 J.R. Levenson, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the Mind of Modern China (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University 
Press, 1959), 103-112. Levenson introduced this term to describe the turn from an early notion of 
Chinese self-definition based on culture towards a new notion based on a nationalist approach for self-
definition per se.  
1220 This approach was still prevalent in the late twentieth century. See Philip C.C. Huang, “Theory and 
the Study of Modern Chinese History:Four Traps and a Question,” Modern China 24, no. 2 (1998): 192. 
1221 According to Levenson, the modern history of China then is one in which nationalism replaced 
culturalism as the dominant Chinese view of their own identity and place in the world. See Levenson, 
Liang Ch’i-ch’ao and the Mind of Modern China., 109-122. This thesis was criticized by James Townsend 




In his writing of the history of Buddhism, Liang primarily defined Chinese Buddhism 
based on the territorial concept of China (regardless of the instability of Chinese 
territory throughout history). In Liang’s opinion, Buddhism automatically became 
Chinese after it stepped across the frontier. In his first article on Chinese Buddhism, 
“Zhongguo fofa xingshuai yange shuolue 中國佛法興衰沿革說略,” Liang used the 
notion of “the Buddhism of China” [Zhongguo de fojiao 中國的佛教] but put it in 
quotation marks, which indicated his hesitation to use this term. Chinese Buddhism, 
as he noted, is not equal to Indian Buddhism, but also ambiguous enough to be 
categorized as something Chinese.1222 In the later part of this essay, he mentioned 
twice the term “history of Chinese Buddhism” [Zhongguo fojiao/foxue shi 中國佛教/
佛學史]. However, in most cases, he preferred to use “the Buddhism of our country” 
[wuguo fojiao 吾國佛教] with a more humble but more nationalist tone. 
Nevertheless, no matter which word Liang chose to use, a sense of self-
identity was quite palpable. In his essay entitled “The Development of Buddhist 
Doctrines in China,” he made a “solemn declaration”[zhenzhong shenming 珍重聲明] 
that Buddhism came from India; undoubtedly, the essential spirit of Buddhism was 
Indian. However, “after it entered China, it became China’s Buddhism.”1223 Buddhist 
schools, such as Tiantai, Huayan, and Chan, were purely Chinese; even the schools of 
Sanlun, Faxiang, Lü, and Mi were all full of Chinese characteristics.1224  
 
rightly that culturalism was not replaced but was still maintained as an important view among modern 
Chinese intellectuals. See James Townsend, “Chinese Nationalism,” The Australian Journal of Chinese 
Affairs, no. 27 (1992): 97-130. John Fitzgerald, “The Nationless State: The Search for a Nation in Modern 
Chinese Nationalism,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 33 (1995): 75-104; Benjamin I. 
Schwartz, “Culture, Modernity, and Nationalism - Further Reflections,” in China in Transformation, Tu 
Wei-ming, ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993); Franke Dikötter, The Discourse of Race in 
Modern China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995). 
1222 Liang, SBP, 4.  
1223 “Fojiao jiaoli zai Zhongguo zhi fazhan佛教教理在中國之發展,” in Liang, SBP, 149 
1224 Ibid., 149. 
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Compared with other Chinese scholars, Liang stressed the boundary between 
China and India, paying more attention to the doctrinal distinction between them.1225 
He discussed less the process of Buddhism’s Sinicization, as well as the detailed 
phenomenon of Chinese Buddhism after its localization, but was attracted by the 
early propagation of Buddhism in China, especially the early missionary and 
translation activities that occurred when Buddhism entered China. To Liang, 
Sinicization was of course a long process; however, the inner diversity and 
complexity of this process were overlooked in Liang’s account. As he imagined China 
as an undivided geographical region rather than a multicultural nation-state,1226 he 
also presumed Chinese Buddhism to be a solid entity that would become more and 
more homogenous. This homogeneity was also able to guarantee that Chinese 
Buddhism could stand beside its Indian ancestor independently and “light up the 
intellectual history of China.”1227 Although Liang touched on the issue of the 
‘transformation’ of Indian Buddhism to Chinese Buddhism, he somewhat evaded the 
questions of how ‘China’ became ‘Chinese’ or how and when the ‘Chinese-ness’ of 
Chinese Buddhism was formed and imagined under the sign of ‘China.’  
Liang’s territorial definition of Chinese Buddhism implied a conceived nation-
form with which he wished to replace the imperial regime of grand unification; 
however, at the same time, by using the term Chinese Buddhism in a territorial sense, 
he simplified the historical relevance between China and Buddhism. To thinkers like 
Liang, the new nation demanded a new history for its substantiation. In this process 
of “inventing China through history,” as Edward Wang described it, the most 
important mission for a historian like Liang was to guide the traditions of ancient 
China towards the goal of fostering national consciousness. Therefore, in such a 
 
1225 There are eight articles in his shibapian dealing with the issue of Indian Buddhism and the original 
Buddhist canons. He also had several studies on the translation of Buddhist canons and Buddhism in 
the Xiyu and communication between India and China. Among all his studies, there is only one essay (a 
preface to a collection related to Xuanzang) that is related to the Buddhism after the Sui dynasty.  
1226 In his “Zhongguo shi xulun 中國史緒論” Liang divided Chinese people based on the Chinese 
territory and their geographical surroundings. In this long article, he paid much attention to the 
geographical facts of China.  
1227 Liang, “光飾我思想史,” in SBP, 36.  
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narrative, the task of historically retelling the Sinicization of Buddhism was “to bear 
witness to struggles to achieve the national idea that was already implicit at the 
origins of historical time,” as in Melissa Brown’s phrase.1228 This strategy, which 
unified ‘Chinese Buddhism’ as an entity existing in a certain geographical realm with 
consistency, rested its claims to legitimacy not on ‘hard’ historical facts, but on the 
will of constructing a Chinese Buddhism, which normally using a political voice.  
 
Ontological Definition  
Different from Liang, Tang linked ‘Chinese Buddhism’ with Sinicization instead of 
with the geographical concept of ‘China’: Chinese Buddhism was determined by its 
special rituals, lineages, monastic systems, and of course, its unique doctrines. Tang 
Yongtong also used the term “Chinese Buddhism” in his Hanwei published in 1937. As 
he wrote in the epilogue, “the history of Chinese Buddhism is complicated to 
discuss.” However, throughout the whole book, he seldom used the term “Chinese 
Buddhism.” Only when he talked about the long-term and general influence of 
certain historical figures and events did he add the word “Chinese” before 
Buddhism.1229 One of the few examples of this was his discussion of An Shigao’s 
translation activities. He noted that An had had a significant influence on ‘Chinese 
Buddhism’ [zhonghua fojiao 中華佛教].1230 In another place, Tang emphasized in his 
general methodological discussion a ‘textual criticism’ for understanding the 
historical changes in ‘Chinese Buddhism.’1231 However, throughout his Hanwei, Tang 
preferred to use “the theory coming from the West” [zilai zhifa 西來之法] to refer to 
 
1228 Melissa J Brown, Is Taiwan Chinese?: The Impact of Culture, Power, and Migration on Changing Identities 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004). 28-33. 
1229 In the whole book of his History, Tang only used the term ‘Chinese Budhdism’ [中國佛教] six times.  
1230 Tang, History, 48; He also mentioned Yan Futiao 嚴浮調, the disciple of An, as the “first Chinese 
Buddhist” [Zhongguo fojiao tu 中國佛教徒]; Hanwei, 50 
1231 Hanwei, 416.   
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Buddhism and particularly separated it from “the teaching of China” [zhongxia 
zhixue 中夏之學].1232  
 Given Tang’s frequent use of the notion of Chinese Buddhism in his later work 
Shigao, it is reasonable to speculate that Tang avoided applying ‘Chinese Buddhism’ 
when talked about pre-Tang Buddhism. Obviously, Tang had already conceived a 
clear definition of what Chinese Buddhism was and when Buddhism had been fully 
Sinicized. In the preface to his Shigao, he declared that “Chinese Buddhism, although 
based on translated scriptures, was developed doctrinally due to local writings.”1233 
The emergence of native Buddhist sects in the Sui and Tang periods, such as Tiantai 
and Chan, according to his criterion, marked the establishment of “purely Chinese 
Buddhism.” When he further analyzed each of the sects, he clearly named them 
under the rubric of ‘Chinese,’ such as “the Chinese san-lun school” [zhonghua sanlun 
zong 中華三論宗]1234, “the Chinese Tiantai school” [Zhongguo tiantai zong 中國天台
宗]1235, and so on. The terminology of Chinese Buddhism, in Tang’s view, defined itself 
only after each different school of Indian Buddhism had been inherited by its Chinese 
followers, after a Sinicized doctrinal system had been built up based on Chinese 
canons, and after native monastic lineages had been established at local sacred sites. 
This historical process was rendered by Tang as ‘living on its own’ [zili menhu 自立門
戶].1236 In general, in Tang’s definition (although he never really put it forward), 
‘Chinese Buddhism’ did not indicate simply the Buddhism in China, but rather, it 
meant the Buddhism which had accomplished its process of Sinicization.  
 
1232 The term zhongxia literally is an abbreviation of the two words zhongtu中土 and huaxia 華夏. This 
word in Tang’s usage may come from the Sutra of the Forty-Two Sections, where it was written: 於是發使
天竺，寫致經像，表之中夏. In Tang’s History, the word zhongxia was always used as the counterpart 
of xiyu/xifang [西域/西方]. For examples see History, 34, 104, 207. The word zhongxia was also an 
important concept in the prevailing debate of yixia [夷夏之辨] between the Song and Qi dynasty. See 
Gu Huan 顧歡, on “yixialun” in Houhanshu. Tang in his History discussed this debate and cited the 
relevant argument about zhongxia written by Gu Huan. History, 350-352. 
1233 The Original text: “中國佛教，雖根源譯典，而義理發揮，在於本土論述.” Tang, Shigao, 5 
1234 Tang, Ibid., 113. 
1235 Ibid., 134. 
1236 Ibid., 5. 
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However, Tang’s definition still remained vague in several aspects. For 
example, he ignored the ethnic dimension of China when he used the term Chinese 
Buddhism; Buddhist belief among the non-Han Chinese seemed largely excluded from 
his research domain. Moreover, there were still questions left unanswered in his 
whole narrative, such as the uniqueness of Sinicized Buddhism and its relationship 
with the original Indian Buddhism. Taking account of Tang’s extreme emphasis on 
Chinese Buddhist texts, it might be better to understand his conception of Chinese 
Buddhism as a documentary or philological tradition that based its core doctrines on 
texts written in Chinese (with the Japanese and Korean Buddhist texts excluded as 
well). This classification was, however, very narrow and sometimes contained 
paradoxes. Tang had already realized that the Buddhist canons written in Chinese 
were not equivalent to the ‘Chinese’ Buddhist canons, since the translated Buddhist 
texts were not really Chinese. In one letter he wrote in 1963, he suggested Lü Cheng 
revise the title “The Category of Chinese Buddhist Canon” [Zhonghua dazangjing 
mulu 中華大藏經目錄] and use “The Chinese-Translated Canon” [hanyi 漢譯] 
instead.1237 Tang also emphasized in another place that the main textual corpus of 
Chinese Buddhism is primarily “the expositions of the [Chinese] ancients” [qianxian 
zhuanshu 前賢撰述] instead of the translated works. However, he also noted that 
translated texts, as another crucial part of the doctrinal foundation of Chinese 
Buddhism, represented the diverse reactions of the Chinese processors to foreign 
teachings. Further, these texts also gained their ‘Chinese-ness’ in the process of 
selection, translation, and distribution, although they still had their doctrinal roots in 
original Indian texts.1238 
Hu Shih’s Revolution 
Compared with Liang and Tang, Hu Shih’s study of Buddhism focused on Chan, the 
most Sinicized Buddhist tradition. Significantly, Hu had little interest in other 
Buddhist schools (Tiantai, Huayan, Faxiang, Pure Land, and so on).1239 Likewise, 
 
1237 Tang, TYQJ, vol.7, 660. 
1238 Tang, Hanwei, TYQJ, vol.1, 414. 
1239 He only mentioned other schools when he needed to disparage them as being colonized by “India’s 
complex philosophy,” referring, for example, to Xuanzang’s “falling into the great spider’s web” of 
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popular Buddhism and other religious traditions, such as Taoism, were conspicuously 
absent from Hu’s horizon. To Hu, the study of Chinese Chan Buddhism, as indicated in 
several titles of his works, was equal with, or at least could represent, the study of 
Chinese Buddhism.  
As a historian, Hu knew Chan in its historical manifestation, but not “Chan in 
itself.” To him, Chan was a totally Chinese production, while Buddhism was always 
Indian. Although he never officially claimed this position, one can see that the history 
of Chan, in Hu’s view, was an independent phenomenon rooted not in the Indian 
concept of dhyāna but in the context of Chinese culture, politics, and philosophy. In a 
letter to Yanagida, Hu wrote: “You are a first-rate Buddhist, a first-class Zen scholar, 
while I am a ‘student’ of the history of Chinese thought, someone who does not 
believe in any religion.”1240 Clearly, Hu Shih’s recurrent interest in Chan did not relate 
to any religious enthusiasm but could only be interpreted in terms of his efforts to 
rehabilitate Chinese classical philosophy and Chinese culture, namely his enterprise 
of the ‘Chinese Renaissance.’1241  
Hu defined the emergence of Chan as “a revolution” of Chinese Buddhism: it 
was an inner transformation that led to a “new Buddhism which never existed in 
India”; the ‘Chan school’ [chanzong 禪宗] or ‘Chan sect’ [chanmen 禪門], he wrote, 
was a “new religion.”1242 This new religion, which Hu called the “new Buddhism of 
China’ [Zhongguo xin fojiao 中國新佛教], was established in the mid-Tang, after an 
 
Yogācāra idealism and being unable to escape it. Hu Shih (1970, 42-43), also John R McRae, “Religion as 
Revolution in Chinese Historiography: Hu Shih (1891-1962) on Shen-Hui (684-758),” Cahiers d’Extrême-
Asie 12, no. 1 (2001): 59–102. 
1240 Letter dated 15 January 1961, in Zenggaku kenkyū 53 (1973): 162-170; Reprinted Hu Shih 1975,614-
655. See Yanagida’s reply in Zenggaku kenkyū 53 (1973): 170-172. 
1241 See Hu Shih, The Chinese Renaissance (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934). According to 
McRae, Hu’s study had a close link with his theory of ‘Chinese Renaissance,’ which he posited as the 
theoretical outline of the movement of ‘recognizing the national past.’ See John R. McRae, “Religion as 
Revolution in Chinese Historiography: Hu Shih (1891-1962) on Shen-Hui (684-758),” Cahiers d’Extrême-
Asie 12, no. 1 (2001): 59–102; For the issue of the Chinese Renaissance and its influence on Hu Shih’s 
scholarship, see also Jerome B. Grieder, Hu Shih and the Chinese Renaissance: Liberalism in the Chinese 
Revolution, 1917-1937 (Cambridge MA.: Harvard University Press, 1970).   
1242 Hu Shih, HSWJ, vol.12, 338. 
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inner revolution within the monastic community of the Chan school. Compared to 
the Indian tradition of Buddhism, this Chan Buddhism was pictured by Hu as simple, 
rational, and native.1243 Here Hu indicated a ‘revolutionary’ rupture between the Chan 
discourse and Indian Buddhism as well as the pre-Chan Buddhist tradition. He thus 
slightly replaced the concept of Chinese Buddhism with his setting of Chan. In his 
booklet A Brief History of Medieval Chinese Thought [中國中古思想小史], 1244 he wrote in 
the eleventh chapter, entitled “Indian Buddhism becomes Chinese Chan,” that  
From the eighth century, Chan replaced Buddhism. Chan monasteries replaced the 
Vinaya monasteries. The word “Chan” was used as the synonym of “Buddhism” in 
poems and essays. Buddhism had completely become Chan. 八世紀以下，「禪學」
代替了佛教，禪院代替了律居。詩文中的「禪」字即使「佛教」的代名詞。佛教
已完全變成禪學了.1245 
As he described it, Hu tacitly replaced ‘Buddhism’ with ‘Chan’, which indicated his 
standpoint that the tradition of ‘Chan’, which is stood in lieu of Buddhism in the 
intellectual world of the Chinese, was actually not ‘Buddhism.’ To Hu, historically, 
there was no such thing as ‘Chinese Buddhism’ at all, but instead this concept 
consisted of two things that were fundamentally exclusive and independent: ‘Indian 
Buddhism’ and ‘Chinese Chan.’ From the perspective of intellectual history, Hu 
composed his general reevaluation of Chinese civilization by dividing Chan from 
Buddhism and excluding other Buddhist traditions from his framework of the 
‘national past.’ In this sense, Hu invented his object: a Buddhism named Chan.  
Since Hu used the term ‘Chinese Buddhism’ repeatedly and established an 
interpretative relevance between ‘Chinese Buddhism’ and Chan, he undoubtedly had 
his own standard for separating Chan from its predecessor. Unlike Liang, who defined 
Chinese Buddhism with his nationalist imagination of ‘China,’ or Tang, who focused 
on the formation of Chinese Buddhism and its historical manifestations, Hu 
conceptualized Chinese Buddhism with his philosophical criteria. As demonstrated in 
 
1243 Ibid., 395 
1244 Hu Shih, Zhongguo zhonggu sixiangshi changbian 中國中古思想史長編, (Taipei: Yuanliu, 1986 [1931-
1932]), 3-74. 
1245 Ibid., 63. 
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his critique that Chinese religions were fundamentally shamanism, his positivism led 
him to blindness towards the religious character of Chan and Chinese Buddhism but 
remarkably emphasized the role Chan had played in the intellectual history of China. 
Notably, Hu’s Western-originated rationalism paradoxically reinforced his nativist 
outlook on Chinese culture, prompting him to see Chan as the privileged expression 
of a Chinese nationalist humanism, which he called “Sinicism” [huaxia zhuyi華夏主
義].1246 In Hu’s interpretation, ‘Sinicism’ was a kind of “primitive rationalism,” a 
“Socratic tradition” that respected truth, fact, knowledge, and independent 
thinking.1247 Taking this one step further, Hu tried to philosophize ‘Chan’ by scraping 
all the irrational or ritual touches from it. It is evident, in this regard, that Hu already 
had presuppositions about ‘Chinese Buddhism’ and “how it should be.” He then, just 
as Faure described, extolled “the ‘Ockham’s razor’ of Chan—its sharp nominalist 
criticism of Indian Buddhist’s scholasticism”—to interpreted Chinese 
Buddhism/Chan as “an instrument of intellectual emancipation from all 
‘superstitions, beliefs in Buddhas, Bodhisattvas, magic powers, charms, spells,’ of 
traditional Buddhism and as a genuine manifestation of the pragmatism of ‘Chinese 
mentality’.”1248 This is the reason why Hu treated Chan as a pivot for the ‘Chinese 
Renaissance’ that took place in the Tang and continued throughout the Song. During 
this ‘Renaissance,’ Hu noted, China was able to divest itself of intellectual and 
religious domination from India and revert to the simple, humanistic rationalism of 
the native Chinese tradition, with the help of Chan.1249 
 
 
1246 Hu Shih, “Zhongguo ren sixiang zhong de buxiu guannian 中國人思想中的不朽觀念.” HSWJ, 
vol.12, 340. 
1247 Ibid., 340, 401-06. 
1248 Bernard, Chan Insight and Oversight.,97, with quotation from Hu Shih. “The Development of Zen 
Buddhism in China,” The Chinese and Political Science Review, 15 (1932): 481. 
1249 John R McRae, “Religion as Revolution in Chinese Historiography: Hu Shih (1891-1962) on Shen-Hui 
(684-758),” (2001): 64. According to McRae, the version of Hu’s theory I am dealing with here is 
developed most clearly in his “Religion and Philosophy in Chinese History,” in Sophia H. Chen Zen 




Sinicization and Indianization  
The discourse of “Sinicization,” although under critique nowadays, did not bother the 
modern scholars too much when they wrote the history of Chinese Buddhism, since 
the historical phenomenon through which Buddhism became a part of Chinese 
culture seemed an unquestionable fact to them. However, several epistemological 
and hermeneutical issues still remained in their narratives of Sinicization. As is well 
known to us through historical sources, the writing of Chinese Buddhism was a 
product of two traditions that sometimes overlapped, sometimes contradicted, and 
sometimes ignored each other: Buddhist philosophy and Chinese historiography. The 
complex attitudes and tendencies towards these two currents were represented by 
the debates and divergence between scholars. 
 
Sinicization 
In the view of the nineteenth-century Orientalist studies, Indian Buddhism was 
considered to be the only source of the authentic knowledge of Buddhism. Indeed, 
from the viewpoint of Buddhist orthodoxy or essence, Chinese Buddhism was an 
outgrowth of the reconciliation of Indian Buddhism with local Chinese spirits and was 
undeniably a ‘distortion’ of Indian Buddhism. However, outside the Western schema 
of Orientalism, the issue of Sinicization, to modern Chinese historians and scholars, 
discernably demonstrated the particularity of Chinese Buddhism: a Buddhism in the 
particular Chinese context.1250 Therefore, the process of Sinicization, which indicated 
the vigor or even superiority of Chinese culture, became closely linked with 
 
1250 The term of Sinicization was also a very important concept in Chinese political and cultural history. 
It has been discussed recently by the New Qing historians. For example, Evelyn S. Rawski has argued 
that “Sinicization—the thesis that all of the non-Han peoples who have entered the Chinese realm 
have eventually been assimilated into Chinese culture-—is a twentieth-century Han nationalist 
interpretation of China’s past.” See Evelyn S. Rawski, “Reenvisioning the Qing: The Significance of the 
Qing Period in Chinese History.” The Journal of Asian Studies 55, no.4: 829–50; see also John McRae, “State 




historiography (although it was a secular discipline) and its object: the national 
history of China.  
The Choice of the Chinese 
For the early acceptance of Buddhism during the Han era, Erik Zürcher has explained: 
“Despite occasional (and surprisingly rare) terminological borrowings from 
Confucian and Daoist lore, the most striking aspect of Han Buddhism is its novelty. 
The view of Buddhism was accepted because it, in certain ways, accorded with 
indigenous traditions must be rejected: Buddhism was attractive not because it 
sounded familiar, but because it was something basically new.”1251 The feeling of 
“exoticism” Zürcher mentioned here echoes the opinion of Hu Shih.  
In his article “On the Concept of Immortality in Chinese Thought,” Hu noted 
that not because of its sophisticated philosophical setting but because of its 
newfangled gadgets of karma, Saṃsāra and the dichotomy of good and evil, which 
had never been imagined by the Chinese before, had attracted the ordinary Chinese 
people and made them imagine Buddhism as one great religion.1252 Hu used the words 
“shock” and “frighten” to describe the first impression Buddhism left on Chinese 
people and he narrated their reaction as “confusing and dazzling.” He wrote, “These 
novel conceptions were accepted by the Chinese men and women impatiently, 
because they are what the Sinic religions [huaxia zongjiao 華夏宗教] lack.”1253 Hu 
suggested that the ancient Chinese in the Han dynasty neither passively accepted 
Buddhist teachings nor were forced by any external force to change their original 
beliefs to Buddhism. Rather, the Chinese used Buddhism as an intellectual appeal, 
carefully picking up certain concepts, symbols, and ideals from Buddhist doctrines to 
enhance the native Huaxia system of thinking.1254 Being blind to back and forth within 
 
1251 Erik Zürcher, “A New Look at the Earliest Chinese Buddhist Texts,” in From Benares to Beijing: Essays 
on Buddhism and Chinese Religion in Honour of Prof. Jan Yün-Hua, Shinohara Koichi and Gregory Schopen 
ed., (Oakville: Mosaic, 1991), 291. 
1252 Hu, HSWJ, vol. 12, 354. 
1253 Ibid.  
1254 Current scholarship has reemphasized Hu’s and Zürcher’s viewpoint. For example, Yü Chunfang, in 
her monograph Kuan-yin, has argued that Chinese people became attracted by Kuan-yin not because 
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the process of Buddhist Sinicization, Hu simplified the Chinese transformation of 
Chinese Buddhism to a linear narrative in which Buddhism gradually lost its 
exoticism and strangeness after entering into China and was finally replaced by a new 
Buddhism called Chan. After doing so, Hu claimed, “Heaven now adopted a Chinese 
name, and Hell was governed by Chinese emperors and judges.”1255  
To Hu Shih, therefore, the ‘dialogue’ between Buddhism and China was a 
soliloquy on the Chinese side. Ancient Chinese people utilized and absorbed some 
ingredients of Buddhism as a supplement to their local thought, while abandoning 
others as useless. This opinion, which showed less sympathy to Buddhism itself, was 
criticized by D.T. Suzuki as “utterly unable to grasp what Chan is.”1256 However, as 
Bernard Faure has pointed out, the divergence between Hu and Suzuki was actually 
smaller than Suzuki claimed, for they “were only considering different strata of some 
reality and taking part for the whole.”1257 Just like Suzuki, who considered Zen to be 
the expression of the spirit of Japan, Hu held a similar position that the Sinicized 
Buddhism, namely Chan, was a product of the Chinese mentality.1258 
A similar emphasis on the role China played in Buddhist Sinicization can be 
observed in Liang’s writings. With a more pronounced nationalist orientation, Liang 
believed that the choice of the Chinese was the most important factor in Buddhism’s 
ability to take root in Chinese soil and experience prosperity. However, unlike Hu 
Shih, Liang considered the cultural accordance between Buddhism and Chinese 
native thought, instead of the feeling of exoticism, as the premise of Sinicization.    
 
Kuan-yin bore any resemblance to any Chinese indigenous deity, but because “none of them was like 
him/her.” See Chün-fang Yü, Kuan-yin: The Chinese Transformation of Avalokitesvara (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2001), 5. 
1255 Hu, HSWJ, vol. 12, 354 
1256 D.T. Suzuki, “Zen: A Reply to Hu Shih.” Philosophy East and West 3, 1 (1953): 29.  
1257 Bernard, Chan Insight and Oversight. 97. 
1258 See D.T. Suzuki, “Zen: A Reply to Hu Shih.” (1953): 40-41. Also, Theodore Griffith Foulk, “The “Ch’an 




 In his first article on Buddhism, entitled “The Early Import of Buddhism” 
[Fojiao zhi chu shuru 佛教之初輸入] and published in 1920,1259 Liang used the North-
South dualism as the pattern to explain and narrate the transmission of Buddhism in 
its early stage. According to this scheme, the cultural structure of China in the pre-
Buddhist era was divisible into two basic types: the North (religious, practical, 
militaristic, and pure) and the South (philosophical, abstract, cultured, and mystical). 
This typology resembles Herbert Spencer’s description of the development of world 
history and was influenced by Henry Thomas Buckle.1260 Under such a historical-
geographical framework, Liang argued that geographical conditions mold 
fundamental cultural characteristics that determined the missionary route of 
Buddhists in China. Rather than the activities of the early Buddhist missionaries and 
the promotion of political powers, Liang argued that the liberal, scholarly 
atmosphere in the South, which agreed implicitly with the Buddhist view, was the 
real reason for the popularity of Buddhism.1261 This dualist view, in Liang’s narrative, 
was not only the reason why Buddhism became popular among the Chinese 
beginning in the Late Han period but also was the evidence for his sea route 
hypothesis.1262   
Further, Liang discussed that the proclivity for “religious color” [zongjiao 
secai] in Northern China led to the prevalence of Buddhist monasticism (including 
temple construction, rituals, the expansion of the population of clerics, and so on) but 
meanwhile a slow and weak development of its doctrinal dimension. Liang was not 
satisfied with the Northern tradition of Chinese Buddhism because it could not 
represent the national character of China. He argued that, after the uprising of the 
Five Barbarians, the northern region of China then was occupied by non-Han 
 
1259 In 1922, it was collected with eleven other articles into one volume of the three-volume collected 
work of Liang Qichao  titled Liang Rengong jinzhu 梁任公近著 and was published by Zhonghua shuju 中
華書局 in 1922. These collected works are the first batch of Liang’s studies on Buddhism.   
1260 Tang Xiaobing, Global Space and the Nationalist Discourse of Modernity: The Historical Thinking of Liang 
Qichao, 40. 
1261 Liang thought that the popularity of Buddhism in the northern part of China relied on the imperial 
power. It is more like superstition that relied on the power of despotism.  See SBP, 9. 
1262 Liang, SBP, 33-36, also, 9. 
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ethnicities that had not been assimilated by “our nation.” In this situation, the “most 
distinguished” Chinese intellectuals had all moved to the South; therefore, “the Non-
Han development could not be considered as our national characteristics” and 
remained just a subsidiary factor of the Sinicization of Buddhism.1263  
Liang’s nationalism and Hu’s nativism, however, might have led them to an 
overestimation of China’s subjectivity. For example, neither Hu nor Liang, in their 
writings of Buddhist history, really addressed the issue of who made the choice for 
Buddhism. They also did not answer the question of why Buddhism in Chinese history 
had distanced itself not only from Indian Buddhism but also from the mainstream of 
Chinese thought. Because of the limited sources at their disposal (namely the 
literature written by or for the literati), both Hu and Liang actually narrowed their 
horizon to the Buddhist intelligentsia—cultured clergy and literati. It was true, 
perhaps, that Buddhism was an ‘exotic alternative’ that was chosen by the Chinese; 
however, it was not merely chosen by the “gentry” or educated elite, but also chosen 
by the majority of ordinary, marginalized, illiterate Chinese men and women. 
Noticing this flaw in Liang’s writing, Tang Yongtong pointed out that most of the 
materials existing now picture only one segment of the immensely complex 
phenomenon. He criticized Liang’s deduction that Buddhism had first spread among 
the Southern literati as an argument that “makes no sense,” since Liang relied too 
heavily on the biographical records of An Shigao in the Gaoseng zhuan but failed to 
realize the fact that the author of Gaoseng zhuan, Huijiao, was himself a scholarly 
monk who lived in Southern China.1264 Tang argued, with subtle, abstruse 
philosophical expressions and refined, highly artificial, over-stylized language, the 
circulation of these texts must have been restricted to a distinct, highly important, 
 
1263 Here Liang argued that after the Uprising of the Five Barbarians, the northern part of China became 
long occupied by different tribes and non-Han ethnic groups; their lifestyle, conventions, and spiritual 
characteristics were not rooted in Chinese national identity未能根於我國民性也]. See ibid.  
1264 Tang, TYQJ, vol.1, 63. Tang pointed out five flaws in Liang’s argument, including that in the official 
histories of the Han and Jin dynasties, there are records of Buddhist preaching activity in Luoyang 
called “聽者雲集”; also, since Buddhism was primarily a kind of mystic art that first emerged in the 
regions of Yan燕 and Zhao 趙 (present-day Hebei province), Buddhism should also first have become 
popular in the northern region of China.   
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but relatively small part of the Buddhist population—the cultured elite and those 
monks who had obtained a literary education that enabled them to become members 
of this elite circle. Moreover, even the Buddhism of the elite contained heterogeneous 
elements. For example, the majority of the cultured clergy may have come from the 
lower strata of society and closely served the local community of believers during 
their whole lives through rituals, rites, and other forms of religious practices, while 
isolating themselves from other activities of the elite. Therefore, the Chinese choice 
of Buddhism needs to be contextualized, since it was not the game of the ‘privileged.’ 
In fact, one of the most significant concepts of Buddhism promoted in Chinese society 
was the ‘monastic ideal’—the great equality of all [zhongsheng pingdeng 眾生平等].  
As one part of Buddhism’s Indian heritage, this concept to a certain extent challenged 
the innate social hierarchy of medieval China and provided opportunities for people 
from the most diverse origins to engage in intellectual activities.1265 This “novum in 
Chinese cultural history”1266 indicated that Buddhism was far from submissively 
waiting for the decision of the Chinese elite, as Liang and Hu described; on the 
contrary, Buddhism changed the old class boundaries and created new social strata 
and organization.  
Buddhism and Local Spirit 
Buddhism’s contacts with local Chinese traditions, such as religious Daoism, 
happened immediately after it entered China. Folk religions, although they were 
somewhat repressed and failing, also profoundly influenced Buddhism and played a 
significant role in its Sinicization. Tang Yongtong was one representative historian 
who deeply discussed the relationship between Chinese folk culture and Buddhism in 
a systematic way. Tang had observed from considerable evidence in Chinese 
historical writings, both official and unofficial, that the early image of Buddhism in 
Han China was always intensely entangled with the local religious atmosphere.1267 In 
 
1265 Zürcher, The Buddhist Conquest of China., 4-9. 
1266 Ibid. 
1267 On this issue, Robert Sharf has pointed outthe study of Wu Hong, which claimed that the Buddha 
was worshipped as a foreign god of imposing visage possessing supernatural powers. While the foreign 
origins of this buddha-god may have been appreciated, the Buddha was nonetheless thought of and 
 404 
 
his Hanwei, Tang examined in detail the connection between Buddhism and local 
cults, which are now often subsumed under the category of ‘religious Daoism,’ in his 
chapter titled “Buddhism and Daoism.” According to Tang’s analysis, there were two 
kinds of indigenous ideas that contributed to the early prevalence of Buddhism. The 
confrontation between Buddhism and local Daoism went through two stages:  
First was the cosmology based on the Yijing. The Chinese conception of the 
universe, as presented in the ritual life of the court of the Han dynasty, was an 
interconnected harmonious whole that was expressed by the cyclic progression of 
wuxing 五行 and the yin-yang schema.1268 This naturalist world view then was 
developed into a full-fledged cosmology by Daoists and Confucianists, such as Dong 
Zhongshu 董仲舒 (BC. 192-BC. 104).1269 Daoist priests designed several patterns and 
orders, referred to as “correlative thinking,” to use Needham’s words, through which 
 
worshipped as a member of the indigenous pantheon. See Sharf, Coming to Terms With Chinese Buddhism: 
A Reading of the Treasure Store Treatise. 22; Wu Hong, The Wu Liang Shrine: The Ideology of Early Chinese 
Pictorial Art (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986), 273. 
1268 The common use of the term “element” for xing 行 can be traced to misconceptions on the part of 
early European missionaries to China; see Manfred Porkert, The Theoretical Foundations of Chinese 
Medicine: Systems of Correspondence (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1974), 45. It continues to be used by 
some even though xing carries none of the connotations of “essential material substance” associated 
with the term “element” in medieval European alchemy or modern science. Xing is etymologically and 
semantically closer to “phase” or “process.” However, Schwartz has expressed reservations, noting 
that “if the term ‘five elements’ overemphasizes the role of the ‘static substances,’ the terms ‘phases’ 
and ‘activities’ overlook the role of static substances and categories within the entire syndrome of the 
wuxing 五行”; see Benjamin I. Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard 
University Press, 1985), 455. A.C. Graham has preferred to distinguish between early (pre-Han) usage, 
for which the translation “process” or “conduct” is preferred, and later (Han and post-Han) usage, for 
which “phase” is more appropriate; see Yin-Yang and the Nature of Correlative Thinking (Singapore: 
Institute of East Asian Philosophies, National University of Singapore, 1986), 74–77, 89–92. 
1269 Henderson has suggested that by “consigning numerological speculations and occult ideas to a 
particular classical school, all taint of such ideas could be removed from classical Confucianism and 
Taoism. One could thus attribute the embarrassing appearance of questionable cosmological 
conceptions in the postclassical Confucian and Taoist traditions to an extrinsic source”; see John B. 
Henderson, The Development and Decline of Chinese Cosmology. New York: Columbia University Press, 
1984), 35. Relatively recent views of the early development of Chinese correlative thinking before the 
Han can be found also in Vitaly A. Rubin, “The Concepts of Wu-Hsing and Yin-Yang,” in Journal of 
Chinese Philosophy 9, no.2 (1982): 131–157; Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China, 356–378; and 
Graham, Yin-Yang and the Nature of Correlative Thinking, 70–92. 
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the cosmos would be understood and controlled;1270  they also embodied this system 
with rituals and practices such as pseudo-prophecy, ‘weft-texts’ [wei 緯] and numero-
calendric ‘charts’ [tu圖], self-cultivation, eating drugs [fushi 服石], and so on.1271 As 
the logic behind these designations, a theory of sympathetic resonance [ganying 感
應]1272 (in the Confucian expression, a phenomenalism known as “interaction of 
heaven and man” [tianren ganying 天人感應]) was applied and was transformed into 
a hermeneutic approach to interpreting Buddhist concepts such as the resonant-body 
of the Buddha and resonant retribution [baoying 報應].1273 In Tang’s view, this 
striking character of ‘synthesis’ of the Han cosmology and religious Daoism was the 
prerequisite for the dissemination of Buddhism.1274  
Secondly, from the Jin dynasty, xuanxue, which emphasized the eternal 
existence of qi 氣 and the quiescence of nonaction, dominated the intellectual sphere 
of the Chinese. Originating from the teaching of Zhuangzi, xuanxue depicted the spirit 
of humanity as an immortal, universal being, spontaneously responding to the stimuli 
of nature. Due to the prevalence of xuanxue among the Chinese literati, Buddhist 
figures were matched with Daoist sages; for example, Laozi was portrayed as a 
Buddhist or even one of the reified Buddhas. This phenomenon represented a blend 
of the Chinese models of the sage-king and the Indian ideal of bodhi. According to 
Tang, these conceptual overlays formed the intellectual foundation for the 
Sinicization of Buddhism in the pre-Tang era. Realizing the entanglement of foreign 
 
1270 Joseph Needham, “Human Laws and Laws of Nature in China and the West.” Journal of the History of 
Ideas 12 (2): 230. 
1271 For the historical examination of Chinese early mysticism in the Taoist tradition, see Livia Kohn, 
Early Chinese Mysticism: Philosophy and Soteriology in the Taoist Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1992).  
1272 The principle of ganying is used to explain the mechanism of invocation in Taoism as well; see 
Isabella Robinet, Méditation taoïste (Paris: Dervy livres, 1979), 81–82. 
1273 For a detailed investigation of this issue, see Sharf, Coming to Terms With Chinese Buddhism: A Reading 
of the Treasure Store Treatise. 120-133. 
1274 Tang, History, 39-43. Tang argued that the theory of wuxing had synthesized with Daoism in the Han 
dynasty. Later, Buddhism also became one part of this large synthesis [為此大綜合之一部分]. 
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conceptions of Buddhism with native beliefs and cults,1275  Tang focused more on the 
interaction between different faiths and the epistemological tensions between them 
than on the inner doctrinal division within Buddhism and certain localized ritual 
practices.1276  
The relationship between Buddhism and Daoist esoteric arts was a main topic 
of Chen Yinke’s study of the history of Chinese Buddhism. According to Chen’s 
observation, proceeding its long journey to China, Buddhism was at first a foreign 
religion under the guise of mythology, introducing new deities, demons, and exotic 
rituals into a highly secularized civilization that worshipped the historical-evidential 
ancestors and blood ties within clans. In contrast to Tang, who emphasized the 
mystic tradition of religious Daoism, Chen Yinke focused more on the tantric element 
within Buddhism. In Chen’s view, despite some native potential rivals,1277 the Indic 
mythology of Buddhism was also an essential aspect of its initial appeal for the 
Chinese.1278 An instance was the story of Huatuo 華佗, a widely circulated legend 
about a doctor. Using the approach of comparative linguistics, Chen analyzed the 
possible Buddhist origin of the name Huatuo and some other names of Indian doctors 
scattered in the books of Chinese traditional medicine,1279 demonstrating how Chinese 
 
1275 Faure used the term ‘locative’ to discuss the tension between a specific place and an abstract space. 
According to Faure, he borrowed the term from Jonathan Z. Smith. Smith defined the locative vision as 
emphasizing place and the utopian vision as stressing the value of being in no place. See Bernard, Chan 
Insight and Oversight. 156; Jnathan Z. Smith, Map is Not Territory: Studies in the History of Religions (Leiden: 
Brill, 1978), 101.  
1276 The contact between Buddhism and local cults also cause antagonism, especially in the case of Chan 
Buddhism, which was refined, de-ritualized, and intellectualized.  
1277 Bernard Faure, “Indic Influences on Chinese Methodology: King Yama and His Acolytes as God of 
Destiny,” in Kieschnick and Shahar, India in the Chinese Imagination. 46. He also pointed out this 
interpretation has been contested by Victor Mair See his “What Is Geyi, After All?,” China Report 48, no. 
1–2 (2012): 29–59. 
1278 See Rolf A. Stein, “the Guardian of the Gate: An Example of Buddhist Mythology, from India to 
Japan,” in Asian Mythologies, ed. Yves Bonnefoy ans Wendy Doniger (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1991), 119-21; and Michel Strickmann, Mantras et mandarins: Le bouddhisme tantrique en Chine 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1996). 
1279 In his article “Sanguozhi Cao Chong Hua Tuo zhuan yu fojiao gushi三國志曹沖華佗傳與佛教故
事,” Chen analyzed that the eminent doctor Hua Tuo was also a Chinese fabrication that named a 
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people re-portrayed mythic Indian doctors, such as Qiyu 耆域, as real historical 
Buddhist monks who had traveled to China with Buddhist missionaries and lived in 
Chinese cities.1280 To Chen, this process of ‘historicization’ or ‘de-mythization’ 
indicated the role myths and legends played in the early contact between Buddhism 
and Chinese local traditions. In other articles, Chen also elaborated that the 
Sinicization of Buddhism in its early stage was more or less driven by the enthusiasm 
of some Daoist reformers for rehabilitating Daoism into a more powerful belief that 
would fit better the Chinese taste for esotericism and mysticism.1281  
Compared to Tang, Chen Yinke was more sensitive to confrontations than 
harmony in the encounter between Buddhism and China. He did not depict the 
Sinicization of Buddhism as a mild and smooth “acculturation” of different traditions; 
1282 on the contrary, Chen suggested that Buddhism, although initially changing itself 
to gratify the needs of its Chinese audience, was also sometimes forced to give up 
some of its characteristics and was transformed under the compulsion of certain 
political and ideological forces on particular occasions. He noticed that the way 
Chinese people tampered with the Indian Buddhist texts to make them compatible 
with native ideologies and ethical principles, such as filial piety and chastity, was a 
very crucial issue in Buddhist Sinicization.1283 In his article “Epilogue to the Causes 
 
Chinese historical figure with an Indian name originating from Buddhist myth. See Chen, HLTJ, 176-
181. 
1280 Chen further listed the other records in the Gaoseng zhuan and other literature in the Wei and Jin 
dynasties to demonstrate that the early generation of Buddhist monks, such as Yu Fakai 于法開 and Yu 
Daosui 于道邃, always had identities as doctors. Chen even suspected that the name of the legendary 
doctor Qing He was also fabricated under the influence of Indian medical theory. “Cuihao yu Kou 
Qianzhi 崔浩與寇謙之,” in JMCB, 128-130. 
1281 Ibid.  
1282 The term ”acculturation” [涵化]’ here is borrowed from Wittfogel. See Karl A. Wittfogel and 
Feng Jiasheng, History of Chinese Society: Liao (907–1125) (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 
1949). See also John Kieschnick, “Guanyu Fojiao hanhua de xingsi 關於佛教漢化的省思,” in 
Zhongguoshi xinlun: zongjiaoshi fence 中國史新論: 宗教史分冊, ed., Lin Fu-shih 林富士(Taipei, 
Linking, 2011), 272. 
1283 Kenneth Ch’en, for example, has argued that the emergence of Buddhist texts that propagated filial 
piety demonstrated how Buddhism was Sinicized and obeyed the rule of Confucian morality. See 
Kenneth K. Ch’en, Buddhism in China, A Historical Survey (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), 
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[nidana] of Ordination of the Bhikṣuṇī Utpala-varṇā” [Lianhua seni chujia yinyuan ba 
蓮華色尼出家因緣跋], Chen scrutinized the story of Bhikṣuṇī Utpala-varṇā in the 
Dunhuang manuscript of Foshuo zhujing zayu yinyou ji 佛說諸經雜緣喻因由記1284, 
pointing out that the claimed seven retributions Utpala-varṇā experienced before she 
was ordained as a Buddhist nun were altered and became six when this story was 
introduced into China.1285 Through further investigation, Chen confirmed that the sin 
and punishment of Utpala-varṇā’s incest were completely deleted from the Chinese 
translated version in the Dazang jing. Comparing the Palī scriptures and the Chinese 
translated texts in the collected Dunhuang manuscripts, he contended that the plot 
point of Utpala-varṇā committing incest was deliberately removed by the Chinese 
translators because such a story was unacceptable according to the Confucian 
principle of women’s chastity.1286 
More generally, Chen interpreted the Sinicization of Buddhism as a 
mechanism compelled by political forces and social obstacles. The contradictions and 
compromises between Buddhism and China sometimes were very severe, as he 
observed; sayings such as “Śramaṇa should not bow to kings” [shamen bujing wanzhe 
沙門不敬王者] and “Śramaṇa should not worship the mundane affairs”[shamen 
bubai sushi 沙門不拜俗事] demonstrated the Buddhists’ rejection of Confucian 
morality and the relationship between the ruler and minister [juchen 君臣]. Another 
 
179. Also, Ch’en “Filial Piety in Chinese Buddhism,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 28 (1968): 81-97; The 
Chinese Transformation of Buddhism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), 14. 
1284 “ Fo shuo zhujing zayuan yu yin you ji佛說諸經雜緣喻因由記” (Beijing, National Library國家圖
書館藏), Number: BD03129.  
1285 Chen noted that, in the text, the author repeatedly mentioned that Utpala-varṇā had experienced 
seven retributions as “投盟作七種之誓,” “作如是七種咒誓惡報.” However only six of them are 
recorded. Also, the number ‘seven’ was a fixed formula in Buddhist scripture; therefore, it was 
impossible that the author of the text unintentionally wrote “seven” instead of “six.” See Chen Yinke, 
“Lianhuase ni chujia yinyuan ba 蓮花色尼出家因緣跋,” HLTJ, 169-75. 
1286 Chen’s opinion, however, was criticized by later scholars. According to Zhao Xin’s趙欣master’s 
thesis “Lianhuase biqiuni jiqi xiangguan renwu de yanjiu” 蓮花色比丘尼及其相關人物的研究, the 
story was mentioned but without details 22 times in Dazangjing, and the story was recorded but 
without the plot detail of committing incest 45 times. However, the whole story appeared only three 
times in the Vinaya. See Zhao, 22-23. Although this issue exceeds the scope of this dissertation, I think 
the examples in the Vinaya cannot fully negate Chen’s hypothesis.  
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example Chen mentioned was that Chinese Buddhism, in particular the Chan school, 
had revised Buddhist monastic regulation, domesticating the Indian Vinaya teaching 
into a Sinicized system of rules of purity [Qinggui 清規] that better suited the 
political principles of Confucianism.1287  
The impact of India is a common cliché in the modern historiography of 
Buddhism. Indeed, Buddhism and its religious and cultural attachments played a 
crucial role in China’s history; however, the different interpretations mentioned 
above indicate that ‘Sinicization’ was not an ‘either-or’ issue. Meanwhile, the 
different prepositions behind these modern interpretations sometimes blur the 
problems that the ancient Chinese really faced, but instead present the actual 
situation those modern historians themselves encountered: how could China 
regenerate itself by critically adapting foreign intellectual resources but maintain the 
survival, or even triumph, of the native traditions at the same time? The history of 
Buddhism was always circling around this issue and revealed its difficulty and 
ambivalence.   
Mistranslation  
The nationalist tendency in modern Chinese historiography sometimes led to an 
overestimation of the one-sided function of China in the process of Buddhist 
Sinicization: namely, Buddhism was selected, accepted, and ceaselessly re-interpreted 
by the Chinese. This consensus among modern Chinese scholars more or less 
exaggerated the role China played in the Buddho-Sino encounter. Only a few scholars 
have inquired into this narrative and have noticed the weakness within the Chinese 
attempt to domesticate foreign religion.   
Chen Yinke and Lü Cheng realized that the foundation of Chinese Buddhism 
was a set of mistranslations and was therefore shaky. Writing the history of 
Buddhism with translated materials was also problematic. As analyzed before, 
 
1287 Other examples mentioned by Chen included the Buddhist vegetarianism in China. Chen found 
evidence in the Gaoseng zhuan that vegetarianism was not a rule for Buddhists before the sixth century 
(the period of Emperor Wu) in the Liang dynasty. See Chen Yinke, Dushu Zhaji sanji讀書札記三集 
(Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 2009), 38. 
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although early Chinese Buddhists had realized the shortcomings of geyi in conveying 
accurate meanings and consciously repudiated it, the practice of geyi did not, and 
indeed could not, be stopped in the Chinese religious culture. It was believed that the 
problem of mistranslation would be ameliorated as the Chinese were given access to 
better translations. However, the Chinese had their own criteria for selecting and 
judging the texts of translated Buddhist scriptures. For example, the advance of 
Kumārajīva’s translations over those of his predecessors was not due to their fidelity 
to the originals (perhaps only the modern scholars like Chen Yinke could explicitly 
point out the fallacies in the old translation as an arbiter of Buddhist knowledge), but 
rather due to the elegance and accessibility of his prose.1288 From the 
historiographical perspective, judging the accuracy of Chinese translations may beg 
the question. The shortage of high-quality translation was not a severe obstacle for 
the distribution of the Buddha’s teaching but just the beginning of the domestication 
of Buddhism.1289 
Under the rubric of ‘the Buddha’s teaching,’ the rift in translation was very 
deep. Lü Cheng noted the pitfalls of mistranslation and considered it a forced, 
inexorable form of ‘Sinicization’. It resulted unavoidably in a distortion of the 
authentic meaning of the Dharma. Lü cited the mis-translation of the terminology 
‘tathatā’ as an example in the introduction to his book The Origins and Changes of 
Chinese Buddhism [Zhongguo fojiao yuanliu luejiang 中國佛教源流略講].1290 The term 
‘tathatā’ was initially translated as benwu 本無 in early Chinese Buddhist texts. 
However, due to the literal confusion of benwu with some Daoist notions, this term, 
 
1288 Sharf, Coming to Terms with Chinese Buddhism: A Reading of the Treasure Store Treatise, 12. 
1289 The term domestication, as mentioned above, has been used by Arthur Wright in his Buddhism in 
Chinese History. Kenneth Ch’en also refers this term in the title of one chapter in his Buddhism in China: A 
Historical Survey. Some scholars, such as Yü Chun-fang, intend to replace the term ‘Sinicization’ with 
this term. As Yü clarified, her definition of ‘domestication’ comes from Todd Lewis and means “the 
dialectic process by which a religious tradition is adapted to a region’s or ethnical group’s socio-
economic and cultural life.” See Yü Chun-fang, Guan-yin, the Chinese transformation of Avalokitesrava 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2001). Todd T. Lewis, “Newar-Tibetan Trade and the 
Domestication of ‘Siṃhalasārthabāhu Avadāna’,” in History of Religions 33, no. 2 (1993): 135-60. 
1290 In the preface, Lü adopted the translation of “ruxing” [如性]. 
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which was closer to its Indian meaning, was gradually replaced by zhenru 真如, a 
word with a totally different meaning.1291 The enormous doctrinal divergence 
between Chinese and Indian Buddhism made Lü understand Chinese Buddhism as a 
new religion. He said, “We could not consider Chinese Buddhism as a transplanting 
[yizhi 移植] of Indian Buddhism; rather, it is a grafting [jiajie 嫁接] of Buddhism. 
There is a difference between them. That is to say, Chinese Buddhism has its roots in 
China, instead of in India.”1292 According to Lü’s observation, the backflow of Chinese-
ness even influenced India Buddhism itself. He took Xuanzang as an instance and 
argued that, although Xuanzang dedicated himself to distributing the orthodoxy of 
Indian Buddhism, his translation and works were still full of the “taste of China” 
[Zhongguo fengwei 中國風味].1293 When Xuanzang wrote Huizong lun 會宗論 at the 
Nalanda, he unconsciously introduced this “taste of China” into India.1294 This 
Chinese-ness, Lü believed, was a passive or even negative assimilation of different 
traditions.1295 Because of the inescapable ‘nostalgia’ in Xuanzang’s writing, Lü argued, 
although he had direct contact with the Indian origin of Buddhism, Xuanzang failed 
to make the distance between China and India any closer.  
For Lü, the sinicization of Buddhism was not chosen and compelled by the 
Chinese for their own purposes.1296 Rather, it was a product of the accumulation of 
 
1291 Lü, Yuanliu, 4 
1292 Ibid. 
1293 Lü, Yuanliu, 4 
1294 Xuanzang travelled around India between 630 and 643 CE and visited Nalanda first in 637 and then 
again in 642, spending a total of around two years at the monastery. There he received the Indian 
name of Mokshadeva and studied under the guidance of Shilabhadra, the venerable head of the 
institution at the time. See Sally H. Wriggins, Xuanzang: a Buddhist pilgrim on the Silk Road (Boulder, 
Colo.: Westview Press, 1996). 
1295 In Huizonglun, Xuanzang combined the Middle Way school [Sanskrit: Madhyamaka, 中觀] and 
Yogācāra school, which was unusual in the Indian Buddhist tradition. Lü, Yuanliu, 4. In his article “大乘
起信論攷證” he repeated this opinion about the “hengtong” 橫通 character of the Chinese people; see 
Lü, LFLX, 248. 
1296 In only a few cases, Lü mentioned the social-political background of the transformation of Chinese 
Buddhism. For example, when he discussed the core concept of “xinxing” 心性, Lü pointed out that 
Chinese Buddhism largely removed the notion of “zhuanyi” 轉依 from the Indian doctrine, for this 
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mistranslations, which largely had resulted from the dearth of true knowledge of 
Buddhism. Thus, Lü Cheng advocated for a decisive rejection of the narrative of 
Sinicization, although he did not compeletely abandoned the logic of ‘assimilation’ 
between Buddhism and local culture. In Lü, the Sinicized Buddhism was not 
“genuine” Buddhism, but rather a heresy—the fake imitation, in his words—that 
betrayed the original meaning of the Buddha’s teaching. Here, he jumped out of the 
discursive shackles of ‘Sinicization’ but declared the fundamental separation between 
Chinese Buddhism and Indian Buddhism.  
 
Indianization 
In 1936, Hu Shih wrote an article entitled “The Indianization of China: A Case Study of 
Cultural Borrowing.”1297 This critical essay on the intellectual transformation in 
Chinese history aroused a strong response. His remark in this article —	“India 
conquered and dominated China culturally for twenty centuries without ever having 
to send a single soldier across her border”—became one of the most popular and 
extensively quoted statements among the later Sino-Indian discourses. After Hu, the 
‘Buddhist conquest of China,’ to a large extent, became a paradigm of the historical 
narrative of Chinese Buddhism in the field of both Buddhology and Sinology. 
 Leaving aside his controversial summation of this issue, Hu’s notion of 
‘Indianization’ was usually understood as an equivalent expression to ‘Sinicization.’ 
For scholars who concern about the Buddhism in its Indian form or the superiority of 
Indian thought, Hu’s idea of Indianization provided an ‘authoritative’ 
acknowledgement of the cultural hegemony of India over ancient Chinese 
civilization. Because of its relatively radical tone, this idea was unique in Chinese 
academia at the time. However, soon it was tacitly recognized by Hu’s Western 
 
notion implied a will of social revolution that was not welcomed by the Chinese rulers. See Lü, LFLX, 
vol. 3: 1416. 
1297 This article was written for the Harvard Tercentenary Conference of Arts and Sciences, which was 
published in 1937 in Independence, Convergence, and Borrowing in Institutions, Thought, and Art (Cambridge, 
MA.: Harvard University Press, 1937), 219-247. 
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counterparts because it encapsulated their ultimate concern. How did Buddhism 
change China? 
Chinese Renaissance  
The extraordinary claims to India’s significance made in Hu Shih’s article “The 
Indianization of China” were aimed at the audience in the Western world. Lin Yü-
sheng has suggested that this article was written in a mood of cultural nationalism 
when Hu Shih was inclined to explain the intrinsic cruelty of the Chinese people in 
terms of the influence of Indian Buddhism.1298 He interpreted the Buddhinization 
[fojiaohua 佛教化] of China as the very key to his understanding of the medieval 
transformation of Chinese culture and his project of the independent re-evaluation of 
Chinese civilization.1299  
Hu Shih’s interests in Chinese history were remarkably broad, far 
transcending his work on early Chan Buddhism. For example, he became involved in 
academic discussions concerning the relative dating of Laozi and Confucius, the 
meaning of the rise of Neo-Confucianism in the Song dynasty, and the comparison 
between the rise of empirical scholarship during the Qing era and the European 
reformation. As a historian, no mere antiquarian, Hu, in keeping with the pragmatist 
teachings of his mentor John Dewey, undertook the study of history by means of 
‘organizing the national essence’ for the explicit purpose of serving the present.1300 In 
its narrowest sense, organizing the national essence implied the use of rigorous 
methodologies and an inquisitive yet critical approach to primary sources. On a 
broader level, this slogan provided a justification for a two-pronged endeavor. On the 
one hand, the scholar — and indeed the educated person in general — was to use this 
process to come to terms with his or her own tradition and to understand the Chinese 
past and its transformations. On the other hand, this endeavor was always to take 
 
1298 See Lin’s chapter on “the pseudoreformism of Hu Shih” in his The Crisis of Chinese Consciousness: 
Radical Antitraditionalism in the May Fourth Era (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979), 99. 
1299 John R McRae, “Religion as Revolution in Chinese Historiography: Hu Shih (1891-1962) on Shen-Hui 
(684-758),” (2001): 64 
1300 Eber, “Hu Shih and Chinese History: The Problem of Cheng-li Kuo-ku.” 169-207.  
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place for the benefit of the present and, more specifically, on behalf of the successful 
modernization of China.  
In Hu’s works, religious issues always obeyed his secular concerns about the 
past, present, and future of China. In his early writings, Hu Shih was largely critical 
toward Confucianism for its ‘superstitious’ implications; however, propelled chiefly 
by the growing realization that he could not reject its religious dimension while 
rehabilitating its humanistic and rationalistic aspects, his attitude gradually 
changed.1301 In one article on religion, he announced that “probably I am a 
Confucianist” and discussed that although Confucianism was not a real religion and 
might be “dead,” it could represent an ideal form of faith.1302 Confucianism, although 
it contradicted the principle of science,1303  had prepared China for modernization, in 
both institutional and intellectual dimensions.1304 Eber has concluded that Hu Shih 
was also moving toward a more positive appreciation of Daoism as a tradition that 
was conducive to modernization, although this position was only fully expressed in 
the 1950s.1305 
 
1301 Compare his statements on Confucianism in his The Develoment of the Logical Method in Ancient China 
(Shanghai: Oriental Book, 1922; rpt., New York, Paragon Book, 1963), 7-9, 17, 56, and 69, and the article 
“Shuo ru說儒,” in Hu Shih Wencun 胡適文存 4, no. 1, 1-103, esp. 68 and 75. Also see Eber, “Hu Shih and 
Chinese History: The Problem of Cheng-li Kuo-ku,” 187. 
1302 Hu Shih, “The Task of Modern Religion,” Journal of Religion 14, no. 1 (1934): 104. 
1303 See his comments in Albert E. Haydon, ed., Modern Trends in World Religions (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1934), 46. 
1304 He mentioned the examination system, the abolishment of primogeniture, the censorial system, 
the concept of the goodness of human nature, and the rationale for rebellion against tyrannical 
government provided by the theory of the mandate of heaven. See Hu Shih, “Historical Foundations 
for a Democratic China,” Edmund J. James Lectures on Government, Second Series (Urbana: University 
of Illinois Press, 1941), 54-63. 
1305 See Eber, “Hu Shih and Chinese History: The Problem of Cheng-li Kuo-ku.” 199-202. It is significant 
that Hu Shih did not significantly alter his estimation of Buddhism and Shen-hui’s role during the 
1950s, when he modified several other aspects of his interpretation of Chinese history. For Hu’s 
description of the successes and failures of Chinese classical scholarship during the last three hundred 
years, as well as a more detailed statement of the methodology of ‘organizing the national essence,’ see 
his “A Systematic Study of China’s Cultural Heritage,” Chinese Studies in History 14, no. 3 (1981): 80-87. 
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During the early 1930s, just after his major work on Shenhui was completed 
and at virtually the same time that he was reevaluating the Confucian and Daoist 
traditions, Hu Shih articulated a general theory of the periods of Chinese history. The 
hallmark of this theory was the identification of several particularly creative epochs 
that he referred to as periods of ‘renaissance.’1306 Hu Shih considered the emergence 
of Chan and the development of neo-Confucianism to be intimately related processes 
that profoundly influenced the emergence of the age of renaissance. Before the 
period of the ‘Chinese Renaissance,’ according to Hu Shih, was the period of the 
classical age, which ended about 200 B.C.E. (in another place he classified the first 
period as ‘the Sinitic Age’ [huaxia shidai 華夏時代], which lasted until the initial 
ascendency of Buddhism in the fourth century C.E), and the medieval or Buddhist age 
as long as eight hundred years, from approximately 200 B.C.E. to 1000 CE. According 
to Hu, the classical age was characterized by humanism, rationalism, and 
intellectualism, and a spirit of freedom and democracy; purely religious sensibilities, 
however, were not as well developed as other aspects of ancient Chinese society: 
[The Chinese people] had no time to indulge in speculating about the ways of the 
gods, or in effusive praises of the wonderful benevolence of heaven which they never 
enjoyed. They had a very simple religion consisting chiefly in a worship of their own 
ancestors, a belief in the spirits and the powers of the natural forces, a worship of a 
supreme God or heaven (which was probably evolved out of the worship of natural 
objects), and a belief in divination. To these they added a belief in the idea of 
retribution of good and evil. There was neither Hell nor Paradise; no life after death, 
only a firm belief in the importance of the perpetuation of the family line, primarily 
for economic reasons. This was the original religion of the Chinese. The extreme 
simplicity of this racial religion was the most remarkable in the history of mankind. 
There was little mythology, and little elaborate ritualism. It never had a generic 
name, and I have elsewhere proposed to call it ‘Siniticism.’1307 
 
1306 This list occurs in the lecture “The Chinese Renaissance” from Hu Shih, The Chinese Renaissance 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934), 44-45. 
1307 Hu Shih, The Chinese Renaissance (1934), 80-81; the allusion at the end of this passage is to Hu’s 
“Religion and Philosophy in Chinese History,” in A Symposium on Chinese Culture, Sophia H. Chen Zen ed. 
(Shanghai: China Institute of Pacific Relations, 1931). 
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As shown in this passage, the history of the pre-Buddhist age, namely the Sinitic or 
classical age, was marked by ‘simplicity’ and non-religiousness. As we shall see below, 
native Chinese thought was inherently and quintessentially simple, in direct contrast 
with the fundamental complexity of Indian Buddhism. The importation of Buddhism 
and its near-total domination of Chinese intellectual and religious life dramatically 
changed this landscape. 1308 To the Chinese, Hu analyzed, Buddhism possessed 
“impressive images and grandiose rituals and unintelligible metaphysics and 
superstitious charms and spells”; an extreme religious zeal then was incited among 
the Chinese when they were under the sway of Buddhism for, particularly, its 
“inhuman fanaticism” of self-mortification.1309 In Hu’s opinion, all the religions and 
philosophies of ancient China were free from the fantastic imaginativeness, 
hairsplitting analysis, and gigantic architectonic structure that can be found in 
almost all religious and philosophical texts of India. Gradually, “China was 
overwhelmed, dazzled, and dumbfounded by the vast output of the religious zeal and 
genius of the Indian nation. China acknowledged its defeat and was completely 
conquered.”1310 This process was what Hu called “Indianization.” 
Hu’s descriptions of the original Indian Buddhism, often in a manner that 
scarcely disguised his own contempt, were generally couched in terms of its 
complexity, which he saw as a shortcoming. For example, he dismissed Yogācāra 
idealism as quibbling that was both entirely inimical to the Chinese mentality and 
ultimately inexpressible in Chinese language. He also portraited the eminent pilgrim, 
translator, and Yogacara master Xuanzang as a monk with “close-minded 
fabrications,” who traveled to India at a time when “complex philosophy” was in its 
very heyday, along with idealism, logic, and many kinds of “meaningless dhāranīs”:  
The great Xuanzang threw himself into the great spider’s web and could not escape, 
so becoming a great believer and proselytizer of the Vijñānavādin School. At this 
 
1308 Hu Shih, “Chinese Thought” in China, Harley Farnsworth MacNair, ed., (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1951), 227. 
1309 Hu Shih, “Development of Zen Buddhism in China,” in Seizan, Ko Teki zengaku an 胡適禪學案 (1975), 
714. 
1310 Ibid., 715. 
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time of the seventh century, China was transformed into a great colony of India’s 
complex philosophy.1311 
He used ‘colony,’ the modern concept of imperialism, to describe the Indianization of 
China. Further, he pointed out that although the flood of strange Buddhist ideas and 
practices overwhelmed the Chinese people for several centuries, this sense of 
fascination was always accompanied by a feeling of revulsion:  
But the native rationalistic mentality of the Chinese intelligentsia gradually 
reasserted itself and revolted against this humiliating domination of the whole 
nation by a foreign religion which was opposed to all the best traditions of the native 
civilization throughout the country. Its celibacy was fundamentally opposed to the 
Chinese society which emphasized the importance of continuation of the ancestral 
lineage. Its mendicant system was distasteful to the Chinese social and political 
thinker who was naturally alarmed by the presence of millions of monks and nuns 
living as parasites on society. Its austere forms of asceticism and self-sacrifice and 
suicide were fundamentally against the idea of filial piety which regarded the human 
body as a sacred inheritance from one’s parents. And its wonderfully abstruse 
mythology and metaphysics, never ending in the most ingenious inventions of new 
gods and new titles of the gods, and never failing in the most captious 
differentiations and sub-differentiations, were most foreign to the simple and 
straightforward ways of thinking of the native tradition. And, most important of all, 
the whole scheme of salvation preached in Buddhism seemed to the Chinese thinker 
as most selfish and anti-social. Each man endeavors to become an arahat [sic], a 
bodhisattva, or a buddha. But the Chinese began to ask, for what end? What value is 
there in a salvation which must require the forsaking of the family and the desertion 
of all one's duties to the family and the state?1312 
 
1311 Hu Shih, Shenhui heshang yiji 神會和尚遺集. The original volume of the Yiji was published in 1930; 
here see the second edition, Shenhui heshang yiji fu Hu xianshang zuihou de yanjiu 神會和尚遺集附胡先
生最後的研究 (Taipei: Hu Shih jinianguan 胡適紀念館, 1968), 42-43; Hu Shih also dismissed the 
Tiantai school as a form of complex philosophizing. At one point, he also noted with obvious contempt 
that Zhiyi 智顗 was the sort of scholar who took 100,000 characters to explicate the two-character 
term for meditation, ‘zhiguan’止觀 [concentration and insight]. 
1312 Hu Shih, The Chinese Renaissance (1934), 85. In his distaste for superstition, Hu refers to Tantrism as 
one of the “worst features of Mahāyāna Buddhism”; see Hu Shih, “Religion and Philosophy in Chinese 
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Undoubtedly, there was a long tradition of Confucian anti-Buddhist polemic thriving 
in Hu Shih’s writings. He believed that the innate revulsion towards Buddhism was 
expressed publicly during the Age of the Chinese Renaissance. Then, China divested 
itself of the intellectual domination of India and reverted to the simple, humanistic 
rationalism of the native Chinese tradition. Buddhism, therefore, ‘disappeared’ when 
its contributions were appropriated by Chinese society as a whole. In this sense, in 
the third phase of Chinese history, as Hu described, China assimilated the  
more subtle elements of the Indian culture—the philosophy of the world and of life, 
the moral and social standards, the intellectual habits—things ...which had required 
much intermediate work of sifting, discarding, distilling, and reinterpreting, before 
some of them were sufficiently domesticated to be unconsciously appropriated into 
the Chinese culture.1313 
The Chinese Renaissance thus involved four types of effort aimed at overcoming the 
“humiliating domination” by a foreign religion “which was opposed to all the best 
traditions of the native civilization.”1314 Hu argued, as scholar John McRae 
summarized, these efforts included (a) imitation, as practiced by the Daoists in an 
attempt to supplant Buddhism; (b) persecution, the motive for which was 
nationalistic in nature; (c) internal revolt, the process of radical simplification that 
occurred within Chinese Buddhism, and specifically within the Chan school; and (d) 
philosophical secularization, as undertaken by the Neo-Confucians of the eleventh 
and twelfth centuries.1315 By these means Buddhism was able to be fully ‘integrated’ 
 
History,” 51. On another occasion he said with obvious relief that in spite of the careers of 
Amoghavajra and Vajrabodhi, two of the major translators of esoteric texts, China did not “fall” into 
becoming an esoteric or lamiast state; see Hu Shih, “Chan xue gushi kao 禪學古史考,” in Yanagida 
Seizan, Ko Teki zengaku an 胡適禪學案 (Kyoto: Chūbun shuppansha, 1975), 222. 
1313 Hu Shih, “Indianization of China,” in Seizan, Ko Teki zengaku an 胡適禪學案, 239. 
1314 Hu Shih, The Chinese Renaissance (1934), 85. 
1315 Yamaguchi cites various passages to indicate Hu believed that the task of the Sung and Ming 
Dynasty Neo-Confucians was only completed by the scholars of the Qing. See Yamaguchi Sakae山口栄, 
“Ko Teki no Chūgoku Zenshūshi ni tsuite 胡適の中國禅宗史に就いて,” in  Junsei Tanki Daigaku kenkyū 
kiyō 順正短期大學研究紀要, 3 (1973): 63- 76; esp. 71.   
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into Chinese society and allowed to disappear.1316 In this sense, Hu made his bold and 
seemingly paradoxical conclusion of the ‘Buddhist conquest’ of China while he 
implied the tacit triumph of the Chinese essence.  
Transcultural Thesis 
Another paradigm modern historians used to describe the influence of Buddhism on 
Chinese culture was ‘the unity of the three creeds’ [sanjiao heyi 三教合一]’.1317 
Following a traditional narrative, this paradigm focused on the syncretism of Chinese 
Buddhism, which was considered by most scholars to be a significant evolution of 
Buddhism.1318 Chinese Buddhism was approached as emerging from an encounter that 
had engendered a certain degree of mutual borrowing and syncretic rapprochement. 
It was evidence for the flexibility, generosity, and critical thinking of Chinese 
 
1316 John McRae pointed out that Hu thought Buddhism flooded China simply because it was complex 
and filled naive religious desires. Also, note his comment in “Indianization of China,” (231) that after 
1100 or so Buddhism simply failed to have influence in China — omitting mention of the decline of 
Buddhism in India and the loss of easy passage across Central Asia. John R McRae, “Religion as 
Revolution in Chinese Historiography: Hu Shih (1891-1962) on Shen-Hui (684-758),” (2001): 78 
1317 See, for example, William E. Soothill, The Three Religions of China: Lectures Delivered at Oxford (London: 
Oxford University Press, H. Milford, 1923), 13; C. K. Yang, Religion in Chinese Society (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1961), 123–126; Nakamura Hajime 中村元, Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples: India, 
China, Tibet, Japan (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1964), 290–294; Henri Maspero, Les religions 
chinoises (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967):111–138; Taoism and Chinese Religion, trans. Frank 
A. Kierman Jr. (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press 1981), 77–87; Judith A. Berling, The Syncretic 
Religion of Lin Chao-en (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 1–31; Shih Heng-qing, The 
Syncretism of Ch’an and Pure Land Buddhism (New York: Peter Lang, 1992), 7–18; Rodney L. Taylor, The 
Religious Dimensions of Confucianism (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990), 71–75; and Timothy Brook, “Rethinking 
Syncretism: The Unity of the Three Teachings and Their 
Joint Worship in Late-Imperial China.” Journal of Chinese Religions 21 (1993): 13–44. 
1318 The term “syncretism” first appears in Plutarch referring to “the behavior of the Cretans who, 
despite the discord habitual among them, closed ranks when an external enemy attacked them.” See 
Carsten Colpe, “Syncretism,” in The Encyclopedia of Religion, trans. Matthew J. O’Connell, ed., Mircea 
Eliade (New York: Free Press. 1986), 218-27. The term was used frequently in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century in the context of the study of religion and historical theology, meaning something 
like a mishmash of religions (religionsmischerei). On the meaning, intellectual history, and ideological 
investments of the category “syncretism,” see also, Robert D. Baird, Category Formation and the History of 
Religions (The Hague: Mouton, 1971), 142–152; Sven S. Hartman ed., Syncretism (Stockholm: Almqvist 
and Wiksell, 1969); and Charles Stewart and Rosalind Shaw eds., Syncretism/Anti-Syncretism: The Politics 
of Religious Synthesis (New York: Routledge, 1994).  
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civilization; however, it also proved the dynamic and pluralistic facet of Buddhism. A 
syncretic Buddhism would seem particularly apposite to a multiethnic nation/state of 
China.1319 
Chen Yinke, in his studies, provided several examples of the syncretism of 
Chinese Buddhism. Chen considered Buddhism to be an external stimulus and 
theoretical resource that had resulted in intellectual innovations in China. Buddhism 
also changed the behavior and thinking patterns of the Chinese. To Chen, China had 
an advanced construction of ethics but lacked “substantial concepts of philosophy”; 
Buddhism, as a sophisticated “metaphysics,” could compensate for the deficiency of 
the Chinese spirit. Chen once argued that 
[The Confucianists in the Song dynasty] borrowed the most exquisite doctrines of 
Buddhism to interpret the Confucian Classics; purporting to revitalize the ancient 
learning, they were actually absorbing ‘hegemonies’; under the pretext of respecting 
Confucius and rejecting Buddhism, however, the teaching of Buddhism had deeply 
infiltrated into their minds. This is the former Confucianists’ effort to save the world, 
which deserves to be respected. Therefore, Buddhism had rendered significant 
contributions to China. 採佛理之精萃以之註解四書五經，名為闡明古學，實則吸
收異教。聲言尊孔辟佛，實則佛之義理，已浸漬濡染。此先儒愛國濟世之苦心，
至可尊敬而曲諒之者也。故佛教實有功於中國甚大.1320  
Here, Chen claimed that Buddhism had played a very positive role in Chinese history; 
it “breathed fresh air into Chinese scholarship” [zengzhang yuanqi 增長元氣] so that 
the culture of the Tang and Song dynasties flourished extremely well.1321 Buddhism 
offered China something more spiritual, metaphysical, and transcendental, 
 
1319 However, current scholarship has contested this hypothesis of cultural dialogue, pointing out that 
the metaphor is misleading and overestimates the influence of India on Chinese culture. Sharf, for 
example, has argued that, because in most cases there was no direct contact between China and India, 
therefore, the so-called the Indian influence was actually Chinese productions. See Sharf, Coming to 
Terms With Chinese Buddhism: A Reading of the Treasure Store Treatise.18 
1320 Wu Mi, Wu Mi riji 吳宓日記, 9-13. After this passage, Wu Mi added a comment that this historical 
phenomenon was similar to the Christianization of Europe.  
1321 Ibid.  
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effectively counteracting the very secular and pragmatic qualities of Chinese 
thought.1322  
The encounter between Buddhism and Daoism in Chen’s writing presented 
one pattern of sanjiao heyi: Buddhism disguised itself as one kind of Daoist esoteric art 
to enhance its religious attraction and borrowed concepts from Lao-Zhuang 
philosophy to facilitate the Chinese understanding of Buddhist teachings.1323 Daoism, 
on the other hand, absorbed the Buddhist knowledge of medicine, math, astronomy, 
and so on to innovate its doctrines, rituals, and rites. In his article “Cui Hao and Kou 
Qianzhi,” Chen took the Daoist priest Yin Shao 殷紹 as an example to demonstrate 
how Buddhism brought new concepts and techniques into Daoist esoteric arts. 
According to Chen’s analysis based on the biography of Yin Shao in the Weishu, the 
teachers of Yin, Chengong Xing 成公興, Tanying 曇影, and Famu 法穆, were all 
Buddhist monks.1324 In the same article, Chen further investigated how Daoist priests 
selected, rendered, and reinterpreted the Buddhist astronomical concepts to improve 
the old practice system of religious Daoism by taking Kou Qianzhi as an example.1325 
 Buddhist influence on Chinese literature was also one example of how 
Buddhism changed China. Chen elaborated in several articles that the form and style 
of Buddhist literature, which combined the long sentence of prose with rhyme and 
verse, developed into the chapter style [zhanghuiti 章回體] of the traditional Chinese 
novel and tanci 彈詞.1326 He used the story of The Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra and its 
 
1322 For an opinion about India’s spirituality, see the recollection of Chen Xiying in Bian Senghu 卞僧慧, 
Chen Yinke xiansheng nianpu changbian 陳寅恪先生年譜長編, 77. 
1323 For examples and analysis, see the former part of this dissertation.  
1324 Chen, “Cui Hao and Kou Qianzhi崔浩與寇謙之,” in  JMCB, 127. 
1325 Some recent studies supported Chen’s opinion. For example, Strickmann has argued that Tantrism 
had a much deeper influence on Chinese religion than earlier studies have acknowledged. He has gone so far 
as to claim that much of Taoism, as well as popular Chinese rituals such as the “Land and Water Assemblies,” 
cannot be understood without Tantric Buddhism. See Michel Strickmann, Mantras et mandarins: Le 
bouddhisme tantrique en Chine, 16-58, 369-411. 
1326 Tanci is a narrative form of song in China that alternates between verse and prose. The literal name 
“plucking rhymes” refers to the singing of verse portions to a pipa. A tanci is usually seven words long 
and on some occations, ten words. Luo Zhenyu categorized the styles originating from Buddhist 
literature as “the category of foqu” [佛曲之目]. See, Chen, “ Dunhuang ben Weimojie jing wenshu shili 
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Chinese recension and adaption1327 as an example to investigate how the revised 
Indian myths and stories had influenced Chinese vernacular literature, such as Xiyou 
ji西遊記.1328 Based on these studies, Chen concluded that some genres of Chinese 
literature, such as the novel, were basically outgrowths of a ‘Buddhicization’ of 
literature.1329 
 Besides, Buddhism introduced a new pattern of textual exegesis into Chinese 
scholarship. Based on his scrutiny of bianwen 變文, Chen demonstrated the unique 
method Chinese Buddhists utilized to comment and interpret scriptures—an 
enumeration of parables or ‘metaphors’ [avadāna, piyu 譬喻] to illustrate lessons or 
principles of the Buddha. In the Chinese Buddhist tradition, the examples used in 
such metaphorical constructions are mostly myths and fabrications, which differed 
from the traditional exegesis of Classical Learning that relied on historical narratives 
and official documents.1330 In the article “Preface to Yang Shuda’s commentary on the 
Analects” [Yang Shuda lunyu shuzheng xu 楊樹達論語疏證序], Chen analyzed that 
from the Northern and Southern dynasties, this exegetical strategy profoundly 
influenced the commentary works in the “second classification” [yibu 乙部]. 
Historical works, such as Pei Songzhi’s commentary on the Sanguo zhi 三國志, Liu 
Xiaobiao’s commentary on Shishuo xinyu 世說新語, and Li Daoyuan’s commentary on 
Shui jing 水經, all followed the stylistic rules of Buddhist treatises.  
Significantly, Chen avoided addressing the complex mechanism of China’s 
‘Indianization’ from a single angle. He also noticed the Chinese resistance against the 
impact of Buddhism. For instance, Chen observed that Buddhist exegesis received 
only rare advocacy among Confucian commentators, since the orthodox method of 
Confucian exegesis was always based on “historiographical evidential study” [shixue 
 
wenji pin yanyi ba 敦煌本維摩詰經文殊師利問疾品演義跋,” JMEB, 203. Luo Zhenyu 羅振玉, 
Dunhuang linshi敦煌零拾, vol.4 (1924). Zheng Zhenduo鄭振鐸 had for the first time used the term 
‘bianwen’ 變文. See Zheng, “Dunhuang de suwenxue 敦煌的俗文學,” in Xiaoshuo yuebao 小說月報, 20, 
no.3 (1929). 
1327 Chen, JMEB, 203-210.  
1328 Ibid, 217-223. 
1329 Ibid, 209. 
1330 Ibid., 203. 
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kaoju 史學考據].1331 The dissimilarities between Buddhist and Confucian exegetic 
approaches seemed slight in format, but discernible in essence. Historically, Buddhist 
exegesis technique had never shaken the foundation of Han Learning and later, Song 
Learning. Therefore, as Chen observed, the boundary between Indian Buddhism and 
Chinese thought were blurred but always existed. For example, Chinese Buddhists 
preserved the orthodox genre of Indian scriptural commentary that was known as 
avadāna; however, works compiled by native Buddhist schools, the Tiantai school, for 
example, were totally “Sinicized” [zhina hua 支那化].1332  
This opinion was elaborated in detail by Chen in his study on Han Yu’s Neo-
Confucianism. He began his discussion from the tradition of zhangju 章句, an exegesis 
paradigm of the Han Learning that involved a detailed analysis of the paraphrases for 
every line of a text, adding explanations by referring to other Classics.1333 This type of 
exegesis was imitated by Buddhist commentators during the Northern and Southern 
dynasties. However, this exegetic approach attracted critics soon after it was widely 
promoted, for its redundancy and garrulousness. Among all the critics, the most 
significant refutation of zhangju was the Chan Buddhism’s ‘revolution of discourse’ 
with the motto “No dependence on the written letter, a special transmission outside 
the scriptures” [buli wenzi, jiaowai biechuan 不立文字，教外別傳].1334 Partly 
influenced by the Chan school’s stand, the model of zhangju began to be criticized by 
the eminent Confucian intellectual Han Yu when it developed into a very rigid 
 
1331 Ibid. 263. 
1332 Chen Yinke. “Xiyouji Xuanzang dizi gushi zhi yanbian 西遊記玄奘弟子故事之演變,” in JMEB, 218. 
1333 David R. Knechtges defines zhangju as “a type of explication that involved long, sometimes 
irrelevant, digressions, about the moral and political implications of certain words or lines in a text.” 
David R. Knechtges, “The Liu Hsin/Yang Hsiung Correspondence on the Fang Yen.” Monumenta Serica 
33 (1977-78): 314. For studies on the zhangju commentary tradition in the West Han, See, Nomura 
Shigeo, “Zen Kan shōku no gaku shidan,” Aichi kyōiku, daigaku genkyū hōkoku, 27 (1978): 1-12. Also,  Lin 
Qingzhang 林慶彰, “Liang Han zhangju zhi xue zhongtan兩漢章句之學重探,” in Zhongguo jingxueshi 
lunwen xuanji 中國經學史論文選集 (Taibei: Wenshizhe, 1992): 290. 
1334 This motto appeared in the eight century and was not found in earlier texts such as the Damo lun 達
摩論 [Treatise of Bodhidharma], although similar points had been made in the anthology of the early 
Chan. See Yanagida, “Den hōbōki to sono sakusha” [The Chu fabo ji and its Author]. Saizen, Zengaku 
kenkyū 53: 36; Bernard Faure, Le Traité de Bodhidharma: Première anthologie du bouddhisme Chan (Paris: Le 
Mail), 1986.  
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subject of the imperial examination system. Inspired by the Chan school’s 
understanding of language, Han advocated a ‘Classical Prose Movement’ to rectify the 
current scholarship back to the orthodoxy of the Chunqiu and Analects.1335 From Han 
Yu onwards to Zhu Xi, Chan Buddhism’s reflection on language and the Buddhist 
teaching of xinxing 心性 inspired and to certain degree modeled the philosophical 
setting of Neo-Confucianism, playing a vital role in the Confucian philosophical 
repertoire.1336  
Compared to Hu Shih, Chen approached the problem of how Buddhism 
influenced China from a contextualized perspective, illuminating it from a broader 
vision of culture, society, and ideology. At the same time, Chen’s own attitude 
towards the historical scenario of ‘Indianization’ was milder and more ‘sympathetic.’ 
A similar attitude could be observed in Tang Yongtong. Tang dealt with the same 
issue in his two monographs, Hanwei and Shigao, in a comprehensive way. A more 
generalized and theoretical elucidation on the transcultural communication between 
Buddhism and native Chinese culture can be found in his two commentary articles on 
current cultural affairs: “Comments on the recent cultural studies” [Ping jinren 
wenhua yanjiu 評近人文化研究]1337 and “The conflicts and compromises of cultures 
and thoughts” [Wenhua sixiang zhi chongtu yu tiaohe 文化思想之衝突與調和].1338 
To Tang, contact between different traditions always led to a “cultural 
transplantation” [wenhua yizhi 文化移植] which he defined as “a culture moving to 
another nation/ethic community and growing into flourishment.”1339 However, the 
issue of “transplantation” was complicated, for it involved two questions: firstly, 
whether this foreign thought could influence native culture; and secondly, whether 
the native culture would be fundamentally transformed by the foreign stimulus and 
lose its identity.1340 According to Tang, it was not easy to evaluate the extent to which 
 
1335 Chen Yinke, “Lun Han Yu 論韓愈,” in  JMCB, 321.  
1336 Ibid. For the Buddhist influence on Zhu Xi’s philosophy, see John Makeham, The Buddhist Roots of Zhu 
Xi's Philosophical Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018). 
1337 Tang Yongtong, TYQJ, 273-276. Original Published on Xueheng 學衡, 12 (1922). 
1338 TYQJ, 277-281. Original published: Xueshu jikan 學術季刊, 1, no. 2 (1943).  
1339 Ibid., 277. 
1340 Ibid., 278. 
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the native cultural landscape was changed by the new force. As he observed, there 
were always two voices about the transcultural experience of ancient China: some 
people believed that although the external forces like Buddhism were tremendous, 
China was nevertheless able to maintain its ‘great harmony’, namely, the unified 
orthodoxy of Dao. In this sense, China had never lost its cultural identity [wenhua 
tezhi 文化特質]. Other people, on the contrary, believed that Chinese thought had 
been entirely and irreversibly changed by Buddhism; none of the cultural forms 
(philosophy, literature, art, material life, etc.) in the post-Buddhism era could entirely 
abandon Buddhist elements.   
Chen Yinke stood in between. He highlighted both the Buddhist impact on 
native traditions and meanwhile the unchanged orthodoxy of Confucianism—the 
Daotong—which, as Chen believed, was and should be kept alive and inherited. Tang, 
comparatively, placed less emphasis on the ‘daotong’ and stressed the balance in the 
“conflicting and compromising” mechanism of cultural transplantation. Showing a 
tendency toward cultural relativism, he merged the two discourses of ‘Sinicization’ 
and ‘Indianization’ together into a generalized panorama of the Sino-Indian dialogue 
and summarized it as a dynamic image consisting of three phases based on a 
“critical/functional view of cultural anthropology”:1341 first, assimilation based on 
superficial similarities [yinwei kanjian biaomian de xiangtong er tiaohe 因為看見表
面的相同而調和]; second, conflict based on dissimilarities [yinwei kanbujian de 
butong er chongtu 因為看見不同而衝突]; third, a new assimilation based on 
similarities on the level of truth [yin zai fajian zhenshi de xianghe er tiaohe 因再發見
真實的相合而調和].1342  
 
1341 Tang criticized the other two popular theories: Grafton Elliot Smith’s theory that different groups 
learned from one another somehow indirectly (in other words, cultural traits spread from one place to 
another, or are “diffused”), and other ethnologists’ (like Lewis Henry Morgan’s) theory of 
“independent invention” in which different groups had the capability of creating similar beliefs and 
practices. Both of these theories were criticized by twentieth century anthropologists. Tang, TYQJ, 278-
279. See George Marcus and Michael M.J. Fischer: Anthropology as Cultural Critique: The Experimental 
Moment in the Human Sciences (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1986), 1. 
1342 Tang, “Wenhua sixiang zhi chongtu yu tiaohe 文化思想之衝突與調和,” TYQJ, vol. 5, 281. 
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Here, Tang’s attitude slightly leaned towards the camp of Sinicization, with a 
more robust ‘confidence’ in native traditions. He kept a distance from Hu Shih’s bitter 
resentment of China’s Indianization and, compared to Chen Yinke, he tended to 
conclude that the cultural elements of China, through constant communication, were 
eventually capable of maintaining most of their own identities. He placed more 
emphasis on the process through which heterogeneous concepts, thoughts, and 
cultures influenced each other mutually and how the particularity of each cultural 
tradition was preserved. By this means, he tried to provide a historical explanation 
for the contradictions between the traditions. Accordingly, Tang showed less interest 
in comparing different cultures (only in his early statements about the Chan school 
that he posted at Harvard as cited below can we see such comparison) or generalizing 
about a universal human nature; rather, he was focused on understanding particular 
cultures in those cultures’ own terms.  
There were only few cases in which he made an overall comparison between 
Indian and Chinese Buddhism. For example, he said: 
Buddhism has two systems, “dhyāna” [chan 禪] and “Prajñā” [bore 般若]. Dhyāna, 
based on India’s theory of meditation, later attached to the Chinese concepts of the 
yin-yang and the Five Elements (陰陽五行 ) as well as the Daoist theory of “health 
maintaining” [yangsheng 養生]; Prajñā, which is based on the Indian Buddhist notion 
of “Dharma-body” [fasheng 法身], interpreted Laozi as the body of “Dao” [daoli 道體] 
by referring to the Learning of Laozi from the Han dynasty.1343 
As indicated in this passage, the comparison between Indian and Chinese Buddhism 
might be possible, but only on a systematic level, and it must take Chinese local 
beliefs, such as Daoism, into consideration. To Tang, two traditions could be hardly 
directly compared but only could be analyzed together through historical traces and 
manifestations. Noteworthily, Tang emphasized the relationship between Buddhism 
and Daoist thoughts more than Confucianism—especially the Daoist cult and xuanxue. 
 
1343 Tang, “Hanwei foxue de liangda xitong 漢魏佛學的兩大系統.” TYQJ, vol. 5, 177. Original published 
in Zhexue pinglun 哲學評論, 7, no.1 (1936).  
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He also insisted that there was a fundamental controversy between Buddhism and 
Confucianism. In one article, he criticized:  
Today, associations named ‘benevolent societies’ have emerged here and there, 
advocating the principle of ‘the unity of the three creeds.’ They do not understand 
that Confucianism and Buddhism are the products of two different cultures; their 
conceptions, their methods, and their aims are totally contradictory to each other. 
How can these two thoughts be mixed unconvincingly? This kind of theory that 




In Tang’s opinion, assimilation means the presence of a différend in Jean-François 
Lyotard’s sense: two discourses that do not share the same premises and therefore 
never meet on the same ground.1345 The history of Chinese Buddhism is not a 
narrative of ‘who wins-who loses’ but rather indicates a developing mechanism for 
how different cultural factors can coexist in a Chinese intellectual system. 
 
Between Hua and Fan 華梵之別 
The notion of Sinicization forms the basis of the modern narrative of Chinese 
Buddhism. Although it has seldom been referred to directly, this notion is always 
behind the writings of Buddhist history. However, the narrative of Sinicization or 
Indianization itself must be historized and contextualized. It is one historical variety 
of a larger epistemological issue, that of the encounters among native cultures and 
foreign thoughts, traditions, and modern discourses. 
The ‘dialogue’ or ‘encounter’ between China and India in pre-modern times 
was for the most part indirect. Records of embassies between these two countries 
demonstrate that a select few did interact with their counterparts, but such 
 
1344 Tang, “Ping jinren zhi wenhua yanjiu 評近人之文化研究,” TYQJ, vol.5, 275.  
1345 See Jean-François Lyotard, The Differ end: Phrases in Dispute, trans. Georges van Abbeele (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1988).  
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exchanges were the exception rather than the rule. 1346 Even in the case of Buddhism, 
India’s most famous and successful export to China, direct contacts conducted by 
missionaries and pilgrims were also limited over the course of Chinese history. The 
legendary status of these eminent monks, such Kumārajīva and Bodhiruci on the 
Indian side and Faxian (337–ca. 422), Xuanzang, and Yijing (635–713) on the Chinese 
side, indicate that they are famous in part because they were exceptional and rare. 
Historically, especially after the Tang dynasty, most of the accomplished Chinese 
monks spent their whole lives in China, and only few of them expressed an intention 
to make the trip to the Buddha’s land, not only because the journey to India went 
through the Taklamakan desert and the Himalayas, and the sea was considered too 
treacherous and risky, but also because of the establishment of Chinese sacred sites in 
the Middle Land.1347 
Most modern Chinese scholars, like their predecessors, had little direct 
connection with Indian Buddhism. They had never journeyed to India, accessed any 
religious relics, or built close personal relationships with Buddhist clergy. Although 
some of them did develop fluency in Indic languages, acquire primary Sanskrit or Palī 
texts, and have their own understanding of Indian religious tradition, their 
knowledge about India and non-Chinese Buddhism was merely based on textual 
sources. To them, the land of Buddha only existed in books or on paper. Many 
elements of Indian Buddhism—rituals, rites, religious practices, clerical life, and 
monastic institutions, which had drifted into China over the past thousands of years—
were peripheral questions. What they were really concerned about was also 
fundamentally different from the issues raised by the ancient monks. Thus, despite 
their emphasis on the ‘authenticity’ of Buddhist texts and sometimes on the fidelity 
of Chinese Buddhist teachings, they actually looked for answers to questions that 
were quite different from those of the believers in the Wei and Jin dynasties or of 
their Western counterparts. 
 




Although they kept using the dichotomy of ‘Indian’ and ‘Chinese,’ most of the 
modern Chinese historians avoided judging Chinese Buddhism’s ‘fidelity’ to its Indian 
origin. Instead, they created a narrative of Sinicization to depict a blurred, dynamic 
process that obscured the boundary between India and China. These scholars 
inverted the old schemas to serve their own purpose—to present the orthodoxy of 
Chinese Buddhism as a legitimate source and component of Chinese culture and 
scholarship. Their studies were not aimed to recover the ‘primitive’ Buddhism, but to 
elaborate its proper ti 體 and yong 用 in the Chinese historical context. Only some of 
the Buddhist scholars, for example, Lü Cheng, rejected the ti-yong thesis and 
demonstrated an advocacy for a “return to the sources.” 
The modern Chinese understanding of ‘orthodoxy’ reflected a tough 
reconciliation with Western values, trends, and thoughts. To the modern Chinese 
intellectuals, because of the gradual collapse of Confucianism, rebuilding the 
‘orthodoxy’ of the Chinese nation was envisaged as providing answers to the thorny 
situation of China’s modernization. The shifting frames and references among the 
modern intellectuals and historians as well as their involvement in certain 
contradictions can be interpreted as the ‘unsettled’ mind coping with both sides of 
every issue through a situational reflex. Characteristically, their ‘will to orthodoxy’ 
might be seen as a symptom of the “boundary anxiety” that led to determining the 
boundaries between tradition and modernization, and between China, India, and the 
West.1348 
In general, it was not the historical evidence, but rather the interpretations of 
the modern scholars, that formed the discourse of Sinicization. This seemingly 
abstract hermeneutic issue had concrete ramifications for the way scholars framed, 
conceptualized, and represented Chinese religious phenomena. However, none of the 
historians who utilized the narrative of Sinicization could escape the pitfalls of the 
discourse itself. As John McRae has summarized, these scholars actually assumed a 
silent, passive Buddhism that accepted the Chinese transformation without 
 
1348 Judith A Berling, The Syncretic Religion of Lin Chao-en, 10-11 
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resistance.1349  These tendencies reinforced the ‘difference’ between Hua 華 and Fan 
梵 and sometimes led to the ‘fundamentalism’ of both Buddhism and China. 
Moreover, they were unable to escape from the time they lived in: these scholars 
actually read the past in terms of the present and understood Chinese Buddhism as 
having its telos of becoming one part of the Chinese national culture. The meaning of 
history, therefore, was created by the historian in the course of his own reflections, 
which could in turn provide a richer comprehension of the present and the ability to 
make certain estimates about the future. In this sense, the narrative of Sinicization in 
modern China was not necessarily related to concrete historical phenomena that 
really happened but fundamentally to interpretations. As such, Buddhism ‘had to’ and 
‘was willing to’ be Sinicized, either by changing Buddhism itself or by changing the 
native environment; otherwise, Buddhism would have been erased from Chinese 
history. From such historical experience and observation, the modern scholars 
established a mirror of Buddhism that reflected the current ‘final image’: the 
extremity faced by China. 
  
 
1349 John McRae, “State Formation, Indigenization, and Buddhism in East Asian History: The Theoretical 
Foundation,” (2006): 66-67. 
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Conclusion: The Invention of Chinese Buddhism 
 
 
“The history of Chinese Buddhism is not easy to discuss.” This is the first sentence 
written by Tang Yongtong in the epilogue to his book, Hanwei. Tang’s statement is 
reasonable, especially when we consider the time in which he lived. The 
historiography of Buddhism, as a newly emerging domain, occurred in a polarized 
cultural landscape. Intellectuals, scholars, and religious elites were beset by contrary 
expectations regarding belief, power, and identity. On the one side stood ‘traditional’ 
China, which was waiting to be preserved and venerated; on the other side was 
arrayed a different set of orientations, towards modernity and the values attached to 
modernity. This polarity of expectations made the modern Chinese period a 
controversial time. During this special era, two strands of influential inquiry 
emerged: the making of ‘religion’ and the making of ‘history’ in the modern sense. 
Buddhism, as a multifaceted tradition with a cultural breadth caused by trans-
geographical diffusion, was attempting to re-establish its legitimacy within the 
discursive pyramid of science, religion, and superstition and to re-shape itself as a 
modern faith; meanwhile, history was experiencing dramatic transformation and re-
defining its boundaries, competence, and limitations, to explain changes in the past 
and in the present.   
In the general context of the Buddhist revival and the transformation of 
scholarship, the first half of the twentieth century witnessed a ‘historiographical 
turn’ in the Chinese scholarship of Buddhism. Rendering Buddhism into China’s past 
became an important topic in the domains of both Buddhology and historiography. 
As can be seen from the case studies in this dissertation, historians ordered the 
textual corpus of Buddhism, interpreted the changes and influence related to 
Buddhism, and narrated Buddhism into certain chronological and periodized 
frameworks. Being recorded, organized, and interpreted by both Buddhist scholars 
and professional historians, most of whom were ‘outsiders,’ the history of Buddhism 
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relied less and less on faith, doctrines, and the teachings of masters,1350 but became a 
matter of historical reading and interpretation, affected by certain epistemological 
shifts, categories, notions, and discourses in modern historiography. Buddhism, in 
the academic context of modern China, was thus historicized, de-religionized, 
temporalized, localized and also ‘Sinicized’.  
At the same time, Buddhism was then pushed to its “rival of historiography,” 
as Bernard Faure has observed from the modern Chan/Zen history,1351 and was forced 
to respond to history’s inquiry. As the cases in this dissertation demonstrate, 
Buddhists had to response to the inquiries from the historians, about, for example, 
the authenticity of some ‘basis’ canons. This process looks like an ‘arrogation of 
history,’ which implies a fault line in people’s understanding of Buddhism and a 
‘closure’ of the Buddhist canon. However, as shown in historical writings on Buddhist 
themes, a new interpretative space also emerged. On the one hand, Buddhism was 
depicted and defined by history sometimes as a textual tradition, sometimes as an 
example of transcultural communication, sometimes as one segment of Chinese 
national history, and sometimes as a cultural element of ‘Chinese-ness.’ One the other 
hand, Buddhism also provided abundant new resources for historiography and 
challenged some of its presuppositions, such as the authority of the Dao, the Grand 
unity of Imperial China, and the setting of ‘all-under-heaven.’ Buddhism revealed the 
complex, multi-faceted, mixed, and inclusive nature of Chinese history, as well as the 
constant tension between old and new, internal and external, orthodox and 
heterodox in China’s past.  
This dual dimension indicates the core responsibility of the historiography of 
Buddhism in modern China – inventing ‘Chinese Buddhism’ in history. This 
responsibility is reflected in the modern researchers’ discussions of the relationship 
between Indian Buddhism and Chinese Buddhism, their narratives of the Buddhist 
Sinicization, as well as their concern about the issue of geyi. To modern Chinese 
 
1350 Here I do not mean that there was no doctrinal progress. Studies of Yogācāra Buddhism marked one 
of the most noticeable achievements. 
1351 Faure, Chan Insight and Oversight, 92. 
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historians and scholars, the history of Buddhism was not just a narrative about 
Buddhism, but also a narrative about what China is and what happened in China’s 
past. Buddhism, to a certain degree, became one part of Chinese national history, 
under the rubric of ‘Chinese tradition.’1352 As many studies have proven, history is a 
potent agent of ‘inventing nations’;1353 from this dissertation, we can conclude that, in 
twentieth-century China, historiography helped to ‘invent’ Chinese Buddhism: its 
‘past,’ its ‘truth,’ and its manifestation in different times and conditions. This 
discursive construction behind the writings of the history of Buddhism, although 
sometimes alleviated, at other times reinforced, was persistent in the works of Liang 
Qichao, Hu Shih, Chen Yinke, Tang Yongtong, Chen Yuan, Taixu, and so on.  
To be sure, there was a lasting anxiety about historicity among Buddhist 
clergy, and later among Buddhologists and Orientalists: they always attempted to 
identify the biographical data of the Buddha as a historical figure, the authenticity of 
scriptures, the lineage of sects, and so on. However, the ‘historiographical turn’ in the 
scholarship of Buddhism in modern China was very remarkable and unique. It is 
unique in that this discursive invention of ‘Chinese Buddhism’ is always related to the 
construction of China as a nation-state and the formation of Chinese cultural identity. 
As a result, it was always entangled with some political commitments, such as 
‘reform’ and ‘revival’, as we see in the works of Liang Qichao, Taixu, and Hu Shih. At 
the same time, this ‘Chinese Buddhism’ is often discussed outside the realm of 
 
1352 For a long time, theorists like David Apter assumed that the modernization process was 
characterized by the gradual decline of particular traditions and the development towards a universal 
modernity based on the Western model. This assumption has been challenged since the 1970s by 
alternative concepts that take more account of the influence of traditional cultures, especially in the 
cases of India, China, and Japan. Here I interpret the construction of tradition as a conscious attempt to 
integrate elements of the past into a development program to form a modern nation or to create 
cultural identity and social solidarity. For relevant discussions on tradition, see David E. Apter, The 
Politics of Modernization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965) and Samuel N. Eisenstadt, Tradition, 
Wandel und Modernität (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1979). 
1353 For studies of the ‘invention of nation’, see Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: 
Verso, 1983); Eric Hobsbawn and Terence Rager ed., Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983); David Lowenthal, The Past is a Foreign Country (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985) 
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‘religion’: Chen Yinke focused on the relationship between family beliefs and social 
environments; Tang Yongtong discussed the connection between Buddhism and local 
intellectual resources; Chen Yuan, as well, “wrote religious history as political 
history.” 
At the same time, in contrast to their Western and Japanese counterparts, who 
placed more emphasis on linguistic or philosophical approaches, Chinese modern 
scholars always insisted on a path of historiography that combined textual criticism 
and historical interpretation, which still toughly attached to the tradition of the 
Evidential Learnings and Confucian historiography. Unlike scholars in the West, these 
historians and scholars in modern China are faced with the task of stepping beyond 
the traditional writing of Buddhist history. They therefore made use of new historical 
theories, such as the modern framework of historical periodization, and analyzed a 
large number of historical sources that had rarely been read in the past. But they 
were also unable to break completely with ‘tradition’, including the tradition of 
historiography and also the tradition of the Classic Learning. Therefore, they were 
not like their Western counterparts, who quickly detached themselves from texts and 
“looked down” -- to adopt, for example, the anthropological or sociological paths to 
study Chinese Buddhism. Meanwhile, they could not really take the position of fully 
accepting Buddhism and placing it on an equal footing with modern ideas and 
theories. Thus, unlike the modern Japanese Buddhist scholars, these Chinese 
historians and scholars were unable to propose issues full of the sense of ‘modernity’, 
such as ‘the spirituality of Buddhism and the merits and shortcomings of Chinese and 
Western philosophies. Carefully limiting itself to the hermeneutic readings of texts 
related to Buddhism, the historiography of Buddhism in modern China prudently 
historicized Buddhism in China’s historical context and formed a ‘secularized’, 
understanding of Buddhism, replacing the traditional narratives of lineage or 
hagiography. 
Overall, the inventing ‘Chinese Buddhism’ (both in a historical and a 
discursive sense), was the product of two distinct milieux: Buddhist institutions and 
‘secular’ academia, within which there were always tensions between Buddhology 
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and historiography. Meanwhile, this field was influenced by various intellectual 
trends, such as the Evidential Learning of the Late Qing period, Oriental studies from 
Europe, the modern historiography formulated gradually in early Republican China, 
and so on. Therefore, writings on the history of Buddhism differed considerably 
according to the researchers’ academic backgrounds, political standpoints, 
institutional affiliations, and also sometimes their individual idiosyncrasies and 
dogmatic adherence. There were always tensions within this field, which were shown 
in the debates on the nature of Chinese religious and cultural heritage, progressivism 
and linear time, and the relationship between Han China and foreign influences.  
The commonalities within the historiography of Buddhism were very fragile. 
However, there were still some concerns shared by all these modern Chinese 
historians and scholars. To grasp the shared ground, we need to return to the most 
fundamental question that those historians and scholars ask when they wrote about 
the history of Buddhism – namely, what is Chinese Buddhism? This question contains 
several concerns: first, how should we define the origin and authenticity of Chinese 
Buddhism? Second, how should we understand the general trend of Chinese 
Buddhism over a long timespan? Or, as Liang Qichao asked in his essay published in 
the 1920s: is Chinese Buddhism progressing or in decline? Third, how can we learn 
from the historical experience of Chinese Buddhism, namely, how can we understand 
the indigenization of foreign thought in a more general historical context? Different 




The transcultural ‘dialogue’ or ‘encounter’ between China and India was, for the most 
part, indirect and limited. Historically, especially after the Tang Dynasty, most 
accomplished Chinese monks spent their whole lives in China, and only a few of them 
had expressed an intention to make the trip to the Buddha’s land, not only because 
the journey to India was treacherous, but also because of the establishment of the 
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Chinese people’s own sacred sites in the Middle Land. After the Song dynasty, 
especially the establishment of native Buddhist sects, such as Chan and the Tiantai, 
the questions of the authenticity, which had puzzled Chinese Buddhists for a long 
time, gradually faded from view. In the late Qing, this issue, with the increasing 
interests in Buddhism among literati, was raised again. However, unlike their 
predecessors, historians and scholars in this period focused their attention on the 
textual authenticity of Buddhism, such as the authorship, version, and dating of 
compilation of a particular Buddhist text, rather than on whether this text has the 
accurately conveyed the Buddha’ teaching. 
As many scholars have pointed out, modern Buddhology has given overriding 
primacy to textual sources, including both ‘scriptural’ texts and ‘noncanonical’ or 
‘secular’ ones that were divorced from religious life and actual Buddhist practices.1354 
Through discovering, editing, and translating the literary treasures of Buddhism, 
researchers could produce knowledge of Buddhism without having any connection to 
any monastery. To most of the historians and even to some scholars with Buddhist 
faith, Buddhism did not amount to ritual practices, or monastic regulations, or 
philosophical system, but instead was presumed to be a set of ‘historical materials.’1355  
This textual attitude1356, which once had facilitated the invention of Buddhism 
as an Oriental religion, as Tomoko Masuzawa argued, provided the West with 
authority and supremacy in Buddhology, with their housing of ‘oriental’ literature in 
the libraries, museums, and research institutes in Europe as well as their exclusive 
knowledge of linguistics and philology. However, in the context of modern China, the 
‘obsession’ with historical texts, although it might have had some connection with 
 
1354 J. W. de Jong, “The Study of Buddhism: Problems and Perspectives,” in Studies in Indo-Asian Culture, 
vol. IV, de. P. Ratnam (New Delhi: 1975), 14. Also Gregory Schopen, Bones, Stones, and Buddhist Monks: 
Collected Papers on the Archaeology, Epigraphy, and Texts of Monastic Buddhism in India (The University of 
Hawaii Press, 1997), 2-3. 
1355 Here I contend that Buddhism as a tradition is ‘reinvented’ in the writings of Buddhist history. By 
reinvention I mean a process by which lived, heterogeneous traditions would be reduced to a few 
aspects and thus homogenized. By doing so, a “continuity with a suitable historical past” would be 
established. See Hobsbawm and Ranger, The Invention of Tradition, 1. 
1356 I borrow this term ‘textual attitude’ from Said’s Orientalism, 115, 93. 
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the ‘Orientalism’ invented by the Europeans,1357 designated a complex but systematic 
manufacture of identities for ‘China’, instead of for Buddhism. The Chinese historians 
wanted to understand not the doctrinal history of Buddhism or Buddhism itself but 
rather ‘China’ and its historical and cultural past that existed in the collective 
imagination of the Chinese.   
Because of this stand, Chinese historians turned to a body of data that had 
been overlooked or deliberately ignored by their Western counterparts—the texts 
written and produced in China. Some texts in this category had been carefully 
preserved, canonized, and heavily edited or commented upon by the monasteries but 
seldom had drawn attention from outside Buddhist circles, for example, the 
biographies of monks, Buddhist bibliographies, and some Chinese Buddhist treatises. 
Some had been read by historians but not were not considered as Buddhist historical 
writings, such as the records in the Official histories that related to Buddhism. And 
some texts had been mostly unedited or even ‘unread’ before, such as some 
manuscripts discovered in the cave of Dunhuang or the Sayings Records of the Chan 
masters from the Grand Secretariat collection. Behind these activities dealing with 
textual data lay two assumptions shared by these historians. Firstly, texts, no matter 
what ideological or moral implications they presumed, were treated as containers of 
historical information, which were able to be utilized by historiography. Secondly, 
even though these texts were not ‘authentic’ Buddhist scriptures, they were the 
product of historization and were seen as having emerged under certain social, 
economic and political circumstances; or at least having been, when they were 
produced, ‘normative’ expressions, which were aimed variously at setting ideals that 
the authors wished their readers to follow, establishing doctrinal and sectarian 
orthodoxy, inventing certain kinds of tenets and conventions, or responding to other 
practical concerns. Therefore, these texts were mirrors of the more general cultural 
landscape in China’s past.  
 
1357 The teachers of some of the historians, such as Chen Yinke, Tang Yongtong, and Lü Cheng, were 
actually Orientalists; they might have directly influenced the research attitude of these Chinese 
historians. For more details, see chapter 3.  
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Referring to the written records of Buddhism in ancient China, modern 
historians constructed a Chinese Buddhism, or, a Buddhist China. Bearing in mind the 
assumption that the history of Buddhism is essentially a ‘literary artifact’ (just like 
the ‘records’ they read), they suggested that the understanding of China and Chinese 
Buddhism was reliant largely on reading historical texts, especially those texts 
translated, commentated upon, modified, and created by the Chinese. Similar to ‘the 
history of religions school’ [Ge. Religionsgeschichtliche Schule],1358 these Chinese 
historians also emphasized a method of ‘high criticism,’ which assumed “a world 
behind the text.” As a research domain sui generis, the modern Chinese historiography 
of Buddhism believed all the texts to be interwoven with each other, forming 
together the world of Chinese Buddhism. In this sense, there was not a world within 
the Tripitaka (the equivalent to ‘the world of the Bible’ as it is used in theology). For 
these historians, the real concern in their historical writing was not to construct the 
world of the Tripitaka, or the authentic, if not to say correct, meaning of Buddhist 
doctrines, but to establish a historical realm in which Buddhism could be properly 
located. Therefore, they knew Buddhism in texts and ‘contexts,’ but not ‘Buddhism in 
itself.’1359 
This historiographical attitude also brought to Buddhism—a tradition with a 
‘myth of authenticity’—challenges from historical objectivism and the corresponding 
epistemological neutrality. In keeping with science-based rationalism, Buddhologists 
and Orientalists in the West demonstrated a suspension of judgment and replaced the 
supreme ideal in religion—no matter whether religious or moral—with strict 
 
1358 The Religionsgeschichtliche Schule, beginning in 1903, refers to a group of German Protestant 
theologians who consistently applied the history of religions method to the interpretation of the Bible. 
This school of thought originated at the University of Göttingen and was made up of Hermann Gunkel, 
Wilhelm Bousset, Johannes Weiss, Ernst Troeltsch, Wilhelm Wrede, Heinrich Hackmann, and Alfred 
Rahlfs. The main method they used was ‘historical-criticism.’ See Gerd Lüdemann (ed.), Die 
„Religionsgeschichtliche Schule“: Facetten eines theologischen Umbruchs (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 
1996); Carsten Colpe, Die religionsgeschichtliche Schule: Darstellung und Kritik ihres Bildes vom gnostischen 
Erlösermythus (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1961). 
1359 The notion ‘Buddhism in itself’ I use here comes from D.T. Suzuki’s critique of Hu Shih. Suzuki 
criticized Hu as knowing nothing about ‘Zen in itself.’ See D.T. Suzuki, “Zen: A Reply to Hu Shih,” 
Philosophy East and West, 3,1 (1953): 25.  
 439 
 
presentations of facts. This position was partly absorbed by modern Chinese 
historians.1360 However, as shown in this dissertation, they more or less had realized 
that pure objectivity was not, and never would be, possible, although they did not 
acknowledge this publicly. Buddhism was not only an ‘object’ but a living tradition 
that was constantly worshiped and had infiltrated the words, actions, and thoughts of 
every single Chinese, including themselves. Therefore, as observers, these historians 
were also part of their observation.  
The reflections on historical objectivity can be observed in the works of many 
historians, such as Chen Yinke, Tang Yongtong.1361 Their writings showed that the 
historiography of Buddhism—its terminology, methods, and concepts—was forming 
under the rubric of what Gadamer called a “history of effects.” As mentioned before, 
all the historians who endeavored to write the history of Buddhism were trying to 
build links between the past and present, and between subjects and objects, either 
through causal explanations or ‘empathic understanding.’ Exploring and re-
establishing the past is a ‘hermeneutical act’ that is dialogical, implying reciprocity 
between the reader and the text of tradition. In the practice of writing the history of 
Buddhism, Buddhist scholars, although they felt the constant temptation to re-
approach the ‘truth’ based on textual or ‘objective’ evidence, could not easily get rid 
of their sectarian biases and their expectation of reforming Buddhism. Professional 
historians, although they knew better the critical power of ‘objectivism’ and were 
more comfortable with it, were hesitant to embrace its effects, when thought about 
the inertia of traditional Chinese scholarship or reflected on history, nation, and 
culture. In both cases, historians and Buddhist scholars were trying to fuse the past 
with their ‘horizon of expectation’. In this sense, the emphasis on the authenticity of 
Buddhism can not be reduced to a search for objectivity, but is often an expression of 
historiographical independence and the historian’s sense of responsibility, as well as 
a response to modern knowledge systems and to scientific discourses. 
 
 
1360 For example, Fu Sinian and the School of Historical [Shiliao xuepai史料學派].  
1361 I have cited these important paragraphs in the chapter 5 of ‘Geyi.’  
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A Modern Narrative 
If professional historians in modern China were not concerned with Buddhism per se, 
nor were they interested in the study of Buddhism in terms of doctrine (or even, like 
Hu Shih, rejected Buddhism), then what were their expectations? The answer may 
vary from case to case; however, there are still some notable common points. First, 
the historiography of Buddhism was conceived by modern Chinese historians as a 
practice of ‘intellectual’ history; here, the religiosity of Buddhism was enfeebled and 
framed into a certain kind of ‘philosophized’ expression. The Buddhist ‘essence,’ 
which had once been envisioned as ahistorical, was historicized, for it was believed 
that it had been thoroughly modified by the native cultural inheritance of China. In 
this sense, ‘essence’ was then replaced by historical truth. By replacing religious truth 
with historical truth, the knowledge of Buddhism was no longer monopolized by the 
monastic community, nor was it related to religious practice, monastic life, and 
rituals, but rather it was established alongside other ‘secular’ or ‘scientific’ disciplines 
in the modern academic system. Second, underlying these different writings were 
always narrative structures that were related to certain theoretical discourses and 
ideological settings. To be sure, narrative structures also existed in pre-modern texts. 
However, instead of telling the stories of ‘masters’—namely, recalling the past in 
hagiographical or biographical genres or describing the decline of Dharma and the 
fulfillment of the Bodhisattva’s path—the modern historiography of Buddhism 
constructed one kind of normative narrative, applying a general or universal 
framework of periodization to Buddhism.  This framework included elements such as 
the progressive developmental pattern of historical process, the linearity of time, the 
formation and re-formation of tradition, and so on. Third, through detailed 
investigation of the relationship between Buddhism and other native intellectual 
resources, such as Confucianism, Daoism, and so on, historians, as narrators, also 
tried to identify the traditions they belonged to and to construct their identities. 
Therefore, historians were not passively following their sources, but interpreting 
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them and producing a “self-understanding.”1362 They assessed the impact of Buddhism 
on China and the historical process of Chinese understanding and assimilation of 
Buddhism from a comparative perspective to integrate Buddhism as part of Chinese 
history. By doing so, to a certain extent they cut the ties between Chinese Buddhism 
and Indian Buddhism and emphasized the subjectivity of Chinese Buddhism. Thus, 
their conception of Buddhism sometimes seemed too radical to be widely accepted by 
the Buddhist community. However, this approach echoed the demands of nationalist 
historiography at the time and became an important practice in the construction of 
national identity.  
Focusing on issues that had long been ignored in previous studies—for 
example, the relationship between religion and politics, the faith background of royal 
clans, the religious life of literati, and so on—historians developed several 
methodological tools to identify and analyze previously neglected dimensions. With 
these tools, historians who were outsiders to Buddhism could organize, explain, and 
interpret Buddhist texts and produce knowledge of Buddhism. However, although 
most of the historians discussed in this dissertation had stepped outside the shackles 
of sectarian thinking, their writings could still contain a “teleological fallacy” (in 
Benaud Faure’s word) if they read the past in terms of the present. Even in the 
writings of Buddhist scholars who advocated a ‘return to genuine Buddhism,’ a 
certain ‘telos’ existed. For example, as we have seen, behind Lü Cheng’s view that 
Buddhism had had its zenith in its earliest or most primitive form lay in fact a very 
modern understanding of Buddhism. 
However, the teleological overtone in these writings was not the enemy but 
rather a remarkable characteristic of this field of research, indicating a “fusion of 
horizons, not escaping horizons.”1363 The question asked by Liang Qichao—is Chinese 
Buddhism progressing or in decline, when compared to its Indian origin? —	which 
seems like a question about Buddhism’s past, arose along with the historian’s 
 
1362 Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Science, ed. and trans John B. Thompson (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Press, 1981), 142.  
1363 Charles Taylor, “Comparison, History, Truth,” in Myth and Philosophy, ed. David Tracy and Frank 
Reynolds (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 42. 
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understanding of modernity, especially the discourse of progress and evolution. In 
modern China, “the pull of modernity” was dominant, both in academia and other 
public spheres.1364 As shown, for example, in Liang Qichao and Taixu’s writings, the 
evolutionary mode of narrative was tacitly used, whether scholars’ positions were 
‘more secular’ or ‘more religious.’ This view of progress of the history of Buddhism 
also led to a prevailing, if not monopolistic, discourse: the Buddhist revival. It 
proposed that although Buddhism was forced to abandon some of its tenets and 
conventions to adapt to the new era, modernization was good, since it would bring 
about ‘revival’ for Buddhism and further promise a better future. 
Modern theories, such as progressivism, also caused a predicament to 
Buddhism. Obviously, Buddhism, both on the doctrinal and historical levels, could 
hardly fit into the model of evolution or progress. Therefore, we can often see in the 
works of modern historians and scholars a tendency toward ‘geyi’—namely, their 
practice of forcibly applying modern theories to their research object. The crux of 
this practice, however, is neither how these modern figures thought about tradition 
nor whether they correctly understood the theory of modernization, but what they 
really needed from the modern theories, which questions they asked, and what kind 
of answers they were looking for. For example, the pattern of ‘developmental stage’ 
in the writings of Liang Qichao and Taixu imposed certain universal principles 
derived from the historical experience of other traditions on Chinese Buddhism, or 
portrayed the transformation (or revolution) of Chinese Buddhism as a 
predetermined scenario. It was, fundamentally, not a description of what had 
happened, but an expression of their expectations for ‘revival’ itself. Actually, when 
scholars made the judgment of a Buddhist revival, they already had a sort of 
‘criterion’ [Maßstab], which in Gadamer’s sense was the twofold one of 
correspondence and coherence: namely, on the whole, their historical interpretation 
was considered to be consistent with the content of history and can be defended by 
historical evidence; also, it was guided by the “anticipation of perfection (or 
 
1364 Ritzinger, “Anarchy in the Pure Land: Tradition, modernity, and the reinvention of the cult of 
Maitreya in Republican China,” 7-11. 
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completeness)” according to which the historical text one was interpreting were 
assumed to form a perfect unity of meaning.1365  
Due to the gap between the predetermined ‘criterion’ and the reality these 
historians and scholars faced – a gap that had often been described and discussed as 
the relationship between lun 論 and shi 史, there were always paradoxes in their 
writings about Chinese Buddhism. For example, Taixu, although he felt skeptical 
about modernity and always tried to return to the perfect, superior Dharma essence, 
emphasized the ‘modern characteristics’ of Buddhism and tried to reform and change 
Buddhism to adopt to the new environment. Liang Qichao, as the representative 
figure of ‘newness’ and ‘revolution,’ on the other hand, never labeled Buddhism with 
the word “reform” and stressed in several places that Buddhism itself need not to be 
reformed but should be carefully preserved as a valuable cultural heritage. 
  
Transcultural Geyi  
The notion of geyi forms the basis of the modern narrative of Chinese Buddhism. 
Although seldom referred to directly, reflections on this notion were always behind 
the writings of Buddhist history. Geyi, in the modern historiography of Buddhism, was 
interpreted and discussed in various ways, sometimes as a historical phenomenon, 
sometimes as a hermeneutical strategy, sometimes as a method for the indigenization 
of foreign thoughts.  
Although using the dichotomy of ‘Indian’ and ‘Chinese,’ most modern Chinese 
historians avoided judging Chinese Buddhism’s ‘fidelity’ to its Indian origin. Instead, 
they created the narrative of Sinicization to depict a blurred, dynamic process of 
transcultural contacts, obscuring the boundary between India and China. By doing so, 
they inverted the old schemas to serve their purpose—to present Buddhism as one 
example of communication between civilizations. Chinese Buddhism, whether it was 
faithful to its Indian Buddhist origins or not, could be read as the product of the 
interaction between different intellectual traditions and as an embodiment of the 
 
1365 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (London: Bloomsbury, 2004), 279. 
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diversity of Chinese culture. In this sense, writing the history of Buddhism was not 
aimed to recover ‘primitive’ Buddhism, but to elaborate on the proper relationship 
between ‘body’ [ti 體] and ‘function’ [yong 用] in the Chinese historical context.1366  
Reflections on the issue of geyi were deeply related to modern historians’ 
thinking about the challenge from Western learning. Just as Buddhism had 
profoundly transformed the Wei and Jin society, new theories from the West and 
Japan brought not only technical knowledge but also the pressure to fundamentally 
transform Chinese society, government, military, and also ideology. Intellectuals, 
such as Yan Fu and Zhang Zhidong, had realized that a new world order was being 
established and that the Chinese needed to learn from the foreigners whom they used 
to call yi 夷—‘the barbarians.’ Facing this situation, Buddhism became almost the 
only relevant experience that those modern Chinese could mine from their history. 
To those modern Chinese historians, such as Chen Yinke, Chen Yuan and so on, the 
Sinicization [huahua 華化] of Buddhism signified particular forms of cultural 
production, which associated historical precedents with new intellectual dispositions, 
maintaining the independence of native culture and also securing broader social 
order. They believed, neither conquering the ‘foreigners’ nor submitting to their 
influence, the success of Chinese Buddhism resulted from an inner transformation, a 
process of making self-ness, which was based on re-fabricating various cultural 
elements (language, belief, rituals, and so on) in the local context rather on brutally 
replacing the existing intellectual system and identification of individuals with new 
structures of faith, ethics and orders.1367   
 
1366 As investigated in the Chapter 5, many historians in modern period, such as Tang Yongtong, had 
the dichotomy of ti-yong in mind. Only some Buddhist scholars, for example, Lü Cheng, rejected the ti-
yong thesis and demonstrated the ultimacy of the Indian origin of Buddhism.   
1367 This position of viewing foreign thought as passively being Sinicization is evident in the studies of 
these modern Chinese historians. For example, Chen Yuan’s famous book on the issue of huahua, A 
Study of the Sinicization of the Westerners in Yuan Dynasty [Yuan Xiyuren huahua kao 元西域人華化考] 
has been criticized by Western readers for overemphasizing the power of local traditions. See 
Frederick Mote, “Western and Central Asians in China Under the Mongols. Their Transformation into Chinese. 
By Ch’en Yuan. Translated and annotated by Ch'ien Hsing-Hai and L. Carrington Goodrich. Monumenta 
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In the modern period, a time of transition, the gap between the old and the 
new, and between China and the West, sometimes seemed too wide to bridge. How to 
deal with new theories then became a primary issue in academia, including the 
domain of modern Chinese historiography. To some historians (for example, Liang 
Qichao), the history of Chinese Buddhism proved China’s capability to establish 
standards, set frameworks, utilize foreign resources actively, and finally establish the 
triumph of the native culture over them.1368 Behind this standpoint was, 
fundamentally, the popular logic of ‘Chinese Learning as substance, Western Learning 
for application’ [zhongti xiyong 中體西用], which was closely tied to a view that 
knowledge, including historical knowledge, is neutral and functional, and can be used 
both to destroy traditions and to protect them. Other historians, however, such as 
Chen Yinke and Tang Yongtong, read from the history of Buddhism that people’s 
behavior, practices, and beliefs are not law-like or value-free, nor do they contain any 
preset ‘superiority,’ but rather are determined and formed by specific historical 
contexts. Therefore, every tradition has its particularity, and the task of history, then, 
is to reveal such particularities and the possible commonalities between them.  
Through their discussion of the role Buddhism played in Chinese history, 
these historians applied their understanding of geyi to the more general process of 
cross-cultural engagement, reflecting on the relationship between different cultures, 
different traditions, and different forces in society.1369 Behind their comparative 
 
Serica Monograph XV. Los Angeles: Monumenta Serica at the University of California, 1966,” in The 
Journal of Asian Studies, vol. XXVI, no.4 (1967), 690-692. 
1368 One example is Liang Qichao’s nationalist narrative of Buddhism. For the issue of national identity, 
see J. R. Levenson, Modern China and its Confucian Past: The Problem of Intellectual Continuity (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1964); Prasenjit Duara, “De-constructing the Chinese nation,” in The 
Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 30 (1993): 1-26; Henrietta Harrison, China: Inventing the Nation 
(London: Arnold, 2001). Also, Frank Dikötter’s analysis on Chinese racial theories in The Discourse of Race 
in Modern China (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2015).  
1369 This view can also be found in the West from the twentieth century. One of the representative 
advocates of the particularistic view of knowledge is Charles Taylor. See Charles Taylor, “The Politics 
of Recognition,” in Multiculturalism and “The Politics of Recognition” (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 




approach, there was also a ‘geyi’ in their minds. This idea of ‘geyi’ was not simply 
comparison or trans-conceptual loan, but rather an “empathy” towards traditions —	
as explained by Roxanne Euben and others, it was “attempts to cross divides of 
meaning by acknowledging and appropriating their own prejudices within a language 
that evolves to accommodate and ultimately transform disparate understandings into 
mutually intelligible meanings.”1370 Realizing the very ground of geyi, an intellectual 
similarity between the ‘abstract ideals’ of human beings, historians could combine 
universalism and particularism together for geyi assumed that the phenomenon that 
every culture has its particular cultural norms is universal. Just as the historical 
experience of Buddhism proved, the proper application of geyi could help Chinese 
people to “absorb foreign doctrines on the one hand, while not forgetting the status 
of their own nation on the other hand.”1371  
 
From Buddhism to Chinese Buddhism 
Throughout the twentieth century, there were endless discussions on the name, 
origin, nature, and formation of Chinese Buddhism. Even today, there is still no 
consensus on how to define Chinese Buddhism; for example, some thinkers have 
advocated for the abolition of the name Chinese Buddhism [zhongguo fojiao 中國佛教] 
and suggested replacing it with Han Buddhism [hanchuan fojiao 漢傳佛教].1372 
Historians and scholars in modern China reflected on this issue from a 
historiographical perspective. If, as these historians basically accepted, Chinese 
Buddhism was an outcome of indigenization, was it still faithful to the Buddha’s 
teaching, or was it fundamentally a native production? And what was the meaning of 
this Sinicization, historically? Focusing on the issue of how Buddhism became 
 
1370 Euben, Enemy in the Mirror, 37.  
1371 “一方面吸收外來之學說，一方面不忘本民族之地位.” Chen Yinke, “Feng Youlan Zhongguo 
zhexue shi xiece shencha baogao 馮友蘭中國哲學史下冊審查報告,” in JMEB, 282.  
1372 For example, Master Shengyan prefers to use the term ‘Hanchuan fojiao’ 漢傳佛教, which 
emphasizes the importance of either Han culture or Chinese characters ‘hanzi’ 漢字 in the 
dissemination of the tradition throughout East Asia while avoiding the possible political connotations 
of the term Chinese Buddhism [Zhongguo fojiao 中國佛教]. 
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Chinese Buddhism, different perspectives led to several different tendencies in this 
field in general.  
1. The Theory of Evolution  
In the back-and-forth discussions, there seems to have been ‘the differénd’, in 
Lyotard’s sense, among Liang Qichao, Hu Shih, and Taixu. However, they stood very 
close in their enthusiasm for narrating Buddhism with a certain kind of continuity 
and causality. These historians, regardless of their frame of reference or their 
standards of evaluating the role Buddhism had played in China’s past, agreed that the 
transformation of Buddhism brought by indigenous Chinese traditions has promoted 
Buddhism to a new stage of development. The understanding, interpretation, and 
imaginative creation of Buddhism by the ancient Chinese breathed fresh air into 
Buddhism, a tradition that had been experiencing dramatic decline and even been 
threatened with extinction in India. In their view, the Sinicization of Buddhism had 
allowed this old wisdom to continue in the ‘Middle Kingdom’ and the Chinese-
influenced East Asian region for thousands of years. 
To Liang Qichao, Chinese Buddhism’s emphasis on Mahāyāna teachings and 
the establishment of the Chinese indigenous Buddhist traditions based on Mahāyāna, 
such as Chan and Tiantai, reflected the ‘progressive’ nature of Buddhism – a 
movement from superstition to intellectual belief [zhixin 智信], from ritual to 
spirituality, and from religion to philosophy.1373 Taixu, on the other hand, saw 
Chinese Buddhism as an important step towards the globalization of Buddhism. In his 
view, the historical trajectory of Buddhism could be depicted as an ‘evolutionary’ 
path from the Buddha’s personal enlightenment to the awakening of his believers and 
then to the liberation of all sentient beings worldwide; thereafter, the Pure Land on 
Earth would be actualized. The introduction of Buddhism from India to China, the 
reformation and development of Buddhism conducted by Chinese Buddhists, and the 
emergence of Buddhism as a world religion were the necessary stages of this kind of 
Buddhist evolution. Hu Shih, despite his skepticism and even antipathy toward 
 
1373 Liang, “Lun Zhongguo xueshu sixiang bianqian zhi dashi,” in Xia Xiaohong 夏曉虹 ed. Xinshixue 新史學 
(Beijing: Shangwu yinshu guan, 2015), 210-215. 
 448 
 
Buddhism, read in the historical experience of Chan Buddhism the possibility of a 
‘cultural Renaissance’ of China. As he suggested, the emergence of Chan was the 
evolved form of Buddhism (he stressed that Chan is not Buddhism at all), since the 
demons and gods of Indian beliefs were abandoned and replaced by a practical, 
secularized spirit. This was, in Hu’s ‘evolutionary vision [jinhua de yanguang 進化的
眼光], a discursive revolution that brought ‘Indianized’ China back to the rational 
tradition of the pre-Qin era. Buddhism, as a religious faith, would inevitably be 
replaced by science and reason. And this path of Chan, he believed, would lead China 
once again to embrace science, reason, and other modern values. 
Referring to external ‘universal systems’ hanging over the evidential level of 
‘facts,’ their theoretical investments constructed a ‘meta’ structure in their studies 
and further burdened their historical writings of Chinese Buddhism. In Liang’s case, 
especially in his early writings, the structure behind the historical changes in Chinese 
Buddhism was a linear, mechanical framework established by the universal order of 
progressivism; to Hu Shih, his pragmatism and his vision of a Chinese Renaissance 
prompted him to see Chinese Buddhism, especially Chan Buddhism, as the privileged 
expression of a Chinese humanism. Taixu’s reflection on Buddhist history followed a 
unique evolutionary order that was legitimized by the doctrine of ‘the stages of 
cultivation’ [xiuxing cidi 修行次第] and the promised fulfillment of the ‘pure land.’ 
The histories these scholars wrote, which can be categorized as ‘new historiography,’ 
are more or less narratives guided, if not controlled, by predetermined theories or 
frameworks. 
Their perceptions of the universal framework in history motivated these three 
researchers to participate in global conversations on both scholarship and religion; 
paradoxically, however, it reinforced their nativist outlook on Chinese Buddhism. 
They interpreted Sinicized Buddhism as an instrument that emancipated Buddhism 
from its exotic, superstitious, and tantric early form and considered it as a 
progressive, revolutionary manifestation of the ‘Chinese mentality.’1374 To Liang and 
 
1374 Hu Shih, “The Development of Zen Buddhism in China,” The Chinese Political Science Review 15, 4 
(1932): 481.  
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Taixu, Chinese Buddhism was a successful combination of Indian and Chinese 
cultures, strengthening each other and lighting up the intellectual history of China; 
to Hu Shih, it overcame the shortfalls within the original Buddhist doctrines and 
proved the superiority of the Chinese essence. Therefore, the emergence and gradual 
independence of Chinese Buddhism, according to these scholars, yielded an evolved, 
developed version of Buddhism. Although this view led them to different conclusions, 
all retained ‘China’ as the nucleus of their overall narratives and the yardstick of their 
historical judgments.  
2. The Theory of Cultural Transplantation 
Being aware of the problem of universalism as well as the dilemma of applying new 
theories to traditions, some historians turned their eyes to the historical phenomena 
that defined the particularity of China. Chen Yinke, Chen Yuan, and Tang Yongtong 
were three representative historians belonging to this group. To them, there was no 
convincing evidence of the smooth evolution of ‘essential’ traditions (Buddhism, 
Daoism, Confucianism, etc.) from a historical perspective; the changes and 
transformation of these traditions in China’s past could not match any pre-existing, 
universal framework. At the same time, Liang Qichao’s questions—is Buddhism 
progressive or regressive (Here obviously Liang meant the historical process through 
which Indian Buddhism was ‘Sinicized’ to become Chinese Buddhism)? Or is it an 
innovation of Indian Buddhism or a disloyalty to the original teaching? —	were 
absent from the visions of historians like Chen Yinke and Tang Yongtong. For them, 
such questions were inherently untenable because of their ‘geyi’ premise. These 
historians did not place the historical experience of Chinese Buddhism into a 
progressive framework, viewing it as a stage in the development of religion; rather, 
they portrayed the Sinicized Buddhism as the result of cultural ‘transplantation’ - the 
arrival of one intellectual resource into another cultural landscape, where the two 
mutually understood each other, adapted to each other and influenced each other, 
bringing about change on both sides. In the end, as the example of Buddhism 
demonstrated, it was not one tradition that triumphed over the other, but all 
traditions together that constitute the ‘national spirit’ of China. 
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In their writings, therefore, Buddhism did not have an ‘essential’ form; it 
could only be understood historically and in contexts. As other traditions, Buddhism 
was not a clearly defined, changeless entity: if it was shared by certain members of 
society while rejected by others, then Buddhism in China’s history was one segment 
of a fluid network of relationships, belonging to an ongoing process. It was not 
equivalent to the teachings of the Buddha, nor was it a Chinese creation, but rather a 
particular manifestation of certain abstract ideas in a concrete social context and 
cultural atmosphere. The Sinicization of Buddhism, thus, was read by these historians 
as an example of the equality, inclusiveness, and relativity within and among 
cultures.  
These historians believed, inasmuch as a universal principle or absolute truth 
is fundamentally incompatible with history, the mission of historians, then, was to 
adequately understand, re-express historical ‘facts,’ interpret them, and further 
discover, or uncover, an ‘abstract ideal’ from particular events, individuals, and 
changes. In contrast to the previous group of scholars who applied the evolutionary 
theory to the history of Buddhism, these historians were concerned not with long-
term tendencies, but with the ruptures and inconsistencies in history. Meanwhile, 
they tried to define some kind of continuity behind these ruptures. Revolving around 
their understanding of the particularity and continuity of Chinese cultural tradition, 
these historians chose Buddhism, an external force that interrupted the continuity of 
Confucian tradition -- to demonstrate how the cultural sustainability of China was 
maintained through, for example, the powerful but also problematic ability of 
‘matching concepts.’ Placing Chinese Buddhism in the ‘national cultural history,’ 
these historians acknowledged its departure both from Indian Buddhism and from 
other mainstream Chinese thought. However, they also regained the innate, time-
honored sequence of history -- in China’s case, the national spirit -- behind this 
cultural departure, and interpreted it as a facet of a particularity which universally 
existed in history.1375 To these scholars, divergences and alterations might indicate 
 




the transformation of milieu, the exchange between intellectual resources, or the 
revolution of scholarship. Therefore, phenomena like Zhi Dun’s ‘geyi’, or the 
production of Chinese Buddhist scriptures, such as The Treatise of the Awakening of the 
Mahāyāna Faith, in Chen and Tang’s writings, were neither a ‘progress’ of Buddhism or 
a deviation from the Buddha’s original saying, but rather parts of the dynamic 
process of the formation and continuation of national culture. 
 Combining facts with interpretation, this pattern of historiography applied 
the methods of high criticism to historical materials, comparing parallel versions of 
texts in terms of style, content, and background in order to isolate accretions, 
different strata, and heterogeneous components. This position allowed them to 
distance themselves from sectarian bias or predetermined theoretical settings from 
an outsider’s viewpoint. However, it would be an oversimplification to interpret this 
stand as merely a warning to be on one’s guard against any subjective opinions or 
judgements. No witness simply hands down a complete, photograph-like description 
of an event; rather, he selects, alters, interprets, and rationalizes. Insofar as this is 
true, an element of judgement is necessarily present in the writings of these 
historians. But as F. H. Bradley once perceptively pointed out, judgements are not 
mere random inventions or isolated occurrence of thought. They presupposed other 
judgements, beliefs, and opinions as the background against which they occurred and 
in light of which they had meaning.1376 In this sense, this attitude of historiography, 
following the ‘principle of rarefaction,’1377 was never neutral or objective but had 
certain ideological effects. Thus, as described in the former cases in this dissertation, 
although well hidden, the writings of these historians on the history of Buddhism are 
always expressions of their views and reflections on the status quo. This is the reason 
why we can always find political implications in their writings of the history of 
 
1376 See F.H. Bradley, “The Presupposition of Critical History,” in Collected Essays (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1953), I, 1-53. 
1377 As Foucault argued, a tradition and the canon that represents it are a result of limitation, of a 
‘rarefication’ of discourse. This represents an ascent of an ideology, of an ‘essential difference’. Michel 
Foucault, The Order of Discourse, in R. Young ed., Untying the Text: a Post-structural Anthology (Boston: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981), 67. 
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Buddhism -- that is, what Chen called ‘jituo’ [寄託] or Chen Yuan called “the meaning 
of historiography.”    
3. The Theory of Deviation 
While historians were more prone to learn ‘about’ Buddhism, Buddhists, such Lü 
Cheng, were intent on learning ‘from’ Buddhism. Buddhist scholars were easily 
distinguished from historians who lived a ‘secular life’. However, there were 
differences within them as well. In the modern era, a group of influential Lay 
Buddhist scholars emerged, and Lü Cheng was one of them. Although Lü Cheng’s 
understanding of the history of Buddhism was influential in monastic circles, his 
ideas differed from the mainstream view of the Buddhist community. Meanwhile, 
there were conceptual coincidences between Lü and his counterparts in the 
departments of history, despite his distance from academia; for example, as I 
analyzed in the seventh chapter, both Lü and Hu Shih stated that Chinese Buddhism 
was not ‘true’ Buddhism. Because of this complex and delicate position, Buddhist 
historians such as Lü Cheng have often been overlooked by past research. However, 
his study is important, for its critiquing preconceptions and assumptions about 
Buddhist traditions, which had been left untouched in Buddhist reflections on its own 
history.  
Although he had his own sectarian bias, Lü’s history of Buddhism was 
compiled in a very positivist, rigorous way, putting a premium on direct access to a 
large amount of primary resources as well as proper critical skills. Similar to most 
scholars who studied the history of Buddhism at the time, the core of Lü’s writing was 
texts—authentic scriptures, qua canon, sacred books, etc.—behind which the 
essential character of Buddhism was believed to be preserved. Lü’s emphasis on 
textual evidence and his sensitivity to the nuances between languages is similar to 
the comparative linguistic path advocated by Chen Yinke. However, unlike Chen 
Yinke and other historians, who were concerned with the integration and interaction 
between cultures, Lü focused on the difference and hierarchy between the ‘origin’ 
and the derivatives, in particular, between Indian Buddhism and the later Sinitic 
Buddhism. This is the primary framework of Lü’s historiography.  
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Clear enough, Lü actually ‘imagined’ certain ‘original’ texts – in particular 
those he meticulously compiled into his Zangyao; but he also realized that the 
Buddhist canon in front of modern readers had been manipulated by different 
hermeneutical traditions. Therefore, his task was to remove the latter-day 
attachments, derivations, ‘corruptions,’ and mis-readings from the ‘truth’ of 
Buddhism and to restore its genuine form. Through a retrospective perspective of 
historiography, Lü, as a believer and a historian, assumed that he was standing 
outside the tradition of Buddhism, at a safe vantage point from where Buddhism can 
be seen to develop from a simple origin (usually the earliest version of certain sutra 
written in ancient Indian language), towards increasing complexity, followed by 
periodical attempts to return to the source. As he demonstrated in his discussions on 
the Dashang qixin lun 大乘起信論 and Sishier zhangjing 四十二章經, only by 
identifying the deviations and distortions1378 in texts (even if these distortions had 
formed a developmental ‘process’ according to certain temporal sequence), 
researchers and believers were able to perceive earlier or more prior distortions 
imposed by those hermeneutical traditions, and then returned to the origin step by 
step. This textual attitude differs from that of most researchers with a religious 
position and is closer to that of a professional historian, such as Chen Yuan’s path of 
‘historical sources’ [shiyuan xue 史源學]. 
Emphasis on ‘original’ texts and a retrospective view of history mutually 
reinforced each other in Lü’s writings. This combination allowed Lü to ‘envision’ an 
origin from which the entire tradition of Buddhism was derived. It also led him to 
believe that he could stand at the time of ‘singularity’ in Buddhism’s past, from which 
Buddhism had degenerated towards its current form. This notion of the ‘genuine 
Buddhism’ looks at odds with the view that the history of Buddhism, especially the 
formation of Chinese Buddhism, was progressive, because it saw Chinese Buddhism as 
a product of the decay of Indian Buddhism or a deviation from the right path. Because 
of its tendency of ‘looking backward’, which seemed to be incompatible with the 
 
1378 For instance, one of the most important, or in Lü’s view, the most damaging distortions is the 
mistranslation and misunderstanding of the conception ‘tathatā’ [benwu 本無/zhenru 真如] in 
Chinese Buddhism texts, such as the Qixin. 
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modern era that was ‘looking forward,’ this voice had often been buried in the wave 
of ‘the Buddhist revival’. However, this historiographical view is logically sound in 
terms of the Dharma itself and is able to describe and explain the changes of 
Buddhism in the post-Buddha era, for if the Buddha’s sayings are supremely perfect, 
then all subsequent exegeses, interpretations and transformations can only move 
further away from the essence of the Dharma. As such, it circumvented the dilemma 
that Taixu would encounter, namely, why a historically perfect Buddhism needs to be 
reformed. Unsurprisingly, the inquiry of this ‘genuine Buddhism’ posed challenges 
for monasteries. As a critical understanding of Buddhism and its past, this idea 
challenged the traditional Buddhist knowledge controlled by the Sangha, forcing the 
Buddhist community to reflect on assertions that had been considered as ‘truth’ but 
were actually suspect. 
It is noteworthy that behind this conception of history of Buddhism there is 
also a setting of historical ‘process’ or ‘movement’, which has its beginning and 
direction. Lü Cheng also looked back toward the past from the present – a present 
that directed to a kind of implicit telos, which is not the telos of the teleological, 
progressive history, but more or less, was constructed according to the ‘genuine’ 
form of Buddhism that Lü Cheng had built in mind. In this sense, the conceptual 
divergence between Lü Cheng and Taixu in their writing about the history of 
Buddhism is not as huge as it seems at first glance. The same teleological expression 
can be found at work in the two opposite narratives of progress (Taixu) and decline 
(Lü) narratives that privileged either the origin in the past or the end in the future; 
and telos in their narratives are both had its soteriological dimension. More 
generally, this model is found behind all affirmations of a continuity, of a ‘thread of 
history’, of a perennial Buddhism -- just as the title of Lü’s monograph, ‘yuanliu,’ 
indicated and stressed.  
Underlying the teleological but ‘backward’ assumption is also a strong 
response to the prevailing discourses of modernity, especially science, which was 
driving China forward. Lü Cheng’s concern with the history of Buddhism derived 
from his emphasis on knowledge, namely, ‘the true Learning’ [zhenshi zhixue 真實之
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學]. To Lü, the epistemology of Buddhism, including the Buddhist understanding of 
the nature, source, and scope of knowledge [i.e., wisdom 智慧], could enable 
Buddhism to find its niche in an age dominated by science. This tendency was related 
to the booming interest in Chinese logic at the turn of the twentieth century, which 
reflected the pressure of modernity among Chinese intellectuals. Chinese 
intellectuals assumed that European modernity had been grounded in the rationality 
of logic and epistemology, while in contrast the same rationality is considered absent 
in non-Western civilizations. The interest in Yogacārā at the time in both academic 
and religious circles was a response to this view. With an emphasis on the 
epistemological function of Buddhism, Lü suggested that instead of the metaphysical 
stance as exemplified in Qixin lun, which would lead to an impure form of 
‘enlightenment’, ‘Genuine Buddhism’ took the epistemological stance to pursue valid 
knowledge first. Following this patten, true knowledge, including the knowledge 
about the past, as well as valid cognition could be established and would serve as the 
basis for spiritual and social liberation.1379  
 
The History of Buddhism?  
Lacking unified ground and horizons, struggling between faith and truth, and 
vacillating between universality and particularity, the historiography of Buddhism in 
modern China seemed to be an arena of discourses and worldviews. The different 
patterns mentioned above are still oversimplified, given the contradictions and 
overlaps we can read from those writings. Moreover, these patterns all contained 
 
1379 Later, when he when he taught at the Seminar of Buddhist Studies in Nanjing in 1961, Lü Cheng 
explicated his thesis on the social function of Buddhism in more detail in three articles on Qixin lun and 
Chan. He emphasized the idea of the sociality of doctrine, claiming that the theory of “the quiescent 
nature of mind” is ideologically progressive because it requires the transformation of cognition as the 
foundation of ethical, religious, and societal change. Of course, Lü’s emphasis on the sociality of 
religious theory might reflect the dominance of Marxist ideology in China. For this issue, see Lin Chen-
kuo, “Metaphysics, Suffering, and Liberation: The Debate between Two Buddhisms,” in Pruning the 
Bodhi Tree: The Storm over Critical Buddhism, ed. Jamie Hubbard and Paul L. Swanson (Honolulu: 
University of Hawai’i Press, 1997), 298–313. 
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their own shortfalls. The theory of evolution read Buddhism as having its finality in a 
full Sinicized form but overlooked the innate complexity within Buddhism itself, such 
as doctrinal divergence, sectarian conflicts, historical slackening, and dislocation. The 
second pattern which focused on a transplantation between cultures, replaced the 
real meaning of Buddhism, or its essence, with the historical ‘tradition’ that was 
particular, secular, and somewhat ‘detached.’ It actually applied a dichotomy of ti and 
yong upon Buddhism and history, transforming Buddhism into an instrument for 
understanding ‘Chinese culture.’ Viewing Chinese Buddhism as a deviation from 
‘genuine Buddhism’ with a ‘theological’ tendency of advocating a return to the purest 
origin, as Lü Cheng did, define Buddhism as an ahistorical entity; however, the 
‘essence’ it targeted, although supported by textual evidence, was still normative and 
strongly colored by certain factional and sectarian biases.  
Stopping here, I would suggest a return to some general questions: why did 
writing the history of Buddhism matter to so many scholars, clergy, and laypeople? Is 
it proper to write (or ‘rewrite’) the history of something that claims an ahistorical 
nature? And what should we do if the ‘truth’ (in a historical sense) conflicts with 
faith?  
Buddhism is, essentially, a vague term that was ‘created’ by a group of 
European Buddhologists and Orientalists.1380 From the late nineteenth century, with a 
strong historical consciousness entering into different research fields, historians 
began to argue in favor of a study of religions which would translate, reduce, or re-
describe religion into the language they deem proper to the academy.1381 The history 
of Buddhism -- organizing and narrating the past of religion based on textual 
filiations, as well, developed into a main paradigm of religious. Kalpa and kṣaṇa were 
transformed into ‘modern’ time units; saṃsāra began to refer to ‘secular’ historical 
 
1380 Gregory Schopen, Bones, Stones, and Buddhist Monks: Collected Papers on the Archaeology, Epigraphy, and 
Texts of Monastic Buddhism in India (The University of Hawaii Press, 1997), 22.  
1381 Tomoko Masuzawa, In Search of Dreamtime: The Quest for the Origin of Religion (University of Chicago 
Press, 1993), 178. 
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structures; the old biographical approach inherited from the hagiographical tradition 
was replaced by modern historiographical frameworks.  
However, the historiography of Buddhism in modern China was neither 
aiming at restoring the life of the Buddha nor aiming at depicting the changes of the 
Dharma; it was mainly a reflection and refraction against which China measures itself 
(with both positive and negative connotations). It served different positions: the 
concept of progressive, positivist methodologies, nationalism, humanism, cultural 
studies, and so on. In this process, the religiosity of Buddhism was ‘rarefied’, while 
many ideological meanings and modern values were attached to it. This 
transformation and the controversy around its process played a crucial role in the 
transition of the Chinese religious landscape. It was, under the rubric of ‘history,’ a 
modern narrative—a creation from a remote (both temporally and spatially) 
intellectual world—intending to replace the doctrinal foundation of faith with an 
epistemological legitimacy linked with historical evidence and interpretations. This 
narrative itself, fundamentally, was also a production of historicization; and it could 
not and did not have to be insulated from some discursive presuppositions. For 
instance, there were always structures of dichotomy, which had their modern 
meanings: China/India, ti/yong and origin [yuan 源]/evolvement [liu 流], and so on. 
These dichotomies do not suggest that the writings of the history of Buddhism in 
modern China can not restore the ‘truth’ about Buddhism’s past, but rather indicated 
that these writings were not primarily about Buddhism, but about China. Behind 
these writings, there was always a presumption: when Buddhism stepped beyond its 
original cultural bounds and diversified into different local forms, ‘absolute’ 
Buddhism then could not exist anymore. Only in this way, however, did Buddhism 
become a world religion. Modern Chinese historiography of Buddhism reinforced this 
impression of heterogeneity and displacement; it also embodied the transformation 
of heterogeneity and displacement from obstacles to objects of historical study. This 
process yielded new understanding and knowledge about Buddhism and about its 




As we can read from the cases in this dissertation, the historicization of 
Buddhism has allowed historians without a faith background to participate in the 
construction of the Buddhist past. At the same time, however, the historiography of 
Buddhism barely touches on issues about the nature of Buddhism and the modern 
fate of Buddhism, nor did it address the question of how Buddhism should respond to 
the transformation in these particular modern times. These questions are actually 
also important dimensions of the historical research of Buddhism. Obviously, there 
was a kind of “silence” between historians and the religious community. For Buddhist 
scholars, the key question in the history of Buddhism is how the words and actions of 
eminent monks influenced the development of Chinese Buddhism at the levels of 
doctrine, practice, and institutions. They did not just want to know “what happened”; 
but intended to use theories from different disciplines (e.g., psychology, sociology, 
historiography etc.) to support and guide the Buddhist revival and reform. 
The difference of intention between historians and religious scholars often 
makes writing the history of religion a challenge. Because the former always read 
religious texts with a critical or indifferent attitude; the latter, on the other hand, 
have increasingly lost their monopoly on religious knowledge. Earlier, questions like 
what was studied as religion and how it was studied had not been posed by religious 
scholarship, a field in which, as Steven Wasserstrom puts it, “the subject and the 
object of study were confused, conflated, confounded.”1382 From the early twentieth 
century, scholars began to propose sophisticated theoretical models for the study of 
religion that they argued succeeded in separating the ‘study of’ from ‘religion’. 
Prominent among these are paradigms that view the study of religion as an 
‘explanatory’ discourse modeled on historiography and various branched of social 
sciences. Only with this move to explanation, for many, will the field be brought 
closer to the discursive practices of the secular academy. 
 
1382 Steven Wasserstrom, Religion after Religion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 239. 
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Historiography has played an important role in this transformation of 
religious scholarship. Russell McCutcheon has articulated well the tendency of 
historicization at the heart of the explanatory paradigm. 
After all, the premise that makes the human sciences possible in the first place is that 
human behaviors always originate from within, and derived their culturally 
embedded meanings from being constrained by, historical … entanglement.… we 
always begin from the premise that there can be no release from the historical.1383  
This premise encapsulates the position of most modern Chinese historians. In China, 
from the beginning of the twentieth century to the present, this ‘autonomy’ or 
‘privilege’ of historiography is very strong in the scholarship of religion. Although 
there was some controversy and discussions about the validity and legitimacy of 
historiography in both religious and historical circles, for example, Lü Cheng’s 
criticism of Tang Yongtong’s history of Buddhism and the debate between D.T. Suzuki 
and Hu Shi on the history of Zen Buddhism.1384 However, historiographical 
terminology and methodology soon established one of the dominant research 
paradigms in the scholarship of religion. In the later decades, due to various reasons, 
especially the political environment, Chinese Buddhist studies were never able to 
break out of this paradigm. This textual-historiographical path –- namely, the 
integration of historical interpretation and textual criticism -- has always been the 
ethos and character of Chinese Buddhist scholarship that differs from that of the 
West and Japan.1385 To this day, it can still be argued that the foundations of modern 
scholarship of Buddhism laid by historians such as Liang Qichao, Hu Shih, Chen Yuan, 
Chen Yinke and Tang Yongtong, are still being continued and inherited.  
 
1383 Russell McCutcheon, Critics Not Caretakers: Redescribing the Public Study of Religion (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2001), 6-7. 
1384 Both these two cases have been discussed on the 5 chapter.  
1385 Since the early twentieth century, the study of Buddhist history in the West has been increasingly 
influenced by archaeology, anthropology, and sociology, while Japanese Buddhist studies have been 
distinguished by philosophical interpretation and criticism. See Ge, Zhaoguang 葛兆光, “Reng zai Hu 
Shih de yanchangxian shang: youguan Zhongguo xuejie zhonggu chanshi yanjiou zhi fansi 仍在胡適的
延長線上: 有關中國學界中古禪史研究之反思,” in Lingnan xuebao fukan 嶺南學報復刊 7 (Shanghai: 
Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2017), 30. 
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Because this tendency of historicization has located religion securely in 
relation to the academic constellation, current scholarship, especially in China, rarely 
discusses the limitation of the historiographical method in religious studies anymore 
and have paid little attention to the ‘hegemony’ of historiography. However, at the 
end of this dissertation, I would like to remind that it is also proper for us to realize 
the problem of this hegemony. First, historiography provides much more than a 
method, but to a certain extent a definition for religion -- religion becomes a specific, 
contingent, socio-political discourse, and its transcendence and faithfulness are 
ignored. Second, the historicization of religion weakens human subjectivity into a 
historical context or function. In other words, the individual’s thoughts, feelings and 
actions, as well as beliefs, were interpreted as the result of historical change rather 
than the cause. Third, historiography often succumbs to different theoretical 
structures and is influenced from time to time by modern discourses such as science. 
As a result, religions are not always the real object of study for historians, but only a 
‘case study’ in their discussion of historical universality or particularity, no different 
from other cultural factors, such as literature and art. Forth, the tendency of textual 
primacy in the historiographical path replaces religion in life with religion in records, 
thus neglecting the role religion had played in the transformation of the social life 
and material culture of the local people. The historiography of Buddhism in Modern 
China again draws our attention to how history distanced itself from religion, 
limiting its scope to material and methodology, and how historian was “wrapped up 
in the search for the elusive document that will establish him as an ‘authority’ in a 
narrowly defined field.”1386 In this, we can see the difficulty of writing a history of 
religion and the difficulty of using history as a paradigm for the study of religion. 
Meanwhile, the cases discussed in this dissertation remind us again how the 
historiographical approach ‘explains’ and defines religion with a defined ‘truth’ 
which may far differs from the ‘essence’ of certain religion. As some theorists of the 
history of religions, such as Van Austin Harvey, have argued, the ‘truth’ of history is 
 
1386 Hayden White, Tropic of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1978), 28. 
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often a “judgment,” while the ‘truth’ of religion is a “warrant.”1387 The 
historiographical approach is to ‘explain’ and define religion in terms of a definite 
fact-based ‘truth,’ which cannot be equated with the ‘truth’ of religion. To historians 
as ‘outsiders’, Buddhism was always a sphere that sealed to them – or an ‘other’, 
historical, religious and political. They tacitly considered themselves as observers 
instead of practitioners.1388 Some of them, Hu Shih, for example, had claimed that 
historians have their advantages, because they are free from the bias of faith and are 
therefore more neutral and objective. However, what a witness thinks he sees is in 
large part filtered through the prism of his own individual perception which, in turn, 
is heavily influenced by the world of which he is a part. Both historians and Buddhist 
scholars are historical creatures, and their judgements reflect the ‘world’ that they 
 
1387 Van Austin Harvey, The Historian and The Believer (New York; The Macmillan Company), 102-126. He 
discussed the difference and connection of religious knowledge and historical knowledge in the field of 
theology. Also see Russell McCutcheon, Critics Not Caretakers: Redescribing the Public Study of Religion 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), 6-7; and his “‘It’s a Lie. There’s No Truth in It! It’s a 
Sin!’: On the Limits of the Humanistic Study of Religion and the Costs of Saving Other from 
Themselves,” in Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 74, 3 (2006): 724-72. In the field of the 
Buddhist studies, there are also some discussions on this issue, see, for example, the essays collected in 
Buddhist Theology, ed. by Roger Jackson and John Makransky (New York: Routledge, 2000) and David 
McMahan, Empty Vision: Metaphor and Visionary Imagery in Mahayana Buddhism (London: Routledge 
Curzon, 2002). 
1388 For example, Hu Shih once commented on the difference between Japanese Zen scholars and 
himself: “They are Buddhists, but I am only a historian”; “Those who study the history of Buddhism 
and those who really study Buddhism are in different positions, so the methods are also different.” See 
Cao Boyan曹伯言, Hu Shih riji quanbian 胡適日記全編, vol. 6, 229-39. Chen Yinke also said that he 
could not speak about the “meaning” of Buddhism 至其微言大義之所在，則未能言也,” in JMEB, 360. 
Chen Yuan had also said several times that he is the “outsider 門外漢” of Buddhism. See for example, 
“zai Zhongguo foxueyuan jiaoxue wenti yantaohui shang de fayan 在中國佛學院教學問題研討會上的
發言,” in CYQJ, vol.2, 817; “Yesu jidu renzi shiyi xu 耶穌基督人子釋義序,” in CYQJ, vol.2, 406; Mingji 
dianqian fojiao kao 明季滇黔佛教考, in CYQJ, vol.7, 27. At the same time, many modern Chinese 
intellectuals often felt the distance between themselves and the world of faith. They often questioned 
themselves about whether they had a sufficient grasp of religious doctrine. For example, Liang 
Shuming taught Indian philosophy at Peking University in his early years; but he soon left when 
Indologist Baron A. Stael Holstein came to Peking University. Liang Qichao, who was also fond of 
talking about Buddhism, seldom talked about Buddhist Canon after he listened to Ouyang Jingwu’s 
lectures in Nanjing and realized that the texts he read might be mistranslations. Also, Zhang Taiyan 
instructed his disciples to delete all references to Buddhism from his writings in his later years. 
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bring with them and to which they appeal in support of those judgements. In modern 
China, amidst anxieties about self-identity and modernity, the imperative of 
historiography was not writing objective, ideology-free history, as it might claim or 
look like. It was always discursive, political-oriented, and even imaginary.  
With this historiographical attitude, it is difficult for both historians and 
religious scholars to answer the question of how religious beliefs can be described 
and explained beyond history and whether there are any deficits in the historical 
enterprise. Undoubtedly, the approach of history has expanded our knowledge about 
religion and demonstrated a more complicated picture about the changes of certain 
religious landscape throughout a long span of time; however, the view that claims 
religion to be the product of history which can only be understood in historical 
context itself was historically determined and thus is itself an ideology. We should 
also realize that religion is never only support for or enactment of historical 
suppositions and ideals but can be centered on timeless experiences and anti-
historical processes that help us break away from the ‘secular’ configurations preset 
by modernity. The conflicts between religious knowledge and the modern system of 
scholarship which is based on science and rationalism can guide us to think about the 
boundaries of historiography and other modern academic discourses, and further 
allow us to reflect on the limits of secularism and the pitfalls of modernity. As 
theologian Tyler Roberts suggests, history tends to domesticate difficult and even 
traumatic doctrinal, epistemological, and ethical questions in religion instead of 
facing them and facing the disturbances they would bring to the ideal of the 
autonomy of academic discourse.1389 Therefore, when approaching a certain religion, 
an attitude that is more cognizant of the limits of historiography will help us to 
traverse established research paths and those claimed ‘scientific’, ‘objective’ 
academic ‘illusions’, while also enabling us to better deal with the tension between 
faith and truth, which is at work in different forms of thought and practice in the 
realm of religion.  
 
1389 Tyler Roberts, “Between the Lines: Exceeding Historicism in the Study of Religion,” in Journal of the 
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